1
COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 31/IR
/A /Apr11
In the matter between:
INVENSYS PLC First Applicant / Respondent
INVENSYS SYTEMS (UK) LIMITED Second Applicant / Respondent
EUROTHERM LIMITED Third Applicant / Respondent
and
PROTEA TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD First Respondent / Applicant
PROTEA AUTOMATION SOLUTIONS Second Respondent / Applicant
(PTY) LIMITED
PROTEA ELECTRONICS (PTY) LIMITED Third Respondent / Applicant
EOH HOLDINGS LIMITED Fourth Respondent
_______________________________________________________________________
Panel : Norman Manoim (Presiding Member)
Andiswa Ndoni (Tribunal Member)
Lawrence Reyburn (Tribunal Member)
Heard on : 07 November 2012
Order issued on : 21 November 2012
Reasons issued on : 21 November 2012
Decision and order
_________________________________________________________________________
2
Introduction
[1] The Applicants have made an application for a c osts order against the First to the
Third Respondents (“the Respondents”) in terms of R ule 50(3) of the Competition
Act, 1998 (“the Act”). The Fourth Respondent is cited simply because it has potential
interests in the matter. The application comes to u s after the withdrawal of a direct
complaint referral by the Respondents against the A pplicants under Section 51(1) of
the Act, and a simultaneous withdrawal of an interi m relief application under Section
49C brought by the Respondents against the Applican ts in relation to the facts
underlying that complaint.
Background
[2] The Applicants form part of the Invensys group of companies, which is an
international group, which inter alia manufactures control and automation
componentry branded under the Eurotherm name, utili zed in the provision of
industrial automation solutions and distributed worldwide.
[3] The Respondents form part of the Protea group w hich is a South African group that
inter alia markets, installs, and maintains equipment in the oil, gas, food, beverages,
and power utility sectors throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The Protea group is also an
electronic communications solutions provider, focus ing on broadcast, multimedia,
communications and measurement solutions for the te lecommunications, military
and regulatory sectors.
[4] The Respondents are former distributors of the Applicants’ products in South Africa.
The Respondents are aggrieved at the manner in whic h their former role in the
distribution chain of the Applicants’ products came to an end and they allege that the
termination of that role represented an abuse of th e Applicants’ dominance and a
contravention of the Act
[5] The Respondents have also brought High Court pr oceedings against the Applicants,
alleging that conduct of the Applicants in relation to the termination of the former
distribution arrangements amounted to the delict of unlawful competition. The
distribution arrangements amounted to the delict of unlawful competition. The
Respondents’ withdrawal of proceedings before the T ribunal referred to above took
place shortly before a hearing of the matter in the High Court was due to take place.
[6] The Respondents lodged their complaint with the Competition Commission (“the
Commission”) against the Applicants and the Fourth Respondent on 11 April 2011.
The Respondents’ interim relief application was mad e on the same date. The
3
Applicants filed an answering affidavit in response to the interim relief application on
10 May 2011. No replying affidavit was filed and th e Respondents took no steps to
set the matter down for a hearing.
[7] On completion of its preliminary investigation, the Commission issued a notice of
non-referral on 05 August 2011. Following that noti ce, the Respondents filed their
direct referral on 02 September 2011. The Applicant s then filed an exception on 24
October 2011. The Respondents proceeded to file a n otice of withdrawal of both the
interim relief application and the direct referral on 29 November 2011.
[8] No tender to pay costs was contained in the not ice of withdrawal and the Applicants
reacted by bringing an application for costs. This is the matter we now consider.
ARE THE APPLICANTS ENTITLED TO COSTS?
[9] The only provision expressly dealing with cost s in the Act is Section 57, which states
the following:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), and the Competition Tribunal’s rules of
procedure, each party participating in a hearing must bear its own costs.
(2) If the Competition Tribunal –
(a) has not made a finding against a respondent, the Tribunal member
presiding at a hearing may award costs to the respo ndent, and
against a complainant who referred the complaint in terms of
section 51(1); or
(b) has made a finding against a respondent, the Tr ibunal member
presiding at a hearing may award costs against the respondent,
and to a complainant who referred the complaint in terms of
section 51(1).
[10] Rule 50(3) of the Tribunal’s rules deals with the issue of costs following the
withdrawal of matters. This rule reads as follows:
Subject to section 57 --
(a) a Notice of Withdrawal may include a consent to pay costs; and
4
(b) if no consent to pay costs is contained in a No tice of Withdrawal the other
party may apply to the Tribunal by Notice of Motion in Form CT 6 for an
appropriate order of costs.
[11] The Applicants rely on Rule 50(3) of the Tribu nal’s rules, quoted above, which they
submit is perfectly clear about costs in the circum stances of this case. Since the
Respondents withdrew the interim relief application as well as the direct referral
without tendering costs, the Applicants argue that they are entitled to apply to us for
an order compelling the Respondents to pay their costs in both proceedings
[12] The Respondents’ attorney was present througho ut the hearing but for reasons not
known to us the Respondents’ case was argued by a director in the Protea group, Mr
Johnston, who was the deponent to the Respondents’ answering affidavit in this
matter. Mr Johnston explained that he was a practis ing engineer with a qualification
in accounting and a degree in business science and claimed that he was familiar with
legal matters.
[13] In the Respondents’ answering affidavit and in argument Mr Johnson maintained that
the Tribunal is jurisdictionally barred from granti ng the costs order sought in relation
to the interim relief application.1
[14] His argument was that section 57 provides a ge neral rule that in Tribunal
proceedings each party pays its own costs. The only exception to this rule is that
contained in section 57(2) which states that in com plaint proceedings brought by a
complainant in terms of section 51(1) the Tribunal may award costs. However since
the interim relief application was not a section 51 (1) proceeding the exception does
not apply and hence the Applicants are not entitled to costs. Rule 50(3), he argued,
takes the matter no further, as the rule is made subject to section 57.
[15] In relation to the costs of the Applicants in the complaint referral under Section 51(1),
Mr Johnston conceded that the Tribunal was authoris ed to award these costs to the
Mr Johnston conceded that the Tribunal was authoris ed to award these costs to the
Applicants but he contended that as awards of costs are within the discretion of the
Tribunal, the Tribunal should not exercise its disc retion in favour of the Applicants in
1 Record pages 82 and 83, paras 14 to 20.
5
view of their conduct in relation to the termination of the Respondents’ distributorship
of the Applicants’ products 2.
[16] The Tribunal’s power to award costs in proceed ings before it where private parties
(and not the Commission) are the contestants, and t he relationship between Section
57 and Rule 50(3), have already been examined by the Tribunal and the Competition
Court of Appeal (“the CAC”) in a number of decided cases. It suffices to refer to a
few of them.
[17] In Omnia Fertilizer Ltd v The Competition Comm ission (CAC case no. 77/CAC/Jul08)
the CAC held that Section 57(1) is subject to two l imitations on the general rule that
in proceedings before the Tribunal each party shoul d bear its own costs. The first
limitation is encompassed by Section 57(2) (quoted above) and the second is
represented by the Tribunal’s rules. At par 16 of this decision the CAC noted that “...
the Tribunal’s authority to order costs is not limi ted to the circumstances
contemplated by section 57... the Tribunal is entit led to make a costs award in terms
of rule 50(3) of the Competition Tribunal Rules...” This principle had been discussed
at some length by the Tribunal in the case of Mains treet 2 Limited & Others v
Novartis Limited & Others case no: 25/IR/A/Dec99
[18] Despite the difference in circumstances betwee n the Mainstreet 2 case and this
case, paragraph 19 of the decision in the Mainstreet 2 case is in point in this matter:
[18.1] “The final question is even if we have the authorit y to order costs now
should we exercise our discretion to grant costs at this stage or wait until
the complaint has been finally decided. The applica nts urge us to follow
this latter course as they say only then will we kn ow whether applicants’
failure to file on time was justifiable. This argum ent might have had merit if
the applicants hadn’t themselves withdrawn their ap plication. Having done
so, as the respondents correctly argue, these exten sion proceedings have
so, as the respondents correctly argue, these exten sion proceedings have
been finally disposed of and the respondents are en titled to their costs.
Nothing will emerge in the final hearing of the com plaint which will have
any bearing on the fate of an application since withdrawn.”
More recently In Londoloza vs. Bonheur 50 General Trading (Pty) Ltd & Others,
case no: 80/AM/Oct04 , the Tribunal held the following :
2 See answering affidavit, par. 22, pp. 22-23 of the record.
6
[18.2] The meaning of the words “Subject to subsection (2) and the Competition
Tribunal’s rules...” in section 57(1) was the focus of much debate. The
applicant argued that the words must be interpreted to mean that the
circumstances in which costs could be awarded can b e expanded beyond
the section 51(1) stipulation in s57(2) by the rule s of the Tribunal. Hence if
the rules of the Tribunal provided for a tender or an award of costs upon a
Notice of Withdrawal, as did rule 50(3), this expan ded the tribunal’s power
to impose costs in such circumstances. “
[18.3] The Tribunal went further to state in the Londoloza case that:
[18.4] “A similar argument was made by the applicant in th e Omnia case. Given
that the matter has already been decided by the CAC , we find it
unnecessary to repeat the debates and arguments can vassed in that case
and to make any further remarks on the jurisdictional point.
[19] Although Londoloza was a merger case and Omnia a restrictive practice case there
is no reason not to apply the same reading of the p rovisions in respect of interim
relief cases. There is indeed precedent for the awa rd of costs by the Tribunal in
interim relief cases where the applicants have withdrawn their applications.
[20] In Hayley Ann Cassim and other v Virgin Active SA (Pty ) Ltd , case no. 57/IR/Oct01 ,
the Tribunal considered whether costs should be awa rded against applicants for
interim relief who had not proceeded to file a dire ct complaint under Section 51(1)
after the Commission had issued a notice of non-ref erral following an investigation
into a complaint made to the Commission. The compla inants had neither proceeded
with their interim relief application nor withdrawn it. The Tribunal awarded costs
against them, saying that “if they choose to avail themselves of this additio nal
remedy they must be mindful of the consequences 3.” The Tribunal pointed out,
remedy they must be mindful of the consequences 3.” The Tribunal pointed out,
however, that a complainant who abandons or loses an interim relief application may
be able to demonstrate that there are special circu mstances for the Tribunal to
refrain from making an adverse award of costs.
[21] We regard the principles stated in the above-m entioned cases to be settled law and
we see no reason why they should not be followed in this case. Mr Johnston’s
contentions about the law which govern the costs in a withdrawn interim relief
3 See page 5 of decision.
7
application are simply wrong. Moreover he fails to appreciate that for the purposes
of the Act a complaint brought under section 51 as a direct referral begins and ends
with that complaint referral, and no other. If a c omplaint is withdrawn, that for all
practical purposes ends the case which it set in train, and the costs of that case must
be considered in association with the outcome of th at complaint, seen as a discrete
item of litigation. Whether the underlying factual disputes give rise to later items of
litigation is irrelevant in the context of the costs of the first item.
[22] At the hearing it emerged that the Respondents have filed a fresh complaint with the
Commission alleging abuse of dominance by the Appli cants on the basis of conduct
following the above-mentioned termination of the Re spondents’ distributorship of
their products, and have also initiated fresh inter im relief proceedings. From
discussion at the hearing about this fact the quest ion emerged whether the filing of
the fresh complaint could be regarded as a special circumstance justifying the
Tribunal in refusing the Applicants their costs in the withdrawn complaint referral and
interim relief application since the fresh litigati on would demonstrate that the facts
underlying the original complaint are still being processed by the machinery set up by
the Act.
[23] Our conclusion is that this is not such a spec ial circumstance as contemplated in the
Cassim case. What the costs order is directed at is the costs incurred by the
Applicants in dealing with a complaint which required their attention and justified their
engagement of legal representation. They were put to the trouble of considering the
merits of the complaint referral and responding to it, in this instance by preparing and
filing a notice of exception. In the case of the i nterim relief application they had to
peruse the papers filed by the Respondents, and pre pare and file a considered
peruse the papers filed by the Respondents, and pre pare and file a considered
answer. This again represented the time and attention of legal representatives. The
associated expenditure was incurred and, in the light of the Respondent’s withdrawal
of their application, was justifiably incurred, reg ardless of the eventual outcome of
any later litigation which may take place.
[24] The Applicants in our view are entitled to the ir costs now.
[25] The Respondents further submit that the only r eason they withdrew the two cases
from the Tribunal was a misrepresentation by the Ap plicants in their submissions to
the Commission as well as in their answering affidavit in response to the interim relief
8
application 4. Our answer to this submission is that the Respond ents will, if they
proceed with diligence in the fresh litigation, hav e their day in court to attempt to
prove their case, be it through the new interim rel ief application or through the new
complaint before the Commission, should it result in a referral to the Tribunal.
[26] We accordingly make the following order: The F irst, Second and Third Respondents
are jointly and severally ordered to pay the Applic ants’ costs on the party and party
scale in the withdrawn complaint referral under Sec tion 51(1), in the withdrawn
interim relief application under Section 49C, and i n this application. The costs
awarded are to include the costs of one counsel.
______________________ 21 November 2012
LAWRENCE REYBURN Date
Andiswa Ndoni and Norman Manoim concurring.
Tribunal Researcher: Caroline Sserufusa
For the Applicants: Adv Anthony Gotz instructed by Glyn Marais Inc
For the 1
st to 3 rd Respondents: Gary Johnston together with Duncan Okes Attorneys
For the Fourth Respondent: Botoulas Krause Inc
4 Heads of argument of Respondents, pages 12-13.