IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA
Case No: 2025-221325
In the application of:
SIKUMBULE MQOMBOTI Applicant
____________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________
[1] This application concerns the admission of the applicant as a legal
practitioner so that he may commence practice as an advocate.
[2] When served with this application the Legal Practice Council (LPC)
raised objection to his being admitted. Notwithstanding its objection
the applicant has persisted in seeking an order for his admission as
a legal practitioner.
[3] That led to the LPC filing a notice of opposition, together with an
affidavit deposed to by its director of the Eastern Cape Provincial
Council, Mr Hona.
[4] While some of the deficiencies of the application were addressed,
by way of supplementary affidavits, the re remains one particular
issue over which the applicant and the LPC are in dispute.
[5] What it is about is whether or not the applicant has completed the
required period of practical vocational training.
[6] What the dispute engages is a matter of law, the proper
interpretation of the Legal Practice Act, its regulations and its rules,
more particularly, those provisions relating to the practical
vocational training requirements for admission to practice as an
advocate.
[7] The facts are briefly these:
7.1 the applicant obtained admission to the pupillage program of
the Bhisho Society of Advocates. He was advised that the
program was to commence on 15 January 2025 and that its
duration was for “one year”;
7.2 the Bhisho Society of Advocates, as a c onstituent member of
the General Council of the Bar, is accredited by the LPC to
provide the vocational training required by the Act and its
regulations;
7.3 the applicant commenced his pupillage on 15 January 2025
under the supervision of Adv. Nyangiwe;
7.4 on 30 January 2025 the applicant and Adv. Nyangiwe
concluded a practical vocational training contract, as they
were required to do by regulation 7 of the Act. The regulation
requires that the contract be “ for an uninterrupted period of
12 months”;
7.5 during the year the applicant passed not only the competency
examination of the LPC but also the national bar examination
of the General Council of the Bar;
7.6 the Bhisho Society of Advocates’ practical vocational training
was provided to the applica nt from 15 January 2025 until 24
December 2025.
[8] What is at issue is whether or not the applicant had, at the date on
which the application was enrolled for hearing, the 20 th of January
2026, or upon the date on which it was moved, the 22 nd of January
2026, satisfied the requirements of the Act regarding his practical
vocational training.
[9] Section 26 of the Act, at sub-section 26(1)(c), requires an applicant
for admission as a legal practitioner to satisfy the requirement that
he or she has “ undergone all the practical vocational training
requirements... prescribed by the Minister”.
[10] The regulations to the Act, promulgated by the Minister, provide at
regulation 7(1)(a), that a person intending to be admitted and
enrolled as an advocate “ must (a ) serve under a practical
vocational training contract... for an uninterrupted period of 12
months...”.
[11] Rule 17.5 of the rules requires of an applicant, for admission and
enrolment as an advocate, that his or her training supervisor
confirm “ the exac t dates that the applicant served under the
supervision of his or her training supervisor”.
[12] The applicant asserts that he has complied with those
requirements. The LPC asserts that he has not done so. Their
dispute engages, in part, the proper interpretation of the provisions
I have just identified.
[13] Mr Nyangiwe, who appeared for the applicant, submitted that as a
month is defined by the Interpretation Act as a calendar month the
commencement of the applicant’s period of training during the
month of January 2025, irrespective of the day of the month on
which it commenced, and its conclusion during the month of
December of 2025, irrespective of the day of the month upon which
it was concluded, constituted a 12 month period.
[14] Ms Watt, who appeared on behalf of the LPC, submitted otherwise.
Her submission was that a month is to be calculated from the day
of the month upon which the period starts to the corresponding day
of the next month. She accordingly submitted that the period of 12
months, if it commenced on 15 January 2025 ended on 14 January
2026 or, if it commenced on 30 January 2025, will run to an end on
29 January 2026.
[15] The interpretation of the Act and its regulations and its rules
provides no interpretive challenge. Whethe r with or without
reference to Ex parte Minister of Social Development and others
2006(4) SA 309(C) and Matlhwana vs South African Legal Practice
Council and others 2024 JDR 2170(GP) the clear requirement of
undergoing “ an uninterrupted period of 12 months of practical
vocational training” is, if it commenced on 15 January 2025 that it
was required to continue until 14 January 2026 and, if it
commenced on 30 January 2025, it was required to continue until
29 January 2026.
[16] Although the Practical Vocational Training Contract was signed on
30 January 2025 the applicant’s training actually commenced on
15 January 2025. As the regulation requires it to be for an
uninterrupted period of 12 months the period for which it was
required to endure was until14 January 2026.
[17] Ordinarily that period of 12 months would have been completed
when this application served before me. But there is a difficulty
facing the applicant in that regard.
[18] In the supplementary affidavit, filed in response to the affidavit of
Mr Hona, the applicant states that his training concluded on 24
December 2025, some weeks short of the 12 month period, if the
period commenced on 15 January 2025, and some more weeks
short of the 12 month period if it commenced on 30 January 2025.
[19] And there is a further deficiency I should mention. In the applicant’s
founding affidavit he states that he completed 6 months of
uninterrupted pupillage training. And, in the affidavit deposed to by
his training supervisor the same statement is made. That may well
be an error by both of them. But, as the papers are, the
requirements prescribed by the rules, as read with the Act and the
regulations to the Act, which require it to be confirmed by the
training supervisor that a 12 month period of training has been
completed, has not been complied with.
[20] It was submitted by Mr Nyangiwe that if I should find differently to
his submissions upon the interpretation of the Act and its
regulations I should then condone the failure of the applicant to
have fully complied with the Act and its regulations.
[21] He argued that, by the nature of things, no training could have
occurred over the end of the year break, from 25 December 2025
to 14 January 2026, and that the purpose of prac tical vocational
training has been served. In that circumstance I am asked to
condone the failure to have undergone a full 12 month period of
vocational training on the basis of a finding that there has been
“substantial and substantive compliance”.
[22] Upon my reading of section 26 of the Act, together with regulation
7 and the rules, compliance with the terms thereof, in order to be
admitted as a legal practitioner to practice as an advocate, is
peremptory. The regulation stipulates that an applicant “must
serve under a practical vocational contract … for an uninterrupted
period of 12 months …”. That is a peremptory requirement.
[23] Whilst the measure of non -compliance may be seen as
insubstantial I am unpersuaded that a peremptory requirement can
be condoned, on the basis of an adequate or substantial
compliance or on the basis that it is in the interests of justice to do
so. The interests of justice have nothing to do with statutory
compliance. Nor is holding the applicant to strict compliance with
the Act and the regulations putting form over substance. The
substance is in the form of compliance with the statutory provision.
[24] Mr Nyangiwe also argued that the LPC has no role, or a lesser
role, to play as a supervisory authority in the admission of an
advocate. In effect, that as the Bhisho Society of Advocates had
no objection to the admission of the applicant its view upon the
matter was to be preferred above that of the LPC. The only role of
the various Societies of Advocates, who are the co nstituent
members of the General Council of the Bar, in terms of the Act, is
the provision of practical vocational training, which they have been
accredited to provide by the LPC, in terms of regulation 17.6.4.
Every other requirement for admission as an advocate is
prescribed by the Act, its regulations and the rules, the
administration of which falls exclusively upon the LPC.
[25] Mr Nyangiwe sought to find support for his submission from rule 3A
of the Uniform Rules of Court which requires that the Soc iety of
Advocates of the jurisdiction be served with a copy of the
application for admission as an advocate.
[26] Rule 17.7 of the rules, published in terms of the Legal Practice Act,
requires that an application for admission of a legal practitioner
“must lie for inspection with the Council for a period of not less than
one month ”. Notwithstanding the repeal of the Admission of
Advocates Act by the Legal Practice Act rule 3A of the Uniform
Rules of Court requires, inter alia , as a proced ural requirement,
that an application for admission as an advocate be served upon
the secretary of the Bar Council or the Society of Advocates in the
division in which the application is made, Those provisions are
directed at providing the LPC and the rel evant Society of
Advocates with notice of an application for the admission of an
advocate so as to provide them with an opportunity to raise with
the court any issue or objection they may have against the
admission of the applicant.
[27] What requires to be recognised is that while the Societies of
Advocates have an interest in the admission of a person to the
advocates’ profession that interest is derived from the common
law. The interest of the LPC is the discharge of its supervisory
duties over complia nce with what is prescribed by the Legal
Practice Act, together with its regulations and rules, in order to
obtain admission as a legal practitioner.
[28] In that circumstance it is the LPC which bears a statutory obligation
and duty to place information before the court which is relevant to
compliance with the Act and its regulations in order for the
admission of a legal practitioner.
[29] But it would be wrong to say, as submitted on behalf of the
applicant, that upon an issue of compliance with the Act the view of
the Society of Advocates, whose interest in the application for
admission is derived from the common law, is to be preferred
above those of the LPC.
[30] Mr Nyangiwe raised various other issues. He challenged the
authority of the LPC to rai se any objection to an application for
admission to the profession, after the expiry of the one month
period, provided for by rule 17.7. He argued that the LPC was
functus officio after the expiry of one month. In effect, as I
understood the submission, a failure to raise an objection within the
one month period was a decision by the LPC not to oppose the
application. That submission only has to be stated to be rejected.
Absent a decision, one way or the other, the issue of functus officio
does not aris e. He also challenged its right to be heard in the
application without it having been obtained leave to intervene in the
application.
[31] The LPC is charged, by the Act with the regulation and supervision
of the legal professions and, in particular, of a pplications for
admission to the professions. It has a duty, and an obligation, to
raise with the court its objections, if any, to any application for
admission, of which the applicant for admission is required to give
it notice. That being so, it was obvi ously entitled, as of right, to be
heard without seeking leave to intervene in the application.
[32] Nor is there any legal basis upon which it can be barred from
making its views known, at any time before the application is
determined, or that its failur e to raise any objection within the one
month period provided for by the rules precludes it from doing so
thereafter.
[33] In all the circumstances I must conclude that the applicant has not
satisfied the prescribed requirements of his practical vocationa l
training and that, as a consequence, he cannot yet seek to be
admitted as a legal practitioner so as to commence practice as an
advocate, despite having met all the other requirements for his
admission.
[34] I am loathe to dismiss his application, as I should ordinarily do, as
doing so would require, once he has met the requirements, the
applicant to issue a fresh application for his admission and suffer
the delay which that would give rise to with its consequent
prejudice to the commencement of his care er. Nor am I inclined to
make the conditional order suggested in the supplementary heads
of argument filed on behalf of the applicant.
[35] So, instead, by my striking the application from the roll of cases,
the applicant will be afforded an opportunity of fulfilling the
requirements of the Act and its regulations and of supplementing
his present application once he has done so. He may then also
correct the deficiencies I have pointed out. He may also, if he
chooses to do so, withdraw his present applicat ion and issue
another.
[36] It may also be necessary for the applicant to seek condonation for
the period of his vocational training having been interrupted which
should not, in the circumstances of this matter, prove to be
unsurmountable. He would obviously also have to provide the LPC
with appropriate notice of his renewed application.
[37] The applicant sought an order for the payment of his costs which
accrued as a result of the LPC’s opposition to his application in
which Mr Nyangiwe persisted, albei t rather faintly. Ms Watt, on
behalf of the LPC, while stating that ordinarily the applicant should
bear the costs of the LPC’s opposition to the application did not
seek to press an argument upon that issue any further.
[38] As I accept that the applican t hitherto bona fide believed that he
was entitled to the relief sought and as the LPC has done no more
than discharge its duty and obligations to the court I am inclined to
make no order as to costs.
[39] It is accordingly ordered that the application is struck from the roll
with no order as to costs.
D H DE LA HARPE
Acting Judge of the High Court
APPEARANCES:
For the APPLICANT : Adv Nyangiwe
Instructed by : Dyushu & Majebe Attorneys Inc.
No. 20 Smartt Road
Nahoon
East London
Tel: 043 726 4616
Cell: 079 944 0440
Ref: MKD/LIT/0502
Email: admin@dmlaw.co.za
c/o : NN Dullabhs & Co.
5 Betram Street
Makhanda
Tel: 046 622 6611
Email: naran@dullabhs.co.za
For the LPC : Adv Watt
Wheeldon Rushmere & Cole Attorneys
Matthew Fosi Chambers
119 High Street
Makhanda
6139
Tel: 046 622 7005
Email: lit5@wheeldon.co.za
Ref: B Brody/Meghan/S27349
Matter was heard on : 20 January 2026
Judgment Delivered on : 29 January 2026