Roering NO and Others v Master of the High Court, Pretoria and Others (2024/146523) [2026] ZAGPPHC 24 (3 February 2026)

80 Reportability
Insolvency Law

Brief Summary

Insolvency Law — Liquidation — Dispute over claims — Liquidators disputing claims proven at creditors' meeting — Master of the High Court declining to adjudicate dispute citing factual disputes — Court finding Master's refusal to decide reviewable under s 151 of the Insolvency Act — Decision set aside and disputed claims disallowed.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings concerned an application to review and set aside a refusal by the Master of the High Court to make a decision on disputes raised by liquidators against claims that had already been proved and admitted at meetings of creditors. The review was brought in the context of liquidation proceedings and the statutory framework governing proved claims and subsequent disputes under the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.


The applicants were Messrs Roering, Botha and Henning N.O., acting as the liquidators of African Brick Centre Limited (in liquidation) and African Brick (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation). The first respondent was the Master of the High Court, Pretoria. The second and third respondents were Nail Red Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd and Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd, respectively, each of whom had proved claims in both insolvent estates. Elmir Property Projects (Pty) Ltd was cited as the fourth respondent, in circumstances connected to the earlier business rescue process and the background to the disputed indebtedness.


Procedurally, the creditors’ claims were proved and admitted at creditors’ meetings in 2022. After receiving the proved claims and supporting material from the Master, the liquidators examined the estate records and documentation as contemplated in section 45(2), and then formally disputed the claims in writing during May 2024 in terms of section 45(3). The creditors responded. On 25 July 2024 the Master declined to confirm, reduce, or disallow the disputed claims, stating that factual disputes required evidence and that the matter should be referred to court. The liquidators then approached the High Court for review relief. Nail Red Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd and Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd opposed the review and also advanced a counterclaim against Elmir, which the court was required to address.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the Master could refuse to make a statutory decision under section 45(3) on disputed proved claims in the liquidation of companies, particularly where the disputes touched on historically complex issues relating to a prior business rescue plan, alleged shareholder loans, and alleged cessions.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that Yakani Infraco (Pty) Ltd had historical claims within the African Brick group of companies, ostensibly arising from shareholder loan accounts said to total approximately R17.1 million. During a period of financial distress, various companies in the group, including the two companies later liquidated, entered voluntary business rescue proceedings. A business rescue plan was proposed and adopted, and it contemplated (on one version) a reduced or otherwise treated amount of historical shareholder loans, stated in the judgment as R1.756 million. It was also common cause that Yakani adopted the business rescue plan.


In implementing the plan, Yakani sold 74% of its shares to Elmir Property Projects (Pty) Ltd in return for the injection of funds into the companies, and a sale of shares agreement was concluded on 14 February 2014. The judgment recorded that Elmir interpreted this agreement as having reduced Yakani’s historical loans from R17.1 million to R1.756 million, consistent with the plan. The judgment further recorded that Yakani’s claims (to the extent they existed) appeared to have been ceded to Nail Red Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd and Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd during the business rescue, together with certain securities.


Notices of substantial implementation of the business rescue plan were filed and the business rescue proceedings terminated during April 2015. Thereafter, African Brick Centre Limited and African Brick (Pty) Ltd were placed under provisional winding-up on 12 August 2015 and were finally liquidated on 6 December 2021.


At meetings of creditors, the following proved claims were admitted, and these admissions were not in dispute. In the estate of African Brick Centre Limited (in liquidation), a meeting of creditors took place on 10 March 2022, at which Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd proved a claim of R6 224 744.50, supported by a three-page document, and Nail Red Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd proved an equivalent claim supported by an eleven-page document; both were admitted. In the estate of African Brick (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), a meeting of creditors took place on 5 September 2022, at which Nail Red Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd proved a claim of R2 825 000.00 supported by a five-page document, and Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd proved an equivalent claim supported by a three-page document; both were admitted.


It was also not in issue that, in addition to the claim documents, the creditors apparently made available a lever arch file containing 489 pages of documents at the meetings. However, the court accepted as material that these documents were not referenced in the claim documents, with the result that the documentation could not readily be linked to the claims as proved.


The court treated as significant and undisputed, for purposes of the outcome, that ex facie the materials submitted when the claims were proved contained insufficient information or documentation for the liquidators to ascertain whether the amounts were due. The judgment illustrated this by reference to a claim form describing “monies lent and advanced (ceded to the creditor)” and listing multiple alleged sources of indebtedness (including loans and guarantees) without attaching supporting documentation for the underlying loans, the guarantees, or the cessions.


After being notified by the Master of the admitted claims and being furnished with the materials submitted, the liquidators considered the claims in terms of section 45(2) and then, on 22 May 2024, lodged a written dispute with the Master, providing reasons and requesting reduction and/or expungement of the claims. The creditors responded on 27 May 2024, maintaining that the claims should stand.


The judgment recorded that issues relevant to whether the claims should be allowed included disputed questions about the interpretation of events surrounding the business rescue plan, whether it was valid, and whether conditions relating to transactions entered pursuant to it were fulfilled. The Master regarded these as factual disputes requiring evidence for proper adjudication.


On 25 July 2024, the Master concluded that, because of the factual disputes about the business rescue plan and its adoption and implementation, the parties would need to refer the matter to court for a ruling. The Master indicated that the office would abide the court’s decision, rather than confirming, reducing, or disallowing the disputed claims.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, once a trustee or liquidator disputes a claim after it has been proved at a meeting of creditors and reports the dispute to the Master with reasons under section 45(3) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, the Master is statutorily obliged to make a decision to confirm, reduce, or disallow the claim, or whether the Master may lawfully decline to decide on the basis that factual disputes require court determination.


A further issue was whether the Master’s refusal to make a decision under section 45(3) constituted a reviewable “decision, ruling [or] order” under section 151 of the Insolvency Act, read with the relevant company-law provisions applicable to liquidations.


Because the review invoked the statutory review jurisdiction described in the authorities, the court also had to determine what decision ought to have been made once it found the Master’s refusal reviewable and unsustainable. This required an application of the section 45(3) options to the facts accepted as material, especially the admitted inadequacies in the substantiation of the proved claims and the Master’s own conclusion that the dispute involved matters requiring evidence.


Finally, the court had to determine the fate of a counterclaim brought by the second and third respondents against the fourth respondent (Elmir), which was advanced in the context of the same contested business rescue history.


The dispute predominantly concerned the application of statutory duties and reviewability (questions of law) to the established procedural history and the Master’s stance, with an evaluative component in deciding what the appropriate section 45(3) outcome should have been given the Master’s position and the state of the claims as proved.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court’s reasoning began with the text and structure of section 45(3) of the Insolvency Act, which provides that once a trustee disputes a proved claim and reports the dispute with reasons, “thereupon the Master may confirm the claim, or … reduce or disallow the claim” after affording the claimant an opportunity to substantiate it. The court treated section 45(3) as prescribing a mandatory decision-making stage: once the statutory process is engaged by a dispute report, the Master must select one of the three outcomes contemplated by the section.


On that approach, the Master’s stated reason for inaction—namely the presence of disputes of fact requiring oral evidence—did not create a further option under section 45(3) to decline to decide. The court considered that the statutory scheme requires a Master’s decision as a necessary procedural step before dissatisfied parties can pursue the further consequences contemplated by the section, including the ability of a claimant to establish a disallowed claim by action at law. The court identified that the Master’s approach produced a procedural impasse: the Master asserted that the liquidators could not proceed with liquidation and distribution accounts until the dispute was resolved by a court, yet the statutory scheme made the claimant’s route to court dependent on the Master having made a decision.


Turning to reviewability, the court relied on section 151 of the Insolvency Act and the Supreme Court of Appeal’s explanation in Nel and Another NNO v The Master (ABSA Bank Ltd and Others intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) that section 151 constitutes the so-called “third type of review”, a statutory review power that may combine aspects of appeal and review, allowing a court to enter upon and decide the matter afresh. In that framework, the refusal by the Master to decide under section 45(3) was treated as a reviewable decision, and the court considered the refusal irrational in light of the consequences identified, including the inability of the liquidation to progress and the absence of a proper procedural route to finality without a Master’s decision.


The court further drew on the guidance in Constantia Insurance Company Ltd v The Master, Johannesburg High Court and Others 2023 (5) SA 88 (SCA), which emphasised that where reduction or expungement is contemplated, the Master must apply an objective mind to the material before him or her, and should not reduce or expunge without sufficient grounds. The court also referenced Mantis Investments Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another v De Jager NO and Another 2024 (3) SA 431 (SCA) for the proposition that the section 45(3) procedure is peremptory, and that the status of a proved claim becomes conclusive if not properly taken further within the statutory scheme.


Having found the refusal reviewable, the court proceeded to the question of what decision ought to have been made. The court reasoned that the Master’s own conclusion that the matter involved disputes of fact requiring evidence led to the inference that the claims were not suitable for confirmation on the materials. The court treated the presence of unresolved factual disputes, coupled with the deficiencies in how the claims were substantiated when proved, as indicating that the claims should not have been admitted as proven in the first place. On that basis, and because the Master had neither confirmed nor reduced the claims, the court considered that disallowance was the only logical section 45(3) decision available in the circumstances described.


In dealing with the opposition, the court noted that the second and third respondents advanced far-reaching allegations, including allegations of misconduct by business rescue practitioners who were not parties to the proceedings, and these issues related to historical events preceding liquidation. The court considered that such contentions reinforced the conclusion that the disputes could not be properly resolved on the papers, and did not displace the procedural and evidentiary difficulties underpinning the section 45(3) outcome adopted.


On the counterclaim, the court considered it ill-conceived in the context of these proceedings because the matters it raised were intertwined with the broader dispute about the business rescue plan and related transactions, which the Master had already characterised as requiring evidence. The court therefore found no merit in pursuing that counterclaim in this application and dismissed it.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court reviewed and set aside the Master’s refusals dated 25 July 2024 to decide the disputes under section 45(3) in respect of the proved claims in both insolvent estates. Substituting for that refusal, the court ordered that the claims proved by Nail Red Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd and Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd in each estate were disallowed, while expressly preserving the statutory entitlement to establish the disallowed claims by an action at law as contemplated in section 45(3).


The court imposed a time condition: any such action to establish the disallowed claims had to be instituted within 60 days of the order.


The court dismissed the second and third respondents’ counterclaim.


On costs, the court ordered that the applicants’ costs (as between attorney and own client) were to be paid in the administration of the respective insolvent estates, jointly and severally. The costs of the opposition were ordered against the second and third respondents, jointly and severally, payable to the respective insolvent estates on the party and party scale, including counsel’s costs on Scale C.


Cases Cited


Nel and Another NNO v The Master (ABSA Bank Ltd and Others intervening) 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA).


Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111.


Constantia Insurance Company Ltd v The Master, Johannesburg High Court and Others 2023 (5) SA 88 (SCA).


Mantis Investments Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another v De Jager NO and Another 2024 (3) SA 431 (SCA).


Wilkens v Potgieter NO and Another 1996 (4) SA 936 (T).


Legislation Cited


Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, sections 45(2), 45(3), 75, and 151.


Companies Act 61 of 1973, sections 336 and 339.


Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, sections 6(2)(d) and 6(2)(e)(iii) (referred to but not relied upon for the decision).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Master’s refusal to make a decision under section 45(3) after the liquidators had disputed proved claims was held to be impermissible, because section 45(3) contemplates that the Master must decide to confirm, reduce, or disallow the claim once properly seized with a dispute.


That refusal constituted a reviewable decision under section 151 of the Insolvency Act, and it was set aside. Given the Master’s stated inability to resolve the disputes on the papers and the deficiencies surrounding the proof and substantiation of the claims, the court held that the appropriate section 45(3) outcome was disallowance of the claims, subject to the creditors’ statutory right to establish them by action at law within a specified period.


The respondents’ counterclaim was held to be without merit in the context of this application and was dismissed.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 45(3) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 requires that when a trustee or liquidator disputes a claim after it has been proved and reports that dispute with reasons, the Master must make a decision within the statutory options, namely to confirm, reduce, or disallow the claim. The section does not contemplate a further option allowing the Master to decline to decide merely because factual disputes exist.


A refusal by the Master to perform the decision-making function envisaged in section 45(3) constitutes a reviewable act under section 151 of the Insolvency Act, which provides for a statutory form of review (the “third type of review”) enabling a court to set aside the Master’s decision and, where appropriate, to determine the matter afresh.


Where the Master concludes that the dispute cannot be resolved without evidence and the proved claims are materially deficient in substantiation on the papers, the statutory mechanism may properly result in disallowance of the claims under section 45(3), without depriving the claimants of the statutory right to pursue an action at law to establish their claims, subject to applicable constraints imposed by the court’s order.

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA . .
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE:-¥ES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ¥1:-S/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE: 3 FEBRUARY 2026
SIGNATURE:
In the matter between:
ROERING, LEIGH WILLIAM N.O
BOTHA, JOACHIM HENDRIK N.O
HENNING, HANNLIE N.O
And
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT,
PRETORIA
NAIL RED RUST TRADING {PTY) LTD
Case No. 2024-146523
FIRST APPLICANT
SECOND APPLICANT
THIRD APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT

2
WEND RA INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD THIRD RESPONDE NT
ELMIR PROPERTY PROJECTS (PTY) LTD FOURTH RESPONDEN T
Coram:
Heard on:
Delivered:
Summary:
MILLAR J
Millar J
26 January 2026
3 February 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLI I. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 1 0H00 on 3 February
2026.
Liquidation - dispute raised by liquidators against claims proven at a
meeting of creditors - dispute raised in terms of s 45(2) of the
Insolvency Act - Master's adjudication of the dispute requires a
decision in terms of s 45(3) to either confirm, reduce or disallow
disputed claim - Master declined to make a decision citing disputes
of fact to be decided by Court - failure of the Master to make a
decision in terms of s 45(3) reviewable in terms of s 151 of the
Insolvency Act - decision reviewed and set aside and disputed claim
disallowed.
JUDGMENT

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[1] This is a case concerning a dispute between the liquid~tors of two companies,
African Brick Centre Limited (ABC) afld African Brick (Pty) Ltd (AB), the
applicants and two creditors of both of those companies, the second, Nail Red
Rust Trading (Pty) Ltd (NRR) and third, Wendra Industrial Holdings (Pty) Ltd
(WIH) respondents. The dispute falls within the ambit of s 45(3) of the Insolvency
Act1 (the Act) and its application.
[2] What makes this dispute unusual, is that the statutory "referee", the Master of the
High Court, the first respondent in these proceedings, refuses to decide on the
dispute. The dispute concerns claims that were initially proven before the Master
and allowed, but which were subsequently disputed.
[3] S 45 of the Act provides:
1 24 of 1936.
"(1) After a meeting of creditors the officer who presided thereat shall deliver
to the trustee eve,y claim proved against the insolvent estate at that
meeting and every document submitted in support of the claim.
(2) The trustee shall examine all available books and documents relating to
the insolvent estate for the purpose of ascertaining whether the estate in
fact owes the claimant the amount claimed.
(3) If the trustee disputes a claim after it has been proved against the estate
at a meeting of creditors, he shall report the fact in writing to the Master
and shall state in his report his reasons for disputing the claim. Thereupon
the Master may confirm the claim, or he may, after having afforded the
claimant an opportunity to substantiate his claim, reduce or disallow the
claim, and if he has done so, he shall forthwith notify the claimant in

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writing: Provided that such reduction or disallowance shall not debar the
claimant from establishing his claim by an action at law, but subject to the
provisions of section seventy five."
[4] The background relating to the claims of NRR and WIH which are in issue may
be summarized as follows:
[4.1] A company by the name of Yakani lnfraco (Pty) Ltd (Yakani), as a
creditor, had historical claims against ABC and other companies within
the African Brick group of companies. This claim was ostensibly in
respect of shareholder loan accounts in the sum of R17.1 million.
[4.2] The African Brick group of companies fell into financial distress and
various companies within the group including ABS and AB commenced
voluntary business rescue proceedings.
[4.3] The business rescue plan that was proposed inter alia provided for a
reduction or other treatment of these historical shareholder loans to
R1 .756 million as set out in paragraph [4.5] below.
[4.4.] The plan was adopted, including by Yakani
[4.5] When the plan was implemented, it was necessary for Yakani to sell 74%
of its shares to the fourth respondent, Elmir Property Projects (Pty) Ltd
(Elmir) in return for the injection of funds into the companies.
[4.6] A sale of shares agreement was concluded on 14 February 2014 which
inter alia provided for the treatment of Yakani's historical loans. Elmir's

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interpretation of the agreement is that these loans were reduced from
R17.1 million to R1 .756 million as contemplated in the plan.
[4.7] Such claims as Yakani may have had, then appear to have been ceded
to NRR and WIH during the business rescue proceedings together with
certain securities.
[4.8] Notices of substantial implementation of the plan were filed and the
business rescue proceedings terminated during April 2015.
[4.9] Both ABC and AB were placed under provisional winding up on 12 August
2015 and were finally liquidated on 6 December 2021.
[5] It is common cause between the parties that at a meeting of the creditors, the
following claims were proven:
[5.1] In respect of ABC (in liquidation), the meeting of creditors took place on
10 March 2022. WIH proved a claim in the sum of R6 224 744.50. The
substantiation of this claim was contained in a three-page document.
NRR similarly proved a claim in the same amount which was
substantiated in an eleven-page document. Both claims were admitted.
[5.2] In respect of AB (in liquidation), the meeting of creditors took place on 5
September 2022. NRR proved a claim in the sum of R2 825 000.00. The
substantiation of this claim was contained in a five-page document. WIH
similarly proved a claim in the same amount which was substantiated in
a three-page document. Both claims were admitted.

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[5.3) It is not in issue that at the time of the presentation and proving of the
respective claims, besides the claim documents (as referred to above),
the NRR and WIH also (apparently) made available at the respective
creditors' meetings, a lever arch file consisting of 489 pages of
documents, in support of the claims. Nowhere in the claim documents
for each claim are these documents referenced and so it was not possible
to readily link these documents to the claims that were proven.
[6)" It is not in issue that the claims that were submitted and proven, were done so in
circumstances where ex facie what was submitted, there was insufficient
information or documentation for the applicants to ascertain whether those
amounts were due.
[7] In this regard, for example, the claim form of WIH for the claim submitted against
ABC describes the claim in respect of "monies lent and advanced (ceded to the
creditor)" which then goes on to describe three sources of indebtedness in the
following terms:
[7 .1] "Secured loan, advanced by Yakani lnfraco (Pty) Ltd to African Brick Lenasia
(Pty) Ltd for which the debtor is guarantor - 50% of debt has been ceded to the
creditor" and dated January 2010.
[7.2) "Secured loan, advanced by Yakani lnfraco (Pty) Ltd to African Brick (Pty) Ltd
for which the debtor is guarantor - 50% of debt has been ceded to the creditor"
and dated September 2010.
[7.3] "Secured loan, advanced by Yakani lnfraco (Pty) Ltd to African Brick (Pty) Ltd
to the debtor- 50% of debt has been ceded to the creditor" and dated August
2013.

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[8] No supporting documents were attached to any of the claim forms, whether in
relation to the principal indebtedness or the guarantees referred to. No
documents were attached to support the existence of the alleged loan/s or in
respect of any of the alleged cessions.
[9] In view of the ultimate decision of the Master regarding the claims, it is not
necessary to set out each one of the four claims made in detail. It suffices to
state that the claims were all beset with the same or similar deficits referred to
above and hence the applicants dispute of such claims.
[1 O] It bears mentioning also, that Elmir, also addressed a letter to the applicants
setting out the reasons why they, as a shareholder, disputed the veracity of the
claims of NRR and WIH and requesting that the applicants seek the expungement
of those claims.
[11] The Master notified the applicants of the claims that had been proven and had
furnished them with the documents that had been submitted in support, the
applicants then considered these in terms of s 45(2).
[12] The consideration resulted in the applicants lodging a written dispute with the
Master on 22 May 2024, substantiating their reasons for disputing each of the
respective claims and requesting inter a/ia the reduction and/or expungement of
certain claims. On 27 May 2024 NRR and WIH then delivered a response to the
applicants' reports asserting why the claims as proven, should be allowed.
[13] In issue relating to whether the claims should be allowed or not is inter alia the
interpretation of events surrounding the business rescue plan, whether it was
ever valid and whether conditions relating to transactions entered pursuant to it

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were ever fulfilled. These issues are historical and as the Master correctly found
would require evidence for proper adjudication.
[14] The Master, having now been presented with the report of the applicants as to
why the claims should be disallowed, and of the second and third respondents as
to why they should be allowed, concluded on 25 July 2024 that:
"Therefore, in light of the factual dispute as to the validity of the Business Rescue
Plan whether it was indeed adopted and (substantially) implemented, which will
require evidence to be lead, the parties will need to refer this matter to the Court
for its Ruling."
[15] The Master then indicated that it would abide the decision of this Court. It is the
case for the applicants that the Master must decide as provided for in terms of s
45(3) of the Act. NRR and WIH for their part assert that the Master was quite
entitled to refuse to make any decision.
[16] S 45(3) is clear in its terms. The Master must make a decision once a claim has
been disputed. T he section permits the Master to make one of three decisions -
[16.1] He may either confirm the claim, or
[16.2] He may reduce the claim or
[16.3] He may disallow the claim.
[17] The section does not permit the Master to refuse to make any decision simply
because there is a dispute of fact. S 45(3) is clear in its terms that before either
the applicants or NRR or WIH can take any further action in respect of their
dissatisfaction with the decision of the Master (whatever that decision may have
been within the ambit of the section) a decision in terms of the section is required.

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(18] Is the Master's decision to refuse to decide in terms of s 4 5(3) in the present
circumstances reviewable? The succinct answer is that it is.
(19] In Ne/ and Another NNO v The Master (ABSA Bank Ltd and Others intervening), 2
it was held that:
"[22] In terms of s 151 of the Insolvency Act, read together with s 339 of the
Companies Act
' . . . any person aggrieved by any decision, ruling, order or taxation
of the Master ... may bring it under review by the court . . . '
South African courts have long accepted that the review envisaged by s
151 of the Insolvency Act is the 'third type of review' identified more than
a hundred years ago in Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v
Johannesburg Town Council, i.e, where Parliament confers a statutory
power of review upon the Court. In the Johannesburg Consolidated
Investment Co case, Innes CJ stated, with reference to this kind of review,
that a Court could
'. . . enter upon and decide the matter de nova. It possesses not
only the powers of the Court of review in a legal sense, but it has
the functions of a Court of Appeal with the additional privileges of
being able, after setting aside the decision arrived at ... , to deal
with the matter upon fresh evidence . .. '
2 2005 (1) SA 276 (SCA) at paras [22]-[23]. Besides the third type of review referred to in this case, the
provisions of 6(2)(d) and 6(2)(e)(iii) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) may
also be of application. However, this review need not be decided in terms of PAJA as the Insolvency
Act has the specific statutory provision ins 151 to accommodate reviews of the decision of the Master.

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[23] Thus, when engaged in this third kind of review, the Court has powers of
both appeal and review with the additional power, if required, of receiving
new evidence and of entering into and deciding the whole matter afresh.
It is not restricted in exercising its powers to cases where some irregularity
or illegality has occurred. However, while it is sometimes stated that the
Court's powers under this kind of review are 'unlimited' or 'unrestricted',
this is not entirely correct. The precise extent of any 'statutory review type
power' must always depend on the particular statutory provision
concerned and the nature and extent of the functions entrusted to the
person or body making the decision under review. A statutory power of
review may be wider than the 'ordinary' judicial review of Administrative
Action {'the second type of review' identified by Innes CJ in the
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co case), so that it combines
aspects of both review and appeal, but it may also be narrower, 'with the
Court being confined to particular grounds of review or particular
remedies.' [References omitted]
(20] In Constantia Insurance Company Ltd v The Master, Johannesburg High Court
and Others, 3 it was held that:
"[18] When the reduction or expungement of a claim is contemplated, the
Master would generally have before him or her not only the report of the
trustee/liquidator, but also the material submitted to substantiate the
claim. The Master is enjoined to apply his or her mind objectively to all
the relevant material thus placed before him or her. Whilst the Master is
not required to determine whether the insolvent estate is in fact not
indebted (or indebted) to the claimant, he or she should not reduce to
expunge a claim unless there is sufficient ground for doing so."
3 2023 (5) SA 88 (SCA) at para [18].

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[21] In Mantis Investments Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another v De Jager NO and
Another, 4 it was held that:
"[17] A liquidator may not review the decision of the Master to admit the claim,
unless the liquidator has followed the procedure contemplated in s 45(3)
of the Act, which is peremptory. A creditor who has unsuccessfully
objected to a Master's decision to admit the claim, may take the Master's
decision on review in terms of s 151 of the Act. The Master's decision to
reject a creditor's proved claim may also be taken on review by the
aggrieved creditor. However, where no steps are taken to review the
Master's decision to admit or reject approved claim, that claim becomes
conclusive and enforceable in law against the company in liquidation. In
that event the Master's decision would stand."
[22] The failure to decide as required by the section, leads to an absurd situation. It
was argued for the applicants that "the liquidators are hamstrung in their winding up
of the two estates as they cannot proceed to draft liquidation and distribution accounts.
Indeed, the Master in her letters of 25 July 2024 specifically states that the liquidators
cannot lodge a liquidation anc;I distribution account until the court has decided inter alia
on the validity of the proven claims. Yet, absent the Master making a decision, there is
no procedure for a court to so decide."
[23] The refusal to decide in terms of section 45(3) is in and of itself a reviewable
decision as provided for in section 151 of the Act. Its irrationality is demonstrable
from the position adopted in the letter of 25 July 2024.
[24] The consequence of this decision is that no litigation may be instituted until a
decision is made by the Court on the dispute of fact, but in terms of section 45(3),
4 2024 (3) SA 431 (SCA) at para (17].

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neither NRR nor WIH may proceed to Court to establish their claims without such
decision. The winding up of these estates will also be unable to proceed.5
[25] Since the review in this matter is of the third type as referred to in Ne/ and Another
NNO v The Master (ABSA Bank Ltd and Others intervening), it behooves this
Court having reached the conclusion that the refusal of the Master to decide is
reviewable to then consider the decision that ought to have been made.
[26] The conclusion by the Master that there are disputes of fact which cannot be
decided on the papers, and which will require evidence lead one to the ineluctable
conclusion that the claims ought never to have been admitted as proven in the
first place. Had the claims been conclusively proven in totality, the Master would
have confirmed them. Had the claims been proven in part then the Master would
have reduced them. The failure of the Master to do either leaves the disallowance
of the claims as the only logical decision that could (and should) have been made
in terms of s 45(3).
[27] NRR and WIH opposed the application primarily on the basis that the claims
ought to have been confirmed. However, in doing so, they made far reaching
claims and serious allegations of misconduct by the business rescue practitioners
who are not before this Court and in relation to events which preceded the
provisional and final liquidation orders and the tenure of the applicants in the
affairs of ABC and AB. It should have been apparent to them that this Court would
also not be able to adjudicate such matters on the papers alone.
[28] It is for these reasons that the review succeeds and the claims of NRR and WIH
in ABC and AB are disallowed .
5 See Wilkens v Potgieter NO and Another 1996 ( 4) SA 936 {T)

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[29] Besides opposing the application, NRR and WIH also counterclaimed for an order
against Elmir relating to matters arising from the business rescue plan. This
counter claim was ill conceived because the very subject matter to which it relates
forms part of the dispute between the parties to this application and in respect the
leading of evidence is required. The counterclaim simply has no merit in these
proceedings and is dismissed.
[30] The costs will follow the result. Since the applicants are acting on behalf of
insolvent estates, I am making an order for costs qua their attorney and own client
costs to be recoverable from the respective estates. In respect of the opposition
by the NRR and WIH, the costs order I make is in respect of the cost's payable
to the respective estates of ABC and AB arising out of their unsuccessful
opposition to this application.
[31] In the circumstances, it is ordered:
[31.1] The first respondent's refusal on 25 July 2024 to confirm, or to reduce or
disallow, the claims proven by the second and third respondents in the
insolvent estate of African Brick Centre Ltd (in liquidation) (Master's
reference number T2150/2015) in terms of s 45(3) of the Insolvency Act,
as read with s 339 and/ors 336 of the Companies Act, 1973 is reviewed
and set aside.
[31.2] The first respondent's refusal on 25 July 2024 to confirm, or to reduce or
disallow, the claims proven by the second and third respondents in the
insolvent estate of African Brick (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) (Master's
reference number T2151/2015) in terms of s 45(3) of the Insolvency Act,
as read with s 339 and/ors 336 of the Companies Act, 1973 is reviewed
and set aside.

14
[31.3) The second and third respondents claims in respect of African Brick
Centre Ltd (in liquidation) is disallowed, subject to the second and third
respondents being entitled to establish their disallowed claims by an
action at law as provided for in s 45(3) of the Insolvency Act, 1936 as
read with s 339 and/or s 336 of the Companies Act, 1973 provided
however that such action is to be instituted within 60 (sixty) days of the
granting of this order.
[31.4) The second and third respondents claims in respect of African Brick (Pty)
Ltd (in liquidation) is disallowed, subject to the second and third
respondents being entitled to establish their disallowed claims by an
action at law as provided for in s 45(3) of the Insolvency Act, 1936 as
read with s 339 and/or s 336 of the Companies Act, 1973 provided
however that such action is to be instituted within 60 (sixty) days of the
granting of this order.
[31 .5) The applicants' costs of this application as between attorney and own
client, are to be paid jointly and severally in the administration of the
respective insolvent estates of African Brick Centre Ltd (in liquidation)
and African Brick (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation).
[31.6) The costs of the opposition to this application are to be paid jointly and
severally by the second and third respondents to the respective insolvent
estates of African Brick Centre Ltd (in liquidation) and African Brick (Pty)
Ltd (in liquidation) on the scale as between party and party with counsels'
costs on scale C.

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[31.7] The second and third respondents' counterclaim is dismissed.
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND & THIRD
RESPONDENTS:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
26 JANUARY 2026
3 FEBRUARY 2026
ADV. B GILBERT SC
REITZ ATTORNEYS
MR. J REITZ
ADV. L MATSIELA
MPHAHO ATTORNEYS
MR. KMPHAHO
NO APPEARANCE FOR EITHER THE FIRST OR FOURTH RESPONDENTS