COMPETITION TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 70/LM/Jul07
In the matter between:
Growthpoint Management Services (Proprietary) Ltd Acquiring Firm
And
Fund Management Business;
Property Administrators Business; and
Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd Target Firms
_______________________________________________________________
Panel : U Bhoola (Presiding Member), Y Carrim (Tribunal
Member), and M Holden (Tribunal Member)
Heard on : 31 August and 17 October, 2007
Decided on : 17 October 2007
Reasons issued on: 13 November 2007
REASONS FOR DECISION
APPROVAL
[1] On 17 October 2007, the Tribunal conditionally approved the merger between
Growthpoint Management Services (Pty) Limited ( “GMS”) and Fund Management
Business; Property Administration Business; and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd ( “the
target firms” ), as follows:
“The merger between the parties in this matter is approved in terms of section 16(2)(b)
of the Act subject to the following conditions:
1. The entire paragraph 12.1 in the Sale of Business Agreement signed by the
merging parties on 20 July 2007 is of no force and effect and shall be deleted
forthwith.
2. Paragraph 10.2 in the Cooperation Agreement concluded between the
merging parties on 20 July 2007 shall be deleted. The duration of the entire
agreement shall be limited to four (4) years and may not be extended or
renewed.
3. The parties shall provide the Tribunal with signed copies of the Sale of
Business and Cooperation Agreements, amended to reflect the above
conditions, within five (5) business days of this order.”
BACKGOUND TO THE APPROVAL
[2] The first hearing for this merger took place on 31 August 2007. In its
recommendations the Commission had recommended that the merger be approved
without conditions. It, however, emerged during the hearing that the proposed merger
is subject to three interrelated agreements, namely the Sale of Business Agreement;
the Property Management Agreement; and the Cooperation Agreement. Of the three
agreements only the Sale of Business Agreement had been filed with the Commission.
The Tribunal ordered the parties to submit copies of the agreements.
[3] On 4 September 2007 the merging parties provided copies of the agreements to
the Commission together with written legal submissions on the implications of the
Agreements. The Commission submitted its legal opinion on the agreements to the
Tribunal on 8 October 2007. On 17 October 2007 a second hearing was held. The
Commission and the merging parties made oral submissions on the implications of the
agreements, an aspect to which we shall revert later.
THE TRANSACTION
agreements, an aspect to which we shall revert later.
THE TRANSACTION
[4] The primary acquiring firm is Growthpoint Management Services (Pty) Limited
(“GMS”), a newly formed subsidiary of Growthpoint Properties Limited (“Growthpoint”).
GMS does not control any firm. The target firms are Fund Management Business;
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Property Administration Business; and Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd. The target firms
are collectively controlled by Investec Property Group ( “IPG”), which in turn is an
indirect subsidiary of Investec Limited ( “Investec”).
[5] In terms of the Sale of Business Agreement Investec Property Group is to sell all
rights, title and interest in the target firms as well as all related activities conducted as a
going concern. As a result of the transaction Growthpoint will acquire control of the
target firms via GMS.
[6] The transaction, as stated in paragraph 2 above, is also subject to three
interrelated agreements, which includes the Sale of Business Agreement and the
Cooperation Agreement. 1
RATIONALE FOR THE TRANSACTION
[7] Growthpoint owns a portfolio of properties, which prior to the merger were
managed by Investec Property Group. According to Growthpoint inhouse property
management is more convenient than outsourced management. Investec Property
Group on the other hand wants to realise a return on its investment on the target
properties. The parties also pointed out that Investec Asset Management holds 12.1%
of Growthpoint’s issued share capital and as result Investec will benefit continuously
from the sale. The parties described the transaction as an arrangement by Growthpoint
to move the target firms inhouse.
THE PARTIES’ ACTIVITIES
[8] Growthpoint owns a diversified portfolio of retail, commercial and industrial
property and derives its income from the rentals it charges from its tenants. The target
firms’ business activities can be grouped under three categories viz,
• Property Fund Management Business (which provides advice and proposals on
acquisitions; developing; and managing the portfolio in order to maximise the
acquisitions; developing; and managing the portfolio in order to maximise the
1 Nothing of substance turned on the Property Management Agreement and as result this
agreement was not considered.
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performance and minimise risks);
• Property Administrators Business (which as property manager is responsible for
the physical management of the property under its control including letting;
lease renewals; facilities management; and rent collection); and
• Buildmain Managers (Pty) Ltd, (which provides maintenance services such as
plumbing; electrical; and general repairs).
THE RELEVANT MARKET
[9] This transaction will affect the listed property loan stock market; the market for the
provision of property fund/asset management services; and the market for the provision
of property management/administration services. Due to the nature of the product
markets involved we consider the geographic market as national.
COMPETITION ANALYSIS
[10] The parties and the Commission held the view that this was a vertical merger and
was unlikely to result in customer foreclosure since the target firms were the sole
providers of property services to Growthpoint.
[11] The Commission had further submitted that no firm will suffer input foreclosure,
except Investec Property Group, since Investec will in future need the services or
businesses it is selling to Growthpoint, as it holds a property portfolio of its own.
Growthpoint, however, undertakes to provide these services to Investec at a fee. In the
unlikely event that Growthpoint refuses to supply Investec with these services, the
Commission further submitted, there are alternative suppliers that Investec can turn to.
As regards fund/asset management services alternative suppliers includes Madison
Property Fund; Resilient Income Property Fund; Acucap Properties Limited; Gensec
Property Services; and Old Mutual Investment Group. As regards property
management services alternative suppliers includes Broll Property Group; Hyprop
Investments; Marriot Property Services; Colliers International; Gensec Property
Services; and City Property Administrators.
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[12] However at the hearing of the matter, the Tribunal expressed its concerns about
relevant provisions of the Sale of Business Agreement and the Cooperation
Agreement.
The Sale of Business Agreement
[13] Section 12.1 of the Sale of Business Agreement, in relevant parts, provided as
follows:
“12 Restraint
21.1 Restraint Against Competition
12.1.1 The Warrantors
Each of the warrantors undertake to the purchaser that, unless otherwise agreed in
writing between them, it shall not, either alone or together with, or as agent for any
person, firm, company or association whatsoever, directly or indirectly –
12.1.1.1. carry on or be entered in, in any way;
12.1.1.2. be employed in; or
12.1.1.3. be engaged in or concerned with,
the creation of any listed property fund or property management business, in
competition with the business or with Growthpoint generally, as the case may be (which
for the avoidance of doubt does not include any property development or listed property
investment management businesses).
12.1.2 Purchaser and Growthpoint
Each of the purchaser and Growthpoint undertake to the warrantors that, unless
otherwise agreed in writing between the parties, it shall not, either alone or together
with, or as agent for any person, firm, company or association whatsoever, directly or
indirectly –
12.1.2.1. carry on or be entered in, in any way;
12.1.2.2. be employed in; or
12.1.2.3. be engaged in or concerned with,
any property development, other than those properties being developed by Growthpoint
at the Effective Date and other than in accordance with the provisions of the Co
Operation Agreement.”
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[14] The Commission took the approach that the Sale of Business Agreement was an
agreement between parties in a vertical relationship and would fall within section 5(1) of
the Act. 2 It analysed the impact of clause 12.1 on this basis and concluded that
the agreement was unlikely to substantially lessen or prevent competition.
[15] However, The Tribunal was concerned that clause 12.1 effectively amounted to
an agreement between the parties in contravention of 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Competition Act.
The Commission had not investigated this possibility.
[16] Section 4(1))(b)(ii) of the Act provides as follows:
“4. Restrictive horizontal practices prohibited
1) An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an
association of firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal
relationship and if
....
(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:
(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers,
territories, or specific types of goods or services.”
[17] In Nedschroef Johannesburg (Pty) Ltd and Teamcor Limited and Others ,3 the
Tribunal held as follows:
“…market division does not require that both firms be competitors prior to
the act of division. If they are potential competitors this will suffice.
Frequently firms will divide a market before they become de facto
competitors precisely to avoid that outcome 4 (our emphasis).
[18] In support of the above conclusion the Tribunal quoted the United States
2 Section 5(1) of the Act prohibits agreements, as defined, between parties in a
vertical relationship if that agreement has the effect of substantially preventing
or lessening competition in a market.
3 Case No: 95/IR/Oct05.
4 Id at para 44.
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Supreme Court decision in Jay Palmer et al v BRG of Georgia, INC et all ,5 where the
Court held,
“Such agreements are anticompetitive regardless of whether the
parties split a market within which both do business or whether
they merely reserve one market for one and another for the other”
[19] At the hearing, the parties were afforded an opportunity to address the Tribunal
on this matter. Mr Sasse on behalf of Growthpoint submitted that the restraint
agreement was a normal commercial agreement and was agreed upon between
Investec and Growthpoint, pursuant to the payment by the latter of a substantial
purchase price. He explained that the nature of the business being bought relied upon
the relationship between the service provider and the customer, in which employees
developed the skills and knowhow to manage such relationships. In order for
Growthpoint to succeed post merger, it necessitated imposing a restraint on Investec
from entering the market and from poaching its employees for a period of 2 (two) years.
[20] The Tribunal was not concerned about the restraint on employees. However in
the Tribunal’s view clause 12.1 was not an ordinary commercial restraint which sought
to limit only the seller from entering the market from which it had exited through a sale
transaction and for which it had been paid a premium. Clause 12.1 in fact restrained
both Investec and Growthpoint from entering into each other’s markets and seemed to
be more in the nature of a market division agreement.
The Cooperation Agreement
[21] At the hearing of the matter the Tribunal panel raised concerns with clauses 4
and 5 of the Cooperation Agreement. Clauses 4 and 5, in relevant parts, provide:
“4. DEVELOPMENT ARRANGEMENT
5 498 U.S. 46, 111, S.CT. 401.
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4.1 Right of First Refusal
4.1.1 The parties agree that Growthpoint grants (and shall procure the
same on behalf of each company within the Growthpoint Group) IPG a
right of first refusal in respect of development opportunities and
requirements of all the properties within the Growthpoint Portfolio of
properties (only to the extent that any such development exceeds R50
000 000 (fifty million rand) in value or if under R50 000 000 (fifty million
rand) in value and Growthpoint does not itself decide to develop
same)...”
“ 5. RECIPROCAL RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL IN RESPECT OF
PROPERTIES
AND RELATED PROVISIONS
5.1 General
....
5.1.1 Each of Investec and Growthpoint undertakes in favour of the other that
should any of the companies within their respective Groups wish to place any
property within the Investec Portfolio of Properties or Growthpoint Portfolio of
Properties, as the case may be, owned by it in the RSA on the market for sale
whether pursuant to the receipt of an unsolicited bid from a third party or not,
then such selling party ( “Selling Party”) shall advise the other party ( “the
Potential Purchasing Party” ) thereof in writing as soon as reasonably
possible after it or such company within its Group has resolved to sell such
properties,
.....
5.1.3 If the Potential Purchasing Party is not willing to accept the terms of the
Sale Notice....the Selling Party and/or any member of its Group shall be entitled
to dispose of and transfer such property within a period of 180 (one hundred
and eighty) days following the date on which the parties stopped negotiating in
respect of such Sale notice is terms of this 5.1.3, to any third party provided
such sale shall not take place on terms materially more favourable than those
contained in the Sale Notice, failing which the provisions of this 5 shall apply
afresh thereto.”
afresh thereto.”
[22] The parties submitted that the Cooperation Agreement is a temporary
arrangement intended to facilitate the sale of the target firms by Investec to
Growthpoint.6 The Commission in its written submissions stated that rights of first
6 The merging parties supported this contention by adding that as Investec facilitated the growth
of the business of Growthpoint over the past six years, it was prudent from a commercial
perspective to retain their relationship for a limited period as both parties are dependent on the
services and support which either the one or the other provides, and that it was similarly prudent
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refusal are common in the property market and do not raise any significant competition
concerns;7 and recommended that the merger be approved without conditions.
[23] The Tribunal expressed the view that while it may be common practice for firms
in the property market to enjoy rights of first refusal, the Cooperation Agreement
provided for a renewal of it by mutual agreement between the parties. On this basis,
clauses 4 and 5 could be renewed in perpetuity by agreement between the parties, a
fact that the Commission had not previously considered. This meant that the rights of
first refusal could continue beyond the initial four years contemplated in the agreement.
[24] In light of above concern the Commission submitted that it would be concerned
about a Cooperation Agreement being renewed by mutual agreement between the
parties. In its view the competitive impact of an agreement beyond the initial four year
period would have to be done at that time in future, as market condition changes. The
Commission submitted that it would want such renewal to be notified to the
Commission and to be investigated for competition implications.
PARTIES’ UNDERTAKINGS
[25] At the end of the hearing the parties submitted that they were willing to
accommodate the Tribunal’s and the Commission’s concerns by effecting amendments
to their agreements. They undertook to delete clause 12.1 of the Sale of Business
Agreement and delete clause 10.2 of the Cooperation Agreement which provided for
the renewal of that agreement. 8
[26] The Tribunal accepted the undertakings offered by the parties.
CONCLUSION
to introduce certain restrictions to safeguard the investment that Growthpoint has made.
7 The Commission’s communications with market participants revealed that there were no
objections or concerns raised about the merger or associated agreements by their competitors
as the merging parties are considered insignificant players in a market characterized by very
large corporations.
8 This is evident from letters of 17 October 2007, received by the Tribunal from the merging
parties’ Attorneys and the Commission.
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[27] We find that the transaction does not raise any significant public interest issues
and accordingly approve the merger on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above.
_______________ 13 November 2007
Y Carrim Date
U Bhoola and M Holden concurring.
Tribunal Researcher : P S Munyai
For the merging parties : Jowell Glyn & Marais
(Proprietary) Limited
For the Competition Commission : M Dasarath and HB Senekal
(Mergers & Acquisitions)
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