Brief Summary

Vexatious Litigation — Declaration of vexatious litigant — Application for security for costs and declaration as vexatious litigant under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 — Court finding that Kevin Williams persistently instituted legal proceedings without reasonable grounds — Declaration made that Williams is a vexatious litigant, requiring leave of court for future proceedings — Security for costs application stayed pending compliance with court orders.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

These proceedings were an application brought by Thomson Wilks Inc and Mr Nicholas John Elliot (together referred to in the judgment as the TW Respondents) for relief in two principal forms. First, the TW Respondents sought an order requiring Mr Kevin Williams to furnish security for costs in relation to a separate, pending “main application”. Second, they sought an order declaring Mr Williams a vexatious litigant, both in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 and under the common law, together with consequential restrictions and a stay of parts of the main application.

Mr Williams was cited as the Respondent/Applicant in this interlocutory application because he was the applicant in the main application under the same case number (2025-058552). The TW Respondents were cited as Applicant/First Respondent (reflecting their procedural role in the vexatious/security application and their citation as first respondent(s) in the main application). The South African Legal Practice Council (LPC) and the Office of the Legal Services Ombud were cited as the second and third respondents in the main application; they were also parties to the broader dispute context but the principal relief in this judgment concerned Mr Williams’s conduct towards the TW Respondents.

The judgment concerned the court’s control of its process and the statutory mechanism for limiting abuse of litigation. The underlying conflict originated in a decade-long history of disputes and litigation flowing from a modest Magistrates’ Court rental claim and the subsequent attorney–client dispute between Mr Williams and Thomson Wilks. The court was not called upon to decide the merits of the main application; instead, it addressed whether Mr Williams’s litigation conduct justified statutory and common-law restrictions, and whether security for costs should be ordered at that stage.

2. Material Facts

The litigation history was rooted in a Goodwood Magistrates’ Court action issued on 13 November 2014 by Coleman Street Properties (Pty) Ltd (CSP) for arrear rental of R55 971.97 against Mr Williams and his son. The summons included an attachment mechanism associated with section 32(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, and the issuing of summons led to the attachment of movable assets on the premises occupied by Paper and Tissue Solutions (Pty) Ltd (PTS), a company controlled by Mr Williams. CSP also pursued cancellation and ejectment relating to the leased premises.

Mr Williams initially had different legal representation. He later concluded a written mandate and fee agreement with Thomson Wilks on 25 January 2015 to represent him in litigation arising from the lease dispute. It was common cause that monies were paid into Thomson Wilks’s trust account for fees and disbursements. The relationship deteriorated, and the judgment recorded that Mr Williams declined to engage with Thomson Wilks’s requests for instructions and resisted advancing the civil matter to trial. On the court’s account of the correspondence, Mr Williams directed that no further steps be taken, expressed a desire to “wait”, and indicated a personal motivation for conflict. This culminated in adverse consequences, including the sale in execution of PTS’s movable property.

After the mandate ended, Thomson Wilks rendered accounts for services. Mr Williams refused to pay those accounts and demanded the return of trust monies, while Thomson Wilks refused to release funds and files pending settlement of fees, relying on the written fee agreement and a claimed lien. Thereafter, Mr Williams initiated extensive litigation and complaints against Thomson Wilks and others, including complaints lodged with professional bodies.

The court distilled the dispute between Mr Williams and the TW Respondents in the main application into four core contentions advanced by Mr Williams (and treated as central to the relief directed at the TW Respondents).

First, Mr Williams contended that he was entitled to review relief because the LPC had not afforded him a “hearing” in relation to his complaints. The court treated the relevant disciplinary rules as dispositive of this contention, and it relied on LPC correspondence recording that various complaints were investigated and dismissed with written reasons. One complaint reached an appeal tribunal, which referred a narrow issue back for further investigation due to insufficient evidence; this was described by the court as a “technical success” rather than a success on the merits. It was undisputed on the record before the court that no adverse finding had been made against Thomson Wilks or Mr Elliot in these complaint processes.

Second, Mr Williams alleged fraud/forgery concerning an allocatur and taxation outcomes in the Magistrates’ Court relating to Thomson Wilks’s bills of costs. The court accepted that the Taxing Master had initially applied the incorrect tariff and that Thomson Wilks pursued reviews to correct taxation to the contractually agreed scale. The judgment traced repeated taxations and reviews, including orders by magistrates confirming the applicable scale, and later review proceedings in the High Court. The court found, after comparing the documents Mr Williams relied on, that the relevant “change” reflected adjustments consistent with the judicial outcomes (moving from party-and-party amounts to amounts consistent with the fee agreement), rather than any indication of fraud.

Third, Mr Williams asserted that an order made on 13 March 2018 in High Court case 3267/2017 (dismissing his application with attorney-and-client costs) was obtained fraudulently and through “secret” set-down by Mr Elliot. The court relied on the procedural history: Mr Williams instituted the application; Thomson Wilks filed opposition relying on the undisputed fee agreement; Mr Williams failed to set the matter down; Thomson Wilks enrolled it in terms of the rules; notices of set down were issued and served; and Mr Williams did not appear on the day. The court found no factual basis for fraud on the TW Respondents’ part and regarded the history as demonstrating Mr Williams’s approach to litigation instituted in his own name.

Fourth, Mr Williams challenged the re-issue of a writ of execution related to the costs order in case 3267/2017, alleging forgery and fraud based on the use of a copy allocatur and an affidavit explaining the original could not be located. The court recorded that Mr Williams accepted in argument that his complaint was not that no allocatur existed or that the copy differed in content, but rather that the deponent could not have had personal knowledge of the original at the time it was created. The court held that this did not establish fraud or forgery. It also recorded that the allocatur copy was printed from Thomson Wilks’s computer system and described it as a stored “data message” under the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.

Beyond these core disputes, the court relied on a consolidated chronology showing that Mr Williams had, over many years, launched extensive litigation and applications (including multiple High Court matters and several Constitutional Court applications), repeatedly advancing allegations of fraud, corruption, conspiracy, and bias, with outcomes largely adverse to him or proceedings not being pursued. The court treated this pattern and its scale as materially out of the ordinary, and it recorded that Mr Williams’s own version was that his adverse costs exposure exceeded R500 000, with the court considering it likely to be higher.

Where the judgment distinguished successes, it did so narrowly. It treated a review success before Cloete J as procedural (because a prior order already existed and the second review was unnecessary), not a vindication of Mr Williams’s substantive accusations. It similarly treated the LPC appeal tribunal’s referral for further investigation as a technical outcome based on insufficient evidence, not a merits determination in Mr Williams’s favour.

3. Legal Issues

The central questions were whether the TW Respondents had established the jurisdictional requirements for a declaration that Mr Williams was a vexatious litigant under section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956, and whether the court should also make a vexatiousness declaration under the common law (including the appropriate scope of any stay of extant proceedings).

This was predominantly a dispute about the application of legal standards to a documented litigation history and to the core allegations advanced by Mr Williams, rather than a dispute about resolving contested evidence on the merits of the underlying attorney–client dispute. The court’s enquiry focused on whether litigation was persistently instituted and without reasonable grounds, and whether the relevant claims were obviously unsustainable as a certainty, which is an evaluative standard derived from the authorities.

A further issue was whether, assuming vexatiousness, the court should order security for costs for the main application at that stage. This engaged both a legal threshold (vexatiousness as a prerequisite for security) and a discretionary judgment as to whether ordering security was appropriate in the circumstances, including the stage of proceedings and the court’s assessment of Mr Williams’s ability to furnish such security.

Finally, the court had to determine the appropriate relief structure: the breadth of any statutory restriction on future proceedings, the permissible scope under the common law (which is more limited and directed to extant proceedings), and how to craft an order that avoided confusion given that the main application also involved other respondents besides the TW Respondents.

4. Court’s Reasoning

Security for costs

The court set out that an order compelling a litigant to furnish security for costs requires a showing that the litigant is acting vexatiously in prosecuting the proceedings, and that the power should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. It adopted the definition of “vexatious” as including proceedings that are frivolous or improper, instituted without sufficient ground, or continued for improper purposes; it also emphasised that vexatiousness can exist by effect even without proof of malicious intent, and that proceedings may be vexatious where they put the other side to unnecessary trouble and expense.

Even where vexatiousness is established, the court held that it retains a discretion as to whether to order security for costs. In exercising that discretion, the court considered that an order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act would itself function as a barrier to further vexatious litigation. It also accepted that Mr Williams appeared to be insolvent and would not be able to furnish security, and it noted that the main application was already well advanced.

On this combination of considerations, the court declined to order security for costs at that time. However, it also declined to dismiss the security application outright. Instead, it removed the security application from the roll, allowing for re-enrolment should circumstances change or with leave and supplementation of papers.

Vexatious litigant relief: statutory and common law

The court treated the statutory remedy and the common-law remedy as distinct but complementary. For relief under section 2(1)(b) of the Act, it relied on the formulation that the applicant bears a stringent onus and must show that the litigant has persistently instituted legal proceedings and that such proceedings were without reasonable grounds. The court linked this to constitutional considerations, emphasising that the remedy curtails access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution and therefore must be approached cautiously and crafted to meet the immediate needs of the case. It nevertheless relied on constitutional authority that the Act survives scrutiny because it balances the right of access to court with protecting repeated targets of unmeritorious litigation and the public interest in the proper functioning of the courts.

For common-law relief, the court emphasised the High Court’s inherent power to regulate its own process and prevent abuse, but also its historical limitation: the common law could restrain abuses in extant proceedings in that court and could not impose a general forward-looking prohibition across other fora. The Act was described as addressing that inadequacy by permitting broader restrictions on the institution of proceedings.

In applying these principles, the court undertook a targeted assessment of the four core aspects it had requested the parties to identify as underpinning the main application insofar as it concerned the TW Respondents. In each instance, the court found that Mr Williams’s allegations lacked reasonable grounds and were obviously unsustainable. In relation to the “no hearing” contention, the court applied the LPC rules to find that no hearing was required where a complaint is dismissed after investigation on specified grounds, and that an appeal mechanism exists. In relation to the allocatur and taxation contentions, the court treated the documentary record and prior judicial findings as demonstrating correction of an initial taxation error rather than fraud. In relation to the 2018 High Court order, the court reasoned that the procedural record (including notices and enrolment steps) did not support any claim of secretive or fraudulent set-down. In relation to the writ re-issue and copy allocatur, the court reasoned that the allegation (as clarified in argument) did not establish falsity of content and did not amount to fraud, and it added that the record existed electronically.

The court then located these conclusions within the broader litigation history. It relied on the scale, repetition, and outcomes of Mr Williams’s applications and complaints, together with the repeated use of serious allegations against numerous individuals and institutions, as supporting an inference of persistent institution of proceedings without reasonable grounds. It also relied on prior judicial observations in other matters involving Mr Williams, which characterised his allegations as conclusory, his accusations as baseless and defamatory, and his litigation as escalating beyond reason. This contributed to the court’s evaluative conclusion that Mr Williams pursued litigation in a manner that met both the Act’s requirements (persistent proceedings without reasonable grounds) and the common-law abuse threshold (obviously unsustainable litigation).

Scope of the stay order in the main application

In crafting relief, the court distinguished between statutory forward-looking restrictions (which could prohibit institution of future proceedings without leave) and common-law relief directed at extant proceedings. When addressing the main application, the court considered that only certain prayers were directed against the TW Respondents alone. It accepted that other prayers in the main application were directed primarily at the LPC or the Ombud (even if they might affect the TW Respondents) and that it would be impractical and confusing to stay the main application against the TW Respondents while allowing it to proceed simultaneously against other respondents who had not sought such relief.

The court therefore limited the common-law stay to those identified prayers in the main application that it considered to be against Thomson Wilks and/or Mr Elliot, namely prayers 1, 2, 3, 7 and 10 to 13, and excluded the remaining prayers that were not exclusively directed at them.

Costs

The court reasoned that, because the TW Respondents succeeded in obtaining vexatious-litigant relief (statutory and common-law), they were entitled to costs of that application. Although the security for costs relief was not granted, the court treated that outcome as a discretionary refusal at that stage, not a substantive failure, and it awarded the TW Respondents their costs in relation to the security application as well. Given the seriousness and repeated nature of Mr Williams’s allegations and the absence of a factual basis for them, the court awarded costs on the attorney-and-client scale.

5. Outcome and Relief

The court declared Mr Kevin Williams to be a vexatious litigant in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956. It ordered that no legal proceedings may be instituted by Mr Williams (in his personal capacity or purported representative capacity for any entity, including Paper and Tissue Solutions (Pty) Ltd) against Thomson Wilks Inc and/or Mr Nicholas John Elliot in any court or inferior court without leave, and that such leave may be granted only if the court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of process and that there is prima facie ground for them.

The court also declared Mr Williams to be a vexatious litigant in terms of the common law. It stayed the main application, but only in respect of the relief sought against the TW Respondents in specified prayers, namely prayers 1, 2, 3, 7 and 10 to 13 of the notice of motion in the main application, pending a further order of the court upon application.

The application for security for costs was removed from the roll, with permission to re-enrol if relevant circumstances change or with leave and supplemented papers.

Mr Williams was ordered to pay the TW Respondents’ costs of the vexatious-litigant application (statutory and common-law) and the security for costs application on the attorney-and-client scale.

Cases Cited

Boost Sports Africa (Pty) Ltd v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd 2015 (5) SA 38 (SCA).

Crest Enterprises v Barnett and Schlosberg 1986 (4) SA 19 (C).

Ramsamy v Maarman 2002 (6) SA 159 (C).

Ecker v Dean 1938 AD 102.

Ecker v Dean 1937 AD 254.

Western Assurance Co v Caldwell's Trustee 1918 AD 262.

Re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929 CPD 532.

Mystic River Investments 45 (Pty) Ltd v Zayeed Paruk Inc 2023 (4) SA 500 (SCA).

Cohen v Cohen 2003 (1) SA 103 (C).

Department of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs v Maphanga 2021 (4) SA 131 (SCA).

Corderoy v Union Government 1918 AD 512.

In re Anastassiades 1955 (2) SA 220 (W).

Absa Bank Ltd v Dlamini 2008 (2) SA 262 (T).

Beinash and Another v Ernst & Young and Others 1999 (2) SA 116 (CC).

Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van der Merwe and Others (7255/2019) [2021] ZAWCHC 197; 83 SATC 19 (21 September 2021).

Manfredi de Filippo v Alessandra Micillo 23724/2016 and 11709/2017 (WCC) (16 September 2024).

Pieters N.O v Pienaar and Others [2025] 3 All SA 224 (WCC).

Legislation Cited

Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956.

Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (including section 32(1) and section 81).

Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (including sections 34 and 36).

Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (referred to in the judgment as the LPA).

Rules of Court Cited

Uniform Rule 6(5)(f)(ii).

Uniform Rule 45A.

Uniform Rule 28.

Magistrates’ Court Rules, Rule 35(3).

Legal Practice Council Rules relating to discipline (including Rule 40.5, Rule 40.6, and Rule 44.8.3, as referenced in the judgment).

Held

The court held that Mr Williams’s core contentions against the TW Respondents, including his assertions of entitlement to review relief due to the absence of an LPC “hearing”, and his allegations of fraud or forgery relating to taxation/allocaturs, a High Court order obtained on set-down, and writs of execution, were without reasonable grounds and obviously unsustainable on the material placed before the court. It further held that his broader litigation conduct over many years demonstrated persistence in instituting proceedings lacking reasonable grounds.

On that basis, the court held that the stringent statutory requirements for relief under section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act were satisfied, and that the common-law basis for restraining abuse in extant proceedings was also met. The court accordingly imposed a statutory leave requirement for any future proceedings by Mr Williams against Thomson Wilks and/or Mr Elliot, and stayed defined portions of the existing main application against them.

The court held that, although vexatiousness was established, it would not order security for costs at that stage as a matter of discretion, and instead removed that application from the roll with leave for potential re-enrolment.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The judgment applied the principle that a court may order security for costs only where it is established that the party against whom the order is sought is acting vexatiously, and that this power should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Even where vexatiousness is established, ordering security remains a discretionary determination.

For purposes of identifying vexatiousness, the judgment applied the understanding that “vexatious” litigation includes proceedings that are frivolous or improper, instituted without sufficient grounds, or pursued in a manner that causes unnecessary trouble and expense. The judgment treated malice as not being a necessary mental element for vexatiousness, focusing instead on the objective unsustainability of the litigation and its effect.

In relation to statutory relief under section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the judgment applied the jurisdictional requirements that the litigant must have persistently instituted legal proceedings and that such proceedings must have been without reasonable grounds, with the applicant bearing a stringent onus. It further applied the principle that courts must approach such relief cautiously and craft orders to meet the immediate needs of the case, given the limitation such orders impose on the constitutional right of access to courts under section 34.

The judgment reaffirmed that the common law preserves the High Court’s inherent power to regulate its own process to prevent abuse, but that its reach is limited in comparison to the Act: the common law is directed at controlling and restraining abuse in extant proceedings, whereas the Act provides a broader forward-looking screening mechanism enabling restrictions on future proceedings subject to leave.

Finally, the judgment applied the principle that costs on the attorney-and-client scale may be justified where a party persists in serious, unsubstantiated allegations and engages in litigation conduct warranting a punitive costs response, subject to the court’s discretion.

Williams v Thomson Wilks Inc/Mr Elliot and Others (2025058552) [2026] ZAWCHC 29 (4 February 2026)