Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd (019034) [2014] ZACT 77 (31 October 2014)

75 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger Approval — Vodacom (Pty) Ltd's acquisition of Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd's Vodacom subscriber base — The Competition Tribunal unconditionally approved the acquisition, determining that the transaction would not substantially lessen competition in the mobile telecommunications market. The merging parties, Vodacom and Nashua, operate at different levels of the telecommunications value chain, with Vodacom being the largest mobile network operator and Nashua acting as a service provider. The Tribunal found that the removal of Nashua from the market would not adversely impact service levels or interbrand competition, and acknowledged the public interest considerations regarding employment effects, noting Nashua's commitments to redeploy affected employees and provide generous severance packages.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned large merger proceedings before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa. The Tribunal was required to decide whether to approve a proposed transaction in which Vodacom (Pty) Ltd (the primary acquiring firm) would acquire the Vodacom subscriber base of Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd (the primary target firm, specifically in respect of Nashua’s Vodacom customers).


The proceedings followed an investigation and recommendation process involving the Competition Commission, after which the matter served before the Tribunal. The merger was heard on 26 September 2014, an order was issued on 29 September 2014, and reasons were issued on 31 October 2014.


The dispute concerned the competitive and public interest effects of the removal of Nashua Mobile (a service provider in the mobile telecommunications value chain) as the contractual counterparty to certain Vodacom subscribers, and the substitution of Vodacom itself as the direct contracting party. The Tribunal’s task was to assess whether the transaction would result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition, and to evaluate public interest considerations, particularly employment effects, arising from Nashua’s decision to exit the market and unwind its service provider model.


2. Material Facts


Vodacom was described as South Africa’s largest mobile network operator (MNO), operating as a vertically integrated firm at both the upstream network level and the downstream retail provision of mobile telecommunications services to end-users. Nashua Mobile, by contrast, did not operate a mobile network; it operated as a service provider (SP) functioning as a retail and distribution channel for MNOs and competing with MNOs at the downstream retail level.


The transaction formed part of seven separate yet interrelated transactions flowing from Nashua’s decision to exit the market. The specific transaction before the Tribunal involved Vodacom assuming Nashua’s position in respect of contracts concluded between Nashua and Nashua’s Vodacom subscribers. The effect was that customers who had previously contracted with Nashua for Vodacom services would, post-transaction, be in a direct contractual relationship with Vodacom, while their existing contractual terms and conditions would remain governed by the relevant contracts already concluded.


The Tribunal accepted the background explanation that, historically, service providers played an important role when MNOs sought to reduce exposure to credit risk associated with post-paid customers, particularly before the advent of prepaid products. Over time, however, the industry evolved through market success, prepaid services, and regulatory developments, with MNOs increasingly treating retail service provision as core to their business models. Vodacom’s stated rationale was that the service provider model had become inefficient and obsolete, and that the transaction reflected a continuation of vertical integration of the service provider function. Nashua’s rationale was that retail margins had been declining since 2008, its offering mirrored that of MNOs, and it preferred to exit while it could provide favourable severance packages and return value to shareholders.


On market definition, there was a difference in submissions, but the Tribunal ultimately accepted the Competition Commission’s approach that the effects should be assessed in the market for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and services, with the geographic market treated as national.


On competitive effects, the Commission’s analysis was that the merged entity’s market share would be in the region of 40–45%, with an incremental accretion of between 0.1% and 2%, which it regarded as minimal. The Commission also found that service providers had limited ability to influence pricing to end-users; the enquiry therefore focused on whether Nashua’s removal would reduce service levels and whether it would negatively affect interbrand competition.


On service levels, Nashua indicated that its service had fallen behind market trends and MNO offerings, pointing to the absence of modern account management capabilities (such as online and automated facilities) and its reliance on older, less efficient methods. Nashua stated that improving service would require significant IT investment it was unwilling to make given downward pressure on margins. It also emphasised that many network-related service aspects were outside its control and were provided through back-to-back arrangements with MNOs. Vodacom and other MNOs were described as competing robustly on service, and MNOs were also required to maintain high service levels under the End-User and Subscriber Service Charter Regulations issued by ICASA in 2009.


On interbrand competition, it was accepted that Nashua accounted for a very small and declining percentage of all post-paid subscribers. The parties further confirmed that the sale of the subscriber base would not, by itself, allow individual Vodacom customers to switch to another MNO because customers’ terms and conditions remained governed by their existing contractual arrangements.


On public interest, the Tribunal treated the transaction as not constituting the sale of a business as a going concern, with the consequence that Nashua’s employees would not automatically transfer to Vodacom. The Tribunal recorded initial uncertainty about the number of affected employees due to inconsistent figures, but the position was clarified at the hearing. Although the Tribunal regarded the employment effects as significant, it considered them in the context of Nashua’s decision to exit the market and the commitments offered to mitigate adverse effects.


Nashua undertook to redeploy as many affected employees within the Reunert Group as possible, expecting between 100 and 150 redeployments, and it offered severance packages described as three to five times more generous than what employees would ordinarily be entitled to under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The Tribunal also noted additional support structures for affected employees, including counselling, assistance with curricula vitae, circulation of CVs within the Reunert Group with preferential consideration for vacancies, and letters of reference. Nashua provided specific undertakings to redeploy affected unskilled employees within the Reunert Group. Vodacom also gave undertakings to mitigate employment concerns, which were recorded in the Tribunal’s order and merger clearance certificate.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the proposed acquisition was likely to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in the relevant market and, separately, what the likely effect of the transaction would be on public interest considerations, particularly employment.


The Tribunal was required to make determinations involving a combination of application of law to fact and evaluative judgment. This included selecting an appropriate relevant product market for assessment, evaluating the significance of market share levels and accretion, assessing non-price competitive dimensions such as service quality, and weighing the public interest impact in circumstances where retrenchments were linked to Nashua’s broader market exit rather than a straightforward transfer of a going concern.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Tribunal proceeded from the premise that merger assessment requires consideration of both competition effects and public interest effects. Although the merging parties suggested that final market definition was unnecessary given the absence of competition concerns on any plausible definition, the Tribunal nonetheless accepted the Commission’s market formulation as the appropriate frame of analysis, namely the market for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and services on a national basis.


In assessing competitive effects, the Tribunal placed weight on the Commission’s market share analysis, particularly that the transaction would yield a combined share of approximately 40–45% with only a minimal accretion (between 0.1% and 2%). The Tribunal considered this indicative that the transaction would not materially alter market structure.


The Tribunal then examined whether the removal of Nashua would likely reduce competitive rivalry through diminished service levels. It accepted that service providers had limited ability to influence pricing and therefore treated service competition as a relevant dimension. On the evidence summarised, the Tribunal accepted Nashua’s position that its service levels had already fallen behind MNO offerings and that meaningful improvement would require substantial IT investment that Nashua was unwilling to undertake due to declining margins. The Tribunal also accepted that certain service aspects, especially network-related issues, were in any event not within Nashua’s control. In contrast, the Tribunal noted the MNOs’ stated commitment to ongoing service improvements and their robust competition on service, together with regulatory requirements under the End-User and Subscriber Service Charter Regulations. These considerations supported the Tribunal’s conclusion that the transaction was unlikely to cause a substantial reduction in service levels to end-users.


The Tribunal further considered whether the transaction would harm interbrand competition. It accepted the Commission’s finding that Nashua represented a small and declining portion of post-paid subscribers and that the transaction did not alter customers’ ability to switch networks merely because the contractual counterparty changed, given that customers’ terms and conditions remained governed by existing contractual arrangements. This supported the Tribunal’s assessment that the competitive impact was unlikely to be significant.


Having found no substantial lessening of competition, the Tribunal turned to public interest, emphasising that it is required to consider public interest effects in all merger proceedings. The Tribunal regarded the employment effects as serious, but it evaluated them in context: Nashua had independently elected to exit the market, and the transaction did not involve the transfer of employees as part of a going concern.


The Tribunal’s evaluative judgment on employment impact was influenced by the mitigating measures described. It took account of Nashua’s commitments to redeploy a substantial number of employees within the Reunert Group, the generosity of severance packages relative to the Labour Relations Act baseline, and the supplementary support provided to affected employees. The Tribunal regarded specific undertakings concerning unskilled employees as especially important. It also considered Vodacom’s undertakings, recorded in the merger clearance documentation, as additional mitigation. In the Tribunal’s assessment, these measures were likely to alleviate hardship associated with retrenchment sufficiently for the transaction to proceed.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal unconditionally approved the proposed transaction on 29 September 2014, and furnished reasons on 31 October 2014.


The Tribunal found that the transaction would result in minimal market share accretion, would not alter market structure materially, and was unlikely to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in the relevant market. While the Tribunal treated the employment effects as significant, it accepted that the undertakings and commitments by Nashua and Vodacom would go a long way toward mitigating retrenchment-related hardship.


The reasons do not record any separate or special costs order.


Cases Cited


No case law citations are recorded in the Tribunal’s reasons.


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court are cited in the Tribunal’s reasons.


Held


The Competition Tribunal approved Vodacom’s acquisition of Nashua Mobile’s Vodacom subscriber base. It held that, assessed in the market for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and services (nationally), the transaction involved only minimal accretion in market share and was unlikely to substantially lessen competition, including in relation to service levels and interbrand rivalry. The Tribunal further held that although the transaction had significant employment implications, the public interest concerns were sufficiently mitigated by Nashua’s redeployment commitments, enhanced severance packages and employee support measures, together with Vodacom’s undertakings recorded in the merger clearance documentation. The merger was therefore approved unconditionally.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Tribunal applied the principle that merger control requires an assessment of whether a transaction is likely to result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition, which may include consideration of market structure, market share accretion, and dimensions of competition beyond price, such as service quality.


The Tribunal also applied the principle that, in merger proceedings, it is required to consider the likely effect of a transaction on public interest factors, including employment effects, even where competition concerns are not substantiated.


In applying these principles, the Tribunal treated market definition as a practical framework for competitive assessment, accepted that minimal market share accretion may indicate limited competitive impact, and evaluated whether the removal of an intermediary (a service provider) would realistically diminish service levels or competitive rivalry given industry dynamics, regulatory obligations, and the parties’ evidence. On public interest, it considered mitigation measures—redeployment efforts, severance arrangements exceeding statutory baselines, and support structures—as relevant to evaluating and contextualising employment-related harm.

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[2014] ZACT 77
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Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd (019034) [2014] ZACT 77 (31 October 2014)

COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 019034
In the matter
between:
VODACOM
(PTY)
LTD
.........................................................................................
Primary
acquiring firm
And
NASHUA MOBILE
(PTY) LTD
IN RESPECT OF ITS
VODACOM (PTY) LTD
SUBSCRIBER
BASE
.........................................................
Primary
target firm
Panel: Yasmin Carrim
(Presiding Member)
: Andreas Wessels
(Tribunal Member)
: Medi Mokuena
(Tribunal Member)
Heard
on :
26
September 2014
Order
Issued on:
29
September 2014
Reasons
Issued on:
31
October 2014
Reasons for
Decision
Approval
[1]
On 29 September 2014 the Competition
Tribunal (“Tribunal”) unconditionally approved the
acquisition by Vodacom (Pty)
Ltd (“Vodacom”) of the
Vodacom subscriber base of Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd.
[2]
The reasons for unconditionally approving the transaction follow
hereunder.
Background
[3] It may be of
assistance by way of background to briefly explain the merging
parties’ respective positions in the mobile
telecommunications
value chain and their pre-merger relationship.
[4]
In South Africa there are a handful of mobile network operators
(“MNOs”)
of
which Vodacom is the largest.
1
All of South Africa’s MNOs are vertically integrated entities
involved in operating mobile networks (at the upstream level)
and the
provision of a broad range of mobile communication services to
end-users (at the downstream level).
2
[5]
By contrast, Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd
(“Nashua”)
does
not operate at the upstream, mobile network level. Nashua is known as
a Service Provider
(“SP”)
3
and
essentially acts as a retail and distribution channel for each of the
MNOs. Since the SPs are not operative at the upstream
level, they
compete with the MNOs only at the downstream level of retailing
mobile telecommunication services.
Parties to the
Transaction
Primary acquiring
firm
[6] The primary
acquiring firm is Vodacom, as aforesaid, South Africa’s largest
MNO. Vodacom is a provider of both fixed and
mobile voice and data
services; mobile messaging services; mobile handsets; certain value
added services; and other subscription
services at both wholesale and
retail level. Vodacom is a vertically integrated entity and is
operative at each level in the mobile
telecommunications market; from
network operation level right through to the provision of
telecommunication service to end-users.
[7]
Vodacom is controlled by Vodacom Group Limited
(“Vodacom
Group”)
as
to 93.75% with the remaining shares being held by:-
Lisinfo
209 Investment (Pty) Ltd (1.97%);
Main
Street 661 (Pty) Ltd (0.84%); and
YeboYethu
Limited (3.44%).
The
Vodacom Group is a listed company on the Johannesburg Securities
Exchange Limited
(“JSE”)
with
roughly 35% of its shares being held publically with the remaining
65% held by Vodafone Investments (SA) (Pty) Ltd.
Primary target
firm
[8] The primary
target firm is Nashua in respect of its Vodacom subscriber base. In
other words, what is being acquired is each
and every Nashua
subscriber who makes use of Vodacom’s service(s) as an MNO.
[9] Nashua Mobile is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Reunert Limited (“Reunert”),
a public company listed on the JSE with
its shares widely held.
Proposed
Transaction
[10] The proposed
transaction is just one of seven separate yet interrelated
transactions, each of which flows from Nashua’s
decision to
exit the market.
[11] The specific
transaction currently at hand involves Vodacom assuming Nashua’s
position in respect of each contract concluded
between Nashua and
Nashua’s Vodacom subscribers. That is to say, all Vodacom
subscribers who were previously in a contractual
relationship with
Nashua Mobile will now be in a direct relationship with Vodacom.
Rationale
[12] In order to
fully comprehend the merging parties’ respective rationales in
this proposed transaction, an understanding
of the way in which the
industry has changed over the years is necessary.
[13]
As explained by the merging parties, when mobile telecommunications
services were first introduced in South Africa, the MNOs
were
required to make infrastructure investments of significant
proportions with little certainty that such investments would reap

the abundant rewards subsequently experienced. The MNOs were thus
exposed to substantial risk and were, understandably, averse
to
exposing themselves to further risk by assuming the credit risk
associated with individual contract customers.
4
The MNOs thus considered the existence of SPs, as a valuable route to
market and a mechanism through which to reduce their risk
exposure.
5
SPs would bear the cost of their own operations and would “own’
the customers including the risks thereof.
[14]
With the unprecedented success of the industry, the advent of prepaid
products and regulatory developments, the MNOs now invest
heavily at
the retail level and consider offering services directly to end-users
as core to their business models.
6
[15]
Vodacom submits that it no longer considers Nashua's offering as an
important route to market and it believes the

service
provider business model is becoming inefficient and obsolete."
Vodacom
considers the transaction as a mere manifestation of the “
natural
continuation of the vertical integration of the service provider
function..”
7
[16]
Nashua is acutely aware of the changes the market has undergone and
acknowledges that offerings directly to end-users - a territory

previously inhabited primarily by SPs - now falls squarely within the
competencies of the MNOs, Further, the margins available
at the
retail level of the mobile telecommunications market in South Africa
have been declining consistently since 2008.
8
Nashua’s offering to end-users is mirrored by that of the MNOs
and Nashua submits that it does not envisage this trend changing
in
the near future.
[17]
While Nashua’s survival in the market is not under immediate
threat, its longterm viability is uncertain and it has elected
to
exit the market now rather than later, while it is in a position
where it is able to offer its employees favourable severance

packages, and return some value to shareholders.
9
Relevant Market
[18] The merging
parties submit that concluding definitively on the relevant product
market is unnecessary since, howsoever one
defines the market the
proposed transaction, it raises no substantial competition concerns.
[19]
The Commission however, proposes that the effect of the transaction
be assessed on the “
market
for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and services. ”
[20] Notwithstanding
their dissimilar submissions regarding the relevant product market,
both the Commission and the merging parties
consider the geographic
market to be national in scope.
[21] Having
considered the submissions of the Commission and the merging parties,
we find that the effect of the proposed transaction
is to be assessed
on the market for the resale of Vodacom post-paid subscription and
services.
[22] We are of the
view that even if were to view the transaction on this basis the
competition effects would be unlikely to raise
any concerns.
Competition
Analysis
[23] According to
the Commission’s analysis the merged entity will have a market
share in the region of between 40-45% with
the transaction accounting
for accretion of a between 0.1% and 2%. The Commission considered
this accretion to be minimal and unlikely
to raise any competition
concerns.
[24] The Commission
also found that pre-merger, the SPs have very little ability to
influence pricing to end-users. The question
then became whether the
merging parties compete vigorously on service and whether the removal
of Nashua from the mobile telecommunications
arena would reduce
service levels to end-users.
[25] Nashua
submitted that its service levels to customers had fallen behind
market trends and that of the MNOs. As an example it
pointed to the
fact that while subscribers of the MNOs could manage many aspects of
their accounts online or through automated
call centre facilities
Nashua still relied on older more expensive and less efficient
methods. In order to improve its service
levels it would need to make
significant investments in IT infrastructure which it was unwilling
to make because of the anticipated
downward pressure on margins. In
light of this it was unlikely that service levels to end-users would
decline as a result of the
transaction. In any event the services
offered by Nashua in relation to network issues was not within its
control as this was provided
to the end-users in a back to back
contractual arrangement with MNOs.
[26]
The MNOs on the other hand claim that they are intent on continuously
improving their offering from a service perspective and
they in fact
compete robustly with one another on service.
10
Further, the MNOs are required, by the End-User and Subscriber
Service Charter Regulations
11
,
to provide high levels of service. In light of the above, we are
satisfied that transaction will not result in a substantia! lessening

of service levels to end-users in the relevant market.
[27]
The Commission then assessed the extent to whjch the proposed
transaction, and the subsequent removal of Nashua, would adversely

impact on interbrand competition. The finding in this respect was
that Nashua currently accounts for a very small, and declining,

percentage of all post-paid subscribers. The parties also confirmed
that the sale of the subscriber base did not enable any individual

Vodacom customer to switch to another MNO simply because the terms
and conditions for that individual customer were still governed
by
the contract it had concluded with Vodacom and Nashua.
12
[28] In light of the
above, we are largely in agreement with the submissions of both the
Commission and the merging parties in that
the proposed transaction
is unlikely to result in a substantial lessening of competition in
the relevant market. That is not, however,
the end of the matter. The
Tribunal is enjoined, as in all merger proceedings before it, to
consider the likely effect of the proposed
transaction on the public
interest.
Public Interest
[29]
The merging parties were at pains to impress upon the Tribunal that
the proposed transaction does not constitute the sale of
a business
as a going concern, and that Nashua Mobile’s employees would
thus not be transferred to the acquiring firm.
13
[30] At first, we
were uncertain as to the exact number of employees adversely affected
by the transaction since the figures provided
by the merging parties
were somewhat inconsistent. At the hearing of 26 September 2014, the
position regarding employment effects
was clarified by counsel for
the merging parties.
[31] While we deem
the employment effects of the proposed transaction to be significant,
we are cognisant of the fact that Nashua
has decided to exit the
market. We have also taken cognisance of the substantial commitments
made by Nashua in respect of minimising
the adverse effects on
employment.
[32]
Nashua has undertaken to redeploy as many affected employees within
the Reunert Group as possible and expects this figure to
be between
100 and 150. The severance packages Nashua has offered all of its
employees (“the Severance Packages”) appear
to be
particularly generous, being between three and five times more than
they would ordinarily be entitled to in terms of the
Labour Relations
Act.
14
It also appears that many employees preferred to accept the Severance
Packages rather than be transferred to the acquiring firm.
Further,
the merging parties have established support structures which provide
affected employees with,
inter
alia,
psychological
and financial counselling; assistance in updating their curricula
vitae; having their curricula vitae circulated within
the Reunert
Group and afforded preferential consideration in the event of
vacancies arising; and letters of reference.
[33] It is also
necessary to remark here that Nashua has provided specific
undertakings in respect of all affected unskilled employees,
i.e.
those deemed most vulnerable and least likely to find alternative
employment were they to be retrenched as a result of the
transaction.
Nashua has undertaken to redeploy each affected unskilled employee
within the Reunert Group.
[34] In addition to
the Severance Packages, our concerns regarding adverse employment
effects have been further allayed by Vodacom
having given certain
undertakings which also go towards mitigating employment concerns.
These undertakings are set out fully in
the Tribunal’s Order
and Merger Clearance Certificate dated 29 September 2014.
Conclusion
[35] In conclusion
we find that the transaction results in minimal market share
accretion and will not alter the structure of the
market. We do not
consider that the proposed transaction is likely to result in a
substantial prevention or lessening of competition
in the relevant
market, howsoever defined.
[36] While we do
consider the employment concerns elucidated above to be serious, we
consider the undertakings put forward by Nashua
and Vodacom as likely
to go a long way in mitigating the hardships associated with
retrenchment.
[37] For the reasons
set out above, we approve the proposed transaction unconditionally.
31 October 2014
DATE
MS YASMIN CARRIM
Mr Andreas
Wessels and Ms Medi Mokuena concurring
Tribunal Researcher:
Derrick Bowles
For the target firm:
Adv David Unterhaiter SC instructed by Norton Rose
Fuibright
For the acquiring
firm: Adv Jerome Wilson instructed by Andries Le Grange from
Cliffe Dekker
Hofmeyr
For the Commission:
Mogau Aphane and Lesenda Grace Mohamed
1
The
MNO's operational in South Africa are Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Virgin
Mobile and Telkom Mobile.
2
The
reasons for unconditionally approving the transaction follow
hereunder.
3
Also
referred to as an Independent Service Provider.
4
Note
that during the initial phases of mobile telecommunications in South
Africa, pre-paid as a concept was not yet in existence.
Thus, the
only route to market for MNOs was through the conclusion of post-paid
contracts or through the use of an SP which would
assume the risk
associated with the conclusion of such contracts.
5
The
RBB Economics Report entitled: Nashua Mobile/ Vodacom, Nashua Mobile/
MTN- Competitive Assessment ("RBB Report") at
para 8 page
62 of the Record.
6
RBB
Report para 7 at page 61 of the Record.
7
See
paras 3.11 and 3.12 of the Report entitled Report on Competitive and
Public Interest Aspects in the Large Merger Between Vodacom
(Pty) Ltd
and the Vodacom Subscriber Base of Nashua Mobile (Pty) Ltd
("Competitiveness Report"), appearing at page 51
of the
Record.
8
See
page 14 of The CC's Report.
9
Ibid.
See
also submissions by Nashua at the hearing.
10
Ms
Burger- Smidt of Werksmans Attorneys, MTN's legal representative at
page 52 of the transcript. See also Mr Patel of Vodacom at
page 41
lines 4-9 of the Transcript where he states
"We're
now becoming an industry that's more focused on customer retention
and good quality service experience. And so one of
the conditions and
one of the key areas we wanted all of our service channels to invest
in is really around service experience.
Vodacom alone is also making
quite dramatic and quite significant investments in service
experience."
11
Issued
by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)
in 2009.
12
This
was confirmed in the hearing by Counsel for Nashua Mobile. See
Transcript page 27 line 7 to page 30, line 17.
13
Inter
alia
para
8.2 of the Competitiveness Report which appears at page 65 of the
Record.
14
Act
No. 66 of 1995.