Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd v United Office Furniture Outlets (Pty) Ltd (LM226Nov17) [2018] ZACT 9 (13 February 2018)

75 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger approval — Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd's acquisition of United Office Furniture Outlets (Pty) Ltd approved subject to conditions — Competition Tribunal found merger unlikely to substantially lessen competition in the retail furniture market — Concerns regarding retrenchments prior to merger deemed not merger-specific — Tribunal imposed a moratorium on merger-specific job losses for two years post-transaction.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned the approval of a large merger by the Competition Tribunal of South Africa. The proceedings were merger proceedings in which the Tribunal was required to determine whether the proposed transaction was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition and whether it raised any public interest concerns, particularly relating to employment.


The acquiring firm was Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd (“Lewis”), ultimately a wholly owned entity of Lewis Group Limited, a publicly listed company on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The target firm was United Office Furniture Outlets (Pty) Ltd (“UFO”), a furniture retailer with a footprint of 30 stores.


The Competition Commission investigated the transaction and delivered a recommendation. During the Commission’s process, the South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (“SACCAWU”) filed a notice of intention to participate and raised concerns about employment effects, specifically alleging that Lewis had undertaken retrenchments in the period preceding the merger in preparation for the acquisition. The Tribunal heard the matter on 10 January 2018, received final submissions on 11 January 2018, issued an order on 16 January 2018, and later furnished written reasons on 13 February 2018.


The dispute concerned (i) the competitive effects of the acquisition in the retail furniture market(s) and (ii) the public interest impact, with the principal public interest focus being employment and whether retrenchments were merger-related or whether merger-specific retrenchments might occur post-merger if the parties integrated operations.


2. Material Facts


Lewis Group operated as a retailer of furniture, appliances, and electronics, primarily servicing lower-middle income markets and with a substantial presence in rural areas across South Africa. Its sales model was predominantly supported by in-house credit facilities, supplemented by financial services offered through the group’s financial services arm. By contrast, UFO operated as a furniture retailer focused on a more luxury/value offering aimed at the upper consumer spectrum, with a footprint concentrated in primarily urban, affluent areas, and with sales that were cash-based.


The proposed transaction entailed Lewis acquiring the entire shareholding in UFO, resulting in UFO becoming a wholly owned and controlled entity of Lewis post-transaction. The merging parties’ stated intention was that Lewis would operate UFO as a separate business under its existing business model. Lewis advanced a rationale of achieving economies of scale, enabling entry into new market segments through a wider and more exclusive product range, and diversifying its offering by increasing its cash-to-credit sales ratio. The Commission’s investigation recorded that around 60% of Lewis’s sales were credit sales, while 100% of UFO’s sales were cash-based, and noted the parties’ differing geographic and customer profiles. The Commission concluded that the transaction was most likely driven by Lewis’s desire to diversify and increase its cash-to-credit ratio, particularly in the context of increased regulatory requirements affecting credit sales and a slowdown in sales volumes.


On competition, the Commission identified a horizontal overlap in the retail of household furniture. It assessed the merger on a national market basis “for the retail of furniture across all LSM brackets” and found that the post-merger entity would have an approximate share of 15% with an accretion of no more than 2%. It also assessed regional markets, similarly concluding that sufficient competitors remained to constrain the merged entity and that the transaction was unlikely to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition.


The material public interest facts focused on employment. The merging parties informed the Commission that no retrenchments were envisioned as a result of the proposed transaction. SACCAWU, however, alleged that Lewis had undertaken “various retrenchments” in the year prior to the merger, contending that these were undertaken to save costs so as to facilitate the acquisition and further contending that the employees retrenched belonged to categories unlikely to find employment within UFO’s post-merger structure.


It was common cause that retrenchments had occurred, and the parties’ account (accepted as part of the Commission’s assessment and then tested in the Tribunal proceedings) described four tranches. The first tranche began in December 2016 and affected drivers and porters, said to be motivated by overlap in functions between those categories. The second tranche began in February 2017 and affected general positions, attributed to store closures in areas affected by economic conditions and drought. The third tranche ran from May 2017 to September 2017 and affected debtor follow-up clerks and collectors, attributed to reduced credit approvals arising from stricter credit regulations. The fourth tranche occurred in October 2017 and affected general positions, described as arising from factors rendering Lewis’s staffing model unsustainable.


The key disputed factual question was whether these retrenchments—particularly those closest in time to merger discussions—were merger-specific. SACCAWU maintained that they were part of a plan to facilitate the acquisition, while Lewis maintained they were driven by trading conditions and operational considerations unrelated to the merger.


At the hearing, the Tribunal considered that resolving the dispute required an assessment of the timeline of the merger’s contemplation against the timeline of retrenchments. The merging parties initially could not provide a detailed timeline, but it was apparent that sale negotiations were initiated by UFO. To address the timeline more fully, the Tribunal stood the matter down for the filing of an affidavit by Lewis’s CEO, Mr Johan Enslin, and also considered an affidavit by Mr Rinus Oliphant, Lewis’s operations director responsible for retrenchment processes, together with an Excel document relating to complement and reductions.


Enslin stated that he was approached by a representative of UFO, Mr Wayne Brett, on or about 3 May 2017 to discuss a potential acquisition, and that this was a high-level, in-principle discussion. On this version, the first and second tranches of retrenchments pre-dated the merger’s contemplation and could not be merger-specific. In relation to the third tranche, Enslin indicated that although retrenchments began in May 2017, they had been contemplated in April 2017 following an assessment of a shrinking debtor book. The fourth tranche, initiated in October 2017, was said to have been contemplated in June 2017, which meant that it was conceivable that Lewis’s corporate structure was aware of a potential merger during that period; however, the documentation placed emphasis on store profitability criteria guiding retrenchment decisions.


Separately, looking forward rather than backward, the Commission expressed concern that integration of the businesses might occur post-merger despite the parties’ stated intention to keep UFO separate, and that such integration might result in the loss of at least 15 jobs. The merging parties tendered an undertaking to be made a condition: a two-year moratorium on merger-specific job losses from the implementation date.


3. Legal Issues


The Tribunal was required to determine, first, whether the proposed transaction was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market. This required the application of competition-law standards to the market facts presented by the Commission’s investigation, including the existence of a horizontal overlap, market shares and accretion, and the competitive constraint from remaining competitors. The dispute in this part was principally an application of law to fact (and evaluative economic assessment), rather than a pure dispute of law.


Second, the Tribunal had to assess the merger under the public interest rubric, with employment being the salient consideration. This involved two related questions. One question was factual and inferential: whether Lewis’s historic retrenchments in the period preceding the merger were merger-related, as SACCAWU alleged, or attributable to other business reasons, as Lewis contended. This was treated as a fact-and-inference dispute assessed on the balance of probabilities. The second question was more predictive and evaluative: whether the merger might produce future merger-specific employment harm if integration occurred, and, if so, whether that risk should be addressed through conditions.


Third, the Tribunal had to decide whether the merger should be approved unconditionally or subject to conditions, and in particular whether it was appropriate to impose an employment-related condition tendered by the parties and accepted by the Commission. This required an evaluative judgment linked to the uncertainty around possible integration post-merger.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On competitive effects, the Tribunal accepted the Commission’s approach and conclusions. The Commission had identified the transaction as creating a horizontal overlap in retail furniture and assessed the merger on a national market basis “for the retail of furniture across all LSM brackets.” It found that the merged entity would have a post-merger share of approximately 15% with a small accretion (no more than 2%). The Commission further found that strong competitors would remain in the market and that the transaction was unlikely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. Although the Commission observed that the parties targeted different LSM brackets, it did not consider it necessary to analyse the transaction on that basis. The Tribunal stated that it found no reason to differ from the Commission’s findings, and similarly accepted that, even on narrower regional market assessments, sufficient competitive constraints would remain.


On public interest and employment, the Tribunal separated the inquiry into (i) allegations about past retrenchments and (ii) possible future employment effects. Regarding past retrenchments, the Tribunal treated SACCAWU’s submission as requiring a comparison of the timeline of retrenchments with the timeline of merger contemplation. A significant factual feature for the Tribunal was that negotiations were initiated by UFO, which the Tribunal regarded as undermining the theory that Lewis had been shedding jobs in preparation for a merger it did not seek to initiate.


The Tribunal nonetheless proceeded to address the timeline more fully by relying on the Enslin affidavit. On that timeline, serious consideration of the acquisition arose only around early May 2017 when UFO approached Lewis. The Tribunal then reasoned that the first and second tranches of retrenchments, having been initiated in December 2016 and February 2017 respectively, pre-dated the merger’s consideration and therefore could not be merger-specific. For the third tranche, although it commenced in May 2017, the Tribunal accepted the account that it had been contemplated already in April 2017, based on assessment of the debtor book and credit-related constraints, which placed its rationale outside the merger context.


The Tribunal acknowledged that the fourth tranche, contemplated in June 2017 and initiated in October 2017, temporally overlapped with a period in which Lewis might have been aware of the potential transaction. The Tribunal, however, did not treat temporal overlap as sufficient to infer merger-specificity. It placed weight on the documentation and account suggesting that retrenchment decisions were guided by store profitability criteria and were part of a considered process “divorced from the potential merger proceedings contemplated at the time.” On that basis, it concluded on a balance of probabilities that the retrenchments were not merger-related.


Turning to prospective effects on employment, the Tribunal considered the Commission’s concern that the parties might integrate their businesses post-merger, notwithstanding their stated intention to operate UFO separately and to retain UFO’s head office, warehouses, and entire staff complement, and to continue honouring outsourcing contracts. The Tribunal accepted that uncertainty remained about integration and the consequent possibility of job losses (the Commission’s estimate being at least 15 jobs). In that context, the Tribunal accepted the merging parties’ tender—also accepted by the Commission—to escalate their undertaking into a binding condition imposing a two-year moratorium on merger-specific job retrenchments from the implementation date. The Tribunal stated that it had no reason to dispute the imposition of the tendered condition in circumstances where it was not certain whether the parties would integrate post-merger.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Competition Tribunal approved the large merger between Lewis and UFO, finding that the transaction was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market.


The merger was approved subject to conditions, namely a condition imposing a moratorium on merger-specific job retrenchments for a period of two years from the implementation date of the transaction.


The reasons do not record any separate or additional order as to costs.


Cases Cited


No decided cases were cited in the Tribunal’s written reasons.


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the Tribunal’s written reasons. The proceedings were merger proceedings before the Competition Tribunal in relation to a large merger under the competition-law framework.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were expressly cited in the Tribunal’s written reasons.


Held


The Tribunal held that the proposed acquisition of UFO by Lewis was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, both on the national market assessment and on the Commission’s regional market considerations, and that there was no basis to depart from the Commission’s competition findings.


On public interest (employment), the Tribunal held that Lewis’s retrenchments in the period preceding the merger were, on a balance of probabilities, not merger-specific, particularly given the evidence on the timeline of merger discussions and the operational criteria underpinning retrenchment decisions.


The Tribunal further held that the potential public interest risk associated with future integration-related job losses was appropriately addressed by imposing a condition tendered by the merging parties and accepted by the Commission, namely a two-year moratorium on merger-specific retrenchments.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Tribunal applied the principle that a merger may be approved where the evidence supports the conclusion that it is unlikely to lead to a substantial prevention or lessening of competition, including where market shares and accretion are modest and effective competitive constraints are expected to remain.


In addressing public interest concerns relating to employment, the Tribunal applied an evidentiary and inferential approach in which allegations that retrenchments were merger-related required scrutiny of timelines and the probable causal connection between the merger and the employment decisions. The Tribunal assessed merger-specificity of retrenchments on the balance of probabilities, treating temporal proximity as a relevant but not determinative consideration.


The Tribunal applied the principle that merger approval may be made conditional to address public interest risks, particularly where there is uncertainty about post-merger conduct (such as possible integration of operations) that could affect employment. It accepted that a moratorium on merger-specific retrenchments over a defined period can serve as an appropriate remedial condition to address that risk while permitting the transaction to proceed.

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Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd v United Office Furniture Outlets (Pty) Ltd (LM226Nov17) [2018] ZACT 9 (13 February 2018)

COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: LM226Nov17
In
the matter between
LEWIS
STORES (PTY)
LTD
Acquiring Firm
And
UNITED
OFFICE FURNITURE OUTLETS (PTY)
LTD
Target Firm
Panel

: Mr N Manoim (Presiding Member)
: Mrs M Mokuena (Tribunal Member)
: Mr AW Wessels (Tribunal Member)
Heard
on

: 10 January 2018
Last
submissions received : 11 January 2018
Order
Issued on
: 16
January 2018
Reasons
Issued on
: 13 February 2018
REASONS
FOR DECISION
Approval
[1]
On 16 January 2018, the Competition Tribunal approved the large
merger between Lewis
Stores (Pty) Ltd ("Lewis") and United
Furniture Outlets (Pty) Ltd ("UFO") subject to conditions
placing a moratorium
on merger specific job retrenchments for a
period of two years from the implementation date of the transaction.
[2]
The reasons for the conditional approval
follow.
Parties
to the transaction and their activities
Primary
Acquiring Firm
[3]
The
primary acquiring firm is Lewis, a wholly owned entity of Lewis Group
Limited ("Lewis Group"), a public company listed
on the
Johannesburg Securities Exchange.
[4]
Lewis
Group is a furniture, appliance and electronics retailer focused on
the lower-middle income markets in rural areas across
South Africa.
It conducts its business through three trading brands, namely Lewis,
Best Home and Electric, and Beares. Sales at
stores in the Lewis
Group are predominantly facilitated by in-house credit facilities,
with further support provided by the Lewis
Group's financial services
arm.
Primary
Target Firm
[5]
UFO
is furniture store with a retail footprint of 30 stores in primarily
urban areas.
[1]
UFO sells a variety of luxury brand furniture with a value offering
to the upper consumer spectrum. Unlike stores in the Lewis
Group its
sales are cash based.
Proposed
transaction and rationale
[6]
Lewis
will acquire the entire shareholding in UFO, with UFO becoming a
wholly owned and controlled entity of Lewis post-transaction.
[7]
The
merging parties submitted that Post-transaction, Lewis intends to
operate UFO as a separate business under UFO's current business

model.
[8]
In
terms of rationale, Lewis submits that the proposed transaction will
enable it to achieve improved economies of scale and provide
a
platform to penetrate new market sectors through a wider, more
exclusive product range. In addition, Lewis stores is of the view

that the proposed transaction will diversify its offering by
increasing its cash-to-credit sale ratio.
[9]
The
Commission reviewed Lewis' presented rationale. It found that
approximately 60% of Lewis' sales are credit sales whilst 100%
of
UFO's sales are cash based, further that approximately 60% of Lewis'
stores are situated in rural areas or towns whilst UFO
is based in
primarily urban, affluent areas.
[10]
Noting the growing regulatory requirements on credit sales and a
slow-down in sales volumes presented
by Lewis, the Commission
concluded that the merger is most likely driven by a desire of Lewis
to diversify its offering and increase
its cash-to-credit sales
ratio.
[11]
UFO submits that its shareholders have
exceeded their investment maturity and wish to divest their shares.
Relevant
market and impact on competition
[12]
The Commission indicates in its report
that the proposed transaction raises a horizontal overlap between the
activities of the merging
parties in respect of the retail of
household furniture. The Commission assessed the merger by analysing
the national market for
the retail of furniture across all LSM
brackets.
[13]
The Commission indicated that the
post-merger entity would command approximately 15% of the national
market for the retail of furniture,
with an accretion of no more than
2%. It concluded that given the presence of a number of strong
competitors in the market, the
merger would be unlikely to result in
a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in the national
market. Although the
Commission noted that the two firms targeted
different LSM brackets it did not find this necessary to analyse the
merger.
[14]
The Commission also analysed the
narrower regional markets, finding that even on this basis the merger
would not result in if the
a substantial prevention or lessening of
competition in any relevant market as sufficient competitors remained
to constrain the
merged firm..
[15]
We find no reason to differ from the
Commission's findings.
Public
interest
Historic
retrenchments in Lewis
[16]
In
submissions to the Commission, the merging parties indicated that the
proposed transaction would not have any adverse effects
on
employment, as no retrenchments are envisioned as a result of the
proposed transaction.
[17]
During
its assessment of the transaction, the Commission received a notice
of intention to participate from the South African Commercial

Catering and Allied Workers Union ("SACCAWU"). SACCAWU
raised a concern that Lewis had undertaken various retrenchments
in
the year prior to the merger in preparation for the proposed
merger.
[2]
Its theory was that the retrenchments formed part of a concerted
effort to save costs in order to facilitate the purchase of UFO.

SACCAWU raised a further concern that the retrenched employees were
those in categories who would not find employment in UFO's
company
structure post­ transaction.
[3]
[18]
The
Commission engaged with the merging parties on SACCAWU's concerns and
in response the merging parties submitted that the retrenchment

processes were embarked upon due to unfavourable trading conditions
in the market which informed a restructuring its business.
[19]
On
the merging parties' submissions, the retrenchments took place in
four tranches, beginning in December 2016 and continuing up
until the
October 2017.
[20]
The
merging parties submitted that the first tranche of retrenchments
affected drivers and porters and was motivated by the overlap
in
functions of the two categories.
[21]
February
2017 saw the initiation of the second tranche of retrenchments which
affected a number of general positions but were as
the result of
store closures in areas hard hit by the slowing economic climate and
protracted drought.
[22]
The
third tranche of retrenchments in May 2017 up until September 2017
were comprised of debtor follow up clerks and collectors
and was
motivated by reduced credit approvals owing to stricter credit
regulations.
[23]
The
fourth tranche of retrenchments in October 2017, affected number of
general positions and were as a result of a number of factors
which
meant that Lewis' staffing model was no longer sustainable.
[24]
The
Commission assessed the merging parties' submissions. It held that
the rationale provided for each tranche of retrenchments
aligned with
Lewis' slowed performance and it was thus unlikely that the
retrenchments were related to the merger and more likely
that they
were related to the unsustainability of Lewis' employment model as
submitted.
[4]
[25]
SACCAWU
however persisted with its theory at the merging hearing. Mr Ngoato
of SACCAWU submitted:
. .
.Lewis
did not just wake up and
say
tomorrow we want
to buy or acquire UFO. It is
a
plan, and part of
that plan for
a
period of two
years employees were retrenched, which, we submit, that it
was
a cost
saving,
a
plan, an exercise
to ensure that they acquired UFO
[5]
[26]
Addressing Mr Ngoato's submissions
required an assessment of the timeline along which the merger was
contemplated against the timeline
along which the retrenchments took
place.
[27]
The merging parties
were unable to, at the merger hearing, provide a detailed timeline as
to when the merger was considered. What
was apparent however were
that sale negotiations were initiated by UFO.
[6]
This factor on its own is sufficient to address SACCAWU's theory, in
that the acquiring firm could not have been held to be shedding
jobs
in preparation for a merging it did not seek to initiate.
[28]
However, to address the issue of
timelines more fully, the Tribunal stood the matter down to allow the
filing of an affidavit deposed
to by the CEO of Lewis, Mr Johan
Enslin ("Enslin").
[29]
Enslin submitted that he was approached
by Mr Wayne Brett of UFO on or about 3 May 2017 to discuss the
potential acquisition of
UFO by Lewis Stores and that the discussion
comprised a high level, in principle, explanatory discussion.
[30]
On this timeline, it becomes apparent
that the first and second tranches of retrenchments were initiated
prior to the consideration
of the merger and could not be considered
merger specific.
[31]
With regard to the third tranche of
retrenchments, Enslin indicates in his affidavit that whilst the
retrenchments began in May,
such were initially contemplated in April
2017 when Lewis assessed its shrinking debtor book post the 2017
financial year. This
then addresses the third tranche of
retrenchments in the same manner as the first and second.
[32]
This leaves only the fourth tranche of
retrenchments. Enslin indicates in his affidavit that the
retrenchments initiated in October
2017 were first contemplated in
June 2017. An affidavit deposed by Rinus Oliphant, the operations
director of Lewis charged with
the retrenchment processes confirms
this fact. In terms of the timeline, it is thus conceivable that upon
ordering the fourth tranche
of retrenchments, the Lewis corporate
structure was aware of the potential merger with UFO. Does this
however mean that such retrenchments
were merger specific? We say
not.
[33]
An Excel document
submitted with Oliphant's affidavit, when read with Oliphant's
account points to a process whereby potential retrenchments
were
guided by the profitability of certain stores.
[7]
[34]
It thus seems that on a balance of
probabilities the retrenchment process was carefully considered in
relation to a set of criteria
divorced from the potential merger
proceedings contemplated at the time. We are thus satisfied that the
retrenchments were not
merger related.
Employment condition
[35]
In
assessing the future impact of the merger on employment, the
Commission was concerned with the possible integration of the
business
models of the merging parties.
[36]
The
merging parties indicated that although the final decision on the
matter had not yet been made, Lewis intends to operate UFO
as a
separate business under UFO's current business model and it seeks to
retain the use of UFO's head office, warehouses and entire
staff
compliment. In addition, Lewis intends to continue honouring any
outsourcing contracts entered into pre-merger by UFO without
any
change.
[37]
The Commission noted
that in spite of the submissions made by the merging parties, there
was a possibility that an integration of
the two firms would take
place, resulting in the loss of at least 15 jobs. The merging
parties, tendered to escalate their undertaking
given in their merger
filing to a condition placing a moratorium on merger specific job
losses for a period of two years post the
transaction.
[8]
The Commission accepted.
[38]
We find no reasons to dispute the
imposition of the condition tendered by the merging parties and
accepted by the Commission in
the circumstance in which it is not
certain whether the parties would integrate business post-merger.
Conclusion
[39]
In
light of the above, we conclude that the proposed transaction is
unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any

relevant market.
[40]
Although
the acquiring firm undertook a series of retrenchments prior to the
transaction taking place, on a balance of probabilities
we do not
consider such to be merger specific.
[41]
The
Commission expressed a concern relating to the impact of the merger
should the merging parties wish to integrate the businesses.
To allay
this concern, the merging parties tendered an employment condition
which the Commission has accepted. We thus conclude
that the
potential public interest effects arising from this matter are
addressed by the conditions imposed.
[42]
We
thus approve the merger subject to the conditions attached to our
order.
Mr
Norman Manoim
Mrs
Medi Mokuena and Mr AW Wessels concurring
13 February 2018 Date
Tribunal
Researcher
: Alistair Dey-van Heerden
For
the merging parties       : Lizel
Blignaut of ENSAfrica
For
the Commission
: Mogau Aphane
For
SACCAWU
: Piet Ngoatao,
Khulekani Ngubane (Union officials) and
Henry Thabethe (Shop steward)
[1]
UFO is presently controlled by the Martini Enterprise Group Ltd. It
does not control any other store.
[2]
These concerns were raised in correspondence with the Commission
dated 22 and 29 November 2017 found at pages 721-726 of the
merger
record.
[3]
Letter from SACCAWU to the Commission dates 29 November 2017, para
6. Merger record page 725.
[4]
Competition Commission Recommendations, page 30, para 68.
[5]
Transcript of Proceedings before the Competition Tribunal 10 January
2018Transcript, page 14, line
204.
[6]
Tribunal Transcript, page 19, line 285.
[7]
Excel Spreadsheet submitted by the merging parties on 11 January
2018 titled "Total Group New Complement & Reductions
-July
2017".
[8]
Letter from the Merging parties
to the Commission 20 November 2017, merger record page 670, para
16.