JUDGMENT
Woodrow, AJ:
Introduction:
[1] On or about 15 February 2023, the applicants launched a review application,1
seeking the following relief (which I quote verbatim from the applicants’ notice
of motion):
“1. That the resolution dated 23 August 2022 of the investigating committee
appointed by the respondent to refer the first applicant's misconduct to the
applicant in terms of section 37(3)(a) read with section 43 of the Legal
Practice Act, 28 of 2014 ( “the Act”) with a view to institute urgent legal
proceedings against the first respondent, be reviewed and set aside.
2. That the resolution of the respondent dated 10 October 2022 to instruct the
attorneys of the Gauteng Provincial Office of the Legal Practice Council be
instructed to apply to court for the urgent suspension of the applicant in his
practice as a legal practitioner, be reviewed and set aside.
3. Remitting the complaint dated 24 June 2020 lodged against the applicant by
Opes Properties (Pty) Limited, which complaint is the subject matter of the
application issued out of this honourable court under case number
2022/48948, to the respondent for a reconsideration thereof, inclusive but
not limited to instituting disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in
accordance with the provisions of section 39 of the Act.
1 Review application, p 1-2 (the “review application”).
4. That the respondent upon the conclusion and/or finalisation of the
disciplinary proceedings instituted in accordance with prayer 2 above, within
1 (one) month thereafter, submit its written report and recommendations to
this honourable court in case number 2022/48948, and to the applicant, in
respect of the suspension and/or striking off from the roll of attorneys of the
applicant, duly substantiated by the reasons therefor.
5. That the costs of this application be reserved for determination by this
honourable court in case number 2022/48948 on the future date when the
report of the applicant is considered by the court.”
[2] The respondent delivered the record of proceedings ,2 referred to on
CaseLines as:
a. “Record of Proceedings before Investigating Committee on (23
August 2022)”;3
b. “Record of Proceedings before Investigating Committee on ( 10
October 2022)”.4
[3] The applicant s did not deliver any supplementary founding affidavit in the
review application.
2 Apparently on 9 March 2023 – see, p 5-4, par 8.
3 Record of proceedings of 23 August 2022, p 3-1 to 3-171.
4 Record of proceedings of 10 October 2022, p 3-174 to 3-351.
[4] The respondent delivered its answering affidavit to the review application on
25 April 2023.5
[5] The applicants did not deliver a replying affidavit.
[6] The review application had been set down to be heard in the week of 14 April
2025.6 On or about 11 December 2024, the applicants brought a substantive
application for the postponement of the review application .7 The respondent
opposed the postponement application and delivered an answering affidavit.8
The review application was postponed to 9 June 2025 (as there were no
Judges sitting in the opposed motion court of the week of 14 April 2025).9
[7] Before me, the applicants sought the postponement of their review application.
As appears from the judgment below, the postponement was refused and
thereafter the merits were argued.
5 Answering affidavit, p 6-1 to 6-622. Proof of service and filing at p 6-623 to 6-625.
6 The respondent set the application down for hearing in both April 2025 and June 2025
– notice of set down, p 0001 and 000-1 (the second thereof).
7 Application for postponement, p 11-1 (affidavit later ‘re-commissioned’ at p 11-61).
8 Answering affidavit to postponement application, p 11 -24. The applicants replied
thereto – replying affidavit, p 11-84.
9 This appears from a widely shared note on CaseLines dated 27 February 2025.
Brief background
[8] The first applicant is an attorney, conveyancer and notary, duly admitted and
previously practising as Wynand Naude Incorporated (the second applicant).
[9] On 24 June 2020, Opes Properties (Pty) Ltd (“ Opes Properties”) lodged a
complaint with the respondent against the first applicant.10
[10] On 12 August 2020, the first applicant provided a written response to the
complaint of Opes Properties.11
[11] On 13 November 2020, Papier J handed down judgment in the Eastern Cape
Circuit Local Division of the High Court, in the matter in which Opes Properties
was applicant and Wynand Naude Incorporated was the third respondent. (the
“Papier J Judgment ”)12 The Papier J Judgment contained certain adverse
remarks and findings regarding Wynand Naude Incorporated , the second
applicant in the present review application.
10 Complaint of misconduct, p 3-189 to 3-191.
11 Written response to complaint, p 3-195 to 3-202.
12 Papier J Judgment, p 3-57 to 3-73.
[12] Leave to appeal against the Papier J Judgment was dismissed by the High
Court in March 2021 and thereafter by the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”)
in February 2022.13
[13] On 13 May 2022, an inspection report that had been prepared by an Inspector
was submitted to the investigating committee of the respondent.14
[14] On 23 August 2022, the investigating committee of the respondent resolved
to recommend to the Council that urgent legal proceedings be instituted
against the first applicant.15 (the “23 August 2022 resolution”) Apparent from
the recommendation is the fact that the investigating committee paid particular
attention to the content of paragraph 74 -78 of the Papier J Judgment ,16 and
13 Orders dismissing leave to appeal, p 3-228 and p 3-235.
14 Nyali inspection report, p 3-10 et seq.
15 Recommendation of the investigating committee dated 23 August 2022, p 3-183 at p 03-
186.
16 Paragraphs [74] – [78] of the Papier J Judgment, at p 3-69 to 3-70, read as follows (the
third respondent in those proceedings being the second applicant in the review
application, Wynand Naude Incorporated):
[74] It is apparent from the evidence that the third respondent, in April 2017, represented to
the applicant that the funds, in excess of R50m, was part of the financial resources upon
which the applicant could rely.
[75] From the respondents ’ a nswering papers it is apparent, in my view, that the
representation made by the third respondent, with regard to the funds held in trust, was
intended to muddy the water, and misrepresent the true position to the applicant, which
it did.
[76] The third respondent, having represented to the applicant that the funds in excess of R50m
were being held by the third respondent in its trust account, transferred the funds to
accordingly recommended , “4.6 … a referral to Council to consider
suspension or striking.”
[15] The 23 August 2022 resolution reads as follows:
“After having considered the complaint by Opes Properties (Pty) Ltd and the
Inspection report and the findings made, the Committee on the basis of the
available prima facie evidence RESOLVED to refer the practitioner's
misconduct to the Council in terms of section 37(3)(a) read with section 43
of the Legal Practice Act, 28 of 2014 with the view to institute urgent legal
proceedings against Attorney Naude.”
[16] The 23 August 2022 resolution forms the subject matter of the applicants’
review in prayer 1 of their notice of motion.
[17] On 10 October 2022, the Council resolved to launch urgent legal proceedings
to suspend the first applicant as a legal practitioner.17 (the “10 October 2022
resolution”) The Council’s 10 October 2022 resolution reads as follows:
Worldwide Capital on the 27 th of December 20 17, without notifying the applicant of its
intention to do so.
[77] The applicant, in my view, had good reason to doubt the truthfulness of the allegations
made by the second and third respondents in the rescission of judgment application, as
they were never informed of the transfer of the funds from the third respondent's bank
accounts prior thereto.
[78] On the respondents’ own version, the conduct of the third respondent amounted to
providing the applicant with false comfort, by introducing possession of in excess of R50m
of unencumbered funds, when the funds were irrelevant to the transaction. That in itself
would, in my view, be tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation.
17 Resolution of the respondent dated 10 October 2022, p 3-351.
“
…
Application for the suspension in practice as a legal practitioner:
WAYNAND (sic) NAUDE
IT WAS RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL THAT:
1. the attorneys of the Gauteng Provincial Office of the Legal Practice Council,
be instructed to apply to Court for the urgent suspension of attorney Mr
Waynand (sic) Naude in his practice as a legal practitioner AND THAT;
2. the Chairperson and/or any other member of the Management Committee
be and they are hereby authorised to sign all documents necessary to give
effect to this resolution on behalf of the Council.”
[18] The resolution of 10 October 2022 forms the subject matter of the applicants’
review in prayer 2 of their notice of motion.
[19] It is apparent that both the 23 August 2022 resolution and the 10 October 2022
resolution pertain to the brin ging of urgent legal proceedings for the
suspension of the first applicant.
[20] On or about 18 November 2022, the respondent launched an urgent
application in the High Court under case number 48948/2022 to (a) urgently
suspend the first applicant from practising as a legal practitioner and (b) strike
the first applicant from the roll.18 (the “suspension and striking application”)
18 Applicants’ founding affidavit, p 1-11, par 8.
[21] The applicants launched applications seeking to postpone the suspension and
striking application in December 2022 and January 2023.19
[22] Thereafter, on 10 February 2023, the applicants delivered th eir answering
affidavit to the suspension and striking application. 20 At the conclusion of the
aforesaid answering affidavit, the applicants request the court to dismiss the
suspension and striking application, alternatively to grant relief in terms of a
counter application which the applicants’ deponent states as “… being, inter
alia, to postpone this matter [the suspension and striking application] sine die
pending the outcome of the review application I am in the process of issuing
…”.21
[23] On 16 February 2023, the applicants launched the present review application
in order to seek the review of the 23 August 2022 resolution and the 10
October 2022 resolution.22
[24] On 22 February 2023, the court having heard the parties in the suspension
and striking application granted an order inter alia suspending the first
19 Respondent’s answering affidavit, p 6-17, par 3.9.2 – 3.9.3.
20 Answering affidavit in suspension and striking application, p 1-28 to 1-101.
21 Answering affidavit in suspension and striking application, p 1-100, par 113.
22 Review application, p 1-2.
applicant from practising as a legal practitioner pending the finalisation of the
respondent’s suspension and striking application.23 (the “suspension order”)
[25] Leave to appeal against the suspension order was refused by the High Court
but later granted on application to the SCA. Leave was granted by the SCA to
appeal to the full court.
The postponement application
[26] At the hearing before me, the applicants sought the postponement of the
review application. The postponement was opposed by the respondent.
Having heard argument, the postponement application was refused with costs
and ex tempore reasons were provided. In essence, it was found that the
applicants had not shown good cause for the postponement for the reasons
that were provided ex tempore. I indicated at the time that fuller reasons would
be provided in the written judgment in the review proceedings.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid indication, the applicants filed a request for
reasons. I accordingly set out the further reasons herein briefly.
[27] The essence of the postponement application is the argument that the appeal
to the full court in respect of the suspension order ought to be finalised before
the review application is heard , and for such reason the review application
23 Court order of Francis-Subbiah J, p 6-171 to 6-180.
ought to be postponed .24 The applicants argued that the appeal in the
suspension proceedings may render the review application moot and that
certain underlying issues will be dealt with in the full court appeal.
[28] The arguments of the applicants lose sight of the nature of the two
proceedings:25
a. The suspension and striking application proceedings, and accordingly
the appeal against the suspension order, is based on the underlying
merits of the suspension order. The court in those proceedings must
evaluate inter alia whether the relevant legal practitioner is fit and
proper. Those proceedings are sui generis.
b. The review application is aimed at and based on the method by which
the result was reached, in this review application the method by which
the suspension and striking application was brought.
[29] Stated differently, and as submitted on behalf of the respondent “ … in the
review proceedings the [applicants seek] to declare unlawful and set aside the
24 This approach and argument appears to me to conflict with at least (a) the relief sought
at the conclusion of the answering affidavit in the suspension and striking proceedings
which seeks the postponement of those proceedings pending the determination of the
review application, and ( b) the manner in which the notice of motion in the review
application is crafted.
25 Cf. Snyders and Others v De Jager 2016 (5) SA 218 (SCA) at par [13]; Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA)
par [52].
Council's resolutions taken by the Council and a Committee of the Council.
This has nothing to do with a disciplinary enquiry by the Court into whether a
practitioner is fit and proper person to remain on the roll of attorneys.”
[30] The applicants’ argument misses this fundamental difference.
[31] The nature of the relief differs in the two proceedings . The full court is not
asked to grant review relief (but deals with the merits of the suspension order),
and there is not an overlap in the proceedings in respect of the relief sought.
The fact that the full court appeal judgment might render the review application
moot does not constitute sufficient cause to postpone the review application.
At the time of the argument for a postponement, this was only a speculative
possibility.
[32] The further reasons for the refusal of the postponement included inter alia:
a. At the time of the hearing of the application, and with reference to the
papers filed on record and those parties’ heads of argument that were
filed on record, my prima facie view was that the applicants’ prospects
of success in the review application were very slim. In my view, a
postponement would have been an exercise in futility.
b. The applicants were dominus lit is, having launched the review
application on 16 February 2023 , but not having progressed the
matter at all. Finality in litigation is important.
c. The explanation for the need for the postponement was not
satisfactory, and the application for postponement was opposed on
good grounds by the respondent.
d. A further postponement of the review application was not in the
interests of justice . A postponement would probably simply have led
to another court being belaboured with the matter.
[33] For the aforesaid reasons the postponement was refused with costs on a party
and party scale.
Mootness:
[34] On 12 August 2025, the attorney for the applicants furnished to the registrar
the judgment of the full court in the appeal in respect of the suspension order
and brought the appeal judgment to my attention via the registrar (the “Appeal
judgment”).26
[35] The following order was granted in the Appeal judgment by the full court:
“[71.1] The appeal is upheld with costs on the scale as between attorney and own
client.
[71.2] The order of the Court a quo is set aside and replaced with the following:
26 The judgment is available on ‘Saflii’ and reported as Naude and Another v South African
Legal Practice Council (A262/2023) [2025] ZAGPPHC 774 (12 August 2025).
“The application is dismissed with costs on the scale as between
attorney and own client.””
[36] Having considered the Appeal judgment, I requested that a directive and
request be directed to the parties’ legal representatives requesting short
written submissions in respect of:
a. Whether the full court appeal decision had rendered the review
application moot.
b. If so, what the parties submit the appropriate order ought to be in casu.
c. Any further aspects that are relevant with reference to the full court
decision.
[37] The legal representatives for the parties submitted written submissions
pursuant to my request. I thank them for the additional submissions.
[38] The applicants and the respondent are ad idem that the review application is
moot. The parties however differ as to (a) when the review application became
moot, and (b) what rendered the review application moot.
[39] The essential submissions of the respondent are that:
a. The applicants’ review application has always been moot, since its
inception.
b. Because the review application has always been moot, the Appeal
judgment of 12 August 2025 did not ‘render’ the review application
moot.
c. There is binding authority (dealt with extensively in the respondent’s
main heads of argument ) supporting the submission that the review
application has always been moot. The respondent relies on inter alia:
Du Plessis v Prokureursorde, Transvaal 2002 (4) SA 344 (T) at 349
F – G; Bothma v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2017 JDR
1021 (GP) at par [19], [27] and [29]; and Law Society of the Northern
Provinces v Mokone (6370/2018) [2022] ZALMPPHC 61 (25
November 2022) at par [9] and [33].
d. The application should be dismissed with costs on an attorney and
client scale as the applicants have brought an application doomed to
failure from the outset.
[40] The essential submissions of the applicants are that:
a. When the matter was argued the applicants submitted that the facts
and circumstances underlying the issues , and/or the issues, are the
same, if not identical, in both applications, and that when the full court
issues its judgment in respect of the suspension order, the issues will
have become moot and not justiciable.27
b. In support of the submission that there is no “ existing or live
controversy” which still exists, counsel refers to the following
sentences in the Appeal judgment : paragraph [50] (last sentence)
which reads, “The failure on the part of the LPC to afford Mr. Naude a
right to be heard does not appear to have moved the members of the
Council in their consideration of the matter and this is a matter of
concern.” and paragraph [66], last sentence, which reads, “Here there
was to my mind a manifest failure to properly consider what was
before it and an unnecessary and unjustified abdication of its own
responsibility to the urgent court.”
c. the case law referred to by the court in its directive 28 supports the
submission that the full court decision rendered this matter moot.
27 Referring to National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and others v Minister of
Home Affairs and others 2000 (2) SA (1) CC at par [21]. It no longer “presents an existing
or live controversy”.
28 The authorities that are referred to in the Directive are Solidariteit Helpende Hand NPC
and Others v Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (104/2022)
[2023] ZASCA 35 (31 March 2023) par [12]; and Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services and Others v Estate Late James Stransham-Ford and Others (531/2015) [2016]
ZASCA 197; [2017] 1 All SA 354 (SCA); 2017 (3) BCLR 364 (SCA); 2017 (3) SA 152 (SCA) (6
December 2016) par [25 – [26].
d. The case law relied on by the respondent to argue that the review
application was moot from its inception is distinguishable from the
present matter for the reasons addressed in the submissions.29
e. The full court Appeal judgment rendered the review application moot.
f. The applicants refer to Mavudzi and another v Majola and others
2022 (6) SA 420 (GJ) at par [37].
g. The applicants refer to the chronology of proceedings in arguing that
the respondent improperly advanced the review application by filing
an answering affidavit and taking further steps, and submit that the
appropriate order would be to (a) dismiss the review application; (b)
order the applicants to pay the unopposed costs of the review
29 The applicants rely on inter alia the case of Groundup News NPC and Others v South
African Legal Practice Council and Others (20150/2021) [2023] ZAGPJHC 559; 2023 (4)
SA 617 (GJ) (24 May 2023) (“ Groundup”) and contend that the statutory disciplinary
process is mandatory. What occurred in Groundup was that a complaint against a legal
practitioner was dismissed, the file was closed and no further investigation was to occur.
In that context, the court found that the decision of the LPC is final, has legal effect and
is reviewable: “The dismissal of the complaint and the closing of the file are final, as is
the investigation or failure to investigate by the LPC. There is no intimation that the
process is ongoing. I am satisfied that the decision of the LPC is final, has external legal
effect, and is reviewable.” (at par 30) That is not the case in casu where the disciplinary
matter in the form of the suspension and striking application was placed before the
court, is ongoing and where the resolutions to recommend the bringing of and to bring
the suspension and striking application are not final and have no external legal effect.
application; (c) order the respondent to pay the costs for its opposition
of the review application on a punitive scale as between attorney and
own client.
h. Finally, the applicants submit that because the respondent has
brought an application for leave to appeal to the SCA against the full
court Appeal judgment, the judgment in the review application ought
to be reserved until after “the appeal processes have been finally
concluded.”
[41] In my view, the review of (a) the resolution recommending to the Council that
urgent legal proceedings be instituted against the first applicant , (the 23
August 2022 resolution), and (b) the resolution of the Council to launch urgent
legal proceedings to suspend the first applicant as a legal practitioner, (the 10
October 2022 resolution), will have no practical effect on the parties. The High
Court heard and adjudicated the urgent legal proceedings and granted an
order (the suspension order) almost three years ago on 22 February 2023.
That order has been taken on appeal. The full court has granted the full court
Appeal decision upholding the appeal against the suspension order . The
review of the resolutions to commence the urgent proceedings can have no
practical effect whatsoever. In my view, the parties are correct that the present
review application is moot.
[42] In Solidariteit Helpende Hand NPC and Others v Minister of Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs 30 the SCA held as follows: (footnotes
excluded)
“[12] The general principle is that a matter is moot when a court’s judgment will
have no practical effect on the parties. This usually occurs where there is no
longer an existing or live controversy between the parties. A court should
refrain from maki ng rulings on such matters, as the court’s decision will
merely amount to an advisory opinion on the identified legal questions, which
are abstract, academic or hypothetical and have no direct effect; one of the
reasons for that rule being that a court’s p urpose is to adjudicate existing
legal disputes and its scarce resources should not be wasted away on
abstract questions of law. In President of the Republic of South Africa v
Democratic Alliance, the Constitutional Court cautioned that ‘courts should
be loath to fulfil an advisory role, particularly for the benefit of those who
have dependable advice abundantly available to them and in circumstances
where no actual purpose would be served by that decision, now’.
…
[15] As previously stated, the main relief sought by the appellants in the high court
was for the setting aside of the impugned regulations. Having regard to the
fact that the impugned regulations were long since repealed and no longer
in force before the matter came before the high court, there was nothing to
set aside. There was no live issue for that court to adjudicate upon.
…
[18] It must be borne in mind that s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act confers
a discretion on a court of appeal to hear an appeal notwithstanding
mootness. Therefore, when a court of first instance has determined that the
subject matter of litigation has ceased to exist before judgment, it has no
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the matter. Only an appeal court has a
discretion to hear an appeal notwithstanding mootness. In the matter
discretion to hear an appeal notwithstanding mootness. In the matter
30 (104/2022) [2023] ZASCA 35 (31 March 2023).
of Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Estate Late Stransham -
Ford, this Court said:
‘The appeal court’s jurisdiction was exercised because “a discrete legal issue
of public importance arose that would affect matters in the future and on
which the adjudication of this court was required”. The high court is not
vested with similar powers. It s function is to determine cases that present
live issues for determination.
. . .
If a cause of action ceases to exist before judgment in the court of first instance,
there is no longer a claim before the court for its adjudication.’
[19] In a recent judgment, Minister of Tourism v Afriforum NPC, dated 8 February
2023, and also dealing with the effects of the COVID -19 pandemic, the
Constitutional Court stated as follows:
‘A case is moot when there is no longer a live dispute or controversy between
the parties which would be practically affected in one way or another by a
court’s decision or which would be resolved by a court’s decision. A case is
also moot when a court’s decision would be of academic interest only.’”
[43] There is no live dispute or controversy between the parties in respect of the
review application which would be practically affected in one way or another
or be resolved by this court’s decision. The court’s decision in the review
application would be of academic interest only.
[44] In Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others v Estate Late
James Stransham-Ford and Others,31 the SCA held as follows: (footnotes
omitted, my emphasis)
“[25] The situation before Fabricius J was not comparable to the position where
this court or the Constitutional Court decides to hear a case notwithstanding
that it has become moot. When a court of appeal addresses issues that were
properly determined by a firs t instance court, and determines them afresh
because they raise issues of public importance, it is always mindful that
otherwise under our system of precedent the judgment at first instance will
affect the conduct of officials and influence other courts wh en confronting
similar issues. A feature of all the cases referred to in the footnotes to para
22 above is that the appeal court either overruled the judgment in the court
below or substantially modified it. The appeal court’s jurisdiction was
exercised because ‘a discrete legal issue of public importance arose that
would affect matters in the future and on which the adjudication of this court
was required’. The High Court is not vested with similar powers. Its
function is to determine cases that present li ve issues for
determination.”
[45] The High Court has no jurisdiction to hear cases that raise no live issues and
are moot.
[46] I agree with the submissions on the part of the respondent that the review
application has in fact been moot from inception, and any decision granted in
the review application will be of academic interest only, based on the authority
relied upon by the respondent. Whatever the outcome of the review
31 (531/2015) [2016] ZASCA 197; [2017] 1 All SA 354 (SCA); 2017 (3) BCLR 364 (SCA); 2017
(3) SA 152 (SCA) (6 December 2016).
application may be, will have no effect on the outcome of the suspension and
striking application.32
[47] Counsel for the applicants submits that this judgment ought to be further
delayed until after the further appeal proceedings, leave to appeal against the
full court judgment which is pending in the SCA. The further appeal can have
no effect on the review application. No case is made out for the further delay
of the present application.33
[48] The review application ought to be dismissed.34 Based on my finding that the
review application was moot from inception, the applicants ought to be
32 Cf. also: Wild v Legal Practice Council 2023 (5) SA 612 (GP)at par [99]:
[99] Furthermore, it has repeatedly been held that the courts will not deal with
abstract, hypothetical or academic questions in proceedings for a declaratory
order (Ex parte Mouton and Another 1955 (4) SA 460 (A) at 464; South African
Mutual Life Assurance Society v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1977 (3) SA 642 (A)
at 658). Even if a declaratory order 'that the first respondent did not take any of
the decisions' were to be granted, it will have no practical effect. It is for the court
to consider the applicant's conduct and give an appropriate order, irrespective of
whether a decision was taken to issue the advisory note or not (Du Plessis v
Prokureursorde, Transvaal 2002 (4) SA 344 (T) at 349F – G). For these reasons I
have to exercise my discretion against t he applicant and refuse the granting of a
declaratory order.
(Connfirmed on appeal: Hutchinson Wild v Legal Practice Council and Others 2025 (3)
SA 393 (SCA))
33 Cf. Du Plessis v Prokureursorde, Transvaal 2002 (4) SA 344 (T) at p 349.
34 Solidariteit Helpende Hand NPC and Others v Minister of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs (104/2022) [2023] ZASCA 35 (31 March 2023) par [10] read with par
[21].
directed to pay the costs of the review application. If I am wrong regarding the
stage at which the matter became moot, and the review application became
moot only once the full court Appeal decision was rendered, I nonetheless
incline to granting costs against the applicants due to the fact that had the
review application not been moot it would have been dismissed on the papers
before me on the merits.35 Without being exhaustive, in my view the applicants
fail to make out a case for the relief that they seek in their founding affidavit.
Neither of the resolutions that the applicants seek to attack on review
constitute administrative action and the PAJA rev iew brought against such
resolutions is without merit.36
[49] I do not uphold the argument that the respondent ought to be faulted for
advancing the review application. The respondent cannot be faulted for filing
an answering affidavit and taking steps to enrol the matter.
[50] Punitive costs are not warranted. I intend to grant costs on a party and party
scale. Based on the fact that there are certain aspects in the matter that have
some complexity and based on the importance of the matter to all of the
parties, costs on Scale B are warranted.
35 Where a decision concerning costs is divorced from the merits because a decision on
the merits may no longer be required, regard must still be had to the merits in
determining costs (see, for example, Erasmus v Grunow 1980 (2) SA 793 (O) at 798D;
Johnson v Minister of Home Affairs 1997 (2) SA 432 (C) at 434B; Thusi v Minister of
Home Affairs & 71 Other Cases 2011 (2) SA 561 (KZP) par [64])..
36 See for instance Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Adekeye and Another
(21758/2018) [2018] ZAGPPHC 371 (17 May 2018) at par [19]-[21].
Attorney for the Respondent: Rooth & Wessels Inc.
Date of Hearing: Friday 9 June 2025
Date of Judgment: 20 January 2026