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[2014] ZACT 78
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Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd (019018) [2014] ZACT 78 (31 October 2014)
COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 019018
In the matter
between:
MOBILE TELEPHONE
NETWORKS (PTY)
LTD
.............................................
Primary
acquiring firm(s)
And
NASHUA MOBILE
(PTY) LTD
IN RESPECT OF ITS
MOBILE TELEPHONE
NETWORKS (PTY)
LTD SUBSCRIBER
BASE
.........................................................
Primary
target firm(s)
Panel: Yasmin Carrim
(Presiding Member)
: Andreas Wessels
(Tribunal Member)
: Medi Mokuena
(Tribunal Member)
Heard on: 26
September 2014
Order Issued on: 29
September 2014
Reasons Issued on:
31 October 2014
Reasons for
Decision
Approval
[1] On 29 September
2014 the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”)
unconditionally approved the acquisition by Mobile Telephone
Networks
(Pty) Ltd (“MTN”) of the MTN subscriber base of Nashua
Mobile (Pty) Ltd.
[2] The reasons for
unconditionally approving the transaction follow hereunder.
[3] It may be
assistive here at the outset, as something of a backdrop against
which to view this transaction, to briefly explain
the merging
parties’ respective positions in the mobile telecommunications
value chain and their pre-merger relationship.
[4]
In South Africa there are a handful of mobile network operators
(“MNOs”) of which MTN is the second largest.
1
All of South Africa’s MNOs are vertically integrated entities
involved in operating mobile networks (at the upstream level)
and the
provision of a broad range of mobile communication services to
end-users (at the downstream level).
2
[5] By contrast,
Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd (“Nashua”) does not operate at
the upstream, mobile network level. Nashua is
known as a Service
Provider (“SP”) and essentially acts as a retail and
distribution channel for each of the MNOs.
Since the SPs are not
operative at the upstream level, they compete with the MNOs only at
the downstream level, i.e. at the level
of retailing mobile
telecommunication services.
Parties to the
Transaction
Primary acquiring
firm
[6] The primary
acquiring firm is MTN. MTN is a provider of both fixed and mobile
voice and data services; mobile messaging services;
mobile handsets;
certain value added services; and subscription services at both
wholesale and retail level. MTN is, as are all
of South Africa’s
MNOs, a vertically integrated entity and is operative at each level
in the mobile telecommunications market;
from network operation level
right through to the provision of telecommunication service to
end-users.
[7]
MTN is wholly owned by Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings (Pty) Ltd
which is, in turn, a wholly owned subsidiary of the MTN
Group Ltd.
The MTN Group Ltd is listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange
Limited (“JSE”) and is not controlled,
directly or
indirectly, by any entity.
3
Primary target
firm
[8] The primary
target firm is Nashua in resect of its MTN subscriber base. Worded
differently, what is being acquired is each and
every Nashua
subscriber who makes use of MTN’s service(s) as an MNO.
[9] Nashua Mobile is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Reunert Limited (“Reunert”),
a public company listed on the JSE with
its shares widely held.
Proposed
Transaction
[10]
The proposed transaction is just one of seven separate yet
interrelated transactions, each of which flows from Nashua’s
decision to exit the market
4
[11] The specific
transaction currently at hand involves MTN assuming Nashua’s
position in respect of each contract concluded
between Nashua and
Nashua’s MTN subscribers. That is to say, all MTN subscribers
who were previously in a contractual relationship
with Nashua Mobile
will now be in such a relationship with MTN.
Rationale
[12] In order to
fully comprehend the merging parties’ respective rationales in
this proposed transaction, an understanding
of the way in which the
industry has changed over the years is necessary.
[13]
When mobile telecommunication services were first introduced in South
Africa, the MNOs were required to make infrastructure
investments of
significant proportions with no certainty that such investments would
reap the abundant rewards they have subsequently
experienced. The
MNOs were thus exposed to substantial risk and were, understandably,
averse to exposing themselves to further
risk by assuming the credit
risk associated with individual contract customers.
5
The MNOs thus considered the existence of SPs at the intermediary
level as a valuable route to market and a mechanism through which
to
reduce their risk exposure.
6
[14]
With the unprecedented success experienced by the industry, the
introduction of prepaid products and regulatory developments
over
time, the MNOs now invest heavily in the retail level and consider
offering services directly to end-users as core to their
business
models.
7
[15]
MTN submits that it no longer considers Nashua’s offering as an
important route to market and it believes the “
service
provider business model is becoming inefficient and obsolete.''
MTN
considers the transaction as the mere manifestation of the "
natural
continuation of the vertical integration of the service provider
function..
,”
8
[16]
Nashua is acutely aware of the changes the market has undergone and
acknowledges that offerings directly to end-users - a territory
previously inhabited primarily by SPs - now falls squarely within the
competencies of the MNOs. Further, the margins available
at the
retail level of the mobile telecommunications market in South Africa
have been declining consistently since 2008.
9
Nashua submits that since its offering is, to a large extent,
mirrored by that of the MNOs it does not envisage this trend changing
in the near future.
[17]
While Nashua’s survival in the market is not under immediate
threat, its longterm viability is uncertain and it has elected
to
exit the market now rather than later, while it is still in a
position to offer favourable severance packages to its employees
and
some returns to shareholders.
10
[18]
In
addition
to the gradual shifts in market conditions which in and of themselves
are threatening Nashua’s ability to compete,
the contractual
terms which govern the relationship between Nashua and the MNOs (“the
Service Provider Agreements”),
are currently up for
renegotiation. Nashua does not consider the terms currently on offer
to be adequately favourable so as to
enable it to compete on a
long-term basis.
Relevant Market
[19] The merging
parties submit that concluding definitively on the relevant product
market is unnecessary since howsoever one defines
the market, the
proposed transaction raises no substantial competition concerns.
[20] The Commission
however, proposes that the effect of the transaction be assessed on
the “market for the resale of MTN
post-paid subscription and
services.”
[21] Notwithstanding
their dissimilar submissions regarding relevant product market, both
the Commission and the merging parties
consider the geographic market
to be national in scope.
[22] We are of the
view that even if we were to consider the transaction on the basis of
the Commission’s analysis, the competition
effects would be
unlikely to raise any concerns.
Competition
Analysis
[23] According to
the Commission’s analysis the merged entity will have a market
share of between 30% and 40% with the transaction
accounting for
accretion of between 0.1% and 1.5%. The Commission considered this
accretion to be minimal and unlikely to raise
any competition
concerns.
[24] The Commission
also found that pre-merger, the SPs have very little ability to
influence pricing to end-users. The question
then became whether the
merging parties compete vigorously on service and whether the removal
of Nashua from the mobile telecommunications
arena would reduce
service levels to end-users.
[25]
Nashua submitted that its service levels to customers had, in certain
respects, fallen behind market trends. As an example
it pointed to
the fact that while subscribers of the MNOs could manage many aspects
of their accounts online or through automated
call centre facilities
Nashua still relied on older, more expensive and less efficient
methods. In order to improve its service
levels it would need to make
significant investments in IT infrastructure which it was unwilling
to make because of the anticipated
downward pressure on margins. The
MNOs submitted that they are intent on continuously improving their
offering from a service perspective
and they in fact compete robustly
with one another on service.
11
Further, the MNOs are required, by the End-User and Subscriber
Service Charter Regulations
12
,
to provide high levels of service. In light of the above, we are
satisfied that the proposed transaction will not result in a
substantial lessening of service levels in the relevant market.
[26]
The Commission then assessed the extent to which the proposed
transaction, and the subsequent removal of Nashua, would adversely
impact on interbrand competition. The finding in this respect was
that Nashua currently accounts for a very small, and declining,
percentage of all post-paid subscribers. The parties also confirmed
that the sale of the subscriber base did not enable any individual
MTN customer to switch to another MNO simply because the terms and
conditions for that individual customer were still governed
by the
contract it had concluded with MTN and Nashua.
13
[27] In light of the
above, we are largely in agreement with the submissions of both the
Commission and the merging parties insofar
as the proposed
transaction will not result in a substantial lessening of competition
in the relevant market. That is not, however,
the end of the matter.
The Tribunal is enjoined, as in all merger proceedings before it, to
consider the likely effect of the proposed
transaction on the public
interest.
Public Interest
[28]
The merging parties were at pains to impress upon the Tribunal that
the proposed transaction does not constitute the sale of
a business
as a going concern, and that Nashua Mobile’s employees would
thus not be transferred to the acquiring firm.
14
The Tribunal is acutely aware of the fact that approving the proposed
transaction necessarily results in Nashua exiting the market
and many
of Nashua’s employees facing retrenchment.
[29] At first we
were uncertain as to the exact number of employees adversely affected
by the transaction since the figures provided
by the merging parties
were somewhat inconsistent. At the hearing of 26 September 2014, the
position regarding employment effects
was clarified by counsel for
the merging parties.
[30] While we deem
the employment effects of the proposed transaction to be significant,
we are mindful of the fact that Nashua
has elected to exit the
market. We have also taken cognisance of the substantial commitments
made by Nashua in respect of minimising
the adverse effects on
employment.
[31]
Nashua has undertaken to redeploy as many affected employees within
the Reunert Group as possible and expects this figure to
be between
100 and 150. The severance packages Nashua has offered all of its
employees (“the Severance Packages”) appear
to be
particularly generous, being between three and five times more than
they would be in terms of the Labour Relations Act.
15
It also appears that many employees preferred to accept the Severance
Packages than a transfer to the acquiring firm.
16
Further, the merging parties have established support structures
which provide affected employees with,
inter
alia,
psychological
and financial counselling; assistance in updating their curricula
vitae; having their curricula vitae circulated within
the Reunert
Group and afforded preferential consideration in the event of
vacancies arising; and letters of reference.
[32] It is also
necessary to remark here that Nashua has provided specific
undertakings in respect of all affected unskilled employees,
i.e.
those deemed most vulnerable and least likely to find alternative
employment were they to be retrenched as a result of the
transaction.
Nashua has undertaken to redeploy each affected unskilled employee
within the Reunert Group.
[33]In addition to
the Severance Packages, our fears regarding adverse employment
effects have been further allayed by MTN having
given certain
undertakings which also go towards mitigating employment concerns.
These undertakings are set out fully in the Tribunal’s
Order
and Merger Clearance Certificate dated 29 September 2014.
Conclusion
[34] In conclusion
we find that the transaction results in minimal market share
accretion and will not alter the structure of the
market. The
proposed transaction is unlikely to result in a substantial
prevention or lessening of competition in the relevant
market,
howsoever defined.
[35] While we do
consider the employment concerns elucidated above to be significant,
these have been ameliorated by the employment
related undertakings
put forward by both Nashua and MTN.
[36] For the reasons
set out above, we approve the proposed transaction unconditionally.
31 October 2014
DATE
MS YASMIN CARRIM
Mr Andreas
Wessels and Ms Medi Mokuena concurring
Tribunal Researcher:
Shannon Quinn
For the target firm:
Adv David Unterhalter SC instructed by Norton Rose
Fulbright
For the acquiring
firm: Ahmore Burger-Smidt of Werksmans Attorneys
For the Commission:
Grashum Mutizwa, Mogau Aphane and Grace Mohamed.
1
The
MNOs operative in South Africa are Vodacom (Pty) Ltd, MTN, Cell C,
Virgin Mobile and Telkom Mobile.
2
The
reasons for unconditionally approving the transaction follow
hereunder.
3
MTN
Group Limited's shares are widely dispersed with just a single entity
holding more than 6% in MTN, namely the Government Employees
Pension
Fund C/O Public Investment Corporation that holds roughly 14%.
4
The
hearings for the Vodacom & Nashua, MTN & Nashua,
and Altech & Cell C transactions were held together
at the
Competition Tribunal on 26 September 2014
5
Note
that during the initial phases of mobile telecommunications in South
Africa, pre-paid as a concept was not yet in existence.
Thus, the
only route to market for MNOs was through the conclusion of post-paid
contracts or through the use of an SP which would
assume the risk
associated with the conclusion of such contracts. See paras 3.4 and
3.5 of the Report on Competitive and Public
Interest Aspects Aspects
(sic): in the Large Merger between Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty)
Ltd and MTN subscriber base of Nashua
Mobile (Pty) Ltd
("Competitiveness Report").
6
Ibid
7
The
RBB Economics Report entitled: Nashua Mobile/ Vodacom, Nashua Mobile/
MTN- Competitive Assessment ("RBB Report") at
para 19.
8
See
paras 3.11 and 3.12 of the Competitiveness Report, appearing at page
60 of the Record
9
See
page 59 of the Record and pages 24 and 25 of the transcript.
10
See
the testimony of Mr Taylor at pages 64 and 65 of the transcript.
11
Ms
Burger- Smidt of Werksmans Attorneys, MJN's legal representative at
page 52 of the transcript
12
Issued
by the independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)
in 2009
13
There
was a back to back agreement between Nashua and MTN in relation to
the terms and conditions of the service provided to the
customer.
14
Inter
olia
para
8.2 of the Competitiveness Report which appears at page 65 of the
Record
15
Act
No. 66 of 199S.
16
See
page 14 of the transcript.