Growthpoint Management Services (Propietary) Ltd and Fund Management Business; Property Administrators Business; and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd (70/LM/Jul07) [2007] ZACT 90; [2008] 1 CPLR 105 (CT) (13 November 2007)

78 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Merger Approval — Conditional approval of merger between Growthpoint Management Services (Pty) Ltd and target firms, including Fund Management Business and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd — Tribunal imposed conditions to ensure compliance with Competition Act — Concerns raised regarding restraint clauses in Sale of Business Agreement potentially contravening section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Act — Tribunal's decision to approve merger subject to deletion of certain clauses to prevent anti-competitive practices.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned merger proceedings before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa in terms of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. The Tribunal was required to determine whether to approve a transaction in which Growthpoint Management Services (Proprietary) Ltd (“GMS”), as the acquiring firm, would acquire control of certain target businesses described as the Fund Management Business, Property Administration Business, and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd (collectively, “the target firms”).


The Tribunal’s reasons record that the Competition Commission had initially recommended approval without conditions, but issues emerged during the first hearing regarding the contractual structure underpinning the transaction. This prompted further procedural steps, including the filing of additional agreements and a second hearing focused on the competition implications of those agreements.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether contractual provisions contained in agreements related to the merger—particularly a restraint clause in the Sale of Business Agreement and renewal-related provisions in the Co-operation Agreement—raised competition-law concerns requiring conditions to be imposed on approval.


2. Material Facts


GMS was described as a newly formed subsidiary of Growthpoint Properties Limited (“Growthpoint”). The target firms were collectively controlled by Investec Property Group (“IPG”), an indirect subsidiary of Investec Limited (“Investec”). In terms of the Sale of Business Agreement, IPG would sell its rights, title, and interest in the target firms and related activities as a going concern, resulting in Growthpoint acquiring control of the target firms through GMS.


The Tribunal accepted that the transaction was subject to interrelated agreements, including the Sale of Business Agreement and the Co-operation Agreement. At the first hearing, it emerged that only the Sale of Business Agreement had been filed with the Commission, and the Tribunal directed that the additional agreements be submitted. Following the filing of the agreements and written submissions, a second hearing was convened to address their implications.


The Tribunal recorded that Growthpoint owned a portfolio of properties that, prior to the merger, were managed by IPG. Growthpoint’s rationale was that in-house property management was more convenient than outsourced management, while IPG sought to realise a return on its investment. It was also noted that Investec Asset Management held 12.1% of Growthpoint’s issued share capital, which the parties contended meant Investec would continue to benefit from the transaction.


In competition terms, the Tribunal recorded that the transaction affected the listed property loan stock market, the market for property fund/asset management services, and the market for property management/administration services, assessed on a national geographic basis. The Commission and the parties characterised the transaction as a vertical merger and considered customer foreclosure unlikely because the target firms were the sole providers of property services to Growthpoint. The Commission further considered that alternative suppliers existed for Investec should Growthpoint not supply relevant services post-merger.


The key facts giving rise to the Tribunal’s concerns were contractual. Clause 12.1 of the Sale of Business Agreement imposed restraints which, on the Tribunal’s reading, restrained both Investec and Growthpoint from entering each other’s markets, rather than operating as a conventional seller-only restraint. In the Co-operation Agreement, clauses providing for rights of first refusal were accompanied by a provision (identified in the proceedings as clause 10.2) permitting the agreement to be renewed by mutual agreement, raising the possibility of continuation beyond the initial four-year period contemplated.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the competition-law characterisation and permissibility of provisions in the agreements ancillary to the merger, and whether those provisions required the Tribunal to impose conditions on approval.


A primary issue was whether clause 12.1 of the Sale of Business Agreement should be treated merely as a restraint assessed within a vertical framework (as the Commission had approached it under section 5(1) of the Act), or whether it was properly understood as a form of market division prohibited as a restrictive horizontal practice under section 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Act.


A further issue was whether the rights of first refusal in the Co-operation Agreement, when coupled with the ability to renew the agreement potentially indefinitely, raised competition concerns that could not be left unregulated within the merger approval.


These issues primarily involved the application of competition-law provisions to the contractual facts, with an evaluative assessment of the competitive significance of the relevant clauses in the context of the transaction.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Tribunal proceeded from the premise that the merger itself, viewed as a vertical transaction, had been assessed by the Commission as unlikely to create foreclosure effects and that alternatives existed for any firm that might require property fund/asset management or property management services. The Tribunal’s concerns, however, were directed not at the merger structure alone but at the interrelated agreements that formed part of the broader transaction context.


In relation to the Sale of Business Agreement, the Tribunal noted that the Commission had analysed clause 12.1 as a vertical restraint under section 5(1) and had concluded it was unlikely to substantially lessen or prevent competition. The Tribunal, however, considered that clause 12.1 appeared to go beyond a conventional restraint aimed at preventing the seller from re-entering a market after selling a business. The Tribunal emphasised that the clause, as drafted, restrained both parties from entering each other’s markets, which the Tribunal regarded as resembling a market division arrangement.


To support its concern that market division can arise even where firms are not current competitors, the Tribunal referred to its earlier decision in Nedschroef Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd and Teamcor Limited and Others, where it had held that market division does not require firms to be competitors prior to the division; potential competition could suffice. The Tribunal also referred to the quoted statement from the United States Supreme Court decision in Jay Palmer et al v BRG of Georgia, Inc et al, indicating that agreements splitting markets are anticompetitive regardless of whether the parties previously did business in both markets. On this reasoning, the Tribunal viewed clause 12.1 as raising a potential contravention of section 4(1)(b)(ii), an aspect the Commission had not investigated in its original approach.


The merging parties were given an opportunity to address the Tribunal on the restraint. Growthpoint’s representative submitted that the restraint was a normal commercial arrangement linked to the payment of a substantial purchase price and was needed to protect the post-merger business, including by preventing employee poaching for a limited period. The Tribunal indicated that it was not concerned about the restraint on employees, but remained concerned about the broader reciprocal restraint effect in clause 12.1, which it viewed as not confined to protecting the purchased business in the conventional manner.


Regarding the Co-operation Agreement, the Tribunal accepted that rights of first refusal could be common in the property market and noted the parties’ submission that the agreement was intended as a temporary arrangement facilitating the sale. The Tribunal’s concern centred on the fact that the agreement could be renewed by mutual agreement, which meant that the rights of first refusal could, in effect, be continued beyond the initial term. The Tribunal considered that this potential for renewal had not been previously considered in the Commission’s initial unconditional recommendation. The Commission, in turn, indicated concern about renewal beyond the initial period because competitive effects would need assessment in light of future market conditions, and it indicated a preference that any renewal be notified and investigated.


The Tribunal accepted the parties’ undertakings to amend the agreements to address these concerns. It therefore grounded its conditional approval on the deletion of the reciprocal restraint clause in the Sale of Business Agreement and the removal of the renewal mechanism in the Co-operation Agreement, together with a fixed limitation on the duration of the Co-operation Agreement.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal conditionally approved the merger in terms of section 16(2)(b) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998.


The approval was subject to conditions that the entire paragraph 12.1 of the Sale of Business Agreement (signed 20 July 2007) would be of no force and effect and deleted; that paragraph 10.2 of the Co-operation Agreement (concluded 20 July 2007) would be deleted; and that the duration of the entire Co-operation Agreement would be limited to four years and could not be extended or renewed. The parties were also required to provide the Tribunal with signed copies of the amended agreements within five business days of the order.


The Tribunal recorded that the transaction did not raise significant public interest issues. The reasons do not record any costs order.


Cases Cited


Nedschroef Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd and Teamcor Limited and Others, Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Case No: 95/IR/Oct05.


Jay Palmer et al v BRG of Georgia, Inc et al 498 U.S. 46, 111 S. Ct. 401 (United States Supreme Court).


Legislation Cited


Competition Act 89 of 1998, section 4(1)(b)(ii).


Competition Act 89 of 1998, section 5(1).


Competition Act 89 of 1998, section 16(2)(b).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the reasons.


Held


The Tribunal held that, although the merger had been assessed as a vertical transaction unlikely to raise foreclosure concerns, the interrelated agreements created competition issues requiring conditions.


The Tribunal held, in particular, that clause 12.1 of the Sale of Business Agreement was not treated as a conventional seller-only restraint but instead appeared to restrain both parties from entering each other’s markets, raising concern that it resembled market division prohibited by section 4(1)(b)(ii), including in circumstances of potential competition.


The Tribunal held that, while rights of first refusal in the property context may be common, the ability to renew the Co-operation Agreement by mutual agreement raised concern that these rights could persist beyond the contemplated term, and it accepted amendments that prevented renewal and fixed the agreement’s duration.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The decision applied the principle that market division prohibited by section 4(1)(b)(ii) does not depend on firms being current competitors at the time of the division; potential competition may be sufficient, consistent with the Tribunal’s earlier approach in Nedschroef Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd and Teamcor Limited and Others.


The decision further reflected the principle that, in merger proceedings, the Tribunal may scrutinise interrelated or ancillary agreements forming part of the broader transaction structure, and may impose conditions to remove or neutralise contractual provisions that raise competition concerns.


The decision also applied the principle that contractual arrangements such as rights of first refusal, while not inherently unlawful in the abstract, may raise competition concerns depending on their structure and duration, including where provisions permit renewal that could extend effects beyond an initial term without further competition scrutiny.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
                   Case No: 70/LM/Jul07
In the matter between:
Growthpoint Management Services (Proprietary) Ltd                  Acquiring Firm
And
Fund Management Business;
Property Administrators Business; and
Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd                                                                 Target Firms
_______________________________________________________________
Panel    :        U Bhoola (Presiding Member), Y Carrim (Tribunal 
Member), and M Holden (Tribunal Member)
Heard on    : 31 August and 17 October, 2007
Decided on    : 17 October 2007 
Reasons issued on:    13 November 2007  
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPROVAL
[1]       On   17   October  2007,   the   Tribunal   conditionally   approved   the  merger  between  
Growthpoint   Management   Services   (Pty)   Limited   ( “GMS”)   and   Fund   Management  
Business; Property Administration Business; and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd ( “the 
target firms” ), as follows:

“The merger between the parties in this matter is approved in terms of section 16(2)(b)  
of the Act subject to the following conditions:
1. The entire paragraph 12.1 in the Sale of Business Agreement signed by the  
merging parties on 20 July 2007 is of no force and effect and shall be deleted  
forthwith.
2.   Paragraph   10.2   in   the   Co­operation   Agreement   concluded   between   the  
merging parties on 20 July 2007 shall be deleted. The duration of the entire  
agreement   shall   be   limited   to   four   (4)   years   and   may   not   be   extended   or  
renewed.
3.   The   parties   shall   provide   the   Tribunal   with   signed   copies   of   the   Sale   of  
Business   and   Co­operation   Agreements,   amended   to   reflect   the   above  
conditions, within five (5) business days of this order.”
BACKGOUND TO THE APPROVAL
[2]       The   first   hearing   for   this   merger   took   place   on   31   August   2007.   In   its  
recommendations   the   Commission   had   recommended   that   the   merger   be   approved  
without conditions. It, however, emerged during the hearing that the proposed merger  
is subject to three interrelated agreements, namely the Sale of Business Agreement;  
the Property Management Agreement; and the Co­operation Agreement. Of the three  
agreements only the Sale of Business Agreement had been filed with the Commission.  
The Tribunal ordered the parties to submit copies of the agreements.
[3]    On 4 September 2007 the merging parties provided copies of the agreements to  
the   Commission   together   with   written   legal   submissions   on   the   implications   of   the  
Agreements.   The   Commission   submitted   its  legal   opinion   on  the  agreements  to  the  
Tribunal on 8 October 2007.   On 17 October 2007 a second hearing was held.   The  
Commission and the merging parties made oral submissions on the implications of the  
agreements, an aspect to which we shall revert later.
THE TRANSACTION

agreements, an aspect to which we shall revert later.
THE TRANSACTION 
[4]       The   primary   acquiring   firm   is   Growthpoint   Management   Services   (Pty)   Limited  
(“GMS”), a newly formed subsidiary of Growthpoint Properties Limited (“Growthpoint”).  
GMS   does   not   control   any   firm.   The   target   firms   are   Fund   Management   Business;  
  2

Property Administration Business; and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd.  The target firms  
are   collectively   controlled   by   Investec   Property   Group   ( “IPG”),   which   in   turn   is   an  
indirect subsidiary of Investec Limited ( “Investec”).
[5]   In terms of the Sale of Business Agreement Investec Property Group is to sell all  
rights, title and interest in the target firms as well as all related activities conducted as a  
going concern.   As a result of the transaction Growthpoint will acquire control of the  
target firms via GMS.
[6]       The   transaction,   as   stated   in   paragraph   2   above,   is   also   subject   to   three  
interrelated   agreements,   which   includes   the   Sale   of   Business   Agreement   and   the  
Cooperation Agreement. 1 
RATIONALE FOR THE TRANSACTION
[7]       Growthpoint   owns   a   portfolio   of   properties,   which   prior   to   the   merger   were  
managed   by   Investec  Property  Group.     According   to   Growthpoint   in­house   property  
management   is   more   convenient   than   outsourced   management.     Investec   Property  
Group   on   the   other   hand   wants   to   realise   a   return   on   its   investment   on   the   target  
properties. The parties also pointed out that Investec Asset Management holds 12.1%  
of Growthpoint’s issued share capital and as result Investec will benefit continuously  
from the sale. The parties described the transaction as an arrangement by Growthpoint  
to move the target firms in­house.
THE PARTIES’ ACTIVITIES
[8]       Growthpoint   owns   a   diversified   portfolio   of   retail,   commercial   and   industrial  
property and derives its income from the rentals it charges from its tenants. The target  
firms’ business activities can be grouped under three categories viz,
• Property Fund Management Business (which provides advice and proposals on  
acquisitions;  developing; and managing the portfolio in order to maximise the

acquisitions;  developing; and managing the portfolio in order to maximise the  
1    Nothing  of  substance  turned  on  the  Property  Management  Agreement   and  as   result  this  
agreement was not considered.
  3

performance and minimise risks); 
• Property Administrators Business (which as property manager is responsible for  
the   physical   management   of   the   property   under   its   control   including   letting;  
lease renewals; facilities management; and rent collection); and 
• Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd, (which provides maintenance services such as  
plumbing; electrical; and general repairs).
THE RELEVANT MARKET
[9]   This transaction will affect the listed property loan stock market; the market for the  
provision of property fund/asset management services; and the market for the provision  
of   property   management/administration   services.   Due   to   the   nature   of   the   product  
markets involved we consider the geographic market as national. 
COMPETITION ANALYSIS
[10]   The parties and the Commission held the view that this was a vertical merger and  
was   unlikely   to   result   in   customer   foreclosure   since   the   target   firms   were   the   sole  
providers of property services to Growthpoint.  
[11]    The Commission had further submitted that no firm will suffer input foreclosure,  
except   Investec   Property   Group,   since   Investec   will   in   future   need   the   services   or  
businesses   it   is   selling   to   Growthpoint,   as   it   holds   a   property   portfolio   of   its   own.  
Growthpoint, however, undertakes to provide these services to Investec at a fee.   In the  
unlikely   event   that   Growthpoint   refuses   to   supply   Investec   with   these   services,   the  
Commission further submitted, there are alternative suppliers that Investec can turn to.  
As   regards   fund/asset   management   services   alternative   suppliers   includes   Madison  
Property Fund;   Resilient  Income Property  Fund;  Acucap  Properties  Limited;  Gensec  
Property   Services;   and   Old   Mutual   Investment   Group.   As   regards   property  
management   services   alternative   suppliers   includes   Broll   Property   Group;   Hyprop

Investments;   Marriot   Property   Services;   Colliers   International;   Gensec   Property  
Services; and City Property Administrators.
  4

[12]   However at the hearing of the matter, the Tribunal expressed its concerns about  
relevant   provisions   of   the   Sale   of   Business   Agreement   and   the   Co­operation  
Agreement.
 The Sale of Business Agreement
[13]     Section 12.1 of the Sale of Business Agreement, in relevant parts, provided as  
follows:
“12  Restraint­
  21.1  Restraint Against Competition
12.1.1 The Warrantors­
Each  of  the  warrantors  undertake  to  the  purchaser  that,  unless otherwise  agreed  in  
writing between them, it shall not, either alone or together with, or as agent for any  
person, firm, company or association whatsoever, directly or indirectly –
12.1.1.1.  carry on or be entered in, in any way;
12.1.1.2.  be employed in; or
12.1.1.3.  be engaged in or concerned with,
the   creation   of   any   listed   property   fund   or   property   management   business,   in  
competition with the business or with Growthpoint generally, as the case may be (which  
for the avoidance of doubt does not include any property development or listed property  
investment management businesses).
12.1.2   Purchaser and Growthpoint­
Each   of   the   purchaser   and   Growthpoint   undertake   to   the   warrantors   that,   unless  
otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, it shall not, either alone or together  
with, or as agent for any person, firm, company or association whatsoever, directly or  
indirectly –
12.1.2.1. carry on or be entered in, in any way;
12.1.2.2. be employed in; or
12.1.2.3. be engaged in or concerned with,
any property development, other than those properties being developed by Growthpoint  
at   the   Effective   Date   and   other   than   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   Co­
Operation Agreement.”
  5

[14]   The Commission took the approach that the Sale of Business Agreement was an  
agreement between parties in a vertical relationship and would fall within section 5(1) of  
the Act. 2  It analysed the impact of clause 12.1 on this basis and concluded that  
the agreement was unlikely to substantially lessen or prevent competition. 
[15]    However, The Tribunal was concerned that clause 12.1 effectively amounted to  
an agreement between the parties in contravention of 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act.  
The Commission had not investigated this possibility. 
[16]   Section 4(1))(b)(ii) of the Act provides as follows:
“4. Restrictive horizontal practices prohibited
1) An  agreement between, or  concerted practice  by,  firms, or a decision by an  
association   of   firms,   is   prohibited   if   it   is   between   parties   in   a   horizontal 
relationship and if
....
(b) it involves any of the following  restrictive horizontal practices:
(ii)   dividing   markets   by   allocating   customers,   suppliers,  
territories, or specific types of  goods or services.”
[17]     In   Nedschroef Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd and Teamcor Limited and Others ,3  the  
Tribunal held as follows:
“…market division does not require that both firms be competitors prior to  
the   act   of   division.   If   they   are   potential   competitors   this   will   suffice.  
Frequently   firms   will   divide   a   market   before   they   become   de   facto  
competitors  precisely  to avoid that outcome 4 (our emphasis).
[18]       In   support   of   the   above   conclusion   the   Tribunal   quoted   the   United   States  
2  Section 5(1) of the Act prohibits agreements, as defined, between parties in a  
vertical relationship if that agreement has the effect of substantially preventing  
or lessening competition in a market.
 
3  Case No: 95/IR/Oct05.
4  Id at para 44.
  6

Supreme Court  decision in  Jay Palmer et al v BRG of Georgia, INC et all ,5 where the  
Court held,
“Such agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether the  
parties split a market within which both do business or whether  
they merely reserve one market for one and another for the other”
[19]   At the hearing, the parties were afforded an opportunity to address the Tribunal  
on   this   matter.     Mr   Sasse   on   behalf   of   Growthpoint   submitted   that   the   restraint  
agreement   was   a   normal   commercial   agreement   and   was   agreed   upon   between  
Investec   and   Growthpoint,   pursuant   to   the   payment   by   the   latter   of   a   substantial  
purchase price. He explained that the nature of the business being bought relied upon  
the relationship between the service provider and the customer, in which employees  
developed   the   skills   and   know­how   to   manage   such   relationships.     In   order   for  
Growthpoint to succeed post merger, it necessitated imposing a restraint on Investec  
from entering the market and from poaching its employees for a period of 2 (two) years.  
[20]     The Tribunal was not concerned about the restraint on employees. However in  
the Tribunal’s view clause 12.1 was not an ordinary commercial restraint which sought  
to limit only the seller from entering the market from which it had exited through a sale  
transaction and for which it had been paid a premium.   Clause 12.1 in fact restrained  
both Investec and Growthpoint from entering into each other’s markets and seemed to  
be more in the nature of a market division agreement.  
 
The Co­operation Agreement
[21]     At the hearing of the matter the Tribunal panel raised concerns with clauses 4  
and 5 of the Co­operation Agreement.  Clauses 4 and 5, in relevant parts, provide:  
“4. DEVELOPMENT ARRANGEMENT
5  498 U.S. 46, 111, S.CT. 401.
  7

4.1 Right of First Refusal
4.1.1 The parties agree that Growthpoint grants (and shall procure the  
same on behalf of each company within the Growthpoint Group) IPG a  
right   of   first   refusal   in   respect   of   development   opportunities   and  
requirements   of   all   the   properties   within   the   Growthpoint   Portfolio   of  
properties (only to the extent that any such development exceeds R50  
000 000 (fifty million rand) in value or if under R50 000 000 (fifty million  
rand)   in   value   and   Growthpoint   does   not   itself   decide   to   develop  
same)...”
  “ 5.   RECIPROCAL   RIGHT   OF   FIRST   REFUSAL   IN   RESPECT   OF  
PROPERTIES
       AND   RELATED PROVISIONS
5.1 General
....
5.1.1 Each of Investec and Growthpoint undertakes in favour of the other that  
should any of the companies within their respective Groups wish to place any  
property within the Investec Portfolio of Properties or Growthpoint Portfolio of  
Properties, as the case may be, owned by it in the RSA on the market for sale  
whether pursuant to the receipt of an unsolicited bid from a third party or not,  
then   such   selling   party   ( “Selling   Party”)   shall   advise   the   other   party   ( “the 
Potential   Purchasing   Party” )   thereof   in   writing   as   soon   as   reasonably  
possible after it or such company within its Group has resolved to sell  such  
properties,
.....
5.1.3 If the Potential Purchasing Party is not willing to accept the terms of the  
Sale Notice....the Selling Party and/or any member of its Group shall be entitled  
to dispose of and transfer such property within a period of 180 (one hundred  
and eighty) days following the date on which the parties stopped negotiating in  
respect of such Sale notice is terms of this 5.1.3, to any third party provided  
such sale shall not take place on terms materially more favourable than those  
contained in the Sale Notice, failing which the provisions of this 5 shall apply  
afresh thereto.”

afresh thereto.”
[22]       The   parties   submitted   that   the   Co­operation   Agreement   is   a   temporary  
arrangement   intended   to   facilitate   the   sale   of   the   target   firms   by   Investec   to  
Growthpoint.6  The   Commission   in   its   written   submissions   stated   that   rights   of   first  
6  The merging parties supported this contention by adding that as Investec facilitated the growth  
of   the   business   of   Growthpoint   over   the   past   six   years,   it   was   prudent   from   a   commercial  
perspective to retain their relationship for a limited period as both parties are dependent on the  
services and support which either the one or the other provides, and that it was similarly prudent  
  8

refusal are common in the property market and do not raise any significant competition  
concerns;7 and recommended that the merger be approved without conditions. 
[23]   The Tribunal expressed the view that while  it may be common practice for firms  
in   the   property   market   to   enjoy   rights   of   first   refusal,   the   Co­operation   Agreement  
provided for a renewal of it by mutual agreement between the parties.  On this basis,  
clauses 4 and 5 could be renewed in perpetuity by agreement between the parties, a  
fact that the Commission had not previously considered.  This meant that the rights of  
first refusal could continue beyond the initial four years contemplated in the agreement.  
[24]   In light of above concern the Commission submitted that it would be concerned  
about   a   Co­operation   Agreement   being   renewed   by   mutual   agreement   between   the  
parties.  In its view the competitive impact of an agreement beyond the initial four year  
period would have to be done at that time in future, as market condition changes.  The  
Commission   submitted   that   it   would   want   such   renewal   to   be   notified   to   the  
Commission and to be investigated for competition implications. 
PARTIES’ UNDERTAKINGS
[25]       At   the   end   of   the   hearing   the   parties   submitted   that   they   were   willing   to  
accommodate the Tribunal’s and the Commission’s concerns by effecting amendments  
to   their   agreements.   They   undertook   to  delete   clause   12.1   of   the   Sale   of   Business  
Agreement and delete clause 10.2 of the Co­operation Agreement which provided for  
the renewal of that agreement. 8 
 
[26]   The Tribunal accepted the undertakings offered by the parties. 
CONCLUSION
to introduce certain restrictions to safeguard the investment that Growthpoint has made.
7  The   Commission’s   communications   with   market   participants   revealed   that   there   were   no

objections or concerns raised about the merger or associated agreements by their competitors  
as the merging parties are considered insignificant players in a market characterized by very  
large corporations. 
8  This is evident from letters of 17 October 2007, received by the Tribunal from the merging  
parties’ Attorneys and the Commission.
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[27]   We find that the transaction does not raise any significant public interest issues  
and accordingly approve the merger on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above. 
_______________                                                                   13 November 2007
Y Carrim                                                                                            Date    
U Bhoola and M Holden concurring.
Tribunal Researcher                       :        P S Munyai
For the merging parties                   :       Jowell Glyn & Marais 
                                                                 (Proprietary) Limited
For the Competition Commission    :        M Dasarath and HB Senekal
                                                                 (Mergers & Acquisitions)
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