REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
26 January 2026
DATE SIGNATURE
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CASE NO: 2024/098840
In the matter between:
ACCELERATED CHRISTIAN EDUCATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
VICKI FOURIE
and
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
INRE
ACCELERATED CHRISTIAN EDUCATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
VICKI FOURIE
1st Applicant
2nd Applicant
Respondent
1'" Applicant
2nd Applicant
and
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS OF THE JOINT
MATRICULATION BOARD OF SOUTH AFRICA
JOINT MATRICULATION BOARD OF SOUTH AFRICA
UNIVERSITIES SOUTH AFRICA
MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
INNOVATION
SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AUTHORITY
UMALUSI COUNCIL FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE IN
GENERAL; AND FURTHER EDUCATION TRAINING
JUDGMENT: INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION
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1st Respondent
2nd Respondent
3rd Respondent
4th Respondent
5th Respondent
6th Respondent
7th Respondent
(The matter was heard in open court and uploaded onto the electronic case file
of the matter of Caselines. The date of the order is deemed to be the date of the
uploading of the judgment onto the electronic file of the matter on Caselines.)
BEFORE: HOLLAND-MUTER J:
[1] The Applicants lodged an interlocutory application against the first
respondent (University of Pretoria referred to as "UP") in terms of Rule 30(1) of
the Uniform Rules of Court to set aside the Respondent's Notice in terms of Rule
6(S)(d)(iii) as an irregular step and/or improper procedure in terms of Rule 30(1).
The Applicants aver that the Respondents' Notice is premature because the
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Applicants have not been privy to UP's record in terms of Rule 53(1)(b). The
interlocutory relief is sought against UP alone.
[2] The First Applicant, Accelerated Christian Education of South Africa ("ACE"),
is a private education company which facilitates its education programmes via
its member Schools of Tomorrow ("SoT") to provide private high-quality
independent secondary education to its learners. The aim of the education is to
empower its learners to pursue, amongst other careers, a tertiary education
within the Republic. This education is provided by South African Universities and
in the past ACE's learners who obtained a Sol College Entrance Certificate after
completing the education provided for by SoT, where granted admission to a
South African University.
[3] The Second Applicant obtained such qualification during 2007 but was
refused admission by UP during June 2023 when she applied for admission at UP
for 2024 to further her desire for tertiary education. No relief is sought against
her and the present dispute is between ACE and UP.
[4] The First Applicant, after unsuccessful out-of-court interaction by its legal
representatives with UP, issued application to review the decision by UP taken
during 2023 to refuse the Second Applicant admission to tertiary education.
[S] The review application was issued and delivered to UP on 2 September 2024.
UP filed its Notice of Intention to Oppose on 29 November 2024. The review
application calls for the delivery of the record of the impugnable decision in
terms of Rule 53(1((b) before 8 January 2025.
[6] UP did not deliver the requested record but delivered its Rule 6(S)(d)(iii)
Notice raising a point of law that the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
review due to it being brought out of time. The thrust of UP's Notice is that the
Applicants failed in the founding papers to make the necessary allegations to
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prove that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the review
application. UP admits that it must deliver such record should the court have the
necessary jurisdiction to hear the review.
[7] ACE delivered its Rule 30{2)(b) claiming that the Rule 6(S)(d)(iii) Notice by UP
amounts to an irregular step or improper procedure in terms of Rule 30(1). ACE
further moves for relief that the court to prohibit UP from taking any further
procedural steps in the main review application before first taking the steps
envisaged in Rule 53{1)b) by delivering to the Registrar of this Court the record
of all documents and electronic records relating to the decision sought to be set
aside, together with reasons by UP as required by law, within 15 days form this
order being granted.
[8] The crisp issue for this court to decide in the interlocutory application in
terms of Rule 30 is whether the Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) Notice by UP is irregular or
improper, and if so, that UP comply with Rule 53 to deliver the necessary
required record of its decision. If not, UP need not deliver the record.
[9] UP contends that the court has to determine the issue of jurisdiction before
tending to the merits of the review application . It contends that because the
review application was brought way out of the 180 days as set out in section 7
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (PAJA), and unless
the 180 day time period has been extended by agreement between the parties,
or if no agreement was reached, by the court on application (section 9 of PAJA),
it does not have to deliver the record. The court may grant such application in
the interests of justice on application after hearing an application for extension
of the 180-day period.
(10] Rule 53 provides that where such application is delivered, the party whose
de<;i:.ion i:. the :.ubject of the application, will, within 15 day:; from receivin& the
application, despatch the record of the impugned decision to the registrar of the
application, despatch the record of the impugned decision to the registrar of the
court. ACE is of the view that the mere delivery of the Rule 53 Notice entitles it
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to receive the record. ACE further argues that nowhere in sections 7 or 9 of PAJA
the word '1urisdiction" appears and that this court has the inherent competence
to hear the review even where no application for condonation is part of the
application. This according to ACE, would be contrary the entire purpose of these
sections in PAJA and to any other interpretation thereof would result in an
absurdity.
[11) UP contends that the principle that in every review proceeding
contemplated in Rule 53 that the interpretation by ACE that an applicant, as of
right, is entitled to the record of the decision to be reviewed, is not an
unqualified application. The parties therefore differ on the aspect of whether an
applicant has an unqualified right to the record or that such right can be
restricted when non-compliance of the provisions of the rule may exclude a
court's jurisdiction to hear the matter. Put differently, does the non-compliance
with the 180 days period in section 7 without any formal application in terms of
section 9 of PAJA disqualify the hearing of the application for lack of jurisdiction.
[12) It is a given that ACE did not formally apply for extension of the 180 days
period (no condonation sought) but that ACE avers that such relief sought is only
at stake when the main review application us heard. Its contention is therefore
that the Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) Notice is premature and that issue is for the court
hearing the main review application to resolve. UP however contends that the
absence of a condonation application to extend the 180 days is fatal for ACE's
application.
[13) The Constitutional Court (ConCourt) decided in Commissioner, South Africa
Revenue Service and Another v Richards Bay Cola Terminal (Pty) Ltd CCT104/23
[2025] ZACC 3, par 1S0-155 that the question whether the Competition Appeal
Court could decide on the merits of an issue where non-compliance with the
prescribed regulations occurred. In this matter the issue was whether the
prescribed regulations occurred. In this matter the issue was whether the
Competition Appeal court could order the product1on of the Rule 5.3 record
when its jurisdiction to adjudicate the review was in dispute. The ConCourt held
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that the Competition Appeal Court could not do so, because to order production
of the record without determining its jurisdiction would lead to an order that
would become a nullity if the Competition Appeal Court found that it had no
jurisdiction. The ConCourt then held that it is trite that once a party successfully
establishes the jurisdiction of a court on its founding papers, a party is entitled
toa Rule 53 record.
[14] In par [144-(a)] in the Richards Bay case (supra) it was held that the court
first need to be persuaded to exercise its review jurisdiction and if it decides to
do so, then the record must be made available. In the present matter before this
court it is the dispute whether this court has the jurisdiction to hear the matter.
[15] The review application is way out of time and therefore section 9 of PAJA
requires either agreed extension of the 180 day period between the parties or a
court order to extend the 180 days. There is no agreement nor any application
at present before this court to grant such extension. See par [88] in Richards Bay
(supra) where it was clearly held that a court may defer to exercise its jurisdiction
until certain conditions are met, such as that the review is brought within a
particular time. Should the parties fail to comply with these conditions, they will
ordinarily not be entitled to pursue their review. PAJA regulates a party's right to
judicial review. The right of review itself may be subject to conditions before it
can be considered by a court. This is the crips issue before the court to be
decided.
[16] A similar approach was held in Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v
ASLA Construction (Pty) Ltd 2019 (4) SA 331 (CC) par (51] resulting in that in a
case of a PAJA review where an explicit condition is not met that a court will not
have the jurisdiction to consider the review if it was launched outside the 180
days period and not accompanied by an explicit condonation application.
days period and not accompanied by an explicit condonation application.
[17) In Competition Commission of South Africa v Standard Bank of South
Africa 2020 CCT 159/18 (2020) 2 at [118] it was held that the production of the
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record in terms of Rule 53 could not have been ordered before deciding whether
the Competition Appeal Court has decided on the issue of jurisdiction to hear
the review. This must be decided before any other issue is decided. The result is
that In the matter before the court the issue of jurisdiction must first be decided
and if no jurisdiction exists, the record need not be provided.
(18) The matter in Murray and Others NNO v Ntombela 2024(4) SA 9S SCA can
be distinguished form the present matter in view thereof that in the Murray
casethe issues raised was directly a merit issue and not a prerequisite regarding
non-compliance with requirements to determine jurisdiction. The Rule 30(2)
Notice is not directed to compel UP to deliver the record but to set aside the
Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) Notice as irregular. Should the court find that the Rule 6(5)(d)(iii)
Notice is not irregular, the court will dismiss the Rule 30{2) application. This
application does not raise the issue of UP's duty to provide the record.
[19) After considering all arguments and pleadings the court is satisfied that the
Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) Notice is not irregular and that the Rule 30(2) application be
dismissed.
COSTS:
[20) There is no reason to grant any punitive cost order against the ACE. The
application was not frivolous or an abuse of process. Costs normally follow
success and in this instance be on a party-and-party scale on Scale C within the
discretion of the Taxing Master.
ORDER:
The Application is dismissed with costs, including the cost of counsel taxable on
Scale C. (Draft Order marked "XVZ" attached).
26 January 2026 (Uploaded onto Caselines)
Day in Court: 6 November 2025
8
HOLAND-MUTER J
~//~
Judge of the Pretor1a High Court
Judgement delivered onto Caselines: 26 January 2026
Appearances:
Obo Applicant: Adv A Thompson
Adv P Eilers
Obo Respondent: Adv JP Vorster SC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRIC
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
I , ;_c> 2-- (,
?tJ 0 1
CASE NO: 2024-0988 40
HEARD IN COURT __ ON 6 NOVEMBER 2025 :
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE HOLLAND-MUTER:
In the interlocutory application between:
ACCELERATED CHRISTIAN EDUCATI
SOUTH AFRICA
FOURIE, VICKI
And
IN RE:
ACCELERATED CHRISTIAN EDUCA
SOUTH AFRICA
FOURIE, VICKI
and
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS OF THE JOINT
MATRICULATION BOARD OF SOUTH AFRICA
First Applicant
econd Applicant
Respondent
First Applicant
Second Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
JOINT MATRICULATION BOARD OF SOUTH
AFRICA
UNIVERSITIES SOUTH AFRICA
MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION , SCIENCE
AND INNOVATION
SOUTH AFRICAN QUALIFICATIONS AU
UMALUSI COUNCIL FOR QAU
IN GENERAL , AND FURTH l 'No ~ ~
TRAINING ,~'< ~
~ st' ~ _$/l'~ ; <l-\
cP / ~,P~' Disclaimer: /.. 1..0'<"
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Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
th Respondent
This order is made an Order of ut..~,,~l"l me is reflected hereon,
duly stamped by the Registrar miffed electronically to the
parties or their legal representative Order is further uploaded to the
electronic file of this matter on ines by the Judge or his/her
Secretary/Registrar. The date of this Order is deemed to be 6 November 2025.
~ RDER
Having read the Notice of Motion, Notices and documents filed of record, heard
counsel and conside red the matter,
The application is dismissed with costs, including the costs of counsel
taxable on Scale C.
For the Applicants:
With:
Instructed by:
For the Respondent:
076 072 6096
adrian@lawcircle.co .za
Adv P Eilers
076 024 0359
Paul.eilers@lawcircle.co.za
Hurter Spies Incorporated
012 941 9230
willie@hurterspies.co.za /
carl@hurtersp ies.co .za
Adv JP Vorster SC
072 288 6927
vors teri@law.co.za
F THE COURT
REGISTRAR
(Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
japie@vorsterj.onmicrosoft .com
Instructed by: Tim du Toit Incorporated
012 470 7777 / 7525
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