DSV A-S v Panalpina Welttransport Holding (Panalpina World Transport Holding) AG (LM032May19) [2019] ZACT 48 (25 July 2019)

80 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger Approval — DSV A/S acquiring Panalpina Welttransport Holding AG — Tribunal approving transaction unconditionally — No substantial prevention or lessening of competition identified in relevant markets — No public interest concerns raised.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned merger proceedings before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa in which the Tribunal was required to determine whether a proposed acquisition should be approved in terms of South African competition law merger control.


The parties to the proceedings were DSV A/S as the primary acquiring firm and Panalpina Welttransport Holding (Panalpina World Transport Holding) AG as the primary target firm (collectively referred to in the reasons as the merging parties). The Competition Commission of South Africa participated in the proceedings in its statutory capacity, having investigated the transaction and presented its assessment to the Tribunal.


From a procedural perspective, the matter was heard on 26 June 2019, on which date the Tribunal issued an order unconditionally approving the transaction. The Tribunal’s written reasons for that approval were subsequently issued on 25 July 2019.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the proposed transaction—DSV’s acquisition of 100% of the issued share capital in Panalpina—was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market in South Africa, and whether the merger raised any public interest concerns, including in relation to employment.


2. Material Facts


DSV A/S was described as a public company incorporated in Denmark that is not controlled by any individual shareholder. It controlled a number of firms active in South Africa (referred to collectively as the Acquiring Group). The Acquiring Group provided freight-forwarding and logistics services globally, including arranging freight-forwarding by air, land (road and rail), and sea, and related services such as assisting with border clearance requirements, customs and excise arrangements, and warehousing while goods are in transit. The Tribunal recorded that the Acquiring Group did not own transport equipment/assets, and that the actual transport operations were performed by external shipping companies and airlines.


In South Africa, the Acquiring Group had a presence in Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Cape Town. The freight-forwarding services it provided in South Africa were recorded as being in respect of non-perishable products such as pharmaceutical products, hazardous goods, automotive parts, and clothing. A material factual feature relied upon by the Tribunal was that the Acquiring Group did not currently provide freight-forwarding services in South Africa in respect of perishable products.


Panalpina Welttransport Holding (Panalpina World Transport Holding) AG was described as a public company incorporated in Switzerland, also not controlled by any individual shareholder. It controlled a number of firms with activities in South Africa, including Skyservices (Pty) Ltd. Panalpina was characterised as a global freight-forwarding and logistics company, also involved in cargo security solutions and supply chain management services. In South Africa, through Skyservices, Panalpina offered solutions directly related to air freight-forwarding, and the Tribunal recorded that the majority of these air freight-forwarding services were in respect of perishable goods. The provision of these services involved operating facilities at O.R. Tambo International Airport and Cape Town International Airport, and the Commission described these services as requiring specialised facilities such as cold rooms, fumigation chambers, force coolers, and ozone purification systems.


The proposed transaction was that DSV would acquire 100% of the issued share capital in Panalpina, with DSV obtaining sole control over Panalpina upon implementation. The merging parties’ stated rationale included that the transaction would create an opportunity for the Acquiring Group to diversify its freight-forwarding services in South Africa by enabling it to provide such services in respect of perishable products after implementation.


As to competition conditions, the Commission identified a horizontal overlap between the merging parties in the (broad) market for freight-forwarding and clearing services in South Africa and assessed the merger on that basis. The Tribunal recorded that there was no publicly available information on market shares in South Africa, and that the Commission referred to information suggesting there were in excess of 300 providers of freight-forwarding and clearing services active in South Africa, with the majority being very small providers. The Tribunal also recorded the Commission’s estimate that the total market size was approximately R211 billion by annual turnover, but treated this figure as unreliable because the Commission could not adequately explain the sources or methodology when questioned.


The Tribunal relied on the Commission’s analysis that there were a number of other larger players active in South Africa in the provision of freight-forwarding and clearing services, including Bidvest-Sebenza, Kuehne + Nagel, OHL, Expeditors International, and DB Schenker. The Tribunal further took into account that none of the merging parties’ customers raised concerns during the Commission’s investigation.


On public interest, the merging parties confirmed that the transaction would not have negative effects on employment in South Africa, and the Tribunal recorded that the transaction raised no other public interest concerns.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the Tribunal was required to determine were whether the proposed transaction was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market in South Africa, and whether any public interest concerns arose that would justify conditions or refusal of approval.


A further issue—treated as relevant to the competition assessment—was the appropriate delineation of the relevant product market. The Tribunal expressly considered that the market might be defined broadly (freight-forwarding and clearing services generally) or more narrowly (by mode of transport such as air, land, or sea, or by specialisation such as services related to perishable goods). The Tribunal ultimately treated market definition as an open question in the circumstances of this case.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of competition law standards to the factual context of the merger (including market structure, presence or absence of overlap, and potential constraints), together with an evaluative assessment of whether the evidence supported a finding of likely harm to competition and whether any public interest impacts were triggered.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Tribunal approached the competition analysis by first recording the Commission’s assessment that there was a horizontal overlap between the merging parties in a broad market for freight-forwarding and clearing services in South Africa. However, the Tribunal made clear that it took no view on the exact parameters of the relevant product market in this matter. It expressly contemplated multiple plausible market formulations, including a broad market for all freight-forwarding and clearing services, narrower markets based on transport modality, and narrower markets based on areas of specialisation such as perishables.


In considering a potential narrow market relating to perishable goods, the Tribunal referred to evidence indicating that providing freight-forwarding and clearing services for perishables involves a degree of specialisation and would typically require a firm to make a conscious decision to enter at scale, including potentially leasing or having access to appropriate facilities. The Tribunal treated this as suggesting that a narrow market focused on perishables could be relevant. Nonetheless, it did not finally delineate the market because, on that narrower approach (specifically, a market for air freight-forwarding and clearing services for perishable goods), the Tribunal found that there was no overlap between the merging parties’ activities in South Africa, and therefore no competition concerns arose on that framing.


Turning to a potential broad market for freight-forwarding and clearing services, the Tribunal noted the lack of publicly available market share information and examined the Commission’s reliance on the presence of numerous providers (in excess of 300). The Tribunal expressed a reservation about whether a large number of very small players, considered individually, would effectively constrain the merged entity. The Tribunal therefore did not treat the mere existence of many small firms as determinative.


The Tribunal also scrutinised the Commission’s estimate of market size (approximately R211 billion in turnover). Because the Commission could not adequately explain the data sources and methodology used to arrive at that figure when questioned by the Tribunal, the Tribunal stated that it placed no reliance on that estimate. This formed part of the Tribunal’s evaluative approach to the evidence, in which it declined to rely on unsupported quantitative assertions.


Despite these reservations, the Tribunal considered that the competitive landscape included a number of other significant competitors active in South Africa, identified in the Commission’s analysis as including Bidvest-Sebenza, Kuehne + Nagel, OHL, Expeditors International, and DB Schenker. The Tribunal also relied on the absence of customer complaints or concerns raised during the Commission’s investigation as an additional indicator that the transaction was not likely to generate substantial competitive harm.


Synthesising these considerations, the Tribunal concluded that there was no reason to believe the merger was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any plausible relevant market in South Africa. The Tribunal then addressed public interest, recording the merging parties’ confirmation that the merger would not negatively affect employment in South Africa and finding that no other public interest concerns arose. On this basis, the Tribunal determined that unconditional approval was appropriate.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Competition Tribunal approved the proposed transaction unconditionally.


No conditions were imposed in relation to competition or public interest factors, and the Tribunal recorded that no public interest concerns (including employment effects) arose on the facts presented.


The reasons provided do not record any separate or specific costs order.


Cases Cited


No cases were cited in the Tribunal’s written reasons.


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the Tribunal’s written reasons.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the Tribunal’s written reasons.


Held


The Tribunal held that the proposed acquisition of Panalpina by DSV was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market in South Africa, including on a narrower consideration of services for perishable goods where the Tribunal found no overlap between the merging parties’ activities in South Africa. The Tribunal further held that the transaction raised no public interest concerns, including in relation to employment. The merger was therefore approved unconditionally.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A competition assessment may proceed without a definitive finding on the precise relevant market definition where, on the available facts, the outcome is not dependent on choosing among plausible market delineations. In this matter, the Tribunal left the product market definition open because the merger raised no competition concerns on the narrower perishables framing and was not shown to be problematic on a broader framing.


Claims about market size or quantitative market indicators must be supported by an intelligible source and methodology before they can be relied upon in evaluating competitive effects. Where the proffered market-size estimate could not be adequately explained, the Tribunal treated it as insufficiently reliable for its assessment.


In evaluating likely competitive effects, the presence of other substantial competitors and the absence of concerns raised by customers during an investigation may be treated as relevant contextual indicators when determining whether a merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, particularly where market-share evidence is limited.


Public interest considerations, including employment effects, form part of the merger assessment. Where the parties confirm no adverse employment impact and no other public interest concerns are identified, the Tribunal may approve the merger without public interest conditions.

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[2019] ZACT 48
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DSV A-S v Panalpina Welttransport Holding (Panalpina World Transport Holding) AG (LM032May19) [2019] ZACT 48 (25 July 2019)

COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No: LM032May19
In
the matter between:
DSV
A/S

Primary Acquiring Firm
And
Panalpina
Welttransport Holding (Panalpina World
Transport
Holding)
AG

Primary Target Firm
Panel:
E Daniels (Presiding Member)
:
A Wessels (Tribunal Member)
:
M Mokuena (Tribunal Member)
Heard
on: 26 June 2019
Order
Issued on: 26 June 2019
Reasons
Issued on: 25 July 2019
REASONS
FOR DECISION
Approval
[1]
On 26 June 2019, the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal")
unconditionally approved the proposed transaction involving
DSV A/S
("DSV") and Panalpina Welttransport Holding (Panalpina
World Transport Holding) AG ("PWT"), hereinafter

collectively referred to as the merging parties.
[2]
The reasons for the approval of the proposed transaction follow.
Parties
to the proposed transaction
Primary
Acquiring Firm
[3]
DSV is a public company
incorporated in accordance with the laws of Denmark and is not
controlled by any individual shareholder.
DSV controls a number of
firms with activities in South Africa.
[1]
DSV and all the firms, directly or indirectly, controlled by it are
hereafter collectively referred to as the "Acquiring Group".
[4]
The Acquiring Group provides freight-forwarding and logistics
services globally. It provides its freight-forwarding services
by
air, land (road and rail) and sea. The services provided· also
include arrangements for meeting the legal requirements
for goods to
clear the relevant border crossings and for the applicable customs
and excise to be paid and arranging for the warehousing
of the goods
whilst in transit. It however does not own transport equipment /
assets and the actual transport operations are performed
by external
shipping companies and airlines on its behalf.
[5]
In South Africa, the Acquiring Group has a presence in Durban,
Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, East London and Cape Town. The

freight-forwarding services provided in South Africa are in respect
of non-perishable products such as pharmaceutical products,
hazardous
goods, automotive parts and clothing. We note that the Acquiring
Group currently does not provide freight-forwarding
services in South
Africa in respect of perishable products.
Primary
Target Firm
[6]
PWT is a public company incorporated in accordance with the laws of
Switzerland and is not controlled by any individual shareholder.
PWT
controls a number of firms with activities in South Africa including
Skyservices (Pty) Ltd ("Skyservices").
[7]
PWT is a global freight-forwarding and logistics company. It is also
involved in the provision of cargo security solutions and
supply
chain management services.
[8]
In terms of services provided
in South Africa, which are conducted through Skyservices, PWT offers
solutions directly related to
air freight-forwarding.
[2]
The majority of these air freight-forwarding services are in respect
of perishable goods. To provide these services PWT operates

facilities located at the O.R Tambo International and Cape Town
International airports. According to the Competition Commission

("Commission"), the provision of these services requires
facilities such as cold rooms, fumigation chambers, force coolers
and
ozone purification systems.
Proposed
transaction and rationale
[9]
In terms of the proposed transaction DSV intends to acquire 100% of
the issued share capital in PWT. On implementation of the
proposed
transaction DSV will exercise sole control over PWT.
[10]
As rationale for the proposed transaction the merging parties
submitted that the proposed transaction
inter alia
presents an
opportunity for the Acquiring Group to diversify its
freight-forwarding services offering in South Africa by being able
to
provide such services in respect of perishable products pursuant to
the implementation thereof.
Impact
on competition
[11]
The Commission found a horizontal overlap between the
activities of the merging parties in the (broad market for the)
provision
of freight-forwarding and clearing services in South Africa
and it assessed the proposed transaction on that basis.
[12]
The Tribunal takes no view in this matter on the exact
parameters of the relevant product market, i.e. whether there is (i)
a broad
market for all freight-forwarding and clearing services in
general; or (ii) narrower product markets based on whether these
services
are provided by (a) air, (b) land (road and rail) and (c)
sea; or (iii) narrow product markets based on certain areas of
specialisation,
for example the provision of freight-forwarding and
clearing services in relation to perishable goods.
[13]
In relation to providing
freight-forwarding and clearing services specifically for perishable
goods, Mr Gary Dracatos from DSV indicated
that
"there
is
a
certain
level of I guess specialisation required for perishables and this is
in an area that you would probably have to make
a
conscious decision to enter
by for example leasing
a
facility etcetera, to do on
any significant scale"
and
"there are
a
number of third parties we
would go to currently if we had an ad hoe requirement but to do it
[perishables] on scale you would probably
want to have your own
facilities."
[3]
This suggests to us that a
potential narrow relevant product market for the provision of
freight-forwarding and clearing services
in relation to perishable
goods should be considered. However, as stated above, we leave the
issue of product market delineation
open. When one in this case does
consider a potential (narrow) relevant product market for the
provision of air freight-forwarding
and clearing services for
perishable goods, there is no overlap between the merging parties'
activities in South Africa and thus
no competition concerns.
[14]
In relation to a potential broad market for freight-forwarding
and clearing services in general, the Commission submitted that that

there is no publicly available information on market shares in South
Africa. The Commission however indicated that according to
the
Freight Forwarding Association of South Africa, there are in excess
of 300 providers of freight forwarding and clearing services
that are
active in South Africa, with the vast majority of these providers
being very small players. We question if the (large
group of) very
small players in this market individually could effectively constrain
the merged entity.
[15]
The Commission in its report further indicated that it
estimates the total market for the provision of freight forwarding
and clearing
services in South Africa to be approximately R211
billion in size by annual turnover. However, when questioned by the
Tribunal
about the source(s) of this information and the methodology
used to calculate the total size of the market, the Commission was
unable to adequately explain how this figure was arrived at. We
therefore place no reliance on the abovementioned figure.
[16]
What we do however know
from the Commission's analysis is that there are a number of other
larger players active in the provision
of freight-forwarding and
clearing services in South Africa including Bidvest-Sebenza, Kuehne +
Nagel, OHL, Expeditors International
and DB Schenker.
[4]
[17]
We have also considered the fact that none of the merging
parties' customers raised concerns regarding the proposed transaction
during the Commission's investigation.
[18]
Given the above, we have no reason to believe that the
proposed transaction is likely to substantially prevent or lessen
competition
in any potential relevant product market in South Africa.
Public
interest
[19]
The merging parties
confirmed that the proposed transaction will not have any negative
effects on employment in South Africa.
[5]
[20]
The proposed transaction raises no other public interest
concerns.
Conclusion
[21]
In light of the above, we conclude that the proposed
transaction is unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen
competition in any
relevant market. In addition, no public interest
concerns arise from the proposed transaction. Accordingly, we approve
the proposed
transaction unconditionally.
_____________________
25
July 2019
Mr.
AW Wessels
Date
Mr.
Enver Daniels and Mrs. Medi Mokuena concurring
Tribunal
Case Manager: Olwethu Shedi and Hlumelo Vazi
For
the Merging Parties: A Scallan of ENSafrica
For
the Commission: Y Okharedia and W Gumbie
[1]
See Merger Record inter alia pages 21 and 22.
[2]
Contrary to DSV, PWT's South African freight-forwarding business is
limited to air freight-forwarding services and a negligible
amount
of ocean freight-forwarding services.
[3]
Transcript, pages 17, line 11, to page 18, line 7.
[4]
The Commission provided turnover figures for these firms for
freight-forwarding and clearing services provided in South Africa.

These figures can be compared to the merged entity's turnover for
the same services.
[5]
Merger Record, pages 15 and 84.