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[2014] ZACT 77
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Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd (019034) [2014] ZACT 77 (31 October 2014)
COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 019034
In the matter
between:
VODACOM
(PTY)
LTD
.........................................................................................
Primary
acquiring firm
And
NASHUA MOBILE
(PTY) LTD
IN RESPECT OF ITS
VODACOM (PTY) LTD
SUBSCRIBER
BASE
.........................................................
Primary
target firm
Panel: Yasmin Carrim
(Presiding Member)
: Andreas Wessels
(Tribunal Member)
: Medi Mokuena
(Tribunal Member)
Heard
on :
26
September 2014
Order
Issued on:
29
September 2014
Reasons
Issued on:
31
October 2014
Reasons for
Decision
Approval
[1]
On 29 September 2014 the Competition
Tribunal (“Tribunal”) unconditionally approved the
acquisition by Vodacom (Pty)
Ltd (“Vodacom”) of the
Vodacom subscriber base of Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd.
[2]
The reasons for unconditionally approving the transaction follow
hereunder.
Background
[3] It may be of
assistance by way of background to briefly explain the merging
parties’ respective positions in the mobile
telecommunications
value chain and their pre-merger relationship.
[4]
In South Africa there are a handful of mobile network operators
(“MNOs”)
of
which Vodacom is the largest.
1
All of South Africa’s MNOs are vertically integrated entities
involved in operating mobile networks (at the upstream level)
and the
provision of a broad range of mobile communication services to
end-users (at the downstream level).
2
[5]
By contrast, Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd
(“Nashua”)
does
not operate at the upstream, mobile network level. Nashua is known as
a Service Provider
(“SP”)
3
and
essentially acts as a retail and distribution channel for each of the
MNOs. Since the SPs are not operative at the upstream
level, they
compete with the MNOs only at the downstream level of retailing
mobile telecommunication services.
Parties to the
Transaction
Primary acquiring
firm
[6] The primary
acquiring firm is Vodacom, as aforesaid, South Africa’s largest
MNO. Vodacom is a provider of both fixed and
mobile voice and data
services; mobile messaging services; mobile handsets; certain value
added services; and other subscription
services at both wholesale and
retail level. Vodacom is a vertically integrated entity and is
operative at each level in the mobile
telecommunications market; from
network operation level right through to the provision of
telecommunication service to end-users.
[7]
Vodacom is controlled by Vodacom Group Limited
(“Vodacom
Group”)
as
to 93.75% with the remaining shares being held by:-
Lisinfo
209 Investment (Pty) Ltd (1.97%);
Main
Street 661 (Pty) Ltd (0.84%); and
YeboYethu
Limited (3.44%).
The
Vodacom Group is a listed company on the Johannesburg Securities
Exchange Limited
(“JSE”)
with
roughly 35% of its shares being held publically with the remaining
65% held by Vodafone Investments (SA) (Pty) Ltd.
Primary target
firm
[8] The primary
target firm is Nashua in respect of its Vodacom subscriber base. In
other words, what is being acquired is each
and every Nashua
subscriber who makes use of Vodacom’s service(s) as an MNO.
[9] Nashua Mobile is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Reunert Limited (“Reunert”),
a public company listed on the JSE with
its shares widely held.
Proposed
Transaction
[10] The proposed
transaction is just one of seven separate yet interrelated
transactions, each of which flows from Nashua’s
decision to
exit the market.
[11] The specific
transaction currently at hand involves Vodacom assuming Nashua’s
position in respect of each contract concluded
between Nashua and
Nashua’s Vodacom subscribers. That is to say, all Vodacom
subscribers who were previously in a contractual
relationship with
Nashua Mobile will now be in a direct relationship with Vodacom.
Rationale
[12] In order to
fully comprehend the merging parties’ respective rationales in
this proposed transaction, an understanding
of the way in which the
industry has changed over the years is necessary.
[13]
As explained by the merging parties, when mobile telecommunications
services were first introduced in South Africa, the MNOs
were
required to make infrastructure investments of significant
proportions with little certainty that such investments would reap
the abundant rewards subsequently experienced. The MNOs were thus
exposed to substantial risk and were, understandably, averse
to
exposing themselves to further risk by assuming the credit risk
associated with individual contract customers.
4
The MNOs thus considered the existence of SPs, as a valuable route to
market and a mechanism through which to reduce their risk
exposure.
5
SPs would bear the cost of their own operations and would “own’
the customers including the risks thereof.
[14]
With the unprecedented success of the industry, the advent of prepaid
products and regulatory developments, the MNOs now invest
heavily at
the retail level and consider offering services directly to end-users
as core to their business models.
6
[15]
Vodacom submits that it no longer considers Nashua's offering as an
important route to market and it believes the
“
service
provider business model is becoming inefficient and obsolete."
Vodacom
considers the transaction as a mere manifestation of the “
natural
continuation of the vertical integration of the service provider
function..”
7
[16]
Nashua is acutely aware of the changes the market has undergone and
acknowledges that offerings directly to end-users - a territory
previously inhabited primarily by SPs - now falls squarely within the
competencies of the MNOs, Further, the margins available
at the
retail level of the mobile telecommunications market in South Africa
have been declining consistently since 2008.
8
Nashua’s offering to end-users is mirrored by that of the MNOs
and Nashua submits that it does not envisage this trend changing
in
the near future.
[17]
While Nashua’s survival in the market is not under immediate
threat, its longterm viability is uncertain and it has elected
to
exit the market now rather than later, while it is in a position
where it is able to offer its employees favourable severance
packages, and return some value to shareholders.
9
Relevant Market
[18] The merging
parties submit that concluding definitively on the relevant product
market is unnecessary since, howsoever one
defines the market the
proposed transaction, it raises no substantial competition concerns.
[19]
The Commission however, proposes that the effect of the transaction
be assessed on the “
market
for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and services. ”
[20] Notwithstanding
their dissimilar submissions regarding the relevant product market,
both the Commission and the merging parties
consider the geographic
market to be national in scope.
[21] Having
considered the submissions of the Commission and the merging parties,
we find that the effect of the proposed transaction
is to be assessed
on the market for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and
services.
[22] We are of the
view that even if were to view the transaction on this basis the
competition effects would be unlikely to raise
any concerns.
Competition
Analysis
[23] According to
the Commission’s analysis the merged entity will have a market
share in the region of between 40-45% with
the transaction accounting
for accretion of a between 0.1% and 2%. The Commission considered
this accretion to be minimal and unlikely
to raise any competition
concerns.
[24] The Commission
also found that pre-merger, the SPs have very little ability to
influence pricing to end-users. The question
then became whether the
merging parties compete vigorously on service and whether the removal
of Nashua from the mobile telecommunications
arena would reduce
service levels to end-users.
[25] Nashua
submitted that its service levels to customers had fallen behind
market trends and that of the MNOs. As an example it
pointed to the
fact that while subscribers of the MNOs could manage many aspects of
their accounts online or through automated
call centre facilities
Nashua still relied on older more expensive and less efficient
methods. In order to improve its service
levels it would need to make
significant investments in IT infrastructure which it was unwilling
to make because of the anticipated
downward pressure on margins. In
light of this it was unlikely that service levels to end-users would
decline as a result of the
transaction. In any event the services
offered by Nashua in relation to network issues was not within its
control as this was provided
to the end-users in a back to back
contractual arrangement with MNOs.
[26]
The MNOs on the other hand claim that they are intent on continuously
improving their offering from a service perspective and
they in fact
compete robustly with one another on service.
10
Further, the MNOs are required, by the End-User and Subscriber
Service Charter Regulations
11
,
to provide high levels of service. In light of the above, we are
satisfied that transaction will not result in a substantia! lessening
of service levels to end-users in the relevant market.
[27]
The Commission then assessed the extent to whjch the proposed
transaction, and the subsequent removal of Nashua, would adversely
impact on interbrand competition. The finding in this respect was
that Nashua currently accounts for a very small, and declining,
percentage of all post-paid subscribers. The parties also confirmed
that the sale of the subscriber base did not enable any individual
Vodacom customer to switch to another MNO simply because the terms
and conditions for that individual customer were still governed
by
the contract it had concluded with Vodacom and Nashua.
12
[28] In light of the
above, we are largely in agreement with the submissions of both the
Commission and the merging parties in that
the proposed transaction
is unlikely to result in a substantial lessening of competition in
the relevant market. That is not, however,
the end of the matter. The
Tribunal is enjoined, as in all merger proceedings before it, to
consider the likely effect of the proposed
transaction on the public
interest.
Public Interest
[29]
The merging parties were at pains to impress upon the Tribunal that
the proposed transaction does not constitute the sale of
a business
as a going concern, and that Nashua Mobile’s employees would
thus not be transferred to the acquiring firm.
13
[30] At first, we
were uncertain as to the exact number of employees adversely affected
by the transaction since the figures provided
by the merging parties
were somewhat inconsistent. At the hearing of 26 September 2014, the
position regarding employment effects
was clarified by counsel for
the merging parties.
[31] While we deem
the employment effects of the proposed transaction to be significant,
we are cognisant of the fact that Nashua
has decided to exit the
market. We have also taken cognisance of the substantial commitments
made by Nashua in respect of minimising
the adverse effects on
employment.
[32]
Nashua has undertaken to redeploy as many affected employees within
the Reunert Group as possible and expects this figure to
be between
100 and 150. The severance packages Nashua has offered all of its
employees (“the Severance Packages”) appear
to be
particularly generous, being between three and five times more than
they would ordinarily be entitled to in terms of the
Labour Relations
Act.
14
It also appears that many employees preferred to accept the Severance
Packages rather than be transferred to the acquiring firm.
Further,
the merging parties have established support structures which provide
affected employees with,
inter
alia,
psychological
and financial counselling; assistance in updating their curricula
vitae; having their curricula vitae circulated within
the Reunert
Group and afforded preferential consideration in the event of
vacancies arising; and letters of reference.
[33] It is also
necessary to remark here that Nashua has provided specific
undertakings in respect of all affected unskilled employees,
i.e.
those deemed most vulnerable and least likely to find alternative
employment were they to be retrenched as a result of the
transaction.
Nashua has undertaken to redeploy each affected unskilled employee
within the Reunert Group.
[34] In addition to
the Severance Packages, our concerns regarding adverse employment
effects have been further allayed by Vodacom
having given certain
undertakings which also go towards mitigating employment concerns.
These undertakings are set out fully in
the Tribunal’s Order
and Merger Clearance Certificate dated 29 September 2014.
Conclusion
[35] In conclusion
we find that the transaction results in minimal market share
accretion and will not alter the structure of the
market. We do not
consider that the proposed transaction is likely to result in a
substantial prevention or lessening of competition
in the relevant
market, howsoever defined.
[36] While we do
consider the employment concerns elucidated above to be serious, we
consider the undertakings put forward by Nashua
and Vodacom as likely
to go a long way in mitigating the hardships associated with
retrenchment.
[37] For the reasons
set out above, we approve the proposed transaction unconditionally.
31 October 2014
DATE
MS YASMIN CARRIM
Mr Andreas
Wessels and Ms Medi Mokuena concurring
Tribunal Researcher:
Derrick Bowles
For the target firm:
Adv David Unterhaiter SC instructed by Norton Rose
Fuibright
For the acquiring
firm: Adv Jerome Wilson instructed by Andries Le Grange from
Cliffe Dekker
Hofmeyr
For the Commission:
Mogau Aphane and Lesenda Grace Mohamed
1
The
MNO's operational in South Africa are Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Virgin
Mobile and Telkom Mobile.
2
The
reasons for unconditionally approving the transaction follow
hereunder.
3
Also
referred to as an Independent Service Provider.
4
Note
that during the initial phases of mobile telecommunications in South
Africa, pre-paid as a concept was not yet in existence.
Thus, the
only route to market for MNOs was through the conclusion of post-paid
contracts or through the use of an SP which would
assume the risk
associated with the conclusion of such contracts.
5
The
RBB Economics Report entitled: Nashua Mobile/ Vodacom, Nashua Mobile/
MTN- Competitive Assessment ("RBB Report") at
para 8 page
62 of the Record.
6
RBB
Report para 7 at page 61 of the Record.
7
See
paras 3.11 and 3.12 of the Report entitled Report on Competitive and
Public Interest Aspects in the Large Merger Between Vodacom
(Pty) Ltd
and the Vodacom Subscriber Base of Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd
("Competitiveness Report"), appearing at page 51
of the
Record.
8
See
page 14 of The CC's Report.
9
Ibid.
See
also submissions by Nashua at the hearing.
10
Ms
Burger- Smidt of Werksmans Attorneys, MTN's legal representative at
page 52 of the transcript. See also Mr Patel of Vodacom at
page 41
lines 4-9 of the Transcript where he states
"We're
now becoming an industry that's more focused on customer retention
and good quality service experience. And so one of
the conditions and
one of the key areas we wanted all of our service channels to invest
in is really around service experience.
Vodacom alone is also making
quite dramatic and quite significant investments in service
experience."
11
Issued
by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)
in 2009.
12
This
was confirmed in the hearing by Counsel for Nashua Mobile. See
Transcript page 27 line 7 to page 30, line 17.
13
Inter
alia
para
8.2 of the Competitiveness Report which appears at page 65 of the
Record.
14
Act
No. 66 of 1995.