Boundary Terraces 042 (Pty) Ltd v Bravo Group (Pty) Ltd (LM272Mar19) [2019] ZACT 74 (21 October 2019)

75 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Merger Approval — Conditional approval of merger between Boundary Terraces 042 (Pty) Ltd and Bravo Group (Pty) Ltd — No competition concerns identified, but public interest concerns regarding past retrenchments — Tribunal imposing conditions including a moratorium on post-merger retrenchments and establishment of a Development Fund for affected employees — Approval granted subject to conditions aimed at mitigating negative effects of retrenchments.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These proceedings concerned a large merger before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa in which the Tribunal was required to determine whether to approve, prohibit, or approve with conditions a proposed acquisition, and in particular whether any public interest conditions were warranted notwithstanding the absence of competition concerns.


The primary acquiring firm was Boundary Terraces 042 (Pty) Ltd (“Boundary Terraces”), a newly incorporated investment vehicle established for purposes of the transaction and jointly controlled by MIG Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Corvest 12 (Pty) Ltd. The primary target firm was Bravo Group (Pty) Ltd (“Bravo Group”), wholly owned by Rockwood Private Equity.


The matter followed the ordinary merger control pathway. The merger was notified to the Competition Commission, and the Tribunal conducted a hearing on 21 August 2019. The Tribunal issued an order on 26 August 2019 conditionally approving the merger, and subsequently furnished written reasons on 21 October 2019.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was not market power or competitive harm, but rather whether retrenchments that occurred shortly before notification (and while the transaction was being negotiated) gave rise to public interest concerns relating to employment, and what conditions (including a moratorium on post-merger retrenchments and remedial measures for affected employees) were appropriate.


2. Material Facts


Boundary Terraces was a special purpose vehicle created to implement the transaction and, as such, did not itself conduct business activities. It was jointly controlled by MIG and Corvest 12 (each holding 43.7% shareholding), with the remaining issued share capital held by members of Bravo Group’s management team. MIG was part of a broader investment structure ultimately linked to the Mineworkers Investment Trust, and Corvest 12 was controlled through RMB Corvest within the FirstRand group.


Bravo Group conducted its business through manufacturing operations in lounge furniture and sleep products. Through its Lounge Division, it manufactured lounge suites and related products under brands including La-Z-Boy, Grafton Everest, Alpine Lounge, and Gamma Gomma. Through its Sleep Division, it manufactured mattresses and base sets and imported certain sleep accessories under brands including Sealy, Edblo, Slumberland, and King Koil.


The proposed transaction entailed Boundary Terraces acquiring 100% of the issued share capital of Bravo Group from Rockwood, resulting in Boundary Terraces wholly owning and controlling Bravo Group post-merger. The stated commercial rationale was that the acquiring side viewed the investment as an attractive co-investment opportunity in an established business, while Rockwood sought liquidity and value maximisation for its shareholders and investors.


It was common cause on the record that Bravo Group had engaged in a restructuring process shortly before notification, resulting in retrenchments at the Alpine and Grafton Everest factories. The Tribunal recorded that these retrenchments occurred approximately two months prior to the merger being filed with the Commission, and at a time when the transaction was being negotiated. The retrenchments took place on 18 January 2019 and 7 February 2019, and the Commission received the merger notification on 12 March 2019.


The Tribunal recorded the position presented in the merger filing that no retrenchments would arise as a result of the proposed transaction, but also recorded that the merging parties disclosed that retrenchments had already occurred (the “past retrenchments”). The parties stated that some retrenchments were not compulsory and that others involved acceptance of voluntary severance packages or early retirement.


The public interest concern was raised by trade unions (SACTWU and SAFAWU) and echoed by NUFAWSA, who expressed concern that the pre-merger retrenchments may have been a prerequisite for the sale or otherwise merger-specific. The Minister of Economic Development also filed a notice of intention to participate and urged prohibition absent remedies to mitigate job losses.


The merging parties contended that the retrenchments were not caused by the merger but by broader industry difficulties, and that the retrenchments would have continued regardless of whether the transaction proceeded.


The Commission investigated the timeline of the merger negotiations and the restructuring, and it found that the timing suggested a potential link between the retrenchments and the transaction; however, it conceded it could find no evidence proving direct involvement by the acquiring firm in the pre-merger retrenchments. The Commission nonetheless adopted a cautious approach and recommended conditional approval to address the potential public interest harm.


During the hearing, it emerged that there was not full alignment between the merging parties regarding conditions, in particular a proposed moratorium on merger-related retrenchments. The acquiring firm maintained it had not agreed to those conditions and expressed unwillingness to accept conditions said to arise from retrenchments in which it contended it was not involved.


In relation to identifying the affected employees, the Tribunal recorded that a list of retrenched employees was provided, and it became apparent that 45 of the retrenched employees had since been re-employed, reducing the total number of retrenched employees (including voluntary and non-voluntary) to 253. The Tribunal also addressed whether beneficiaries of remedial measures should include both compulsorily retrenched employees and those who accepted voluntary packages, and recorded that the merging parties were comfortable that both categories should benefit. The Tribunal further addressed that responsibility for a re-employment remedy was more appropriately placed on the target firm rather than the acquiring firm, and recorded agreement to that effect.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the proposed merger, despite raising no competition concerns, nonetheless triggered public interest concerns (specifically employment-related concerns) warranting the imposition of conditions, and if so what the appropriate nature and allocation of those conditions should be.


A further issue concerned the appropriate treatment of post-merger retrenchments, namely whether a moratorium on merger-related retrenchments should be imposed, and how to address the acquiring firm’s objection to conditions given its denial of involvement in the pre-merger retrenchments. This required the Tribunal to make an evaluative assessment of risk and appropriate safeguards, rather than to resolve a pure factual dispute on causation on a balance of probabilities.


The dispute therefore primarily concerned the application of merger control principles to the facts (especially public interest considerations), alongside an element of value judgment or discretion as to the necessity and proportionality of conditions directed at employment impacts in the context of temporal proximity and uncertainty regarding causation.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On the competition assessment, the Tribunal reasoned that the transaction raised no competition concerns because Boundary Terraces (as a newly incorporated vehicle) was not active in the relevant markets for lounge furniture and sleep products. On that basis, the Tribunal concluded that the merger would not substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market.


The Tribunal’s reasoning focused on public interest. It considered that retrenchments had occurred shortly before notification and during the period when the transaction was being negotiated, and it took account of the concerns raised by unions and the Minister that these job losses might have been linked to the merger process. Although the Commission could not establish evidence proving the acquiring firm’s direct involvement in the retrenchments, the Tribunal accepted that the timing and surrounding circumstances justified a cautious approach and warranted remedial conditions directed at potential employment harm.


A significant aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning related to the debate about a moratorium on post-merger retrenchments. The Tribunal noted that the acquiring firm had not agreed to the proposed moratorium and advanced the position that it should not be bound by conditions arising from pre-merger retrenchments it said it did not cause and regarded as a risk. The Commission, however, maintained that a moratorium was appropriate and suggested that operationally justified retrenchments would not, in practice, be treated inflexibly, provided appropriate information was supplied.


The Tribunal evaluated the acquiring firm’s stance as seeking to avoid meaningful constraints (“nothing other than a blank cheque”) and rejected that approach. The Tribunal reasoned that, if retrenchments were truly operationally justified, the merging parties should be able to provide a sworn statement to that effect. In the Tribunal’s assessment, the public interest in protecting against merger-related job losses outweighed inconvenience to the merging parties associated with compliance and disclosure. On this basis, it found that a moratorium on post-merger retrenchments was warranted.


In dealing with remedies directed at past retrenchments, the Tribunal considered practical implementation questions, including whether affected employees were identifiable (and accepted the provision of an employee list), the reduced number of retrenched employees due to subsequent re-employment, and whether recipients of remedial measures should include both compulsory retrenchees and those who accepted voluntary severance or early retirement. It accepted that both categories would benefit. The Tribunal also reasoned that the obligation to notify and potentially re-employ affected employees in suitable roles was, as a matter of appropriateness, better placed on the target firm, and it recorded that this was agreed by the Commission and the merging parties.


Overall, the Tribunal’s reasoning reflects an approach that, in circumstances where competition concerns were absent but public interest employment risks were credibly raised and not fully dispelled (even if not proven as merger-specific), it was appropriate to approve the merger subject to conditions aimed at ameliorating negative employment effects and guarding against merger-related retrenchments.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal conditionally approved the proposed transaction.


The approval was subject to public interest conditions intended to address employment-related concerns arising from the pre-merger retrenchments and to prevent merger-related job losses post-merger. The reasons describe conditions including a moratorium on merger-related retrenchments, the establishment of a development fund aimed at reskilling affected employees (or supporting small business start-ups), and a mechanism requiring that affected employees be notified of relevant job opportunities and be re-employed if they meet relevant criteria, with responsibility for the re-employment remedy situated with the target firm.


No costs order is recorded in the reasons.


Cases Cited


No cases are cited in the reasons.


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 189 (referred to in relation to consultation meetings during retrenchment processes).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court are cited in the reasons.


Held


The Tribunal held that the proposed acquisition of Bravo Group by Boundary Terraces did not raise competition concerns because the acquiring vehicle had no activities in the relevant markets, and therefore the merger would not substantially prevent or lessen competition.


The Tribunal further held that, notwithstanding the absence of competition concerns, the merger raised public interest concerns relating to employment due to the close temporal proximity between pre-merger retrenchments and the merger negotiations and notification, and the inability to exclude a potential link. It accordingly held that conditional approval with employment-related conditions was appropriate, including a moratorium on merger-related retrenchments and remedial measures for affected employees.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Tribunal applied the principle that merger control assessment includes both competition effects and public interest considerations, and that a merger may be approved subject to conditions where public interest risks require mitigation even if competition harm is absent.


In applying public interest principles concerning employment, the Tribunal proceeded on a precautionary evaluative basis: where retrenchments occur in close proximity to merger negotiations and notification, and where concerns are raised that job losses may be merger-related, conditions may be justified even if direct causation is not proven, provided the conditions are directed at ameliorating identified public interest harm.


The Tribunal applied the principle that protective conditions relating to retrenchments must be meaningful. Where merging parties assert that any post-merger retrenchments would be operationally justified, the Tribunal treated it as appropriate for parties to substantiate that position (including, on the Tribunal’s reasoning, by providing a sworn statement), and it weighed the public interest in job protection more heavily than compliance inconvenience to the merging parties.


The Tribunal also applied a practical implementation principle in crafting conditions: remedial measures should be administrable, with affected employees being identifiable, beneficiaries clearly determined, and obligations allocated to the entity best placed to perform them (in this matter, the target firm in relation to notification and re-employment opportunities).

competitiontribunal
SOUTH AFRICA
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: LM272Mar19
In the matter between:
Boundary Terraces 042 (Pty) Ltd Primary Acquiring Firm
and
Bravo Group (Pty) Ltd Primary Target Firm
Panel : Yasmin Carrim (Presiding Member)
: Enver Daniels (Tribunal Member)
: Andreas Wessels (Tribunal Member)
Heard on : 21 August 2019
Order Issued on : 26 August 2019
Reasons Issued on : 21 October 2019
Reasons for Decision (Non-confidential)
Conditional approval
[1] On 26 August 2019, the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal") conditionally approved
the proposed transaction between Boundary Terraces 042 (Pty) Ltd ("Boundary
Terraces") and Bravo Group (Pty) Ltd ("Bravo Group"). The proposed transaction
did not give rise to any competition concerns. It did, however, engender public
interest concerns. Consequently, we imposed a set of conditions aimed at
remedying these concerns.
[2] The reasons for the conditional approval follow.
1

Parties to proposed transaction
Primary acquiring firm
[3] The primary acquiring firm is Boundary Terraces, a company incorporated in
accordance with the company laws of South Africa. Boundary Terraces is jointly
controlled by MIG Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd ("MIG") and Corvest 12 (Pty) Ltd
("Corvest"), each with a 43.7% shareholding. The remaining issued share capital
is held by the members of the management team of Bravo Group.
[4] MIG is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mineworkers Investment Company (RF) (Pty)
Ltd ("MIG Group"), 1 which is, in turn, controlled by the Mineworkers Investment
Trust.
[5] Corvest 12 is controlled by RMB Corvest 2 (Pty) Ltd ("RMB Corvest"), which is
ultimately controlled by FirstRand Ltd ("FirstRand").2
[6] Boundary Terraces is a newly incorporated investment vehicle created for the
purposes of the proposed transaction. Consequently, it does not conduct any
business activities.
[7] Boundary Terraces, all its controllers and the subsidiaries are, hereafter, referred
to as the Acquiring Group, alternatively the acquiring firm.
[8] MIG Group is a 100% black owned broad-based investment holding company
which was established by the Mineworkers Investment Trust ("MIT") to provide
ongoing funding for its social and educational projects.
[9] Corvest 12 is a subsidiary of RMB Corvest, a private equity investment firm within
the FirstRand group. RMB Corvest funds private investments for mid-to-large
1 The MIC Group controls a number of firms, including, amongst others, MIC Investment Holdings (Pty)
Ltd, Ridge Empowerment Capital (RF) {Pty) Ltd, MIC Management Services (Pty) Ltd and MIC-Leisure
(Pty) Ltd.
2 FirstRand controls FirstRand Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd, RMB Investments & Advisory (Pty) Ltd
and RMB Private Equity HoldCo 1 (Pty) Ltd.
2

sized management buyouts and leveraged buy-ins. It further provides
development capital for growing companies and funds black economic
empowerment consortiums in securing equity stakes.
[1 O] FirstRand is active in the financial services market, which includes retail banking,
short-term insurance broking, assets/investment management, private client's
management, mortgage lending and other banking solutions.
Primary target firm
[11] The primary target firm is Bravo Group (Pty) Ltd ("Bravo Group"), a company
incorporated in accordance with the company laws of South Africa. Bravo Group
is wholly owned and controlled by Rockwood Private Equity ("Rockwood"). In
South Africa, Bravo Group controls Bravo Group Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd ("Bravo
Group Manufacturing") and Bravo Group Properties (Pty) Ltd ("Bravo Group").
[12] Bravo Group Manufacturing is active in the manufacture of lounge furniture and
sleep products through two separate divisions, namely the Lounge Division and
the Sleep Division.
[13] The Lounge Division manufactures lounge suites, recliners, coffee tables and
headboards under the brands La-Z-Boy, Grafton Everest, Alpine Lounge and
Gamma Gomma.3
[14] The Sleep Division manufactures mattresses and base sets as well as imports
mattress protectors and pillows under the brands Sealy, Edblo, Slumberland and
King Koil.4
Proposed transaction and rationale
[15] Boundary Terraces will acquire 100% of the issued share capital of Bravo Group,
from Rockwood. Post transaction, Boundary Terraces will wholly own and control
Bravo Group.
3

[16] From the perspective of MIC and Corvest 12, the proposed transaction presents
an attractive opportunity to co-invest in a reputable sleep and lounge product
business.
[17] Rockwood has decided to sell its shares in Bravo to create liquidity and maximise
value for its respective shareholders and investors.
Impact on competition
[18] This merger raises no competition concerns because Boundary Terraces is not . .
active in the lounge furniture and sleep products markets.
[19] In light of the above, we found that the transaction would not substantially prevent
or lessen competition in any relevant market.
Public interest
[20] Although the merging parties submitted, in the merger filing, that no retrenchments
would arise as a result of the proposed transaction, they indicated that Bravo
Group had engaged in a restructuring process which culminated in the
retrenchment of .mployees. Of these employees,.had been employed at
the Alpine factory and llat the Grafton Everest factory ("past retrenchments").
Bravo Group further specified that llof these retrenchments were compulsory,
while the rest had accepted Voluntary Severance Packages (VSPs) or early
retirement.
[21] Notably, the retrenchment process was implemented two months prior to the
merger being filed with the Commission,5 and at a time when the merging parties
were negotiating the proposed transaction.
5 The retrenchments took place on 18 January 2019 and 7 February 2019, respectively. The
Commission received the merger notification on the 12 March 2019.
4

[22] The Commission received a notice of Intention to Participate from the South
African Clothing and Textile Workers Union ("SACTWU") and the South African
Furniture Allied Workers Union ("SAFAWU"),6 both of which expressed the
concern that the pre-merger retrenchments may have been a prerequisite for the
sale to go through. Their concerns were echoed by the National Union of
Furniture and Allied Workers of South Africa ("NUFAWSA"), which expressed the
fear that the retrenchments may have been merger specific.
[23] The Minister of the Department of Economic Development ("EDD") also submitted
a notice of intention to participate and urged for a prohibition of the merger in the
absence of appropriate remedies aimed at mitigating the negative effect of the job
losses.
[24] In response to these concerns, the merging parties explained that the pre-merger
retrenchment process had not been implemented as a result of the proposed
[25]
transaction, but rather the difficulties in the South African furniture industry,
merging parties further submitted that the retrenchments would continue
irrespective of whether the proposed transaction was successfully implem~nted.7
[26] In light of the above, the Commission investigated whether the restructuring
process was tantamount to merger-specific retrenchments by having regard to the
6 SAFAWU indicated that the sale of Bravo Group was not once mentioned during the section 189
consultation meetings that took place at Alpine Lounge in the period 24 January 2019 and 4 March
2019.
7 Record, p68 para 10.4.
5

timeline of engagement between the merging parties. In particular, the
Commission assessed when Bravo Group contemplated the retrenchment of
employees and when they started engaging with the Acquiring Group on the
proposed transaction.
[27] The Commission found that the timing of events relating to the proposed
transaction and the retrenchments suggested that the retrenchments could
potentially be linked to the proposed transaction. However, it conceded that it
could find no evidence to prove the direct involvement of the acquiring firm in the
pre-merger retrenchments that had occurred at Bravo Group.8 In particular, it
could establi~h no relationship between a cost-savings exercise and the proposed
At the hearing, the Commission explained their position
as follows:
" .. . the purchase price essentially went down ... if the theory has been that they are
doing this in order to attract a better price then it seems to suggest that it didn't work
in this case because ultimately the purchase price went down. "10
[28] Nevertheless, the Commission adopted a cautious approach in view of the close
timing of the transaction negotiation, the retrenchments and merger notification,
and concluded that the retrenchments "could potentially be linked to the merger". 11
The merging parties were asked to propose a set of conditions aimed at
ameliorating the negative effects of the retrenchments.
[29] The Commission thereafter recommended that the Tribunal approve the merger
on the following conditions:
29.1 A three-year moratorium to be placed on merger related retrenchments;
6 CC Recommendations p28, para 29.
9 Transcript page 16, lines 1 - 20.
10 As above.
11 Transcript page 16, line 26 & page 17; line 1.
6

29.2 Rockwood to set up a Development Fund aimed at reskilling the Affected
Employees, who could, alternatively, use their portion of the fund to start
up small businesses; and
29.3 The acquiring firm is required to notify the Retrenched Employees of any
relevant job opportunities which may arise at the merged entity and
reemploy them should they meet the relevant criteria.
[30] The Tribunal had a number of queries in relation to the proposed remedies
regarding the past retrenchments. However, before dealing with them, it is
desirable to broach a matter that arose during the course of the hearing in relation
to post merger retrenchments.
Post-merger retrenchments
[31] In the course of the hearing, it became apparent that there was a lack of
consensus between the merging parties on the imposition of conditions. The
acquiring firm advised the Tribunal that it had not agreed to the proposed
conditions, in particular the moratorium on retrenchments. While the Commission
had created the impression that both the merging parties had agreed to the
proposed remedy and Bravo Group may have acquiesced to the Commission's
suggestion, the acquiring firm itself had not agreed to the imposition of the
conditions.12
[32]
12 Transcript page 107, lines 5 -15.
13 Transcript page 104, lines 1 - 14.
7

[33] The above sentiment was elaborated upon by Mr Robert Grieve, an executive at
RMB Corvest. According to Mr Grieve, the acquiring firm had not been involved
in the retrenchments that took place at Bravo Group and had in fact viewed them
as a considerable risk. Accordingly, Mr Grieve indicated that the acquiring firm
would be unwilling to accept any conditions arising as a consequence of these
retrenchments - a position it had made clear to Bravo Group at the time of the
retrenchments. 14
[34] The Commission indicated that it would not be willing to alter its position in relation
to the moratorium. It argued that the acquiring firm's reservations were unfounded
as the Commission did not easily issue notices of apparent breach where
operational justifications for post-merger retrenchments existed.15 All that was
required of the acquiring firm in such eventuality would be to provide the
Commission with the relevant information.
[35] We asked whether the acquiring firm would be prepared to accept a shorter
moratorium on merger related retrenchments - a compromise which was in fact
suggested by Bravo Group - the acquiring firm submitted that it would not change
its position in relation to this remedy.16
[36]
[37]
[38]
14 Transcript page 53, lines 8 - 26.
15 Transcript page 133, lines 17 - 26 and page 134, lines 1 - 21.
1s Transcript page 107, lines 5 -15.
11 Transcript, page 165, lines 10 -12.
8

[39] The position of the Acquiring Group was that it would accept nothing other than a
blank cheque. This is a position that we cannot accept, if the post-merger
retrenchments are to be affected for operational reasons, then the merging parties
should have no difficulty in providing an affidavit to that effect. The public interest
in protecting against merger related job losses is more compelling than the
inconvenience caused to the merging parties.
[40] Accordingly, we found that a moratorium on post-merger retrenchments was
warranted.
Past Retrenchments
[41] We enquired from the merging parties whether the retrenched employees were
identifiable so as to eliminate any uncertainty regarding their status. A list
indicating the retrenched employee's names, gender and category (i.e. whether
they were skilled/semi-skilled) was subsequently provided. During the course of
this enquiry, it was brought to light that 45 (forty-five) of the retrenched employees
had, since the completion of these retrenchments, already been reemployed,
thereby reducing the total number of retrenched employees (whether on a
voluntary basis or not) to 253 employees.19
[42] We queried whether it was the intention of the merging parties that the Affected
Employees - ergo the recipients of the Development Fund and the reemployment
opportunity - should constitute both the forcibly retrenched employees and those
who had accepted VSPs. The merging parties indicated that they were
1s Transcript page 151, lines 18-24.
19 Transcript, page 145, lines 15 - 23.
9

comfortable with both groups of retrenched employees benefitting from the
Development Fund and re-employment opportunity.
[43] We further queried whether it was appropriate for the conditions - as they were
currently phrased - to impose the responsibilities in relation to the re-employment
remedy upon the acquiring firm. Unsurprisingly, the Commission and the merging
parties agreed that it would be apposite for the responsibility to lie with the target
firm.
Conclusion
[44] In light of the above, we approved the proposed transaction subject to the set of
public interest conditions, attached hereto marked as "AnnexureA". In our view
these conditions adequately address any public interest concerns arising from the
proposed tra ,,,,...-...,,"'"""'
~teA 21 October 2019
Ms. Yasmin Carrim DATE
Mr. Enver Daniels and Mr. Andreas Wessels concurring
Case Manager: Helena Graham
For Boundary Terraces: Paul Cleland of Werksmans Attorneys and Adv. F.
Snyckers (first hearing day only).
For Bravo Group: Johan Roodt of Roodt Inc.
For the Commission: Mogau Aphane and Zintle Siyo
10