Competition Commission v Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd (23/CR/Feb09) [2010] ZACT 25; [2010] 1 CPLR 68 (CT) (31 March 2010)

80 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Settlement Agreement — Allegations of cartel conduct — Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd admitted to contraventions of sections 4(1)(b)(i), 4(1)(b)(ii), 4(1)(b)(iii), and 4(1)(a) of the Competition Act — Conduct included price fixing, market division, and collusive tendering in the precast concrete market — Administrative penalty of R 4 022 568.29 agreed upon — Settlement confirmed by the Competition Tribunal as full and final resolution of proceedings.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were consent order (settlement) confirmation proceedings before the South African Competition Tribunal in terms of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended). The matter came before a Tribunal panel constituted by N Manoim (Presiding Member), Y Carrim, and A Wessels and was both heard and decided on 31 March 2010.


The parties were the Competition Commission (as applicant) and Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd (as respondent). The matter was presented to the Tribunal on the basis of an agreement concluded between the Commission and Cobro, in which they sought an order confirming a settlement agreement (also described as a consent agreement) as a Tribunal order.


The procedural history reflected in the judgment and annexed agreement was that the Commission received a corporate leniency application in December 2007 (from Rocia (Pty) Ltd) relating to alleged cartel conduct in the precast concrete market. The Commissioner then initiated a complaint and investigation on 19 March 2008 under Commission case number 2008Mar3595, which culminated in a referral to the Tribunal under Tribunal case number 23/CR/Feb09 and, ultimately, the settlement agreement signed in early 2010 and presented for confirmation.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned alleged and admitted cartel conduct in the markets for precast concrete products (including pipes, manholes, culverts, and manhole covers) in South Africa, including conduct characterised as price fixing, market division, and collusive tendering, in contravention of section 4 of the Competition Act.


2. Material Facts


The material facts relied upon by the Tribunal were those contained in the settlement agreement and the Tribunal’s confirmation of that agreement. The agreement recorded that in December 2007 the Commission received a leniency application from Rocia (Pty) Ltd regarding a cartel in the precast concrete market. The leniency information implicated Cobro and other firms, including (as described in the agreement) SPC, Concrete Units, Cape Concrete, Cobro, Grallio, Empowa-Grinaker, Craig Concrete, Conrite Walls, and D&D Concrete, in coordinated conduct affecting precast concrete products.


On 19 March 2008, the Commissioner initiated a complaint investigation in terms of section 49B of the Act. The Commission’s investigation (as recorded in the agreement) found that, over extended periods ending in September 2007 and November 2007 respectively, Cobro and various competitors engaged in cartel arrangements implemented through meetings and supported by exchanged documentation (including price lists and “modus operandi” documentation).


The agreement recorded findings and admissions that the cartel conduct included price fixing and the fixing of trading conditions in relation to manholes and pipes, including agreements on prices to be quoted to customers/contractors, price increases, discounts, and credit terms. It further recorded that the arrangements had the effect of preventing and/or limiting price competition among the participants in relation to pricing of precast concrete pipes and culverts.


The agreement also recorded market division conduct, particularly in the KwaZulu-Natal (Natal) market, including allocation of customers/contracts by agreed percentage shares in the market for manholes (with changes over time, including arrangements involving Cobro, D&D Concrete, Conrite Walls, and later Rocla) and the allocation of territories. The agreement additionally recorded monthly payments by Cobro (approximately R30 000 per month) to Conrite Walls to ensure that Conrite Walls did not enter the manhole market, with D&D paying Conrite Walls approximately R10 000 per month.


For pipes, the agreement recorded that Cobro, Rocla, Infraset, and Grallio divided the Natal market through allocation of customers/contracts according to agreed market shares, allocation of territories, and allocation of specific goods to be supplied by each firm. For culverts in KwaZulu-Natal, the agreement recorded an arrangement in terms of which Rocla would supply culverts without competition from Infraset, Grallio, and Cobro.


Finally, the agreement recorded collusive tendering conduct over the period 1986 to November 2007, in which Cobro and other firms collectively agreed on tender prices for government contracts, allocated contracts in accordance with agreed market shares for pipes, manholes, and culverts, and coordinated quotations to contractors to secure such contracts.


No disputes of fact were identified in the judgment as it was determined on the basis of a settlement. The essential factual content was recorded as the Commission’s findings and, crucially, as admitted by Cobro in the settlement agreement.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question before the Tribunal was whether it should confirm the settlement agreement as an order of the Tribunal, as requested by the Commission and Cobro, in terms of section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the Competition Act.


The matter also necessarily engaged the legal characterisation of the admitted conduct as contraventions of section 4 of the Act, specifically the prohibitions relating to agreements or concerted practices between competitors involving price fixing, market allocation, and collusive tendering, as well as the imposition of an administrative penalty under sections 58 and 59.


The dispute did not present a contested factual inquiry or an evaluative merits determination in the usual adversarial sense. Instead, it principally concerned the application of the Act’s remedial provisions to agreed and admitted facts, and the Tribunal’s function in making the agreed terms an order of the Tribunal.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Tribunal’s reasoning, as reflected in the judgment, was concise and procedural in nature. The Tribunal recorded that it confirmed the order as agreed to and proposed by the Competition Commission and the respondent, annexed to the judgment and marked “A”. The Tribunal therefore proceeded on the basis that the parties had presented a settlement agreement seeking confirmation as a Tribunal order under the relevant empowering provision of the Act.


The settlement agreement itself set out the statutory framework underpinning the proposed order. It recorded that the Commission and Cobro agreed to approach the Tribunal for an order under section 58(1)(a)(iii). It further recorded Cobro’s admissions of contraventions of sections 4(1)(b)(i), 4(1)(b)(ii), 4(1)(b)(iii), and 4(1)(a), tied to the conduct described (price fixing, fixing of trading conditions, market allocation, and collusive tendering over the relevant periods).


On remedy, the agreement recorded that, having regard to section 58(1)(a)(iii) read with sections 59(1)(a), 59(2), and 59(3), Cobro accepted liability for an administrative penalty. The penalty was agreed at R 4 022 568.29, stated to be 6.5% of Cobro’s turnover for the financial year ending 2008, and payable within six months of confirmation. The agreement also recorded that the Commission would pay the penalty into the National Revenue Fund in terms of section 59(4).


In addition to the penalty, the agreement addressed forward-looking remedial steps. Cobro agreed to cooperate fully with the Commission in prosecutions of other firms arising from the investigation, including testifying in support of the Commission’s case and providing evidence. Cobro also agreed to develop and implement a formal compliance programme incorporating corporate governance measures to prevent contraventions of section 4(1)(b), and to submit a copy of that programme to the Commission within 60 days of confirmation.


The Tribunal’s confirmation of the agreed order reflected acceptance of the settlement mechanism contemplated by the Act, with the Tribunal making the parties’ agreed terms binding as an order of the Tribunal, thereby finalising the proceedings between them on the subject of the complaint investigated under case number 2008Mar3595.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal confirmed the consent order/settlement agreement concluded between the Competition Commission and Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd, annexed to the judgment as “A”.


As confirmed, the order included Cobro’s admission of contraventions of the Competition Act (as specified in the agreement), Cobro’s obligation to pay an administrative penalty of R 4 022 568.29 within six months of confirmation, Cobro’s undertaking to cooperate with the Commission in related prosecutions, and Cobro’s undertaking to implement and submit a competition law compliance programme within 60 days of confirmation.


No separate costs order was recorded in the Tribunal’s brief confirmation order as reproduced in the judgment.


Cases Cited


No cases were cited in the judgment text provided.


Legislation Cited


Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended), including sections 4(1)(a), 4(1)(b)(i), 4(1)(b)(ii), 4(1)(b)(iii), 19, 22, 26, 49B, 58(1)(a)(iii), 59(1)(a), 59(2), 59(3), and 59(4).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment text provided.


Held


The Competition Tribunal made an order confirming, as a Tribunal order, the settlement agreement between the Competition Commission and Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd. The confirmed order reflected Cobro’s admissions of cartel conduct contravening section 4 of the Competition Act, imposed an agreed administrative penalty of R 4 022 568.29 payable within six months, and required Cobro to cooperate with the Commission in related enforcement proceedings and to implement and submit a compliance programme within 60 days.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The matter applied the principle that the Competition Tribunal may, where the Competition Commission and a respondent conclude a settlement agreement, confirm that agreement as an order of the Tribunal under section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the Competition Act, thereby finalising proceedings between those parties on the complaint covered by the settlement.


The matter further applied the Act’s remedial framework permitting the imposition, by agreement and confirmation, of an administrative penalty under sections 58 and 59 in respect of admitted contraventions of the cartel prohibitions in section 4, and permitting associated remedial undertakings, including cooperation with ongoing investigations/prosecutions and the implementation of a competition compliance programme, as part of a full and final settlement.

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[2010] ZACT 25
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Competition Commission v Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd (23/CR/Feb09) [2010] ZACT 25; [2010] 1 CPLR 68 (CT) (31 March 2010)

COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No: 23/CR/Feb09
In
the matter between:
The Competition
Commission
Applicant
and
Cobro Concrete (Pty)
Ltd
Respondent
Panel : N
Manoim (Presiding Member), Y Carrim (Tribunal Member), and A
Wessels (Tribunal Member)
Heard-on :
31
March 2010
Decided
on : 31 March 2010
The Tribunal hereby
confirms the order as agreed to and proposed by the Competition
Commission and the respondent, annexed hereto
marked "A".
N Manoim
Concurring: Y Carrim and
A Wessels
IN THE COMPETITION
TRIBUNAL
OF
SOUTH
AFRICA
CC Case No:
2008Mar3595
In the matter between:
THE
COMPETITION COMMISSION
Applicant
And
COBRO
CONCRETE (PTY) LIMITED
Respondent
SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMPETITION COMMISSION AND
COBRO
CONCRETE (PTY) LTD
LIMITED
IN REGARD TO A CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 4(1) (b) OF THE COMPETITION
ACT, NO
.
89
OF 1998 (AS AMENDED)
The
Competition Commission and Cobro Concrete (Pty) (Ltd) Limited hereby
agree that application be made to the Competition Tribunal
for an
order in terms of section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the Competition Act, No.
89 of 1998 (as amended), on the terms set out more fully
below.
1. Definitions
For the purposes of this
Consent Agreement the following definitions shall apply -
1.1.
"Act"
means
the Competition Act, No. 89 of 1998 (as amended);
1.2.
"Aveng"
means
Aveng (Africa) Limited;
1.3.
"Cape Concrete"
means
Cape Concrete (Pty) Ltd;
1.4.
"Cobro"
means
Cobro Concrete (Pty) Ltd;
1.5.
"Commission"
means
the Competition Commission of South Africa, a statutory body,
established in ferms of section 19 of the Act, with its principal

place of business at Building C, Mulayo Building, dti Campus, 77
Meintjies Street, Sunnyside, Pretoria, Gauteng;
1.6.
"Commissioner"
means
the Commissioner of the Competition Commission, appointed in terms of
section 22 of the Act;
1.7.
"Concrete
Units"
means
Concrete Units (Pty) Ltd;
1.8.
"Conrite Walls"
means
Cori rite Walls (Pty) Ltd;
1.9.
"Consent Agreement"
means
this agreement duly signed and concluded between the Commissipn and
Aveng;
1.10.
"Complaint" means the complaint initiated by the
Commissioner of the Commission in terms pf section 49B of the Act

under case number 2008Mar3595 into possible contraventions of the
Act;
1.12.
"Empowa
-Qrinaker"
means Empowa-Grinaker
Lta
(Pty)
Ltd;
1.13.
"Grallio"
means
Grallio (Pty) Ltd;
1.14.
"Infraset"
means
the Infraset business unit of Aveng Manufacturing, a subsidiary of
Aveng (Africa) Ltd;
1.15. "Parties"
means the Commission and "Cobro";
1.16. "Rocia"
means Rocia (Pty) Ltd
1.17. "SPC"
means Southern Pipeline Contractors (Pty) Ltd
1.18.
"Tribunal"
means
the Competition Tribunal of South Africa, a statutory
body,
established in terms of section 26 of the Act, with its principal
place
of business at Building C, Muiayo Building, dti Campus, 77
Meintjies Street,
Sunnyside, Pretoria, Gauteng.
2
Complaint
investigation and the Commission's findings
2.1
During
December 2007, the Commission received an application for
leniency
under its corporate lepiency programme from Rocia regarding
its
involvement in a cartel in the precast concrete market within
South Africa.
In its leniency application, Rocia advised the
Commission that it, together
with SPC, Concrete Units, Cape
Concrete, Cobro, Graliio, Empowa
Grinaker, Craig Concrete,
Concrite Walls and D&D Concrete had engaged
in the following
conduct:
2.1.1. fixing the seiiing
price of pipes, culverts and manholes;
2.1.2.
dividing the markets for the production and distribution of pipes,
culverts and manholes; and
2.1.3.
collusive tendering |n respect of the supply of precast concrete
products and precast concrete sleepers to certain suppliers.
2.2
The
Commissioner initiated an investigation into this alleged cartel
activity on 19 March 2008.
2.3
The
Commission's investigation found the following:
2.3.1
Price
fixing and fixing pf trading conditions
2.3.1.1.
During
the period 1986 until September 2007, Rocia, Infraset,
Cobro
("competitors") and during the period 1999 until November
2007, Cobro, Conrite Walls and DND Concrete ["DND"]

("competitors"), competitors in the business of manufacture
and sale of precast manholes and pipes in South Africa, acting

through their respectiye representatives in meetings:
2.3.1.1.1.
Directly fixed prices of manholes and pipes sold to their customers
by agreeing on prices that each would quote to customers/contractors

allocated to each other;
2.3.1.1.2.
Directly fixed prices of manholes and pipes by agreeing on price
increases and discounts to be offered to their customers;
2.3.1.1.3.
Directly fixed credit terms to be granted to their customers.
2.3.1.2.
Discussions on price increases, prices to be quoted to customers,
discounts and credit terms occurred between Cobro and
its competitors
during meetings held during the relevant period. These discussions
were confirmed by written documentation such
as price lists and
modus
operandi
documentation
generated arid exchanged between Cobro and its competitors during the
relevant period. This conduct constitutes price
fixing and fixing of
trading conditions in contravention of section 4(1) (b) (i) of the
Act.
2.3.1.3.
Through these price fixing arrangements, Cobro and its competitors
prevented and/or limited price competition amongst themselves
in
relation to pricing of precast concrete pipes and culverts.
2.3.2.
Market
Division
2.3.2.1.
During the period 1999 until November 2007, Cobro together with D&D
Concrete and Conrite Walls, being competitors in
the market for the
manufacture and sale of manholes in South Africa, acting through
their respective representatives in meetings,
divided the
Natal
Market
market
for manholes by:
2.3.2.1.1.
Allocating customers/contracts amongst themselves in accordance with
agreed upon percentage share of the market for manholes,
in
particular it was agreed with Rocla that 75% of available
contracts/customers would be supplied by Cobro and the remaining 25%

by D&D. Prior to the acquistion of D&D by Rocla, between the
period 1999 and 2002 Cobfo, D&D and Conrite Walls agreed
to
divide the market amongst them as follows; Cobro was to have 56% of
the market, D&D 20% and Conrite Wails 15%.
2.3.2.1.1.2.
In terms of the agreement Cobro made monthly payments of
approximately R 30 000 to Conrite Walls to ensure that the
latter did
not enter the manhole market. D&D paid Conrite Walls an amount of
about R 10 000 per month.
2.3.2.1.1.3.
Allocating specific territories within which each firm would supply
manholes.
2.3.2.2.
Further, during the period 1986 until November 2007, Cobro, Rocla,
Infraset and Grallio being competitors in the manufacture
and sale of
pijses in South Africa, acting through their respective
representatives in meetings divided the
Natal
market
for pipes by:
2.3.2.2.1.
allocating customers/contracts amongst themselves in accordance with
agreed upon percentage shares as follows: Rocla
54%; Infraset
19%;Graliio 10% and Cobro 17%
2.3.2.2..2.
allocating
specific territories within which each firm would supply pipes;
2.3.2,2.3
.
allocating
Specific goods to be supplied
by
each.
2.3.2.3
.
Further,
in the market for the production and supply of culverts in
Kwazulu-Natal Cobro, Rocla, Infraset and Grallio entered into
and
implemented ah agreement in terms of which Rocla would supply
culverts in that market without competition from Infraset, Grallio

and Cobro.
2.3.3.
Collusive
Tendering
2.3.3.1.
During
the period 1986 until
November
2007, Cobro
together with Rocla, Infraset and Gjrallib, collectively agreed on
prices that they would submit in relation to tenders
for Goverriment
contracts, agreeing to allocate contracts amongst themselves iri
accordance with agreed upon market shares pertaining
to pipes,
manholes . and culverts, and coordinating quotations offered to
contractors in order
to
secure such
contracts.
3
Admission
3.1
.
Cobro
admits that it has contravened sections 4(l)(b
)(i),
4(l)(b)(il),
4(l)(b)(Hi) and 4(l)(a) in that it a'nd its competitors, through a
series of meetings attended by their respective
representatives,
during the period 1986 until November 2007, colluded to fix prices,
price increases and discounts, allocated customers,
territories and
specific goods amongst themselves and engaged in collusive tendering
in the markets for pipes, manholes and manhole
covers as set out in
paragraph 2 above.
4.
Agreement
concerning future conduct
Cobro
agrees to cooperate fully with the Commission in relation to the
prosecution of any other firm arising from the Commission's

investigation of the Complaint. Without limiting the generality of
the above, Cobro specifically agrees to:
testify
in support of the Commission's case regarding the contraventions in
(his consent agreement; and
provide
evidence, written or otherwise, concerning the contraventions
contained in this consent agreement.
4.2. Cobro agrees to
develop and implement a formal compliance programme incorporating
corporate governance designed to ensure that
employees, management
and directors do not engage in any contraventions of section 4(1) (b)
of the Act, a copy of which programme
shall be submitted to the
Commission within 60 days of the date of confirmation of this consent
agreement by the Tribunal.
5.
Administrative
Penalty
5.1. Having regard to the
provisions of section 58(1) (a)
(iii),
read
with sections 59(1) (a), 59(2) and (3) of the Act, Cobro accepts that
it is liable to pay an administrative penalty.
5.2. The parties have
agreed that Cobro will pay an administrative penalty in the amount of
R 4 022 568.29, being 6.5% of Cobra's
turnover for the financial year
ending 2008.
5.3. Cobro will pay the
penalty the administrative penalty within 6 months of the date of the
confirmation of the Settlement Agreement
by the Tribunal.
5.4
The
Commission will pay the administrative penalty received into the
National Revenue Fund in terms of section 59(4) of the Act.
6.
Full
and
final
resolution
This
Settlement Agreement is entered into in full and final settlement of
all proceedings between the parties, and upon confirmation
as an
order by the Tribunal, concludes all proceedings between the
Commission, and Cobro relating to any alleged contravention
by Cobro
of section 4(1) (b) of the Act that, is the subject of, or was
investigated pursuant to, the Complaint under case number

2008Mar3595.
Dated
and signed in
Durban
on this the
15
day of
March
2010
DIRECTOR-
AUTHORISED SIGNATORY
COBRO
(PTY) LTD
DATE
AND SIGNED IN
PRETORIA
ON THIS THE
01
DAY OF
FEB
2010
SHAN
RAMBURUTH
THE COMMISSIONER, COMPETITION
COMMISSION