Wands Investments (Pty) Ltd v JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd and Another (LM210Jan16) [2016] ZACT 40; [2016] 1 CPLR 281 (CT) (21 April 2016)

75 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger approval — Wands Investments (Pty) Ltd's acquisition of JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd and JDG Investment Holding Company (Pty) Ltd — Proposed transaction assessed for competition impact and public interest concerns — Horizontal overlap in unsecured credit market identified, but market share post-merger below 10% — No substantial prevention or lessening of competition found — Public interest concerns, particularly regarding employment, addressed with no significant negative impact established — Conditional approval granted by Competition Tribunal.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned merger proceedings before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa, in which the Tribunal was required to decide whether to approve a proposed transaction in terms of the merger control regime administered by the Competition Commission and the Tribunal.


The primary acquiring firm was Wands Investments (Pty) Ltd (“Wands Investments”), a shelf company within a broader corporate group referred to in the reasons as the Acquiring Group. The primary target firms were JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd (“JDCF”) and JDG Investment Holding Company (Pty) Ltd (“JDGI”), collectively described as the JD Consumer Finance and Insurance Business, within the JD Group and ultimately within the Steinhoff corporate structure.


The procedural history reflected that the Competition Commission investigated the proposed transaction, identified the relevant overlaps, and considered public interest issues raised during the investigation. The Tribunal heard the matter on 9 March 2016, received the last submission on 18 March 2016, issued its order on 22 March 2016, and later furnished written reasons on 21 April 2016. A trade union, SACCAWU, participated at the Tribunal hearing and raised employment-related concerns.


The dispute concerned the likely competitive effects of the transaction in the relevant market(s) and, more prominently in the Tribunal’s reasons, whether the merger raised public interest concerns, specifically employment concerns, warranting merger conditions.


Material Facts


Wands Investments was described as a shelf company within an acquiring group whose only South African activities comprised an unsecured lending business conducted under the trade name “Capfin”, offering personal loans to South African consumers via Pepkor’s Pep and Ackermans retail stores.


JDCF operated the consumer finance business of the JD Group, including the provision of secured and unsecured credit primarily to customers of JD Group retail chains for purchases made in those stores, with limited credit provision to customers of other Steinhoff group retailers and to customers of certain third-party retailers. JDGI provided micro-insurance products (including credit-related insurance products) to customers of JD Group retail stores, with JDGI having been established to underwrite certain insurance policies sold to retail consumers applying for and obtaining credit from the JD Group.


The proposed transaction was that Wands Investments would acquire the entire issued share capital of JDCF and JDGI from the seller entity, with Wands Investments consequently obtaining control over both target firms upon implementation.


On the competition assessment, the Commission identified a horizontal overlap between the parties in the national market for the provision of unsecured credit. There was no horizontal overlap in insurance, because the acquiring group was not active in that area. The Commission found that the merged entity’s market share in unsecured credit would be below 10%, and that multiple other significant market participants were present, including Nedbank, FirstRand Bank, Capitec Bank, ABSA Bank, Standard Bank of South Africa, and African Bank.


The public interest record included undisputed evidence that the broader JD Group had been engaged in restructuring, including initiatives such as freezing vacancies, redeployments, and reducing staff according to operational requirements. This restructuring was said to have resulted in approximately 3 409 job losses, predominantly in the JD Group’s furniture retail operations, and it was recorded that approximately 2 800 employees accepted voluntary severance packages. It was also placed before the Tribunal that the JD Group intended to close approximately 250 stores, which was likely to affect about 1 500 employees.


SACCAWU represented employees of the JD Group (including JDCF). During the Commission’s investigation and again at the Tribunal hearing, SACCAWU expressed concern that the transaction could lead to retrenchments and sought stringent employment conditions, including a demand that the JD Group reinstate employees retrenched in October 2015. The merging parties’ response, accepted by the Commission in its assessment, was that the relevant restructuring was not merger-specific, having been identified in 2014, with consultations occurring in early 2015, while the proposed transaction was only envisaged toward the end of 2015.


At the Tribunal hearing, SACCAWU relied significantly on the Tribunal’s prior approach in a different transaction involving the consumer finance business of the JD Group, contending that similar conditions should be imposed here, but with a longer moratorium period. The merging parties maintained that job losses in 2015 and those announced in February 2016 were operational and aimed at maintaining the JD Group’s viability rather than being caused by the proposed merger.


Legal Issues


The Tribunal was required to determine whether the proposed transaction was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market, given the identified horizontal overlap in the provision of unsecured credit. This aspect required an application of competition assessment principles to the market facts and structural indicators placed before it (including market shares and the existence of competitors).


The Tribunal also had to determine whether the proposed transaction raised public interest concerns, and in particular whether there were employment-related concerns that justified imposing conditions. This involved an evaluative judgment about the relationship between ongoing job losses within the seller’s broader corporate group and the specific merger before the Tribunal, and about what conditions were justified to address employee uncertainty while remaining proportionate.


A further issue, arising from the history of restructuring and the parties’ submissions, was how to address allegations or anxieties about merger-specific retrenchments where the evidence did not establish causation, but where significant contemporaneous restructuring created a risk of confusion and dispute. This was principally a question of crafting an administrable remedial framework rather than resolving a disputed factual causation finding on the merits.


Court’s Reasoning


On the competition assessment, the Tribunal accepted the Commission’s identification of a horizontal overlap in unsecured credit and noted the absence of overlap in insurance. It placed weight on the Commission’s finding that the merged entity’s market share would be below 10% in the relevant national market and that several other major financial institutions operated in the same space. On this basis, the Tribunal concurred with the Commission that the transaction was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market.


On public interest, the Tribunal agreed with the Commission’s conclusion that there were no significant public interest concerns generally, but it treated employment as requiring specific attention. While the parties asserted that the proposed transaction would not negatively affect employment and that the acquiring group intended to continue the target businesses “as usual,” the record demonstrated substantial ongoing and planned restructuring in the broader JD Group, including historical job losses and contemplated store closures.


The Tribunal stated that it found no evidence that retrenchments to date within the broader JD Group were related to the proposed merger. At the same time, it considered SACCAWU’s submissions about employee insecurity, the ongoing restructuring environment, and the risk of future retrenchments being perceived as merger-related. In that context, the Tribunal characterised the imposition of conditions as serving transparency and certainty for affected employees.


As to the appropriate design of conditions, SACCAWU sought a five-year moratorium on merger-related retrenchments, whereas the merging parties contended for a moratorium of no more than one year. The Tribunal stated that it found no justification for either extreme position and selected a two-year period as the appropriate balance.


In addition, the Tribunal crafted an evidentiary and enforcement framework for the condition during the two-year “Merger Condition Period.” It recorded that, to avoid unnecessary compliance burdens given ongoing restructurings at the seller, retrenchments during the condition period would be presumed not to be merger-specific. The Tribunal then set out how that presumption could be challenged: if employees or their representatives alleged that retrenchments were merger-specific, they bore the burden to rebut the presumption and prove merger-specific causation, after which the Commission would investigate and, if an apparent breach were found, the matter would be dealt with under the enforcement mechanism referenced by the Tribunal.


Finally, the Tribunal required that the merging parties circulate the imposed conditions to employees and their representatives within a specified period, reflecting the Tribunal’s focus on ensuring that employees were informed of protections and procedures.


Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal approved the proposed transaction, finding it unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market.


Approval was granted subject to employment-related conditions, principally that the merging parties would not retrench any employees as a result of the proposed merger for a period of two years from the implementation date, with specified qualifications as to what constitutes retrenchments for purposes of the condition and an administrable framework for disputes about whether retrenchments are merger-specific.


The reasons did not record any costs order.


Cases Cited


Merger involving RCS Cards Proprietary Limited and The Consumer Finance Business of the JD Group, Tribunal Case No. LM193Feb15/020644 (conditionally approved on 20 May 2015).


Wands Investments (Pty) Ltd v JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd and Another (LM210Jan16) [2016] ZACT 40; [2016] 1 CPLR 281 (CT) (21 April 2016).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the provided reasons.


Rules of Court Cited


Rule 39 of the Competition Commission Rules.


Held


The Tribunal held that the proposed acquisition of JDCF and JDGI by Wands Investments was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in the national market for unsecured credit, given the merged entity’s low market share and the presence of multiple significant competitors.


The Tribunal further held that, although there was no evidence that ongoing retrenchments within the broader JD Group were caused by the proposed merger, employment-related anxieties warranted conditional approval to provide transparency and certainty. It therefore imposed a two-year moratorium on merger-specific retrenchments, coupled with a presumption that retrenchments during that period were not merger-specific, subject to rebuttal by affected employees or their representatives and investigation and enforcement processes involving the Commission.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Tribunal applied the principle that a merger may be approved where it is unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant market, particularly where structural indicators such as low post-merger market share and the presence of significant competitors support the conclusion that competitive harm is unlikely on the facts placed before it.


The Tribunal also applied the principle that, even where competition concerns do not warrant prohibition, a merger may be approved subject to conditions to address public interest concerns, including employment concerns, where such conditions are considered appropriate to promote certainty and transparency in a context of workforce insecurity and contemporaneous restructuring.


In formulating employment protections, the Tribunal applied an administrability-oriented approach to merger conditions in circumstances where retrenchments may occur for operational reasons independent of the merger. It endorsed a conditional framework in which retrenchments during a defined period were presumed not to be merger-specific, while allowing employees or their representatives to rebut that presumption and placing an alleged breach within a specified procedural enforcement pathway.

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Wands Investments (Pty) Ltd v JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd and Another (LM210Jan16) [2016] ZACT 40; [2016] 1 CPLR 281 (CT) (21 April 2016)

COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No: LM210Jan16
In
the matter between:
WANDS
INVESTMENTS
(PTY)
LTD
Primary Acquiring Firm
and
JD
CONSUMER FINANCE (PTY)
LTD
Primary
Target
Firms
JDG
INVESTMENT HOLDING COMPANY (PTY) LTD
Panel

: Andreas Wessels (Presiding Member)
: Prof. Fiona Tregenna
(Tribunal Member)
: Andiswa Ndoni (Tribunal
Member)
Heard
on                                             :

09 March 2016
Last
submission received on
: 18 March 2016
Order
Issued on                                 :

22 March 2016
Reasons
Issued on                             :

21 April 2016
Reasons
for Decision
Conditional
approval
[1]
On 22 March 2016, the Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal")
approved the proposed transaction involving Wands Investments
(Ply)
Ltd, JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd and JDG Investment Holding Company
(Pty) Ltd.
[2]
The reasons for approving the proposed transaction follow.
Parties
to proposed transaction
Primary
acquiring
firm
[3]
The primary acquiring firm is Wands Investments (Pty) Ltd ("Wands
Investments"), a private company incorporated in
accordance with
the laws of the Republic of South Africa.
[4]
Wands Investments is a wholly owned subsidiary of Fulcrum Financial
Services SA ("Fulcrum Financial Services"), a
company
registered in accordance with the laws of Switzerland. Fulcrum
Financial Services is wholly owned by Fulcrum Investment
Partners SA
("Fulcrum Investment Partners"), which in turn is wholly
owned by Campion Capital SA ("Campion").
The
above-mentioned firms are collectively referred to as the "Acquiring
Group".
[5]
Wands Investments is a shelf company. The Acquiring Group's only
activities in South Africa comprise of an unsecured lending
business
which is operated under the trade name "Capfin", i.e. quick
and simple personal loans are provided to South
African consumers
under the Capfin brand name via Pepkor's Pep and Ackermans retail
stores.
Primary
target firm
[6]
The primary target firms are (i) JD Consumer Finance (Pty) Ltd
("JDCF"); and (ii) JDG Investment Holding Company (Pty)
Ltd
("JDGI"), both incorporated in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of South Africa. JDCF and JDGI are collectively
referred
to as the "JD Consumer Finance and Insurance Business".
[7]
JDCF and JDGI are wholly owned by JDG Trading (Pty) Ltd ("JDGT"),
which is wholly owned by JD Group Limited ("JD
Group"), a
company incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Republic of
South Africa. JD Group is a wholly owned subsidiary
of Steinhoff
Africa Holdings (Pty) Ltd ("Steinhoff Africa"), which is
wholly owned by Steinhoff International Holdings
Limited ("Steinhoff
International").
[8]
The JD Group operates a diversified retail and consumer finance
business.
[9]
JDCF operates the consumer finance business of the JD Group. It
offers customers the following financial services: the provision
of
secured and unsecured credit to the customers of the JD Group's
retail chain stores for items purchased in these stores; the
limited
provision of credit to the customers of the other retail stores
within the broader Steinhoff Group; and the limited provision
of
credit to the customers of third party retailers.
[10]
JDGI offers micro-insurance products to the customers of the JD
Group's retail stores. JDGI was set up in 2007 with the sole
purpose
of underwriting the credit life, credit goods and funeral insurance
policies sold to retail consumers of the JD Group.
These insurance
policies are sold to consumers who apply and are approved for credit
granted by the JD Group.
Proposed
transaction and rationale
[11]
Wands Investments intends to acquire the entire issued share capital
of JDCF and JDGI from JDGT and as a result will have control
over
JDCF and JDGI upon implementation of the proposed transaction.
[12]
The
Acquiring
Group
submitted that it wishes to [...]
[1]
in South Africa, as well as [...] in
South
Africa.
[13]
The JD Group submitted that it wishes to [...], thus the proposed
transaction is an [...] to dispose of JDCF and JDGI.
Impact
on competition
[14]
The Competition Commission ("Commission") identified a
horizontal overlap between the activities of the merging parties
in
the national market for the provision of unsecured credit. We note
that there is no horizontal overlap between the activities
of the
merging parties in respect of the provision of insurance since the
Acquiring Group is not active in this area.
[15]
The Commission found that the merged entity will have a market share
of below 10% in the national market for the provision
of unsecured
credit. The Commission further found that there are a number of other
players in this market, including Nedbank, FirstRand
Bank, Capitec
Bank, ABSA Bank, Standard Bank of South Africa and African.
Bank.
The Commission therefore concluded that the proposed transaction  is
unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition
in the
relevant market.
[16]
We concur with the  Commission that the proposed transaction is
unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition
in any
relevant market.
Public
interest
[17]
Based on the submissions made by the merging parties, the Commission
concluded that the proposed transaction raises no significant
public
interest concerns, including no significant employment concerns.
[18]
We concur with the Commission insofar as the proposed merger does not
raise public interest concerns other than employment
concerns. We
deal with the employment concerns below.
Employment
Background
[19]
The merging
parties submitted that the proposed transaction will not have any
negative effect
on
employment
since
the
Acquiring
Group
intends
to
continue
with
the
JDCF and
JDGI
businesses
as
usual.
[2]
[20]
The
merging
parties
however
provided
details
of
restructuring
within
the
broader
JD
Group of
companies
that
include
reducing
the
staff
model.
They
submitted
that
reducing
the
staffing
model,
which
had
largely
been
developed
to
serve
peak
trading
conditions
which
occur
only once
a year,
[3]
includes
the following
initiatives:
(i)
freezing
vacancies;
(ii)
redeployment
of certain
staff; and
(iii)
reducing
staff
in
accordance
with
operational
requirements.
[4]
[21]
The
above-mentioned
restructuring
resulted
in the
loss
of
approximately
3
409
JDbs,
predominantly
in the
furniture
retail
operations
of the
JD Group.
Of the total amount of JDbs  lost, approximately
2 800
employees
accepted
voluntary
severance
packages.
[5]
[22]
The employees of the JD Group, including JDCF, are represented by the
South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers
Union
("SACCAWU").
[23]
Since SACCAWU raised employment concerns during the Commission's
investigation, we informed it of the Tribunal's hearing date.
SACCAWU's
submissions to the Commission and merging parties' response
[24]
According to the Commission, SACCAWU during its investigation of the
matter raised similar concerns to those that it
raised
during the
RCS/Consumer
Finance Business of JD
merger
[6]
. SACCAWU
furthermore alleged that the proposed transaction has led to
the
retrenchment of employees of the JD Group as recently as October
2015.
[25]
By way of background, in the
RCS/Consumer Finance Business of
JD
merger, SACCAWU had submitted that the
transaction would result in JDb duplications and retrenchments and
the Tribunal ultimately
approved the transaction subject to certain
employment conditions.
[26]
SACCAWU submitted that this proposed transaction should be approved
subject to stringent employment conditions and that the
JD Group must
reinstate all the employees that were retrenched in October 2015.
[27]
The merging parties, in reaction to the concerns raised by SACCAWU,
submitted that the historic restructuring process taking
place within
the broader JD Group is still continuing. They stated that it is
common knowledge (through the
RCS/Consumer Finance Business of JD
merger) that the restructuring of the JD Group over the past few
years has led to a number of JDb losses which are unrelated to the

proposed transaction. The merging parties also submitted that, as
advised previously, the need to restructure the JD Group's business

was identified in 2014. The resulting JDb losses were already
contemplated and consultations ensued in respect thereof in early

2015, whereas the proposed transaction was only envisaged towards the
end of 2015. Therefore any retrenchments given effect to
in the JD
Group during October 2015 cannot have been as a result of this
proposed transaction.
[28]
The merging parties further submitted that the JD Group is still
continuing the retrenchment process and intends to close down

approximately 250 stores as a result of the ongoing restructuring
process in the JD Group. This is likely to affect approximately
1500
employees (i.e. six employees per store).
[29]
The Commission found that the ongoing restructuring within the
broader JD Group is not merger-specific. The need to restructure
the
JD Group's business was identified in 2014 and the resulting JDb
losses and consultations had already ensued by early 2015.
The
proposed transaction was only envisaged at the end of 2015.
Accordingly the Commission concluded that the
restructuring/retrenchments
in October 2015 are not related to this
proposed transaction. The Commission pointed out that this finding is
consistent with Tribunal's
approach in the
RCS/Consumer
Finance
Business of
JD
merger, where
it was found that the retrenchments occurring within the broader JD
Group were likely to be operational in nature
and therefore less
likely to be merger­ specific. In light of this the Tribunal
imposed a condition that placed the onus of
proof on SACCAWU or an
employee who has been retrenched to prove that such dismissal was as
a result of that merger. The latter
merger was however never
implemented.
Tribunal
hearing
[30]
SACCAWU was represented at the hearing before the Tribunal and was
afforded the opportunity to make oral submissions.
[31]
Ms.
Nyman
of
SACCAWU
pointed
out that
the
RCS/Consumer
Finance
Business
of
JD
transaction
involved
the
same
functions
as the
present
proposed
transaction,
that
SACCAWU
raised
employment
concerns
in
that
transaction
and that
the
transaction
was ultimately
conditionally
approved
by the
Tribunal.
SACCAWU
further
noted
that the
RCS/Consumer
Finance
Business
of
JD
transaction
was
never
implemented
by the
relevant parties and alleged that the reason for that was the
employment conditions that the Tribunal
imposed
at the
time.
[7]
[32]
SACCAWU
reiterated
that,
despite the
merging
parties'
submissions,
it
was
not
convinced
that
the
proposed
merger
would
not
lead to
retrenchments.
It further
noted that
the JD Group has been in the
process of
restructuring
and
retrenching
employees since
2014.
[8]
[33]
It
further
alleged
that, despite the
assurances
given
by
the
merging
parties,
the retrenchment
process
had
already
begun
to
take
place.
It
highlighted
that
the SACCAWU
members
are
currently
very
insecure given
the past
merger
(that
was
never
implemented)
and current
proposed
merger,
as
well
as
the
ongoing
process
of
restructuring
and
retrenchments.
[9]
[34]
SACCAWU
submitted
that
this
proposed
merger
should be
approved
on
the
same basis
as
the
RCS/Consumer
Finance
Business
of
JD
transaction,
but that
the
period of
the moratorium on merger-specific JDb
losses
should
be
longer, i.e. that there should be no retrenchments
as a result
of the proposed transaction for
a period of
5 years.
[10]
[35]
The merging
parties, in response to the concerns
raised by
SACCAWU,
submitted
that a significant
difference
in this
transaction
is that
Fulcrum at
present does
not have
the capacity
to
deal
with
any of
the
functions
that
are
dealt
with
by the
target
firms.
The merging
parties
however
confirmed
that
Fulcrum
is
in the
unsecured
credit
business
and
that
both
merging
parties
therefore
have
financial
service
skills.
[11]
The
merging
parties further
stated that
the
RCS/Consumer
Finance
Business
of JD
transaction
was never implemented
because the
economics
of it had
changed significantly
close to
the implementation
date.
[12]
[36]
The
merging
parties
further
stated
that
the JDb
losses
that
occurred
in
2015
and
the further
restructuring/JDb
losses
that
were
announced
in
February
2016
are
all
related to
keeping
the
JD
Group
viable,
i.e.
they
are
operational
in
nature
and
not
merger­
specific.
[13]
Conclusion
[37]
As stated above, the merging parties submitted that they do not
anticipate any JDb losses resulting from the proposed transaction,

despite the fact that both parties have financial service skills.
[38]
We have found no evidence that the retrenchments to date within the
broader JD Group are related to this proposed merger.
[39]
However, given the apprehensions and concerns raised by SACCAWU and
the presently ongoing and planned retrenchments within
the broader JD
Group and in the interest of transparency and in order to provide
certainty to the employees affected by the proposed
transaction, we
have approved the proposed transaction subject to certain
employment-related conditions.
[40]
The
condition that we
have
imposed is that the merging parties will not retrench any
employees
as
a
result
of
the
proposed
merger for
a
period
of
two
years
from
the
implementation date of the
proposed
transaction.
[14]
Although
SACCAWU
requested
that
the
moratorium on
merger-specific
JDb losses
should be
five years
and
the
merging parties submitted that the moratorium period should be no
longer than one year, we have
found no
justification
for either of these positions.
[41]
We
note
however
that
in
acknowledgement
of
the
ongoing
restructurings
at
the
Seller
[15]
,
and in
order to relieve the merging parties of unnecessary burdens that may
flow from
having to
prove their
compliance
with
the
imposed
conditions,
during
the
Merger
Condition Period
[16]
any
retrenchments at
the
businesses of
the merging
parties
will be
presumed to be not merger-specific.
[42]
Given the above presumption, the following applies:
a.
In instances where retrenched employees, or their representatives,
hold the view that such
retrenchments are as a result of the proposed
merger, it will be for the retrenched employees, or their
representatives, to rebut
the presumption (see paragraph 41 above)
and proof that such retrenchment is merger specific/had been caused
by the proposed merger.
b.
In the event that the Commission concludes that the retrenched
employees, or their representatives,
are/were unable to successfully
rebut the presumption set out in paragraph 41 above, the Commission
must inform the merging parties
of its conclusion in writing
including setting out its findings from its investigation.
c.
Inthe event that the Commission concludes that the retrenched
employees, or their representatives
are/were able to successfully
rebut the presumption set out in paragraph 41 above and the
Commission determines that there has
been an apparent breach by the
merging parties of the imposed merger conditions, the breach shall be
dealt with in terms of Rule
39 of the Competition Commission Rules.
[43]
The merging parties shall circulate a copy of the imposed merger
conditions to its employees and their respective representatives

within seven business days of the Tribunal's date of approval.
Conclusion
[44]
In light of the above, we conclude that the proposed transaction is
unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition
in any
relevant market. For the reasons stated above, we have approved the
proposed transaction subject to a set of employment
conditions. For
the sake of convenience we attach hereto the full set of conditions
that we have imposed, marked as "Annexure
A".
____________________
Mr
Andreas Wessels
Prof.
Fiona Tregenna and Ms Andiswa Ndoni concurring
21
April 2016
DATE
Tribunal
Researcher:        Kameel Pancham
For
the merging parties:    Lizel Blignaut of ENSafrica
For
the Commission:
Amanda Mfuphi
[1]
Certain information has been deleted in the non-confidential version
of these Reasons since it has been claimed as confidential
by the
merging parties.
[2]
Merger Record, page 14.
[3]
I.e. the December period.
[4]
Merger Record, pages 14 and 15.
[5]
Merger Record, pages 15 and 16.
[6]
Merger
involving
RCS
Cards
Proprietary
Limited
and
The
Consumer
Finance
Business
of
the JD Group,
Tribunal
Case
No.
LM193Feb15/020644.
This
merger was
conditionally
approved
by the
Tribunal
on 20
May 2015.
[7]
Transcript page 9.
[8]
Transcript pages 9 and 10.
[9]
Transcript
page
10.
[10]
Transcript
pages
11, 12 and
26.
[11]
Transcript
pages
17 and
18.
[12]
Transcript
page 21.
[13]
Transcript page 19.
[14]
For the
sake
of
clarity,
retrenchments
do
not
include (i) voluntary
separation
arrangements;
or
(ii)
voluntary
early
retirement
packages.
[15]
"Seller"
means
JDGT.
[16]
"Merger
Condition
Period"
means the
two year
period
commencing
on the
implementation
date
of
the
proposed
transaction
and
terminating
on the two
year
anniversary
of the
implementation
date.