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[2016] ZACT 68
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Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Limited v Various Coca-Cola and Related Bottling Operations (LM243Mar15) [2016] ZACT 68; [2016] 2 CPLR 822 (CT) (25 July 2016)
COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case
No: LM243Mar15
ln
the matter between:
Coca-Cola
Beverages Africa
Limited
..
Primary Acquiring Firm
and
Various
Coca-Cola and Related Bottling
Operations
….....
Primary Target Firm
Panel
….......
: Norman Manoim (Presiding Member)
…
......................................................
:
Yasmin Carrim (Tribunal Member)
…
......................................................
:
lmraan Valodia (Tribunal M)
Heard
on
...........................................
:9
May 2016
Order
Issued on Reasons Issued on :10 May 2016
Reasons
Issued on
.......
.....................
:25
July 2016
Reasons
for Decision
Conditional
Approval
[1]
On 10 May 2016, the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal")
conditionally approved the merger between Coca-Cola Beverages
Africa
Limited ("CCBA") and various Coca Cola and related
bottling operations ("Target Firms").
[2]
The reasons for approving the proposed transaction follow.
[3]
The transaction is divided into two separate components; the Bottling
Transaction and the Branding Transaction. For ease of
reference each
of these will be dealt with separately.
[4]
This case was set-down to be heard over the period 9 to 27 May 2016.
For reasons which we will discuss in detail below all outstanding
issues were settled which obviated the need for a prolonged hearing.
Background
[5]
On 19 March 2015, the merging parties filed a large merger
transaction with the Competition Commission ("Commission").
During its investigation the Commission engaged with relevant
stakeholders, including the Minister, and interested third parties.
The Commission engaged with the Ministry of Economic Development and
the Economic Development Department regarding a range of public
interest and competition concerns, relating to employment,
localization of the supply-chain, empowerment and access for smaller
suppliers to fridge space in the retail units that
utilize fridge
facilities of the
me
rging parties. In order
address the abovementioned
concerns, the Commission and
the merging parties had agreed on a set of remedies excluding the
condition in relation to refrigeration
and coolers.
[6]
On 17 December 2015, the Commission filed its recommendation with us,
approving the merger subject to this set of conditions.
[7]
In order to understand the prolonged process that followed as well as
the parties involved we provide a brief background to
the merger
proceedings which ensued.
[8]
Following the Commission's filing, we extended an invitation to all
interested parties to attend the first pre-hearing held
on 19 January
2016. The following parties indicated their intention to intervene in
the merger proceedings: The Minister of Economic
Development ("The
Minister"), The Food and Allied Workers Union ("FAWU"),
The National Union of Food Beverage
Wine Spirits and Allied
Workers("NUFBWSAW'),
SoftBev
Proprietary Limited ("SoftBev") and the Golekane group
which is
a
consolidation of former and current AB! Owner Drivers ("Owner
Drivers").
[1]
[9]
As a matter of process, we drew a distinction between parties who had
a right to participate afforded to them by the Competition
Act ("the
Act"), namely the Unions and the Minister, and parties who were
required to lodge formal applications
to be
allowed to participate namely SoftBev and the Owner Drivers. All the
parties, except the Unions, at this stage in the
process were
tasked with providing a Statement of
Interest
and lssues
[2]
• The Unions
after indicating that they were of the view that their
issues
could be ventilated to the merging parties and resolved through a
series of negotiations were tasked with reporting
back on
whether such negotiations
were
successful. However, in order to mitigate the potential for
unsuccessful
negotiations,
provision was made for the Unions similarly to submit a Statement of
Interest and Issues on 31 March 2016.
[10]The
final outcome of this interlocutory process resulted in the following
prior to the commencement of the hearing.
[11]
Softbev withdrew their application to intervene citing that it did
not wish to incur further costs in pursuing the intervention.
[12]
With respect to the Minister's intervention application, the Tribunal
ruled that the Minister's scope of intervention would
be limited to
the following:
(i)
the
retrenchment of
employees;
[3]
(ii)
refrigerator and cooler capacity in retailers' stores;
(iii)
the possible reduction of the size of the R150 million HDSA/SMME
training and support fund;
(iv)
the manner in which the R500 million fund is to be directed; and
(v)
the
restraint on TCCC from bottling beer and alcoholic ready to drink
beverages
[4]
;
(vi)The
Minister also raised concerns on the continued procurement of apple
juice concentrate which was addressed in the initial
Appletiser
condition. With
respect to
his scope of intervention in relation to Appletiser, the Tribunal
directed that
the
Minister was to provide evidence to support his proposed amendment to
clause
4
of the Initial Conditions. In addition, the Minister was also
directed to provide
legal
submissions to support drafting changes he had proposed in the
Statement
of Interest
and lssues.
[5]
[13]
With respect to the Owner Drivers, after failing to meet our initial
direction with respect to the content of their Statement
of Interest
and Issues, they failed to meet the timetable for our second
direction in which they were required to clearly articulate
the
merger specificity of their issues as well as the remedies sought.
They subsequently had their condonation application dismissed
on 18
March 2016 for, amongst other reasons, failing to establish a
likelihood of success.
[4]
FAWU, while initially reaching consensus together with NUFBWSAW and
the
merging
parties on conditions which would settle their disputes, retracted
their agreement and put
forward
their intention to participate.
[6]
[15]
On the basis of the
above,
a timetable for the further conduct
of proceedings incorporated only the Unions and the Minister into
proceedings and allowed them
to intervene on issues within their
ambit.
Negotiations
between the Merging parties, the Minister and the Unions
[16]
In the week prior to the commencement of the first date of hearing
the Minister and the merging parties negotiated an agreement
which
settled all outstanding issues in dispute between the merging parties
and the Minister. Similarly, FAWU and the merging parties
reached an
agreement in respect of their disputes, which was also incorporated
into the conditions and this settlement offer was
extended to
NUFBWSAW, which subsequently accepted.
[17]
During the pre-hearing held on 6 May 2016 the aforementioned was
communicated to us and we afforded the Commission an opportunity
to
determine whether the newly proposed conditions addressed their
concerns or whether they intended to pursue a prolonged hearing.
Discussions between all the parties successfully reached a consensus
and no outstanding issues remained by the first day of hearing.
Specifically the Commission after having considered the conditions,
raised no dispute and concluded that the newly proposed conditions
satisfied their concerns.
[18]
For the sake of posterity, we will briefly discuss the concerns
raised by the Commission and the various interveners prior
to the
hearing and we will also briefly discuss the conditions. No evidence
was ventilated before us as to whether the harm alleged
had been
established nor if it had, whether the conditions proposed
successfully mitigate them. Our approval of this merger, subject
to
conditions, remains on the basis that a settlement was reached
between the merging parties, Unions, Minister, and the Commission
which settled the concerns raised by them. Where parties settle
disputes over conditions in this manner we generally adopt a
deferential
approach to reviewing them, unless facially the
conditions appear to be disproportionate to the harms they are
alleged to redress,
inappropriate or irrational.
Parties
to transaction
The
"Bottling Transaction"
Primary
acquiring firm
[19]
The primary acquiring firm CCBA, which at the date of filing of the
Commission's
recommendation was yet
to
be
formed, is intended to be a newly formed company
and a
subsidiary of SABMiller Pie ("SABMiller"). CCBA will
comprise
of
the
following
shareholders post-transaction: SABMiller which will hold 57% and
exercise
control
over CCBA, Gutsche Family Investments Proprietary Limited ("GFl'')
[7]
which will hold 31.7% and The Coca-Cola Company ("TCCC")
which will hold the
remaining
shareholding of 11.3%.
[20]
TCCC is a public company incorporated in accordance with the laws of
the United States of America. TCCC is listed on the New
York Stock
Exchange and is not controlled by any single firm or shareholder.
TCCC owns the trademarks and other intellectual property
rights of
various non-alcoholic beverages ("NAB's") including
Coca-Cola, Coke Zero and Sprite.
[21]
Pre-merger, TCCC has five authorized bottlers in South Africa. These
are
Amalgamated Beverage Industries ("ABI") owned by the South
African
Breweries
Proprietary Limited ("SAS"), Coca-Cola Sabco Proprietary
Limited ("SABCO"),
Coca
Cola Shanduka Beverages South Africa Proprietary Limited ("CCSB"),
Coca-Cola
Canners of Southern Africa Proprietary Limited ("Canners")
and Peninsula Beverage Company Proprietary Limited
("PenBev").
[8]
[22]
SABMiller is a public company which has a primary listing on the
London Stock Exchange and a secondary listing on the Johannesburg
Securities Exchange. It is not controlled by any firm or group of
firms. SABMiller is a multinational brewing
and
beverage
company
which is
engaged in
the
manufacture, distribution and sale of
various
types of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. In South Africa,
SABMiller operates through its subsidiary SAB. As mentioned
above,
the SAB business relevant to the proposed transaction is
ABI.
Primary
target firms
[23]
The primary target firms are Coca-Cola Sabco Proprietary Limited
("Sabco"), Coca-Cola Fortune Proprietary Limited
("CCF"),
Coca-Cola Shanduka Beverages South Africa Proprietary Limited
("CCSB"), Waveside Proprietary Limited
("Waveside")
and Coca Cola Canners of Southern Africa Proprietary Limited
("Canners").
[24]
Sabco is an investment holding company which is operational
throughout South Africa through CCF. Sabco is controlled by GFI
and
TCCC. CCF is authorized by TCCC to bottle and distribute TCCC related
or branded products in defined geographic areas within
South Africa.
CCF has six bottling plants in Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Port
Shepstone, Polokwane and Nelspruit as well as seventeen
sales depots.
[25]
CCSB, Canners and Valpre is ultimately controlled by TCCC. CCSB has a
manufacturing and distribution centre in Nigel, a warehouse
in
Witbank and four sales centres in Steelpoort, Groblersdal, Standerton
and Ermelo. Canners is responsible for the production
of certain TCCC
products for a number of mostly canned beverage types and it is not
involved in any distribution functions. Its
bottling operations are
based in Wadevil\e and Epping. Valpre, which is TCCC's authorized
plant, produces and packages Valpre still
and sparkling water.
[26]
PenBev opted to remain outside of this transaction and will continue
to be an authorized bottler in the Western Cape.
Proposed
transaction and rationale
[27]
TCCC believes that the bottling transaction, which creates one
bottling entity, would increase access to investment resources
and
generate benefits that can be reinvested in various initiatives. TCCC
is also of the view that the combination of various bottlers
into one
entity would result in an enhanced ability to distribute its products
more effectively.
[28]
The bottling transaction essentially involves a consolidation of the
bottling operations owned by TCCC, SABMiller and GFI into
one entity
to be known as CCBA. Figure 1 illustrates the pre-merger ownership
structure.
Figure
1: The pre-merger ownership structure of the bottling transaction,
“See pdf”
[29]
Post-merger the bottling operations will be consolidated into one
entity,CCBA, in which TCCC, SABMiller and GFI will hold 11.3%,
57%
and 31.7% respectively.
Figure
2: The post-merger control structure of the bottling transaction,
“See pdf”
Impact
on competition
[
30 ] The Commission found a
vertical
relationship between TCCC and the bottlers given that the bottlers
manufacture and bottle TCCC products, which are then
distributed to
wholesalers and retailers.
[9]
[31]
More
specifically,
TCCC's
route to
market
comprises
two
distinct
activities:
brand
ownership
and bottling. Brand ownership involves the creation and support of
brands, the
supply
of
beverage
concentrate
and
consumer
marketing.
The
brand
owner
would then
authorize local bottlers to prepare, package, distribute and sell the
beverages.
The
manufacturing process of NAB's therefore begins with TCCC supplying
concentrate
and
beverage bases to its five authorized bottlers in South Africa which
comprise ABI,
CCF, CCSB,
Canners and PenBev. The bottlers combine the concentrate with various
inputs such
as sugar which it then packages into authorized PET bottles,
returnable glass bottles and cans
[10]
.
After packaging is complete the
NAB's
are
distributed throughout the country.
[32]
The merging parties submit that each of the bottlers is subject to a
Standard International Bottlers Agreement ("SIBA")
("bottler agreements") which authorizes the bottler to
prepare, package, sell and distribute TCCC products and limits
the
sales process thereafter. Furthermore, the agreements also limits the
bottlers ability to trade in or with customers in a particular
territory as well as set a price which is higher than that set by
TCCC.
[33]
The bottling plants intended to be acquired currently exclusively
bottle Coca-Cola related products in specified territories
pursuant
to their bottler's agreements.
[34]
The merging parties were therefore of the view that the proposed
transaction would have a neutral effect on competition as
the
relevant bottling operations already form part of the TCCC system.
[35]
The Commission concurred with this finding and was of the view that
the manner in which the bottling operations will operate
will not
change following the Proposed Transaction as the status quo will be
maintained, i.e. TCCC through its bottler agreements
would still be
able to 'control' production and distribution.
The
"Branding Transaction"
Primary
acquiring firm
[36]
The primary acquiring firm is TCCC or one of its subsidiaries.
Primary
target firm
[37]
The primary target firms are SABMiller's Appletiser and Lecol brands.
The Lecol brand is owned by Appletiser SA but the manufacturing
is
outsourced to Afoodable Proprietary Limited and the distribution to
RTT Logistics. In South Africa, Appletiser brands are manufactured
by
Appletiser SA and distributed through the TCCC system.
[38]
Appletiser SA is a beverage company involved in the manufacturing and
marketing of non-alcoholic beverages made from concentrated
apple,
pear, grape or blended juice concentrate. Lecol is a lemon juice
substitute made from 100% lemon juice and predominantly
used in the
preparation of food or as a condiment.
Figure
3: The pre and post- merger ownership structure,”See pdf”
[39]
The proposed transaction involves the transfer of SABMiller's
Appletiser and Lecol brands to TCCC or one of its subsidiaries.
Following the transaction TCCC will own these brands.
[40]
The merging parties noted that the proposed transaction did not
constitute a merger, as it did not result in any change
in
control and would, if it did constitute a merger fall within the
thresholds of a small merger. They submit that the proposed
branding
transaction is in line with TCCC's business model of owning brands
and authorizing bottlers to manufacture and distribute
product.
Impact
on competition
[41]
With respect to the proposed branding transaction, the Commission
established that a horizontal overlap existed between TCCC
and
SABMiller in relation to the Appletiser and Lecol brands, in that
both TCCC and SABMiller manufacture and sell NABs. In particular,
TCCC manufactures and supplies a number of NABs which includes
carbonated soft drinks ("CSD"), fruit juices and water
under a number of well-known brands.
[42]
Similarly, SABMiller manufactures, distributes and sells various
types of beverages, including sparkling (carbonated) fruit
juice
(Appletiser) and lemon juice under the Lecol brand.
[43]
The Commission's analysis revealed that from a supply-side
perspective, there was very little substitution between fruit juices
and other NABs like CSDs offered by SABMiller and TCCC. However, from
a demand-side perspective, the Commission found that customers
generally switched between the different sub-segments of the broader
fruit juice market. The Commission also noted that the sparkling
(carbonated) fruit juices such as Appletiser served a different need
(weekend, occasion or celebration) than other fruit juices
or even
soft drinks.
[44]
The Commission found that the proposed transaction will not
materially change the competitive dynamics of the market and will
only result in the transfer of the brand from SABMiller to TCCC. The
Appletiser brand will face the same competition post-merger
as it did
pre-merger and the merged entity will continue to lead the market for
sparkling (carbonated fruit juices). Based on the
above, the
Commission concluded that the proposed branding transaction was
unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition
in any
relevant market.
[45]
The Commission also considered the effect of the transaction on
various parties within the value chain such as customers and
suppliers of input products used in the manufacture of the NAB's. For
the sake of brevity, as none of these concerns were raised
and no
evidence ventilated before us this will not be traversed in further
detail.
Public
interest
Concerns
raised by the EDD
[46]
During the Commission's investigation, the merging parties engaged
with the Minister, who had as mentioned above, raised a
number of
public interest and competition concerns. The Commission's Initial
Conditions incorporated the following remedies which
would address
the concerns raised:
•
Relocation of the head
office-
Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Proprietary Limited ("CCBSA")
would be located, managed and directed from SA as well as remain
a
tax resident of SA. This condition was required in order to avoid a
negative impact on the non-alcoholic beverage ("NAB")
market in SA which would impact on employment and localisation.
•
Production of
Appletiser-
The merging parties undertook to acquire a minimum of
80% of local input in order to address the Commission and the
Minister's concerns
that fruit juice concentrate, which is currently
sourced in SA, would not be sourced elsewhere post-merger.
•
Broad-based
black economic empowerment-
the merging parties undertook to
commit to implementing a BEE transaction which would increase the BEE
ownership by 9 to 20% by
2020. Additionally 20% of Appletiser SA
would be sold to a qualifying black company who would be entitled to
block a special resolution
as if it held 25% plus 1.
•
SMME's-
To
address the public interest concerns with respect to small business,
the following conditions were stipulated:
i.
Subject to certain conditions, from the date of approval to the end
of
2020,
CCBA would invest not less that R500 million in the development of
the downstream distribution and retail aspects of the South
Africa
business of CCBSA
ii.
To ensure that small retail outlets that are supplied with fridges by
Cola-Cola do not exclusively sell Coca-Cola products and
instead be
free to sell competing products, the Commission incorporated a
condition requiring Coca-Cola to allow small and medium
sized
retailers to stock 20% of competing products in Coca-Cola
refrigerators. This was to mitigate the Commission and the Minister's
concern that competitor's lack of access to refrigeration may
significantly hamper their ability to compete. The Commission noted
that similar commitments had been agreed to by TCCC in other
countries in relation to exclusionary conduct investigations. It
should be noted that while the merging parties were largely in
agreement with the proposed conditions, it was not in agreement with
this condition and sought to challenge the imposition of it thereof.
iii.
The merging parties would provide suitable business training to an
additional 25 000 black retailers between Approval date
to 2020.
iv.
CCBSA would create a fund of R 150 million in support and training of
historically disadvantaged developing farmers and/or small
suppliers
of inputs for Appletiser and Coca-Cola products. The administration
and management of the fund would vest in CCBSA.
•
Owner Drivers
In
relation to concerns of the unfavourable management of the owner
driver scheme and the unfair information gap between the parties,
the
merging parties agreed to provide independent counselling to an
employee when an employee elects to be an owner-driver, in
order for
the employee to fully understand the move from an employment
relationship to a contractual relationship. The condition
also
required training be provided to employees who change to an
owner-driver scheme to enable them to manage their businesses
and
understand the inherent risks.
•
Supply Chain-
The
merging parties would undertake to procure all tin cans, glass and
PET bottles, packaging, crates and sugar (sugar includes
procurement
from Swaziland) from local suppliers. Where a direct supplier is an
SMME the merging parties undertook to procure from
these or alternate
local SMME's for a period of 5 years.
•
Employment
- the
merging parties undertook not to retrench any bargaining unit
employees and will limit non bargaining unit employee retrenchments
to 250 employees.
[47]
However, as became apparent during the proceedings, the Minister
challenged the Initial Conditions and required the redrafting
thereof. As mentioned above all these remaining disputes were settled
in negotiations prior to the first day of hearing and so
no evidence
was led in this regard.
[48]
However, in order to provide some insight into the extent to which
the Initial Conditions materially changed, we attach the
agreed Final
Conditions as Annexure A. We note that the main differences between
the Initial Conditions and the Final Conditions
relates to the issue
of coolers and employment, with the merging parties having made
concessions on both fronts. We briefly set
out some of the key
differences below:
•
SMMEs-
The merging
parties undertook to invest R400 million into SMME's.
•
Coolers and
Refrigeration:
With respect to cooler and refrigeration space,
the merging parties shall ensure that in Micro Outlets where there is
no dealer
owned product-visible cooler or competitor
product-visible cooler that such outlets shall at all times be free
to provide 10% of
the visible space in their coolers and
refrigerators supplied or funded by CCBSA to local small competitors'
products. In addition,
such products, will be solely at the
retailer's discretion. A similar condition was drafted in terms of
Small Outlets.
•
Historically
disadvantaged farmers:
the merging parties undertook to increase
their investment
in
the establishment of a Fund for enterprise
development in the agriculture value chain to R400 million
[49]
We again note our approach to the settlement of issues that we set
out earlier and
it
is not necessary therefore for us to make
any findings in this regard.
Concerns
raised by the Unions
[50]
As mentioned above, the Unions had indicated at the first pre-hearing
that most of their issues in relation to
employment could
be settled with the merging parties in private negotiations. However,
despite several negotiation sessions held
between the merging parties
and FAWU no resolution had been achieved by the agreed date of 31
March 2016. As a result, in line
with the Tribunal's direction dated
29 February 2016, FAWU submitted its Statement of Interest and Issues
on 31 March 2016, in
which it highlighted issues remaining in
dispute.
[51]
In particular, these issues related to:
•
The strengthening of the
condition recommended by the Commission regarding retrenchments
at the merged entity;
•
Post-merger harmonization
of pay and benefits at the merged entity; and
•
The exclusion of
employees from the BBBEE scheme forming part of the merger (the SAB
Zenzele employment trust share scheme)
[52]
During an interlocutory hearing on 13 April 2016, FAWU sought to make
an appeal to the Tribunal for discovery of certain documents
in
relation to retrenchments, harmonization and the SAB Zenzele
employment trust share scheme, which they submitted were crucial
to
their bargaining power.
[53]
In particular, FAWU submitted that it had become apparent that a
number of retrenchments that were to take place, as a result
of
integrating four workforces into one, would be of individuals who
were not highly skilled, easily employed, and readily mobile
and were
individuals who would most likely find it difficult to find secure
employment post-merger. Furthermore while FAWU had
received high
level integration, harmonization plans, they had not received
responsive discovery. Finally, FAWU also spoke to the
issue of the
SAB Zenzele employment trust share scheme, a share scheme which only
ABI workers are entitled to participate in, and
which almost
three-quarters of the merged workforce would be excluded from.
While the merging parties had indicated
that a lock-in period
would apply till 2020 preventing other workers from joining the
scheme, FAWU requested access to the documents
of such lock-in period
in order to interrogate whether there were any mechanisms available
to expand the scheme to include the
entire workforce.
[54]
Following some of their discovery requests being granted, FAWU
continued to engage with the merging parties in private settlement
negotiations. As noted above, these negotiations were successful with
same being extended to NUFBWSAW.
[55]
In terms of the changes to the conditions, FAWU successfully
negotiated a strengthening of the employment condition, with the
merging parties committing to amongst other things, to ensure that
for a period of at least three years CCBA would maintain at
least the
number of Employees as are employed in the aggregate by the merging
parties as at the Approval Date. Furthermore, where
the merging
parties seek to retrench employees, appropriate measures to more
sufficiently mitigate the consequences were put in
place.
Conclusion
[56]
In light of the above, we therefore approve the proposed transaction,
subject to a set of conditions as agreed upon by the
parties during
private settlement negotiations. For the sake of convenience we
attach the final set of conditions as "Annexure
A".
________________
Prof
lmraan Valodia
Mr
Norman Manoim and Ms Yasmin Carrim concurring
25
July 2016
DATE
Tribunal
Researcher:
…..........
Aneesa
Raval and Karissa Moothoo Padayachie
For
the merging parties:
.........
Mike van
der Nest S.C. assisted by Mark Wesley and
…
............................................
Benny
Makola instructed by Bowman Gilfillan, Cliffe
…
............................................
Dekker
Hofmeyr and Webber Wentzel.
For
the Commission:
.........
Maya Swart,
Hariprasad Govinda and Ruan Mare
Trade
Unions:
….......
Nqobile Tshabangu for NUFBWSAW. Michelle Le
Roux with Nyoko Muvangua instructed by Cheadle
Thompson
& Haysom Inc for FAWU.
“
A
"
Commission
Case No: 2015Mar0130
Tribunal
Case No: LM243Mar15
In
the large merger between:
Coca-Cola
Beverages Africa
Limited...........................................Primary Acquiring
firm
and
Various
Coca-Cola Bottling and Related
Operations.......................Primary Target firm
Non-
confidential Conditions
1
DEFINITIONS
In
this document the following expressions bear the meanings assigned to
them below and related expressions bear corresponding meanings
-
1.1
"Act"
means the Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998 (as amended);
1.2
"Advisory Board"
means that advisory board to the
Fund contemplated In terms of paragraph 6.5 below and comprised of 2
representatives chosen by
CCBSA, and 1representative chosen by the
Minister of Economic Development;
1.3
"Appletlser"
means finished products bearing the
Appletlser and related brands;
1.4
"Approval Date"
means the date on which the
Merger Is approved by the Competition Tribunal;
1.5
"Appletlser SA"
means Appletlser South Africa
Proprietary Limited, a private company registered and Incorporated In
accordance with the company
laws of
Non-Confidential
version
the
Republic of South Africa (or It successor-in-title or assign after
Implementation of the Merger);
1.6
"B-BBEE"
means broad-based black economic
empowerment as defined In the B-BBEE Act;
1.7
"B-BBEE Act"
means the Broad-Based Economic
Empowerment Act, No. 53 of 2003 (as amended);
1.8
"B-BBEE Codes"
mean the Codes of Good
Practice on Broad-Based Economic Empowerment, 2013, published
pursuant to the B·BBEE Act;
1.9
"Bargaining Unit Employees"
means those
employees of the Merging Parties falling within the respective
bargaining units as defined In the various recognition
agreements of
the Merging Parties in terms of the Labour Relations Act;
1.10
"CCBA"
or the
"merged firm"
means Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Proprietary Limited, a private
company registered and Incorporated in accordance with the company
laws of the Republic of South Africa;
1.11
"CCBSA"
means Coca-Cola Beverages South
Africa Proprietary Limited, a subsidiary of CCBA and a private
company to be Incorporated in accordance
with the company laws of the
Republic of South Africa, Including Its subsidiaries;
1.12
"Commercially
Reasonable
and
Practical
Terms"
means terms
that provide for the application of appropriate quality standards
(based on the CCBA Group's usual and standard business
practices In
South Africa over time), reasonable availability of goods, and
reasonably competitive commercial terms. Such terms
shall not be
regarded as commercially unreasonable or Impractical if the merged
entity has, before calling off further negotiations
with an affected
supplier, given that supplier written notice as to the reasons why
Its terms of supply were considered not to
provide for appropriate
quality standards, reasonable availability, and reasonably
competitive commercial terms;
1.13
"Competition Commission"
means the
Competition Commission of South Africa, a statutory body established
In terms of section 19 of the Act;
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version
1.14
"Competition Tribunal"
means the Competition
Tribunal of South Africa, a statutory body established In terms of
section 26 of the Act;
1.15
"Conditions"
mean, collectively, the
conditions referred to In this document;
1.16
"Employee"
means any permanent employee (as
contemplated under South African labour law) of CCBSA as at the
Approval Date, and excludes (I)
employees of labour brokers who
provide services to CCBSA In South Africa; (ii) Independent
contractors and their employees; and
(Ill) short-term, fixed-term
contractors;
1.17
"FAWU"
means the Food and Allied Workers Union, a
registered trade union with members employed by the Merging Parties
or their subsidiaries;
1.18
"Fund"
means the fund referred to In paragraph 6.5
below;
1.19
"GFI"
means Gutsche Family Investments Proprietary
Limited, a private company registered and Incorporated In accordance
with the company
laws of the Republic of South Africa;
1.20
"Hay Grade 12"
means grade 12 In terms of the
grading system utilised and developed by the Hay Group, a job
evaluation consultancy firm. The Hay
Grade 12 Includes the following:
specialised, skilled, technical specialist and senior supervisory.
The range of salaries for employees
In Hay Grade 12 In 2016 Is from
[CONFIDENTIAL];
1.21
"Historically Disadvantaged"
means
historically disadvantaged persons within the meaning of the Act;
1.22
"Juice Concentrate"
means apple and other
fruit Juice concentrate generally used In the manufacture of
Appletlser;
1.23
"Labour Relations Act"
means the Labour
Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995 (as amended);
Non·Confldential
version
1.24
"Merger"
means (I) the acquisition by CCBA of
the various Coca - Cola bottling and related operations; and (Ii) the
transfer of SABMiller's
Appletiser brands and Its Lecol brand to
TCCC, as notified under case number 2015Mar0130;
1.25
"Merging Parties"
mean, collectively, CCBA,
SABMIiier, TCCC, GFI and Sabco;
1.26
"Micro Outlets"
means retail outlets supplied
by CCBA In south Africa from time to time of which the retail area Is
15 square meters or smaller
In inside floor size;
1.27
"NARTD beverages"
means carbonated soft
drinks, carbonated and still energy and sports drinks, carbonated and
still fruit juice, flavoured milk, Iced
teas, iced coffee and
carbonated and still bottled water;
1.28
"NUFBWSAW"
means the National Union of Food,
Beverage, Spirits, Wine and Allied Workers, a registered trade union
with members employed by
the Merging Parties or their subsidiaries;
1.29
"PET bottles"
means polyethylene
terephthalate pre-forms or plastic bottles;
1.30
"SABMiller"
means SABMiller pie, a public
limited company with a primary listing on the London Stock
Exchange and a secondary listing
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange;
1.31
"Sabco"
means Coca-Cola Sabco Proprietary
Limited, a private company registered and Incorporated In accordance
with the company laws of
the Republic of South Africa;
1.32
"Small Outlet"
means retail outlets
supplied by CCBA In South Africa from time to time of which the
retail area Is more than 15 and up to 20 square
meters In Inside
floor size;
1.33
"Smaller Competitor"
means a producer
of NARTD beverages In South Africa with 5% or lower national market
share in the NARTD beverage market; for the
avoidance of doubt, the
sales by such producer of the brands of TCCC's three largest global
NARTD beverage competitors shall not
be taken Into account In
calculating the relevant national market share of such producer but
shall be
Non-Confidential
version
taken
Into account In calculating the size of the entire national market.
The reference point shall be calculated annually with
reference to
data collected by AC Nielsen (or such replacement agency as may be
agreed between the Competition Commission and CCBSA)
at the end of
each preceding calendar year, measured by volume;
1.34
"SMME"
means a small, very small, medium or
micro enterprise as contemplated In the National Small Enterprise
Act, No 102 of 1996;
1.35
"TCCC"
means The Coca-Cola Company, a United
States publically registered company listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.
2
RECORDAL
2.1
On 19 March 2015, the Merging Parties filed a large merger
transaction with the Competition Commission. The Competition
Commission's
Investigation of the proposed Merger found the following
competition and public Interest concerns arising from the Merger:
2.1.1
The consolidation of the independent Coca-Cola bottlers In South
Africa would result in the merged entity having Increased
bargaining
power. As such, the proposed Merger may have a negative effect on the
current local producers of PET bottles, tin cans,
glass, packaging,
sugar and crates in South Africa;
2.1.2
The proposed Merger Is likely to have
a
negative Impact on
employment since It will result In job losses of 250 employees of the
Merging Parties In South Africa;
2.1.3
Any relocation of the merged entity head office post·Merger Is
likely to have
a
negative Impact on the non-alcoholic
beverages market in South Africa, employment and localisation;
2.1.4
The proposed Merger may result in the fruit Juice Concentrate of the
Appletiser brand currently sourced from South African
producers being
sourced by TCCC from suppliers outside of South Africa. Should the
merged entity discontinue the sourcing of the
fruit juice
concentrate, this would
Non-Confidential
version
have
a negative impact on the growth of the local producers. This may also
result in local producers shutting down and/or reduce
their current
workforce;
2.
1.5 The proposed Merger in its orlglnal form Is likely to have a
negative Impact on B-BBEE. This is based on the merging parties'
views on their relative shareholding post-merger;
2.1.6
The Competition Commission is concerned about the owner driver scheme
(which largely comprises ex-employees of TCCC) and how
It Is
currently being operated by TCCC. When recruited to join the
owner-driver scheme, the owner-drivers have no real control
over the
operation and finances of their businesses. They also have limited
understanding of how the contract$ work and the risks
Involved which
could potentially result In their contracts being terminated for no
reason whatsoever.In the Competition Commission's
view It Is TCCC's
responsibility to ensure that these drivers are fully aware of the
risks when entering Into this scheme and are
supported when their
participation in this scheme ends; and
2.1.7
Further, the Competition Commission Is concerned that the lack of
access to refrigeration and coolers In retail stores where
there is
only one fridge or cooler may prevent smaller rivals from competing
effectively with the merged entity.
2.2
The parties have also engaged with the Minister of Economic
Development and the Economic Development Department regarding a
range
of public interest and competition concerns that the Minister of
Economic Development has highlighted, relating to employment,
localisation of the supply-chain, empowerment and access to smaller
suppliers to fridge space In the retail units that utilise
fridge
facilities of the merged parties.
2.3
In order to address the Competition Commission and Minister of
Economic Development's concerns, the Merging Parties have agreed
on a
set of remedies as set out below.
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3
L
OCATION OF HEAD OFFICE
3.1
Consistent with CCBA's long term commitment to Invest In the South
African economy, CCBA shall remain incorporated In South
Africa and
its head office will be located In, and Its operations will be
managed and directed from, South Africa. Each of CCBA
and CCBSA will
remain a tax resident In South Africa.
4
PRODUC
TION
OF AP
PLETISER
4.1
The Merging Parties commit and undertake that Appletlser SA and the
current operations and facilities In South Africa for the
production
of Appletlser will be maintained and kept In place In line with the
Merging Parties' commitment and Intention to use
and grow the
operations to supply South Africa and as a base from which to export
Appletiser to the countries In Africa, and where
commercially
reasonable and practical, elsewhere in the world, where CCBA will
operate in terms of the TCCC system.
4.2
In order to give effect to this undertaking and subject thereto that
such supply arrangements are on Commercially Reasonable
and Practical
Terms, the Merging Parties undertake:
4.2.1
to maintain and grow the South African production of
Appletiser In order to meet the demand for those products -
4.2.
1.1 in South Africa from time to time; and
4.2.1.2
countries In Africa where CCBA will operate In terms of the TCCC
system and, where reasonably possible, elsewhere In the
world; and
4.2.2
without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 8 below
but subject to paragraph 4.2.3 below, that the current percentage of
local Inputs procured by Appletlser SA In the South African
production of Appletiser, measured In quantities procured during
Appletlser
SA's most recent financial year ended prior to the
Approval Date ("the base year") will be maintained, In each
subsequent
financial year, at a percentage level no
lower
than the percentage prevailing In the base year; and
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4.2.3
that at least 80% of the apples, pears, grapes and similar
fruit inputs used for all Juice Concentrate used In producing
Appletiser
will be procured from fruit grown in South Africa, it
being understood that the merging parties will take all practical
steps to
Increase within the next 5 years of the Approval Date to the
extent possible Its procurement of grapes used for Juice Concentrate
used in producing Grapetlser, from grapes grown in South Africa.
5
BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC
EMPOWERMENT
5.1
The Merging Parties commit to a follow-on broad-based
empowerment transaction, to be Implemented within 5 years of the
Approval
Date, that the current B-BBEE ownership percentage of CCBSA
of 11% under the B-BBEE Codes be increased by a further 9 percentage
points to 20%.
5.2
Further, the Merging Parties shall
[CONFIDENTIAL]
of
the Approval Date ensure that at least 20% of the equity in
Appletiser SA be sold to a qualifying black company or consortium
("black shareholder")
with the Intention that such
company or consortium shall be developed into and/or operate as an
active Industrial partner In the
Appletlser SA business, on
reasonable commercial terms to be agreed with the black shareholder,
who shall be entitled to the rights
to block a special resolution of
Appletlser SA on the same basis that a shareholder holding 25% plus 1
vote would ordinarily enjoy,
In addition, the black shareholder shall
be entitled to appoint not less than one non-executive director to
the board of directors
of Appletlser SA and shall further be entitled
to nominate appropriately qualified candidates for all executive
positions. The
appointment of any such executives shall be the
decision of the Chief Executive of Appletlser SA who shall give due
and proper
consideration to the abovementloned nominees of the black
shareholder.
6
SMMEs
6.1
The Merging Parties undertake, In the five year period from the
Approval Date, that CCBA will invest not less than R400 million
In:
6.1.1
developing the downstream distribution and retail aspects of
the South African NARTD business of CCBSA, on the basis that -
Non-Confidential
version
6.1.1.1
the invested amount should not be redirected from other expenditure
for retailers which would ordinarily have been incurred
but must be
In addition to existing baseline Investment expenditure absent the
Merger;
6.1.1.2
any new retail outlets established pursuant to this Investment will
not be required to operate on an exclusive basis for
any one or more
companies In the CCBA group and shall be free to sell products
competing with those of the CCBA group;
6.1.2
providing suitable business skills training to an additional 25 000
black retailers of CCBSA's products from the Approval
Date until end
2020.
6.2
The Merging Parties shall ensure that In Micro Outlets where there Is
no dealer· owned product·vlslble cooler
or competitor
product·vlslble cooler at the Micro Outlet, such outlets are
at all times free to provide 10% of the visible
space In their
coolers and refrigerators supplied or funded by CCBSA to local
Smaller Competitors' products competing with CCBSA
products, which
products and situation may be chosen by the retailer entirely in
their own discretion. As part of this commitment,
CCBSA shall not
induce the retailers to refuse access to space in the coolers and
refrigerators directly or Indirectly provided
or funded in whole or
in part by CCBSA.
6.3
The Merging Parties shall ensure that In Small Outlets where there is
no dealer· owned cooler or competitor product·visible
cooler at the Small Outlet, such outlets are at all times free to
provide 10% of the visible space In their coolers and refrigerators
supplied or funded by CCBSA to local Smaller Competitors' products
competing with CCBSA products, which products and situation
may be
chosen by the retailer entirely In their own discretion. As part of
this commitment, CCBSA shall not Induce the retailers
to refuse
access to space In the coolers and refrigerators directly or
indirectly provided or funded in whole or In part by CCBSA.
6.4
The conditions In paragraphs 6.2 and 6.3 do not apply to and exclude
the brands of TCCC's three largest global NARTD beverage
competitors.
Non-Confidential
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6.5
The Merging Parties shall, through CCBSA establish a Fund for
enterprise development In the agriculture value chain, particularly
for the support and training of Historically Disadvantaged developing
farmers and Hlstorlcally Disadvantaged or small suppliers
of Inputs
for Appletlser SA and CCBSA products with a view to make and/or keep
them competitive and sustainable and to contribute
an amount of R400
million to the Fund. The monies In the Fund shall be disbursed In
equal annual portions over a 5 year period
from the Approval Date,
I.e. no less than RBO million per successive 12 month period,
6.6
The Fund will provide training and the disbursement of grants as
contemplated by the B-BBEE Codes on Supplier Development and
Enterprise Development.
6.7
The administration and management of the Fund shall vest In CCBSA,
which shall appoint the necessary administrators thereof.
Notwithstanding, CCBSA shall consult with the Advisory Board as
regards the activities and expenditure of the Fund.
6.B
The representatives on the Advisory Board shall be appointed on the
basis of their expertise relating to the objective
of the Fund.
6.9
The Advisory Board, which shall meet as and when It so determines,
shall:
6.9.1
consult with CCBSA to determine the details of each beneficiary as
envisaged In paragraphs 6.5 and 6.6;
6.9.2
advise CCBSA as to the means and mechanisms to fulfil the objects of
the Fund;
6.9.3
be entitled from time to time to call for and receive reports from
CCBSA and CCBA regarding the Implementation of the Fund
and CCBSA and
CCBA shall be obliged to provide such reports with all such detail as
may be reasonably required by the Advisory
Board; and
6.9.4
produce an annual report on the activities of the Fund and Its
assessment thereof which shall be submitted to the Competition
Commission and the Economic Development Department, together with a
set of annual financial
Non-Confidential
version
statements
for the Fund compiled and audited by a firm of external auditors
(which are not the external auditors of CCBSA).
6.10
CCBSA shall design and propose projects to the Advisory Board for Its
advice and recommendation.
7
OWNER DRIVERS
7.1
To the extent that the Merging Parties may be entitled to transfer
current employees with their consent to owner-driver contracts
(the
legality of which the Competition Commission takes no view on) they
shall nevertheless provide independent counselllng to
employees
through the Commission for Conclllatlon Mediation and Arbitration
(CCMA) prior to a decision by any Individual worker
to move to the
owner-driver or similar scheme, to enable them to understand the
risks Inherent In moving from an employment relationship
to a
contracting relationship.
7.2
Further, the Merging Parties shall provide training to the employees
that opt to join the owner-driver scheme or similar
scheme to
be able to manage their businesses and understand the risk Inherent.
8
SUPPLY
CHAIN
8.1
The merged entity (which shall Include Appletlser SA) will use all
reasonable endeavours to ensure that it maintains and, if
possible,
Improves Its level of local production and procurement of inputs
rnade In South Africa. To this end, the merged entity
shall purchase
all tin and aluminium cans and ends, glass and PET bottles, PET
closures, packaging, crates and sugar from local
suppliers (In the
case of sugar, local suppliers include procurement from Swaziland, to
the same percentage of procurement that
applied in the financial year
immediately preceding the Approval Date), subject to supply on
Commercially Reasonable and Practical
Terms. Existing agreements with
suppliers In force at the Approval Date shall be honoured In
accordance with their terms.
8.2
Where SMMEs are direct suppliers to any of the Merging Parties, the
Merging Parties agree that CCBSA will continue to procure
from these
or alternative local
Non-Confidential
version
SMMEs
for a period of at least 5 years after Approval Date, subject to
supply on Commercially Reasonable and Practical Terms.
8.3
The Merging Parties recognize the value of local procurement to the
country and wish to be a partner In deepening such efforts.
To this
end, the merged entity undertakes to Implement the commitments on
local procurement contained In these Conditions and further
undertakes to:
8.3.1
host an annual local procurement conference with suppliers to
Identify opportunities to maintain and grow local procurement;
8.3.2
produce and Issue an annual report on local procurement, Including
new poss!bllities and
eff orts
made to deepen localization;
and
8.3.3
train managers In the merged entity on the value of local procurement
to the country and the company.
9
EM
PLOYM
ENT CONDITIONS
9.1
Notwithstanding any other provision In this paragraph 9, CCBA commits
that, for a period of no less than three years from the
Approval
Date, it will maintain at least the number of Employees as are
employed In the aggregate by the Merging Parties as at
the Approval
Date.
9.2
Without derogating from its commitment set out in paragraph 9.1, CCBA
shall not retrench any Bargaining Unit Employees as a
result of the
Merger, and any retrenchments of employees outside of the bargaining
units shall be limited to 250 employees within
the category of Hay
Grade 12 and above.
9.3
The Merging Parties commit to put In place suitable and appropriate
measures to mitigate the consequences of the retrenchments
by
providing:
9.3.1
In each year during which a retrenchment contemplated In paragraph
9.2 or a separation contemplated In paragraph 9.4.1 takes
place
fiowlng from the Merger, employment In the CCBA group within South
Africa to such number of permanent employees as are equal
to the
number of employees retrenched or separated, voluntarily or
non-voluntarily (with the Intention
Non-Confldent1al
version
that
there shall be no net reduction In employment arising from the Merger
for a period of no less than three years from the Approval
Date);
9.3.2funding
to re-skill affected employees In an amount of R20 000 per retrenched
employee up to a maximum of the fund value of
RS 000 ooo;
9.3.3
counselling and guidance on applying for alternative employment;
9.3.4
within 3 years of Approval Date, redeployment of 20% (twenty percent)
of affected employees, within the business of the merged
firm;
9.3.5
In addition to the redeployment contemplated In paragraph 9.3.4, the
Merging Parties shall procure that, for a period of 2
years of the
Approval Date, the retrenched employees shall be offered the right to
preferential re-employment, subject to final
agreement on the actual
terms and conditions of employment; and
9.3.6
approaching external stakeholders (such as suppliers, customer and
business partners) with a view of them hiring affected
employees.
9.4
In the Interest of clarity, retrenchments In the context of this
condition do not Include:
9.4.1voluntary
separation arrangement (subject to paragraph 9.3.1);
9.4.2
voluntary early retirement packages;
9.4.3
unreasonable refusals to be redeployed In accordance with the
provisions of the
Labour Relations Act;
9.4.4
resignations
or retirements In the normal course;
9.4.5
necessary steps taken by the Merging Parties In terms of
section 189
of the
Labour Relations Act should
operational requirements In the
ordinary course of business that are not merger specific necessitate
that such steps be taken.
Non-Confidential
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10
NO
RESTRAINT
The
parties shall not enter Into any agreement In terms of which TCCC
shall be prohibited from bottling, distributing or marketing
beer
and/or alcoholic ready to drink beverages In South Africa.
11
TRADE
UNIONS
11.1
The Merging Parties have entered Into agreements with FAWU and
NUFBWSAW regarding certain concerns which FAWU and NUFBWSAW
have
raised In relation to the proposed Merger, which agreements are
attached as Annexure "B" and Annexure "C"
("the
Union Agreements"). The Merging Parties agree that the terms of
clauses 3, 4 and 5 of each of the Union Agreements
shall be
conditions of the approval of the proposed Merger.
11.2
In the event of any conflict in Interpretation between the terms of
these conditions and the Union Agreements, the terms of
the Union
Agreements shall prevail.
12
MONITORING
12.1
In the event that the Competition Commission receives a complaint
regarding non-compliance by the Merging Parties with these
Conditions, or otherwise determines that there has been an apparent
breach by the Merging Parties of the Conditions, the matter
shall be
dealt with In terms of
Rule 39
of the Rules for the Conduct of
Proceedings In the Competition Commission.
12.2
CCBA will, within 30 days of each anniversary of the Approval Date up
until the 6th anniversary, provide a suitable and appropriately
detalled annual report to the expiry of 5 years following the
Approval Date to the Competition Commission regarding Its measures
to
comply with these Conditions, together with the report and audited
accounts referred to In paragraph 6.9.4.
12.3
The report referred to in 12.2 shall be accompanied by an affidavit
attested to by the chief executive officer of CCBA confirming
accuracy of the annual report and full compliance of these Conditions
In the year to which the report relates.
Non-Confidential
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12.4
CCBA shall submit to the Competition Commission within 30 days of the
Approval full details of Its relevant procurement during
Its base
year and employment at the Approval Date, as contemplated In
paragraphs 4.2.2, 8.1 and 9.1.
12.5
The Competition Commission may request any additional Information
from CCBA which the Competition Commission from time to time
deems
necessary for the monitoring of compliance with these Conditions.
12.6
In order to enable the Minister of Economic Development to bring a
complaint as contemplated In paragraph 12.1and to enable
him to play
a meaningful role In the Advisory Board, a copy of the annual report
referred to In paragraph 12,2 shall simultaneously
be furnished to
the Economic Development Department. Nothing In this paragraph 12.6
shall derogate from the monitoring and enforcement
role of the
Competition Commission In terms of the Act.
13
VARIATION
13.1
Should the Merging Parties wish to amend the conditions, CCBA shall
be entitled, upon good cause, to make a proposal to the
Competition
Commission to consent to the waiver, relaxation, modification and/or
substitution of one or more of the Conditions,
which consent shall
not be unreasonably withheld. "Good cause'' shall have Its
normal meaning as Interpreted under the Act
and the common law, save
that 'good cause' shall additionally mean that the circumstances
giving rise to the Merging Parties' request
In terms of this
Condition 13.1shall require that the circumstances that could not
reasonably have been foreseen by the Merging
Parties at the time of
the Competition Tribunal's approval of the Merger and which cannot
reasonably be mitigated or addressed
In another manner.
[CONFIDENTIAL]
13.2
In the event of the Competltlon Commission and CCBA agreeing upon the
waiver, relaxation, modification or substitution of any
aspect of the
Conditions, the Competition Commission and CCBA
shall make application
to
the Competition Tribunal for
confirmation by It of such
waiver, relaxation, modification or substitution of
any one or more of the Conditions.
Non-Confidential
version
13.3
In the event of the Competition Commission withholding Its consent to
a waiver, relaxation, modification and/or substitution
of any one or
more of the Conditions, CCBA shall be entitled to apply to the
Competition Tribunal for an order waiving, relaxing,
modifying or
substituting of any one or more of the conditions. The Competition
Commission shall be entitled to oppose such application.
[1]
Two other parties in attendance at this pre-hearing, Boxmore
Packaging and Nampak Limited, resolved their issues with the merging
parties who had undertaken to include refinements to the drafting of
the supply chain condition to better encompass plastic closures
and
aluminium cans and ends.
[2]
In particular, parties were required to elucidate in their Statement
of Interest and Issues on the reasons for their intervention,
the
scope of the issues on which they wished to intervene, provide
potential theories of harm and finally propose remedies should
they
oppose the merger or alternatively wish to alter the Initial
Conditions proposed by the Commission.
[3]
Although the Minister was afforded an opportunity to intervene in
this respect the Unions, FAWU and
NUFBWSAW,
led the negotiations. The conditions negotiated were then
incorporated as conditions to the merger and addressed the
relevant
employment concerns.
[4]
This issue was not addressed in the Commission's conditions.
[5]
Tribunal Directive dated 29 February 2016.
[6]
Please note that prior to FAWU withdrawing its agreement, The
Congress of South African Trade Unions ('COSATU") during the
pre-hearing of 18 March 2016 also indicated that it intended to
intervene. This application was dismissed as COSATU did not have
the
right to intervene in terms of
section 13(A)(2)
of the
Competition
Act and
failed to successfully argue condonation of the late filing
of its Statement of Interest and Issues.
[7]
GFI, a family trust is the majority shareholder of the Coca-Cola
bottler, Sabco.
[8]
PenBev elected not to be part of the proposed transaction and will
continue to operate as an independent bottler in the Western
Cape
and Northern Cape Provinces.
[9]
Apart from SABMiller's current interest in the Appletiser brands no
other bottler is involved in bottling for any third parties.
This
was confirmed by third party competitors such as PepsiCo who the
Commission contacted during their investigation.
[10]
PET bottles are produced by blowing pre-forms into bottles in
dedicated packaging lines and are sourced from companies such as
Mpact (Pty) Ltd and Boxmore. Returnable glass bottles and cans are
also obtained from third party suppliers such as Nampak Limited.