COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 62/X/Oct10
In the matter between:
Freeworld Coatings Limited Applicant
And
Competition Commission 1st Respondent
Kansai Paint Company Limited 2nd Respondent
Panel: N Manoim (Presiding Member)
Y Carrim (Tribunal Member)
A Wessels (Tribunal Member)
Heard on: 9 November 2010
Order Issued on: 14 December 2010
Reasons Issued on: 14 December 2010
Order and Reasons
Introduction
1] On 4 October 2010 Freeworld Coatings Ltd (“Freeworld”) applied to the
Tribunal to review and set aside the Commission’s decision not to
accept Freeworld’s application to file a separate Merger Notification.
The application concerns an indicative non-binding proposal by Kansai
Paint Company Ltd (“Kansai”) to acquire all the shares in Freeworld.
1
2] The review is brought in terms of sec 27(1)(c) of the Competition Act
(‘the Act’)1 read with sec 6(2)(c) and (d), 6(2)(e)(iii), 6(2)(f)(i) and (ii) and
6(2)(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (‘PAJA’) 2. Kansai
opposed the application while the Commission indicated in its
answering affidavit that it would abide by the Tribunal’s decision.
Background
3] Freeworld is a South African listed company that produces automotive
coatings for original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), automotive
coatings for refinishing, decorative paints and various other related
products. Freeworld sells its automotive coatings to OEMs through a
joint venture with DuPont.3
4] Kansai is a Japanese listed paint company which is also involved in the
production and marketing of automotive coatings and decorative paints.
It currently supplies automotive coatings in South Africa through Duco.
5] Kansai first approached Freeworld in a letter on 30 April 2010 in which it
expressed an interest in a potential combination of Freeworld and
Kansai. This happened on the same day that Freeworld posted a
circular in relation to another potential bid to its shareholders initiated by
a consortium led by Brait S.A. , through Saphirefield Investments (Pty)
Ltd,.4 Since then Kansai and Freeworld, through their senior
management and legal advisors, had been in constant contact via
letters and various meetings. According to Kansai , Freeworld was
obstructive in their discussions, raising competition concerns in order to
block Kansai’s access to information. 5 In order to allay the competition
1 Act 89 of 1998
2 Act 3 of 2000.
3 The automotive refinishing products which make up a major part of Freeworld’s automotive refinish business
are produced under licence from DuPont.
4 The Saphirefield scheme of arrangement was rejected by the majority of Freeworld’s shareholders on 14
June 2010.
June 2010.
5 On 12 May 2010 Kansai approached the Securities Regulation Panel to compel Freeworld to make available
problems, Kansai undertook to dispose of Freeworld’s interest in the
joint venture with Du Pont, if the merger occurred, since Kansai and
DuPont are competitors. This did not satisfy Freeworld which continued
to resist Kansai’s efforts to access the due diligence information. For
this reason Kansai withdrew its offer on 20 May 2010. On 14 June 2010
Freeworld shareholders voted down the Saphirefield offer.
6] On 23 August Kansai acquired a 25.03% shareholding in Freeworld
from Brait S.A. 6 Subsequent to acquiring these shares Kansai
reconsidered its offer and on 24 August 2010, at the instance of Kansai,
a further meeting was held between representatives of Kansai and
Freeworld. At that meeting Kansai delivered a letter to Freeworld which
contained a second indicative non-binding proposal to acquire a
majority shareholding in Freeworld. 7 This offer was subject to certain
pre-conditions which included a due diligence, engagement on
competition issues, an approach to Freeworld’s joint venture partner
DuPont, financing, the approval of Kansai’s Board to the making of a
formal offer, an intention to seek shareholder support from Freeworld’s
shareholders and a board recommendation from Freeworld’s Board.
7] Following this Freeworld , on 3 September 2010, filed an
application with the Commission to submit a separate merger
filing in terms of Competition Commission Rule 28. Typically
merging parties file a merger jointly. Freeworld listed the
following reasons in support of its application for a separate
filing:
1) Kansai had already acquired 25.03% of Freeworld’s shares,
2) The unsolicited indicative proposal made by Kansai indicated a
serious intention to acquire control,
3) The transaction raised serious competition concerns,
4) Freeworld and Kansai did not agree on whether the proposed
the same information which had been provided to Saphirefield Investments. Freeworld opposed the
application raising competition concerns related to Kansai’s bid.
6 Its shareholding in Freeworld has since then increased to 27%.
7 According to Kansai it already held a shareholding of 23.05% in Freeworld.
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sale of the Freeworld’s interest in the Du Pont joint venture
could remedy those competition concerns.
8] On 17 September 2010 Maarten van Hoven, the Head of the
Commission’s Merger division, informed Freeworld’s legal
representative during a telephonic discussion that the Commission was
considering whether or not the application was premature owing to the
fact that the indicative bid was not an unconditional bid, but a non-
binding indicative bid. Subsequent to the call and two further letters from
Freeworld to the Commission , the Commission on 22 September 2010
responded to Freeworld’s application informing it that it had rejected
Freeworld’s application.
9] Freeworld then launched these review proceedings in which it submitted
that the Commission’s approach was fundamentally flawed and that the
Commission had committed a number of reviewable errors in coming to
its decision. Freeworld sought an order that the Tribunal set aside the
Commission’s determination and replace it with its own 1) declaring that
the Kansai offer was a proposed merger and 2) permitting Freeworld to
file the merger in terms of Rule 28.
Was the decision of the Commission reviewable
10]The Commission concluded in its letter of 22 September 2010 that on
the facts provided:
“.....the indicative proposal by Kansai does not constitute a merger or
proposed merger as defined in the Competition Act and therefore in
the Commission’s view the application in terms of Rule 28 is premature
in nature.”8
11]Freeworld argues that the Commission’s decision was informed by a
material error of law. It also argued that the Commission had not given
8 Record page 88
Freeworld an opportunity to consider Kansai’s submissions and to
respond to them. The decision was thus also procedurally unfair. On
both these separate and self-standing grounds the Commission’s
decision was reviewable.
12] It seems that the Commission based its decision on the fact that intent
to acquire control was an insufficient condition to constitute a proposed
merger. This is evident from a passage to this effect from a Tribunal
decision in Goldfields v Harmony and Others , which it quotes in the
letter, where the Tribunal stated:9
“Whilst intention may have some evidential value in deciding whether a
transaction is a merger it is by no means decisive of the issue. A good
many buyers have ambitions to control a firm one day and if all
purchases were to be notified as mergers once they have assumed
this intent, any number of people would be jamming the highways to
Pretoria to notify mergers to the Commission. Intent in the ‘air’ does
not suffice.
Whilst Gold Fields’ case is perhaps stronger on the mechanics of the
transaction inasmuch as the offer documentation purports to facilitate a
smooth passage from the early settlement offer to the final offer, we
nevertheless find that the chain between the transaction is broken for
several reasons and that, accordingly, control is not effected at this,
the first stage. Even if Harmony receives all of its acceptances at the
first stage it does not follow that the second stage is inevitable. Whilst
the second offer is automatic, acceptance of it is not, and many things
may happen between now and then, including the possibility of
movement in both share prices which might lead to arbitrage selling by
holders or opportunistic squeezes for a better offer.”
9 Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company and others, [2004] 2 CPLR 358 (CT) at par 62
5
13] This conclusion was the subject of criticism in the Competition Appeal
Court (‘CAC’) decision in the same matter where the CAC noted:10
“But this conclusion is exactly the opposite of what it claims; it has
elevated form over substance. The cumulative weight of the
documents cited is a crystal clear indication of the value of the
transaction – to effect a merger. This is not about day dreams to
control a company, - the prospect and substance of first respondent’s
is publicly announced.”
14]The Commission in its letter quotes the first paragraph from the Tribunal
decision quoted above , but not the second which is the subject of the
CAC criticism. Freeworld argues that this indicates that the Commission
was unaware of the correct legal test. In our view this goes too far. A
careful reading of the CACs’ critique of the Tribunal approach is not so
much a disagreement on the location of intention in the analysis , but the
application of that principle to the analysis of the facts. Hence its
reference to the “conclusion” of the Tribunal and placing “form over
substance”. Note that the CAC’s reference to “ ...not about day dreams
to control a company ”, too suggests the insufficiency of intention on its
own as condition to determine whether a merger has come about.
Rather what we read from this decision is that what is crucial is the
accumulation of facts and their interpretation in the context of that
intention. It is criticising a too mechanistic approach to the facts, not the
principle. Thus the take home message from the CAC decision is - do
not be too mechanistic about the facts when intention is accompanied
by events subject to some contingency.
15] This leads us to what we consider to be the legal error of the
Commission on the present facts of this case. The Commission states in
the letter that Kansai must notify the transaction once the offer becomes
the letter that Kansai must notify the transaction once the offer becomes
binding. It thus appears that the Commission in applying the case law to
the facts of this case considered a non-binding offer not to constitute a
10 Gold Fields Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and another [2005] 1 CPLR 74 (CAC) at 87
proposed merger. Freeworld argues that this is an error of law. We
would agree.11
16]A proposed merger can have taken place before an offer becomes
binding. In this sense the Commission’s application of the law may have
been too mechanistic. This is what the reading of the Goldfields case
law is about. We say more about this below when we discuss how the
Commission should approach the matter. We do not therefore need to
decide the second part of the review which goes to whether the
Commission’s procedures were fair.
17] Freeworld suggests, based on previous merger decisions of the
Tribunal and the CAC, the test should amount to:12
1) Is there indicated a sufficiently serious intent, not a certainty, not a
final decision by a controlling board, but a sufficiently serious
intent?
2) Is there indicated a capability of carrying through the contemplated
transaction, which is to eliminate the idea of some investor just
buying up shares as he or she goes?
3) What is the conduct of the parties which is consistent or
inconsistent with the intent to acquire control?
18]Although we have found that the Commission has applied the wrong
legal test that is not to say that the merging parties’ legal test is the
correct one or that the Commission’s ultimate conclusion was wrong.
We do not express any view on this.
19]Although both parties argued that if we found a reviewable error, we
11 In fairness to the Commission the non-binding offer comment can be read not as the basis for their
decision, but a comment by when, in the circumstances of this case, the offer would, unambiguously,
constitute a merger. Elsewhere in the letter the Commission considers that the conditions attached to the
offer had made the offer too premature to constitute a proposed merger. However the ambiguity on this point
coupled with an uncritical approach to the case law, suggests that on balance a reviewable error of law has
taken place.
taken place.
12 See Freeworld’s Heads at p31 and Transcript p 21.
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should be at large to substitute our own decision for that of the
Commission, we have decided not to. There are two reasons for this. In
the first place Freeworld complains that the Commission did not have
before it information placed before us relating to Kansai’s written
submission to the Securities Regulation Panel( SRP) which Freeworld
contends would manifest the seriousness of its acquisitive intent. Kansai
for its part in a supplementary affidavit filed after Freeworld’s reply
submitted another draft but unsent letter from Freeworld to the SRP.
This too had not been before the Commission. Then, subsequent to the
conclusion of our hearing on 9 November , Freeworld, submitted further
new information regarding Kansai’s conduct , which it deemed
necessary to bring to our intention , despite the fact that the hearing into
the matter had been concluded. This information was submitted on 22
and 29 November On 23 November 2010 Kansai wrote to us and
objected to this approach and requested to be given an opportunity to
file a response if we were to consider this new evidence.
20]The new information consisted of further interactions between Kansai
and some Freeworld shareholders which , according to Freeworld ,
indicate its intent to buy further shares in the company, and then a press
statement which purports to quote Kansai’s intentions to assume
control. If Freeworld considers all these facts that the Commission did
not have before it material , it should place them before the Commission
again, as events in this saga appear to be a moving target. The
Commission is given the primary discretion to determine whether a
particular set of circumstances give rise to a merger or proposed
merger. Whilst we might substitute our decision for the Commission’s
where the record is largely the one they had before them , it is not
where the record is largely the one they had before them , it is not
appropriate for us to decide on a record that is increasingly ceasing to
resemble the one they had before them.
21]Secondly, and more importantly , because the Commission considered
the merger notification request premature it did not consider the
provisions of its Rule 28 which provide:
1) A primary firm may apply to the Commission for permission to file
separate notification of a merger and, on considering an application
under this sub-rule, the Commission –
a) may allow separate filing if it is reasonable and just to do so in
the circumstances;
b) may give appropriate directions to give effect to the
requirements of the Act and in particular, specifying which
primary firm must satisfy which of the requirements set out in
Rule 27; and
c) in an appropriate case, may further permit the applicant to file
any document on behalf of the other primary firm.
22]Rule 28 gives the Commission the discretion not only to determine
whether it is reasonable and just to allow the separate filing , but also to
give the directions contemplated in sub rules (b) and (c). Since the
Commission is tasked with investigating mergers, not the Tribunal , it
should make these determinations, should it come to that, as they have
a material bearing on its investigation. It would not be appropriate for
the Tribunal to give these directions itself.
23]We have therefore decided to refer the matter back to the Commission
to consider:
1) Whether on the correct legal test and the new facts and any
further response to the new issues from Kansai a proposed
merger has come into existence ; and if it has
2) Whether it would be reasonable and just in the circumstances
to have Freeworld notify the merger in terms of Rule 28.
24]In determining the first part of the enquiry it should be noted that we are
not pre-judging the Commission’s final conclusion on the facts. We
simply find that it adopted a too strict and mechanistic legal test. It was
however common cause in the argument before us that no bright lines
9
exist to determine when a proposed merger comes into being.
25] For this reason Freeworld , as we noted earlier , suggested its own test
for when a proposed merger has come about. 13 If it considered that the
case law was clear on this point it would not need to have done so. It
seems the best one can read from the case law is that intention to
control is a necessary, but insufficient condition, but that the additional
factors which would prove decisive are not capable of prior definition as
mergers can take so many varieties of forms. It is the cumulative weight
of the ‘intention plus’ factors that tilts towards the conclusion that the
transaction is a proposed merger.
26] This leaves the Commission with an invidious task. If the law assumes
that there comes a moment when a proposed merger comes into being ,
but cannot determine it with much precision , then it is difficult for the
Commission to be expected to divine it , especially in circumstances
when two putative merging parties contest the significance of their every
act and utterance. For this reason the Commission may wish to place
more emphasis on the second part of the enquiry in terms of Rule 28 . In
that event to assume that a merger exists where there is a body of
cumulated facts to suggest this “intention plus”, albeit to some extent
contested, and then consider if it should be notified i .e. move from the
enquiry as to whether there exists a proposed merger , to an enquiry as
to whether there exist grounds to apply Rule 28. Here it should consider
not only the submissions made to date by Freeworld on the papers , but
any from Kansai, as well as the implications for third parties who may be
required to provide information to the Commission if the investigation
commences, as well as the implications for the resources of the
Commission . Also relevant would be whether merger control will be
effective; for instance if undertakings are to be sought from the acquirer
effective; for instance if undertakings are to be sought from the acquirer
in respect of competition or public interest issues and the acquiring firm
is not a willing party to the filing.14
13 See paragraph 17above.
14 Freeworld also suggests that public interest issues in respect of employment will also be relevant if Kansai is
27]One issue of law must be drawn to the Commission’s intention. It was
argued following a passage in the CAC Goldfields decision that, once a
merger has occurred, it must be notified. As Kansai argued this is not
correct. As long as a merger is not implemented , the Act does to state
when it should be notified.
28]We would point out that prior to an amendment to the Act in September
2000 merging parties were required to notify a merger within 7 days
after the earlier of (a) the conclusion of the merger agreement, (b) the
public announcement of a proposed merger bid or (c) the acquisition of
a controlling interest by any one of the parties to that merger in the
other. This provision was deleted , signalling a clear legislative intent
that there was no time period any longer by which a merger must be
notified. Of course that does not preclude one party to the merger such
as Freeworld from requesting notification. In this case it is common
cause that no implementation has taken place – at least at date of this
decision – so there was no legal obligation on the merging parties to
notify.
Conclusion
29]We have decided to set aside the Commission’s decision that the
alleged proposed merger is not notifiable. We refer it back for the
Commission to reconsider in the light of the correct legal test and the
additional information provided since and the approach outlined above.
If it concludes the transaction is a merger then to consider the
application of rule 28 to the request for permission to file by Freeworld.
30]We make no order as to costs as the decision has been referred back to
the Commission.
the acquirer.
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14 December 2010
N Manoim
Concurring: Y Carrim and A Wessels
Tribunal Researcher: R Badenhorst
For the Applicant: JJ Gauntlett SC assisted by J Wilson instructed by
Nortons Inc
For the 1st Respondent: MM Le Roux instructed by the State Attorney
For the 2nd Respondent: J Blou SC assisted by K McLean instructed by Bowman
Gilfillan Inc