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[2021] ZACT 29
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Alviva Holdings Ltd v Tarsus Technology Group (Pty) Ltd (LM185Jan21) [2021] ZACT 29 (3 June 2021)
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case No:
LM185Jan21
In the matter between
:
Alviva Holdings
Ltd
Primary Acquiring Firm
And
Tarsus Technology
Group (Pty)
Ltd
Primary Target Firm
Panel
Ms
Y
Carrim
(Presiding Member)
Mr
A
Wessels
(Tribunal Member)
Prof
.
F Tregenna (Tribunal Member)
Heard
on:
21 April
2021
Order
Issued on:
21 April
2021
Reasons
Issued on:
3 June 2021
REASONS
FOR DECISION
Conditional approval
[1]
On
21
April 2021
,
the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal")
conditionally approved the proposed transaction whereby Alviva
Holdings Ltd (
"
Alviva
"
)
intends to acquire 100% of the shares in Tarsus Technology Group
(Pty) Ltd ("Tarsus
"
)
.
Upon the implementation
of
the proposed merger, Alviva will
have sole control of Tarsus
.
[2]
The reasons for the conditional approval
follow
.
Parties to the
proposed transaction
Primary
Acquiring Firm
[3]
The primary acquiring firm is Alviva, a
public company listed on the JSE Securities Exchange
.
No shareholder exercises control over
Alviva
.
[4]
Alviva controls several companies with
different operations located in South Africa,
Mauritius, Zambia, Botswana,
Namibia, Kenya, Mozambique, United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, United States of America, and United
Kingdom
.
[5]
Alviva is a level-1 8-BBEE Contributor
with 51
%
of it black
owned
,
including
being 41
.
93%
black female owned.
[6]
Alviva and the firms it controls will be
collectively referred to as the Alviva Group
.
[7]
Alviva is an investment holding company
that provides Information and Communication Technology (ICT) products
and services through
various subsidiaries
.
The Alviva Group operates through
subsidiaries which are distinct and independent
entities that compete
with one another. The Group is active in three
business
segments
:
[7
.
1]
IT Distribution - imports and sometimes assembles IT hardware and
software which is then sold into the sub-Saharan African markets
via
reseller channels and national retail chains
;
[7
.
2]
Services and Solutions - offers systems integration and IT solutions
that include cybersecurity
,
application
development, artificial intelligence solutions and
renewable energy projects in
South Africa and internationally;
[7
.
3]
Financial Services - offers finance solutions to SMMEs and
other commercial entities mainly for office automation
and
technology-based equipment.
[8]
In South Africa, Alviva operates
through OCT Holdings (RF) (PTY) Ltd ("OCT'),
its subsidiary that operates
as an IT investment holding company
which operates two consolidated
clusters
:
[8
.
1]
IT Distribution Cluster- offers hardware and software products
.
The companies that belong to this
cluster are Pinnacle
,
Axiz
,
VH Fibre
,
Obscure
,
Froggy and Apex
.
[8
.
2]
IT Services and Solutions Cluster-offers integrat
i
on
and IT solutions
.
The
companies that belong to this cluster are Solareff, Gridcars
,
lntDev
,
Centravoice
,
Sintrex
,
SynergyERP and Datacentrix
.
Primary
Target F
i
rm
[9]
The primary target firm is Tarsus
.
Tarsus wholly controls Tarsus Shared
Services (Pty) Ltd (
"
Tarsus
Shared Services
"
)
.
Tarsus Shared Services
in turns controls Tarsus Property Holdings RF (Pty) Ltd ("Tarsus
Property
"
)
,
Tarsus Distribution (Pty) Ltd (
"
Tarsus
Distribution
"
)
and Tarsus on Demand (Pty) Ltd (
"
TOD
"
)
.
[10
]
Tarsus Distribution in turn
wholly controls Tarsus Distribution (Pty) (Botswana) and Tarsus
D
i
str
i
bution(Pty)
(Namib
i
a)
.
[11]
The proposed transaction excludes
certain Tarsus companies that were either in the process of
be
i
ng
liqu
i
dated,
dereg
i
stered
or dormant when the merger was recommended and considered by the
Tr
i
bunal.
[12]
Tarsus is wholly owned and controlled by
Mamzen (Pty) Ltd (
"
Mamzen
"
)
.
Mamzen is in turn controlled by Bowwood and Main No
.
188 (Pty) Ltd (
"
Bowwood
and Main
"
)
.
Bowwood and Main is not controlled by
any firm, and the shares are held by Investec Bank Ltd
("Investec")
,
the
Entrepreneurship Development Trust and IEP Portfolio 1 (Pty)
Ltd
.
[13]
Tarsus has five areas
i
n
which it
i
s
active
:
(
i
)
Tarsus Shared Serv
i
ces
that performs internal group services such as management and
consulting
,
IT
,
building facilities
,
marketing
,
accounting
,
treasury
,
risk management, HR and payroll
services
,
(ii)
Tarsus Property which is a holding company
for properties within Tarsus operations
,
(iii) Tarsus Distribution which
is a traditional IT hardware and software distributor of
leading hardware
technology brands to resellers
,
(iii) TOD- Tarsus
'
cloud computing division
that provides serv
i
ces
expert
i
se
around cloud ecosystem, (
i
v)
Tarsus Technology Solutions ("TTS")
that deals with the sales and distribution of data centre
technologies
including
enterprise
compute, storage, enterprise connectivity and cybersecurity
.
Proposed
transaction
[14]
The proposed transaction entails Alviva
acquiring 100% of the shares in Tarsus
.
Post-merger, Alviva will have sole
control of
Tarsus
.
Rationale
[15]
The acquiring firm submits that the
proposed transaction will be a facilitator of growth.
[16]
According to the target firm
,
Tarsus
'
s
shareholders seek to realise their
investment
as the IT Distribution
in
South Africa has been currently slow
growing paired with high costs
.
Upon
the implementation of the merger, Tarsus believes
it will be better positioned, by being part of a larger
organisation,
to grow its business and create opportunities for management
and staff
.
Industry
Background
IT
products distribution market
[17]
The IT distribution market comprises of
the designing, manufacturing, supplying
,
implementing, and supporting of
technologies that allow for the storage, retrieval
,
and transmission of information. The IT
distribution value chain consist of five key levels
:
international vendors or OEMs,
distributors, resellers
,
system
integrators and end-users
.
OEMs
or international vendors design and manufacture IT
hardware and software products such as
HP
,
Dell
,
IBM
,
Microsoft
,
Acer and sell these products to
distributors (i
.
e
.,
use reseller channels as their main
route to market and do not supply directly to the end user) or
supply directly to end-users
.
OEMs
typically appoint distributors on a non-exclusive basis
.
[18]
Resellers/systems integrators buy
products from distributors or OEMs and supply them to end-users
.
In terms of system integrators, they
supply or sell IT products to end users and also offer services
including installation and
integration of the products on the end
user's behalf
.
End
users include the government sector
,
retailers, small businesses, and large
corporates
.
These
different end users can procure by advertising a tender or buy
directly from resellers or system integrators
.
When buying smaller orders, end users
normally approach three different market participants for quotes for
the product they wish
to buy
.
Cloud
computing services
[19]
Cloud computing involves the
delivering of applications, services, or content to
the end user through storage
capacity of large-scale data centres
.
Cloud computing provides the end user
with simple ways of accessing servers, storage, databases, and a
broad set of application
services over the internet. There are three
main types of cloud computing services
:
[19
.
1]
laaS
:
comprises
of the basic capabilities provided by a physical server such as (i)
data processing (or computing)
;
(ii)
data storage; and (iii) networking
.
laaS
involves cloud companies (such as Google) providing IT infrastructure
that allows customers to store their data in the data
centres of the
cloud service provider as well as access, interpret and manipulate
it.
[19
.
2]
PaaS
:
gives
access to a cloud environment in which to develop
,
host and manage applications
.
PaaS provides the same basics as
laaS, but it is used by
developers
.
[19
.
3]
Saas
:
provides
customers with access to their service providers
'
cloud-based software
.
Saas differs from traditional software
because it avoids the need for a customer to buy and install a
particular program on a machine
.
[20]
The merging parties cannot offer cloud
computing services and operate as intermediaries that facilitate
access to cloud computing
services to resellers and retailers on
behalf of OEMs
.
Both
merging parties offer Saas.
Competition
analysis
[21]
The Commission found that the proposed
transaction results in horizontal overlaps in respect of the supply
and distribution of software
and peripherals and the provision of
cloud computing services
.
[22]
A vertical overlap was also identified
by the Commission
,
in
that the Alviva Group is both an upstream distributor of IT hardware
and software products and a downstream system
integrator
and reseller of IT hardware and software
products
.
As a system integrator, the Alviva Group sells IT products to end
users and will also offer services including the installation
and
integration of the products on the end user's behalf
.
[23]
The Commission considered the following
relevant markets in assessing the proposed transaction and made the
subsequent
findings
:
[23
.
1]
In the national upstream market for the
distribution of IT products, the Commission found
that
the merged entity will have a market share of less than 40%
with an accretion of less than 10%.
[23
.
2]
In the national downstream market for the provision of system
integration and services, the Commission found that
Alviva Group has a market share of approximately less than
15%
.
[23
.
3]
In respect of the national broad market for the provision of cloud
computing services, the merged entity will have a market
share of less than 10%, with an accretion of approximately
6%
.
[23.4] With relation of the
national narrow market for the provision of Saas where
both the merging parties are
active
,
the Commission found that merging
parties will have approximately 32,9% of the market, however,
it
is important
to note that this estimate
is overstated as the Commission
'
s
calculation does not include several players active in the cloud
computing
market.
[24]
In all the markets assessed above
,
the Commission found that the merging
parties will continue to face competition from several market
players
.
Countervailing power
[25]
In its investigation, the Commission
conducted a countervailing power assessment to
evaluate the
extent to
which
customers are able to switch
within a reasonable timeframe and
whether alternative suppliers are available in the IT products
distribution and cloud computing
services market. With respect to the
distribution of IT products, customers have the ability to switch
distributors with sufficient
alternative distributors to switch to
(including OEMs)
.
The
Commission also considered whether the ability of the customers to
switch is limited by the number of distributors appointed
for the
product brands
.
The
Commission found that the OEMs generally seek to appoint more than 1
distributor for their brands and the number of
distributors appointed depend on the
product requirements in a particular country
.
[26]
Similarly
,
in respect to the provision of cloud
computing services
,
the
Commission found that the customers have the ability to switch
providers of cloud computing services and have alternative providers
to switch to
.
Taken
as a whole, customers in the relevant markets have countervailing
power as they are able to switch to alternative suppliers
and have
sufficient alternative suppliers to switch to
.
Barriers
to entry
[27]
Based on third parties
'
submissions
,
the barriers to entry in these markets
were found to be significant in the form of capital requirements,
securing distribution agreements
with OEMs and obtaining access to
the customers
as
a new entrant in competition with larger established distributors
.
The Commission considered whether new
entry in the relevant markets would be timely, likely, and sufficient
to constrain the merged
entity post-merger
.
The Commission found that the barriers
to entry are not
insurmountable
as
there are currently several smaller
distributors distributing the various OEM products in South
Africa, although
the
market has not seen any recent entry
.
Unilateral effects
[28]
As earlier mentioned, the Commission
found that it
is
unlikely for players in the IT
distribution market to exercise any market power as distributors are
faced with substantial countervailing
power from both upstream by
OEMs and downstream by retailers
.
OEMs
directly engage with retail partners and make propositions with
regard to the product range offer by them and discuss the order
quantities
,
recommended
retail price points, distributor's margin for warehousing and
logistics and any applicable rebates
.
Moreover, most OEMs publish a
recommended retail price list of their products and monitor sales
reports generated by distributors,
which restricts the merging
parties from manipulating or controlling prices to customers
.
Thus, distributors are price and cost
takers who perform the primary function of linking the OEM with the
retailer. Hence the merged
entity will continue to be constrained by
other distributors and direct supply by the OEMs
.
[29]
In terms of Cloud computing, customers
submit that prices are largely driven by the OEMs
.
End users (customers) have no leverage
over the pricing, while adjusted per country/region, are determined
by the cloud computing
solution providers in their sole and absolute
discretion
.
Creeping
mergers
[30]
The Commission considered historic
transactions over the past 10 years by the
merging parties and found
that Alviva has been involved in several
acquisitions which have contributed to its growth
overtime
.
The
merging parties submitted that currently, Alviva
is
not considering acquiring any other
firms in South Africa or in any other territory and confirms that no
negotiations and/or agreements
have been entered into with intentions
to acquire any other firm and no due diligence investigations are
on-going or planned.
Vertical
assessment
[31]
The Commission found that the existing
vertical relationship within the Alviva Group is not as a result of
the proposed merger
.
[32]
As mentioned above, in the upstream IT
product distribution market, the merged entity was found
to not have market power
to engage in an input foreclosure strategy
as there is a significant number of distributors in
the market that
will continue to constrain the merged entity
.
Furthermore
,
OEMs have the ability to bypass
distribution level of the value chain and sell
directly to the end users
.
[33]
Because distributors are required to
sell their products to as many customers as possible
given that the OEMs that appoint
them typically set sale
targets, it is unlikely that they will be incentivised to
foreclose downstream
customers from access to the IT
products distributed by
Tarsus
.
[34]
Third parties expressed concerns that a
vertically integrated distributor may distribute IT products to their
downstream system
integrators and resellers at a lower or
preferential price and thus place the downstream player within a
vertically integrated
distributor at an advantageous position to
better compete against rivals in the downstream market. However
,
as indicated
,
the Alviva Group is already
vertically integrated and therefore the concerns raised are not
merger specific and there is no
evidence that the Alviva Group is
providing its internal downstream operations with preferential
pricing
.
[35]
In terms of customer foreclosure
,
Datacentrix
,
a subsidiary of Alviva
,
faces competition from several system
integrators in the downstream market. If the merging parties engage
in a customer foreclosure
strategy and Tarsus
supplies more of its products to Datacentrix, there remain other
customers in the market
that the current suppliers of
Datacentrix can turn to
.
All
the competitors of Axiz
,
Tarsus
and Pinnacle would continue to have access to a sufficient number of
customers in the market.
Information
sharing
[36]
The Commission received concerns from
system integrators and resellers that distributors get access to
competitively sensitive information
.
Specifically, that Tarsus has access to
customer information in the downstream
.
This transactional information includes
static and statutory information that is captured when
resellers apply to open
an account and subsequently
enters into agreement with the
distributor
.
[37]
The Commission in its assessment found
that even if this information is disclosed, Datacentrix would not be
able to use this information
to influence a transaction which has
already been concluded
.
The
sharing of this information would be detrimental to Tarsus as
Datacentrix could engage with the reseller and compete directly
with Tarsus since Datacentrix can also purchase
products from OEMs directly at the same price as distributors
and
sell to another reseller in competition with Tarsus
.
[38]
It
is
submitted by the merging parties that
distributors are prevented from disclosing information because
distributors and OEMs vendor
contracts contain strict confidentiality
clauses and breaching these clauses would
mean the termination of
the
distributor's OEMs contracts
.
Disclosure is
further limited by legislation and the
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013
and the General Data
Protection Regulation ("GDPR
"
)
issued
by
the
EU
and
applicable to Axiz
,
Pinnacle and Tarsus
.
Neither of Axiz
,
Pinnacle or Tarsus share a common system
with Datacentrix
,
and
we understand that it would therefore require an
intentional
and unlawful act to acquire or share the
customer information with Datacentrix.
[39]
Given that the vertical integration
within the Alviva Group is pre-existing
,
and the only change is that the Alviva
Group is adding Tarsus
.
Also
noting that the Alviva Group is not the only vertically integrated
company in the relevant markets
.
As
such, the Commission concluded that
the
merger does not present any information sharing concerns
that require further intervention
.
We
did not find any reason to disagree with
this
.
Public
Interest
[40]
In terms of the proposed transaction's
effect on employment
,
the
merging parties provided an unequivocal undertaking that the merger
will not result in any retrenchments or otherwise
negatively
impact employment. It was further indicated by the merging parties
that the merger will not result in any duplications
as Tarsus
will continue to operate as a separate entity
,
post merger
.
[41]
During its investigation
,
the Commission found that in March 2020
,
Tarsus had undertaken a retrenchment
process in terms of which 68 employees ("Affected Employees")
were retrenched across
the group
.
The
merging parties submitted that these retrenchments are not merger
specific but due to operational requirements
given
the dire financial state of Tarsus for several
years
and not in any reference to
the proposed transaction or known by
Alviva.
Competition
[42]
In light of the retrenchments
,
the Minister of Trade
,
Industry and ("the Minister")
filed an intention to participate
.
The
Minister submitted that the retrenchment of the Affected Employees
was likely to have been influenced by the merger given the
notable
proximity of the retrenchment processes to the merger
.
The Minister proposed that the Affected
Employees be reinstated or alternatively, the Commission impose a
condition requiring the
merging parties to reinstate the
Affected Employees or provide offers of employment when suitable
positions become available
for a period of 36 months post-merger
approval.
[43]
The Commission engaged with all the
relevant employee and trade union representatives who confirmed
receipt of the merger
notice and that the
merger did not raise any
concerns
.
[44]
The Commission assessed whether
the retrenchment of the Affect Employees is merger specific by
assessing all relevant
internal documents to ascertain whether the
retrenchment process was conducted in anticipation
of the merger
.
The Commission
'
s
findings are aligned with the merging
parties
'
submissions, in that, the Affected
Employees were retrenched pursuant to a decision taken to restructure
Tarsus for operational
reasons [ ….........................]
.
Further, the Commission found that the
restructuring of Tarsus was contemplated in December 2019, while the
merging parties commenced
negotiations on or about July
2020, after the decision to retrench had been taken internally by
Investec Bank, the
controller of
Tarsus
.
[45]
Nevertheless, in order to address any
employment concerns
,
the
merging parties agreed to a condition placing a 2-year moratorium on
post-merger retrenchments as a result of the merger
and to enable the
Affected Employees to apply for any vacancies that may arise at
the merged entity for a period of 3 years
from the implementation
date
.
[46] In relation
to the proposed transaction`s effect on B-BBEE, the Commission
received concerns from a complainant
who preferred to remain
anonymous (“the complainant”)
[…........................................................]
[47]
[…......................................] The Commission
engaged the Complainant who was subsequently directed to
the relevant
authorities to assist with the concerns raised.
[48]
The proposed transaction does not give
rise to any other public interest concerns.
Conclusion
[49]
Based on the above, we are of the view
that the proposed transaction is unlikely to
substantially prevent or lessen
competition in any of the relevant
markets
.
Furthermore
,
the proposed transaction does not raise
any public interest concerns
.
We
therefore approved the merger subject to the
employment condition set out in the attached
Annexure
A
.
Signed by
:
Yasmin
Tayob Carrim Signed
at:2021-0
6
-
03
15
:
00
:
32
+02
:
00
Reason
:
I
approve this document
Ms Yasmin
Carrim
Mr Andreas Wessels and Prof.
Fiona Tregenna concurring
3
June 2021
Date
Tribunal
Case Manager
:
For
the merging parties
:
For the Commission
:
Lumkisa
Jordan
Zoe Banchetti of Tugendhaft
Wapnick Banchetti and Partners
Portia Bele and Wiri Gumbie
Annexure A
THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Case No.: LM185Jan21
In the matter between:
Alviva
Holdings Ltd
Primary
Acquiring Firm
and
Tarsus
Technology Group (Pty)
Ltd
Primary
Target
Firm
CONDITIONS
1.
DEFINITIONS
The
following expressions shall bear the meanings assigned to them below
and cognate expressions bear corresponding meanings
:
-
1.1
"Acquiring Firm"
means
Alviva;
1.2
"Alviva"
means
Alviva Holdings
Limited
;
1.3
"Affected Employees"
means
the 68 employees of Tarsus who have been retrenched prior to the
Merger
;
1.4
"Alviva Group"
means
Alviva and its
subsidiaries;
1.5
"Approval Date"
means
the date referred to in the Competition Tribunal
'
s
merger clearance certificate (Form CT10)
;
1.6
"Business Days"
mean
any day other than a Saturday
,
Sunday
or official public holiday in the Republic of South Africa;
1.7
"Day"
means
any calendar day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday in
South Africa;
1.8
"Commission"
means the Competition Commission of
South Africa, duly established under the Competition
Act
;
1.9
"Commission Rules"
means
the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the
Annexure A
Commission;
1.10
"Competition Act"
means
the Competition Act, No
.
89
of 1998, (as amended)
;
1.11
"Conditions"
mean,
collectively
,
the
conditions referred to
in
this
document
;
1.12
"HDls"
means
a
historically
disadvantaged person/s as
defined
in
section
3(2) of
the
Competition Act
;
1.13
"Implementation
Date"
means
the
date
,
occurring after
the Approval Date
,
on
which
the Merger is implemented by the Merging Parties
;
1.14
"LRA"
means
the Labour Relations Act
,
No
.
66 of 1995
,
(as
amended);
1.15
"Merger"
means
the
acquisition
of
control
by
the
Acquiring Firm
over
the
Target Firm
;
1.16
"Merged Entity"
means
the
Acquiring
Firm
and
the
Target
Firm
following
the
Merger;
1.17
"Merging Parties"
means
the Acquiring Firms and the Target Firm
;
1.18
"Minister"
means
the
honourable
Minister for
the
Department of
Trade,
Industry and Competition;
1.19
"Moratorium"
means
a period of 2 (two) years from the Implementation
Date;
1.20
"Rules"
mean
the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition
Commission and the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the
Competition Tribunal
;
1.21
"South Africa"
means
the Republic of South Africa
;
1.22
"Target Firm"
means
Tarsus
;
1.23
"Tarsus"
means
Tarsus Technology Group Proprietary
Limited;
1.24
"Tribunal"
means
the
Competition
Tribunal of South Africa
;
and
1.25
"Tribunal Rules"
means
the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Tribunal.
Annexure A
2.
CONDITIONS TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
MERGER
2.1
The
Merging
Parties shall not retrench any employees because of
the Merger for
the duration of the Moratorium
.
2.2
For the sake of clarity
,
retrenchments do not include (i)
voluntary separation arrangements
;
(ii)
voluntary early retirement packages
;
(iii) retrenchments as a result of
unreasonable refusals to be redeployed in accordance with the
provisions of the LRA
;
(iv)
resignations or retirements
in
the
ordinary course of business
;
(v)
retrenchments lawfully effected
for
operational
requirements unrelated to
the
Merger
;
(vi) terminations in the ordinary
course of business
,
including
but not limited to
,
dismissals as a result of misconduct or poor performance; and (vii)
any decision not to renew or extend a contract of a contract
worker.
2.3
For a period of 36 (thirty-six) months
post the Implementation Date, if vacancies at the Merged Entity
become available, first preference
to apply for vacancies at the
Merged Entity will be offered to the Affected Employees
.
2.4
For the sake of brevity for purposes of
clause 2
.
3
of the Conditions, the Affected Employee will
be
considered for
any vacancy on
the
basis
that
the
Affected Employee
(i)
has the relevant expertise and
experience in respect of the position for which he/she is applying;
(ii) is a
person
of good repute with no criminal record; and (iii) it is understood
that preference will be given to applicants who are HDls,
irrespective of whether the applicant in question, is an Affected
Employee
.
3.
MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS
3.1
The Merging Parties shall circulate a
copy of the Conditions to all their employees within 5 (five) Days of
the Approval Date
.
3.2
As proof of compliance with 3
.
1
above
,
a
director of each Merging Party shall within 10 (ten) Business Days of
circulating the Conditions, submit to the Commission an
affidavit
attesting to
the
circulation of the Conditions and provide a copy of the notice that
was sent to the employees in that regard
.
3.3
The Acquiring Firms shall inform the
Commission in writing of the
Implementation
Annexure A
Date within 5 (five) Days of its
occurrence
.
3.4
The Merged Entity shall provide the
Commission with a report detailing the extent of its compliance with
clause 2
.
1
,
2
.
3
and 2.4 of the Conditions on each anniversary of the Implementation
Date for the duration of the conditions
.
This report shall be accompanied by an
affidavit
,
duly
signed by the Director of the Merged Entity, attesting to the
accuracy of the contents of the report
.
4.
APPARENT
BREACH
4.1
In the event that the Commission
receives any complaint in relation to non compliance with the
above Conditions, or otherwise
determines that there has been an
apparent breach by the Merging Parties of these Conditions
,
the breach shall be dealt with in
terms of
Rule 39 of
the Commission Rules read together with
Rule 37 of the Tribunal Rules
.
5.
VARIATION
5.1
The Merger Parties or the Commission may
at any time
,
and
on good cause shown
,
apply to the Tribunal for the Conditions to be lifted, revised or
amended
.
6.
GENERAL
6.1
All correspondence
in relation these Conditions must be submitted to the following email
address
:
mergerconditions@compco
m
.
c
o
.
za
and
minis
t
ry@thedtic
.
go
v
.
za
.