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[2026] ZANCHC 12
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Matlala v Sol Plaatje Local Municipality and Others (2026-011073) [2026] ZANCHC 12 (6 February 2026)

THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
Reportable
/
Not Reportable
Case
no:
2026-011073
In
the matter between:
BARTHOLOMEW
SERAPELO MATLALA
Applicant
and
SOL
PLAATJE LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
First
Respondent
MARTHA
BARTLETT N.O.
(Executive
Mayor: Sol Plaatje Local
Municipality)

Second Respondent
DIPUO
PETERS N.O.
(Speaker:
Sol Plaatje Local
Municipality)

Third Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Matlala
v
Sol
Plaatje Local Municipality and 2 Others
(Case no 2026-
011073
).
(06 February 2026)
Coram:
Tyuthuza AJ.
Heard:
29 January 2026.
Delivered:
06
February 2026.
Summary:
Section
18
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
–
leave
to execute pending appeal – requirements of exceptional
circumstances and irreparable harm considered.
ORDER
1.
The application is urgent, and the rules
relating to forms, service and time periods, as prescribed by the
Uniform Rules of Court,
are dispensed with.
2.
The operation and execution of the order of
court dated 16 January 2026 under case number 2026-004539, which is
the subject of an
application for leave to appeal, is not suspended
pending the outcome of the application for leave to appeal to the
Full Court
of this Division, alternatively to the Supreme Court of
Appeal.
3.
The second and third respondents are
ordered to personally pay the costs of this application.
JUDGEMENT
Tyuthuza
AJ
Introduction:
[1]
On
16 January 2026, I granted the following order in the urgent court:
1.1.
That the
application is urgent, and the
rules relating to
forms, service and time periods, as prescribed by the Uniform Rules
of Court are dispensed with.
1.2.
That the
suspension notice served on and against the applicant on the 8
th
of January 2026 is declared unlawful, null and void and is set aside.
1.3.
That the
applicant resumes his duties as the Municipal Manager of the 1
st
Respondent with immediate effect and on the date of the making of
this order of court.
1.4.
That
the second and third respondents be ordered to pay the cost of this
application in their personal capacities.
[1]
[2]
On
17 January 2026, the respondents lodged an application for leave to
appeal the above order.
Subsequent
thereto, the applicant filed this application in terms of Section 18
of the Superior Courts Act
10 of
2013 (the Act)
for
the orders granted to be put into operation, pending the outcome of
the application for leave to appeal, and the actual appeal
pursuant
to a successful application for leave to appeal. The respondents
opposed the application.
[3]
Together
with the application for leave to appeal, the first respondent also
sought written reasons for the order granted on 16
January 2026. The
reasons for the said order were consequently provided on 28 January
2026.
[2]
Urgency:
[4]
It
is trite that each urgent application must be determined on its own
facts and merits. Rule 6 (12)
of
the Uniform Rules enables the court to dispense with the normal rules
relating to the forms and service as provided for in the
Rules and
dispose of the matter at such time, place and in such manner or in
accordance with such procedure as it may deem fit.
An applicant
seeking to be heard on an urgent basis must set forth explicitly the
circumstances which he avers render the matter
urgent and the reasons
why he claims that he could not be afforded substantial redress at a
hearing in due course.
[3]
[5]
Applications
in terms of
section 18
of the
Superior Courts Act are
, by their very
nature, urgent.
[4]
[6]
On
16 January 2026, this court set aside the applicant’s
suspension and ordered that he immediately resume his duties as the

municipal manager of the first respondent. By the respondents having
lodged the application for leave to appeal on the 17
th
of January 2026, the applicant was effectively prevented from
resuming his duties pending the finalisation of the appeal process.

After having been served with the application for leave to appeal,
the applicant wrote to the respondents requesting that they
withdraw
the application for leave; however, that was not done. On the 19
th
of January 2026, the applicant consulted with his attorneys and on
the 20
th
of January 2026 engaged in settlement negotiations with the
respondents, which came to nothing. On 21 January 2026, the applicant

launched the current application. The respondents argue that the
applicant has not demonstrated urgency. I disagree. I am of the
view
that the applicant acted with the necessary haste in bringing this
application and will not be able to obtain substantial
redress in due
course.
[5]
[7]
Furthermore,
the applicant contends that the urgency is specifically premised on
the unlawful steps taken by the respondents in
suspending him and
their apparent abuse of power. In
Apleni
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another
[6]
,
the Court held
inter
alia
as follows:
“
.
. .
Where
allegations are made relating to abuse of power by a Minister or
other public officials which may impact upon the rule of
law, and may
have a detrimental impact upon the public purse,
the
relevant relief sought ought normally be urgently considered.”
[7]
(own
emphasis).
[8]
The nature of the application is such that
it is urgent. I am satisfied that the matter should be adjudicated on
an urgent basis.
Discussion:
[9]
Section 18
of the
Superior Courts Act sets
out the legislative requirements for determining whether a judgment
should be executed or suspended pending the appeal process.
The said
section
provides as
follows in relevant parts:
‘
18
Suspension
of decision pending appeal
(1)
Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under
exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and
execution of a decision which is the subject of an application for
leave to appeal
or of an appeal, is suspended pending the decision of
the application or appeal.
(2)
Subject to subsection (3), unless the court under exceptional
circumstances
orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a
decision that is an interlocutory order not having the effect of a
final judgment,
which is the subject of an application for leave to
appeal or of an appeal, is not suspended pending the decision of the
application
or appeal.
(3)
A court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1) or
(2), if the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, in
addition proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she will

suffer irreparable harm if the court does not so order and that the
other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so
orders.
. .
. ’
[10]
To
succeed with an application to enforce the operation and execution of
an order pending the outcome of the appeal process in terms
of
section 18 of the Act, the applicant is to prove, on a balance of
probabilities,
(
a
)
that exceptional circumstances exist to enforce the judgment, (
b
)
that he will suffer irreparable harm should the judgment not be
enforced or operationalised, and (
c
)
that the respondents will not suffer irreparable harm should the
judgment be enforced or operationalised.
[8]
[11]
In
Tyte
Security Services CC v Western Cape Provincial Government and
Others
[9]
,
it was held that the consideration of each of the so-called three
requirements is not a hermetically sealed enquiry and can hardly
be
approached in a compartmentalised fashion.
Exceptional
circumstances:
[12]
What
constitutes “exceptional circumstances” has been
considered in various judgments. In
Knoop
NO and Another v Gupta (Execution)
[10]
,
the court described the meaning of “exceptional circumstances”
in the context of section 18 as being ‘
.
. . something that is sufficiently out of the ordinary and of an
unusual nature to warrant a departure from the ordinary rule
that the
effect of an application for leave to appeal or an appeal is to
suspend the operation of the judgment appealed from’
.
[13]
In
University
of the Free State v Afriforum and Another
[11]
the
Supreme Court of Appeal held as follows:
‘
Whether
or not “exceptional circumstances” for the purposes of s
18(1) are present, must necessarily depend on the peculiar
facts of
each case. In
Incubeta
Holdings
at paragraph 22 Sutherland J put it as follows:
“
Necessarily,
in my view, exceptionality must be fact-specific. The circumstances
which are or may be ‘exceptional’ must
be derived from
the actual predicaments in which the given litigants find
themselves.”
I
agree. Furthermore, I think, in evaluating the circumstances relied
upon by an applicant, a court should bear in mind that what
is sought
is an extraordinary deviation from the norm, which, in turn, requires
the existence of truly exceptional circumstances
to justify the
deviation.
’
[14]
The
existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is a necessary
prerequisite for the exercise of the court’s discretion
under
section 18. If the circumstances are not truly exceptional, that is
the end of the matter. Consequently, the application
must fail and
fall to be dismissed on that basis. If, however, exceptional
circumstances are found to be present, it would not
follow, without
more, that the application must succeed.
[12]
[15]
In
Tyte
Security Services CC (supra),
the
Supreme Court of Appeal, in its consideration of exceptional
circumstances, stated as follows:
‘
It
has long been accepted that it is ‘undesirable to attempt to
lay down any general rule’ in respect of ‘exceptional

circumstances’ and that each case must be considered upon its
own facts. In
MV
Ais Mamas: Seatrans Maritime v Owners, MV Ais Mamas and Another
,
Thring J summarised the approach to be followed. He said that ‘what
is ordinarily contemplated by the words “exceptional

circumstances” is something out of the ordinary and of an
unusual nature; something which is excepted in the sense that the

general rule does not apply to it; something uncommon, rare or
different.’
[13]
[16]
In
appropriate cases, when determining whether exceptional circumstances
exist that warrant the order, a Court must also consider
whether
there are prospects of success in the appeal
.
[14]
[17]
Mr Olivier, for the
applicant, submits that it cannot be disputed that exceptional
circumstances exist. It was submitted that the
decision to grant an
order in terms of section 18 remains within the court’s
discretion and, in exercising that discretion,
the court will have
regard to the applicant’s prospects of success in the pending
appeal.
The applicant submits that
the respondents made no case in their application for leave to appeal
and that it had “served only
the purpose of delaying
finalisation of this matter”, and that it has no prospects of
success on appeal. Furthermore, it
was submitted that the
respondents’ concession that there was no compliance with
regulation 6(2) is fatal to their case,
as the respondents have no
grounds to argue substantial compliance or to argue that the court’s
interpretation of regulation
6(2) is flawed.
[18]
Mr
Ngutshana, for the respondents, argued strenuously that the applicant
made no attempt to set out the facts he relies upon to
establish the
requisite exceptional circumstances. The respondents submit that the
applicant based his reliance upon the non-compliance
with regulation
6 (2) of the disciplinary regulations
[15]
,
whilst the he ignored the requirements of section 18(1).
[19]
The
respondents contend that the applicant wholly focuses on the
deprivation or an “alleged infringement of a right”,
which is misplaced as the deprivation or alleged infringement thereof
does not amount to or constitute exceptional circumstances
as
statutorily required. To support their submissions, the respondents
placed reliance on the
University
of the Free State v Afriforum (supra),
wherein
the court stated as follows at para 21 :
‘
I
fail to see how, even if there had been an infringement of rights as
contended for, this would constitute exceptional circumstances
as
envisaged in s 18(1) of the Act. The mere reliance on the foregoing
of the right by the students to exercise a choice does not
in itself
(ie without proof of any adverse consequences) constitute exceptional
circumstances. As submitted on behalf of the UFS,
the submission on
behalf of Afriforum is conceptually confused because it conflates the
deprivation of a right with the adverse
consequences flowing
therefrom in circumstances where there is no proof at all of such
adverse consequences.’
[20]
The
applicant contends that he is duly appointed and substantive
municipal manager of the first respondent and that the respondents’

attempt to keep him unlawfully suspended is a clear violation of his
rights. He contends that he is entitled to be at work, especially
so
because by the operation of the law, his suspension has effectively
lapsed. The applicant asserts that he has instituted this
application
to stem the unlawful conduct of the respondents; to safeguard his
interests and rights, including his right to be treated
lawfully, to
employment, and the exercise of all other rights associated
therewith.
[21]
The
respondents conceded to its non-compliance with regulation 6(2) and
argues that such non-compliance did not invalidate the decision
to
suspend the applicant on 8 January 2026. The respondents assert that
their non-compliance was justified in that: “the
jurisdictional
facts contemplated in Regulation 6(1) were plainly present. The
council was entitled, and indeed obligated, to act
decisively to
protect employee safety, institutional stability, and the integrity
of the Municipality.”
[22]
The
respondents sought to rely on the matter of
Liebenberg
NO and Others v Bergrivier Municipality
[16]
,
wherein the Constitutional Court stated thus:
“
Therefore,
a failure by a municipality to comply with relevant statutory
provisions does not necessarily lead to the actions under
scrutiny
being rendered invalid. The question is whether there has been
substantial compliance, taking into account the relevant
statutory
provisions in particular and the legislative scheme as a whole.”
[23]
When
dealing with the question whether there was non-compliance with
regulation 5(3), the Court in
Maluleke
v Greater Giyani Local Municipality
and
Others
[17]
,
stated
as follows:
‘
.
. . a failure by a Municipality to comply with relevant statutory
provisions does not necessarily lead to the actions under scrutiny

being rendered invalid.
The
question is whether there has been substantial compliance, taking
into account the relevant statutory provisions in particular
and the
legislative scheme as a whole
.’
(own emphasis).
[24]
The
courts have also held in numerous matters that substantial compliance
is not enough to depart from complying with the regulations.
In
Penxa
v Beaufort West Local Municipality and Others
[18]
,
the following was stated:
‘
Furthermore,
the respondents’ contention that there was a substantial
compliance with Regulation 6(2) is fallacious. It cannot
be
overstated that “suspension is a measure that has serious
consequences for an employee, and is not a measure that should
be
resorted to lightly”. Moreover, when suspending the Accounting
Officer, an act that would invariably interrupt leadership
and in
turn impedes the rendering of the Municipal services, the
Municipality must comply with Regulation 6(2) to the letter; which
is
not insuperable obligation, in any event.’
[25]
The
importance of providing a senior manager with notice and compliance
with the regulations was emphasised in
Lebu
v Maquassie Hills Local Municipality and Others
[19]
where it was stated:
‘
Mr
Louw, who appeared for certain of the respondents, and despite the
municipality’s withdrawal of its application for leave
to
appeal against the judgment, invited me to decline to follow
Steenkamp J, at least in so far as his judgment suggests that a

senior employee is to be afforded at least seven days to make
representations on both the misconduct alleged and the purpose of
the
suspension, before any decision to that effect is made final. I must
decline to accept that invitation. In my view, Steenkamp
J’s
interpretation of regulation 6 is correct.
It
is consistent with the principle of
audi
alteram partem
that
the regulation clearly seeks to meet, and with the chronology set out
in the regulation. The terms of the regulation clearly
contemplate an
in-principle decision to suspend, taken on the basis of a reasonable
belief that the senior manager has committed
misconduct and that at
least one of the requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b) is present.
The municipality is then required to
consider the matters set out in
sub-regulation (1) together with any representations received, and
then and only then, may the
municipality suspend the employee. I
would add that in my view, it is not sufficient for a municipality
merely simply to reproduce
the justifications listed in paragraphs
(a) and (b). In the present instance, that is what the applicant has
done, with the omission
only of the factor listed in paragraph (a)
(i) on the basis, presumably, that the investigation initiated into
the applicant’s
conduct has been completed. Suspension is a
measure that has serious consequences for an employee, and is not a
measure that should
be resorted to lightly. There appears to be a
tendency, especially in the public sector, where suspension is
applied as a measure
of first resort and almost automatically imposed
where any form of misconduct is alleged. The purpose of removing an
employee from
the workplace, even temporarily and on full pay, must
be rational and reasonable, and must be conveyed to the employee
concerned
in sufficient detail to enable the employee to compile the
representations that he or she is invited to make in a meaningful
way.
Of course there are those instances where precautionary
suspension is a necessary measure, and where the reasons to remove an
employee
from the workplace as a precautionary measure are
compelling. But those cases will be the exception rather than the
norm.’
[26]
The
first respondent is currently without a municipal manager at its
helm. Should the order granted on 16 January 2026 remain inoperative

pending the appeal process, the first respondent will be without a
municipal manager for months, as there is no indication as to
when
the appeal will be adjudicated or the appeal process concluded.
The pivotal role of
the municipal manager in the functioning of a municipality was
highlighted by the Constitutional Court, which
aptly described the
municipal manager as “
a
key structure of a municipality
”
.
[20]
[27]
In
Tshabalala
v Moqhaka Local Municipality and Another
[21]
,
it was stated as follows:
‘
.
. . the regulation of precautionary suspension is directed not only
at the interests and protection of the affected employee;
the general
public has an interest in the funds expended on public sector
employees who remain on suspension for inordinate periods.’
[28]
It is
apparent from the provisions of section 18 of the Act that
applications brought in terms thereof require strict compliance,
and
that courts should resist relaxing the statutory requirements,
departing from the default position of suspension pending appeal,
or
application for leave to appeal only where necessity and fairness
clearly demand it.
[29]
It
is undisputed that the respondents’ conduct is in contravention
of the regulations and cannot be overlooked or allowed
to stand
merely because of an appeal process which is underway.
Courts
should guard against their orders evaporating or becoming vacuous
gestures.
[22]
Successful litigants should indeed not be left in a predicament where
they feel that no effective relief has been granted, nor
should they
be left with the impression that approaching the courts to enforce
their rights is a waste of time and resources.
[23]
[30]
Having
considered the totality of the facts and the circumstances and
various case law, there is no basis upon
which
I can find that the respondents substantially complied with the
provisions of Regulation 6. To embrace the respondents’
clear
breach of legislative prescripts would be tantamount to promoting an
illegality. In the circumstances, I find that exceptional

circumstances exist in terms of section 18(1) of the Act.
Irreparable
harm:
[31]
Whether
there is irreparable harm depends upon the factual situation in which
the dispute arises, and the legal principles that
govern the rights
and obligations of the parties. The question of irreparable harm is
closely linked to the question of exceptional
circumstances.
[24]
[32]
The
applicant contends that he would suffer irreparable harm in that the
violation of his right to work and assume his responsibilities
as the
Municipal Manager constitutes prejudice and irreparable harm to him.
He avers that he suffers irreparable harm and prejudice
in
circumstances where the envisaged appeal is meritless. He argues that
there is a real possibility that the appeal will not succeed
and that
even if it were to succeed, which is extremely unlikely, the
suspension would have run its course.
[33]
Furthermore,
the applicant submits that the disciplinary hearing is set to start
in March 2026 and that there is no reason to keep
him suspended only
because there is an ongoing disciplinary hearing. He contends that if
his suspension remains unchallenged, he
would suffer irreparable
harm. He submits that the respondents do not suffer any
inconvenience, nor would they suffer any irreparable
harm if the
order sought is granted.
[34]
The
respondents contend that any prejudice alleged by the applicant is
temporary and reversable and in the event that the appeal
fails, the
applicant will be restored to his position and that any interim
consequences can be addressed through the appropriate
legal remedies.
Furthermore,
they contend that evidence shows that the applicant’s return to
the workplace previously resulted in intimidation,
thus the harm to
the residents is real and substantial, and that reinstating the
applicant while the disciplinary process is ongoing
and the appeal
remains unresolved would introduce those risks and undermine both
employee safety and institutional stability. The
respondents contend
that the balance of prejudice favours maintaining the status
quo
.
[35]
The
applicant vehemently disputes that he conducted himself in a manner
which is disruptive, intimidatory or detrimental to the
proper
functioning, stability and integrity of the first respondent. He
further emphasises that the respondents persisted to make

insinuations without providing facts to evidence the apprehension. As
alluded to above, no evidence was presented to the court
to
substantiate these allegations by the respondents.
[36]
It
has been accepted that suspension prejudicially impacts on the
applicant's freedom to work and dignity.
In
South
African Municipal Workers Union o.b.o. Matola v Mbombela Local
Municipality
[25]
the court said the following in this regard:
‘
The
harm that the applicant suffers pending the finalisation of the
disciplinary hearing is not financial because he receives his
salary
during the suspension. The irreparable harm that he suffers has to do
with his dignity and freedom to work. The impact of
the suspension on
the freedom to work and dignity of the suspended employee was stated
in
Minister
of Home Affairs and others v Watchenuka
,
in the following terms:
“
The
freedom to engage in productive work - even where that is not
required in order to survive - is indeed an important component
of
human dignity, as submitted by the respondents' counsel, for mankind
is pre-eminently a social species with an instinct for
meaningful
association. Self-esteem and the sense of self-worth - the fulfilment
of what it is to be human - is most often bound
up with being
accepted as socially useful”.’
[37]
Having
regard to the papers and the submissions made before me, I am of the
view that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm
and that the
respondents will not suffer any harm if the order is executed despite
the pending appeal process.
Prospects
of success:
[38]
Without
pre-judging the pending application for leave to appeal, I consider
it apposite to make some cursory observations and somewhat
restate
the principles relating to the role of prospects of success when
dealing with an application in terms of section 18 of
the Act, as, in
appropriate cases, they are relevant for the purposes of adjudicating
such applications.
[39]
In
University
of the Free State v Afriforum and Another
[26]
,
the
Court made the following observations:
‘
A
question that arises in the context of an application under s 18, is
whether the prospects of success in the pending appeal should
play a
role in this analysis. In
Incubeta
Holdings
Sutherland J was of the view that the prospects of success in the
appeal played no role at all. In
Liviero
Wilge Joint Venture
Satchwell J, Moshidi J concurring, was of the same view.
However,
in
Justice
Alliance
Binns-Ward J (Fortuin and Boqwana JJ concurring), was of a different
view, namely that the prospects of success in the appeal remain
a
relevant factor and therefore —
“
the
less sanguine a court seized of an application in terms of s 18(3) is
about the prospects of the judgment at first instance
being upheld on
appeal, the less inclined it will be to grant the exceptional remedy
of execution of that judgment pending the
appeal.
The
same quite obviously applies in respect of a court dealing with an
appeal against an order granted in terms of s 18(3)”.
’
[40]
It
is also settled that where the prospects of appeal are weak, there is
no need to find that the victorious party has demonstrated
“a
sufficient degree of exceptionality to justify an order in terms of
section 18 of the Act”.
[27]
Costs:
[39]
In
respect of costs, it is trite that the Court is vested with a
discretion which must be exercised judiciously.
[40]
The
court is expected to take into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, carefully weighing the issues in each

case, the conduct of the parties as well as any other circumstance
which may have a bearing on the issue of costs and then make
such
order as to costs as would be fair in the discretion of the court. No
hard and fast rules have been set for compliance and
conformity by
the court unless there are special circumstances.
[28]
[41]
The
applicant seeks a punitive cost order against the respondents and for
the second and third respondents in their personal capacities.
The
applicant contends that the respondents act in brazen violation of
the law, despite having legal representation and the second
and third
respondents being senior and experienced members of the council. The
applicant asserts that the respondents conduct amount
to an abuse of
power and a refusal of submit themselves to the principles of
accountability, since the respondents have conceded
to not having
followed the procedure as set out in regulation 6(2).
[42]
The
respondents submit that it’s application for leave to appeal is
bona
fide
and raises substantial questions of law and fact.
[43]
In
light of the foregoing considerations, I am of the view that it would
be fair and consistent with the interests of justice, and
to
safeguard the public purse by ordering the second and third
respondents to personally bear the costs of this application.
[44]
In
the result, I make the following order:
1.
The
application is urgent, and the rules relating to forms, service and
time periods, as prescribed by the Uniform Rules of Court,
are
dispensed with.
2.
The
operation and execution of the order of court dated 16 January 2026,
which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal,
is not
suspended pending the outcome of the application for leave to appeal
to the Full Court of this Division, alternatively to
the Supreme
Court of Appeal.
3.
The
second and third respondents are ordered to personally pay the costs
of this application.
T TYUTHUZA
ACTING JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
NORTHERN CAPE
DIVISION
Appearances
For
the Applicant:
Adv
JL Olivier
Instructed
by:
Matome
G Mashao Inc.
c/o
Engelsman Magabane Inc.
For
the Respondents:
Adv
VP Ngutshana SC
Adv
S Kunene
Instructed
by:
Kopano
Mothibi Attorneys
[1]
See
Matlala
v Sol Plaatje Local Municipality and Others
(Reasons)
(2026-004539)
[2026] ZANCHC 7
(28 January 2026).
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Rule
6 (12) (b) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
[4]
Maughan
v Zuma and Another
;
Downer
v Zuma and Another
(12770/22P;
13062/22P) [2023] ZAKZPHC 75 (3 August 2023) para 10.
[5]
See
EMW
v SW
[2023]
JOL 59663
(GJ) para 11.
[6]
[2017]
ZAGPPHC 656 (GP); [2018] 1 All SA 728 (GP).
[7]
Ibid
para 10.
[8]
See
Premier
for the Province of Gauteng and others v Democratic Alliance and
others
[2021]
1 All SA 60 (SCA).
[9]
[2024]
ZASCA 88
;
2024 (6) SA 175
(SCA) para 10.
[10]
2021
(3) SA 135
(SCA) para 46.
[11]
[2017] 1 All SA 79
(SCA) para 13.
[12]
Tyte
Security Services CC v Western Cape Provincial Government and Others
(Supra fn 9)
para
11.
[13]
Ibid
para
12.
[14]
University
of the Free State v Afriforum and Another
[2016]
ZASCA 165
(SCA);
[2017] 1 All SA 79
(SCA);
2018 (3) SA 428
(SCA)
para
15.
[15]
Local
Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010 (‘the
disciplinary regulations).
[16]
[2013] ZACC 16
;
2013
(8) BCLR 863
(CC);
2013 (5) SA 246
(CC) para 26.
[17]
[2018]
ZALCJHB
456 at
para 33; (2019) 40 ILJ 1061 (LC)
para 31.
[18]
[2022]
JOL 54312
(LC) para 21; see also
Molibeli
v Speaker of the Municipal Council: Fezile Dabi District
Municipality and Others
[2023]
1 All SA 199
(FB) paras 121 – 122.
[19]
[2011]
ZALCJHB 248 (
7
December 2011) para 14
.
[20]
Executive
Council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and
Constitutional Development of the Republic of South
Africa;
Executive Council of KwaZulu Natal v President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others
1999
(12)
BCLR 1360
CC para 109.
[21]
[2024]
ZALAC 60
;
[2025]
2 BLLR 189
(LAC);
(2025)
46 ILJ 590 (LAC) para 9.
[22]
Incubeta
Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ellis and Another
2014
(3) SA 189
(GJ)
para 28.
[23]
See
Workforce
Staffing (Pty) Ltd v Sadan and Others
[2023]
JOL 59382
(LC) para 12.
[24]
Tyte
Security Services CC v Western Cape Provincial Government and Others
2024
(6) SA 175
(SCA) para 13.
[25]
[2015]
JOL 32540
(LC) para 29.
[26]
2018
(3) SA 428 (SCA) para 14.
[27]
Ibid
para 15.
[28]
Mcpherson
v Teuwen and Another
[2012] ZAGPJHC 18 para 54.