Sanlam Life Insurance Limited and Channel Life Limited (94/LM/Sep05) [2006] ZACT 20 (9 March 2006)

70 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger Approval — Sanlam Life Insurance Limited acquiring 52% of Channel Life Limited — The Competition Tribunal approved the merger between Sanlam Life and Channel Life, finding that it would not substantially lessen competition in the long-term insurance market. The parties' combined market shares showed a slight decrease post-merger, and no significant public interest concerns were identified. The Tribunal concluded that the merger would not result in a substantial lessening of competition and approved the transaction unconditionally.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no: 94/LM/Sep05
In The Large Merger Between: 
Sanlam Life Insurance Limited          Acquiring Firm
And
Channel Life Limited                                        Target Firm
Reasons for Decision
Approval
1. On   18   January   2006   the   Competition   Tribunal   issued   a   Merger   Clearance   Certificate  
approving the transaction between Sanlam Life Insurance Limited and Channel Life Limited.  
The reasons for this decision follow. 
The Transaction
2. The parties to the transaction Sanlam Life   Insurance Limited (“Sanlam Life”)   and Channel  
Life Ltd (“Channel Life”). Sanlam Life is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sanlam Ltd,   1 a public  
company listed on the life assurance sector of the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa.  2 
Channel Life’s shareholding is held as follows: Channel Life Holdings (Pty) Ltd – 48.65%, 3 
PSG   Financial   Services   Ltd   –   40.61%   and   Channel   Life   management   and   a   number   of  
members of the public ­ 10.74%.   4
1  According to the parties, Sanlam Ltd is not controlled by any single firm. Details about Sanlam Ltd’s  
varius subsidiaries can be found from page 131­136 of the Merger Record.
2  Sanlam Life controls the following firms: Sanlam Customised Insurance Ltd, Sanlam Home Loans (Pty)  
Ltd, Total Care Strategy Holdings (Pty) Ltd, Sanlam Direct Access (Pty) Ltd, Sanlam Trust Ltd, Encoresa  
(Pty) Ltd and Cambium Capital Joint venture.
3  Channel Life Holdings is jointly controlled by Arch Equity Life Holdings (26%) and PSG Group Limited (74%).
4  Channel Life controls the following companies: Channel Life Equity (Pty) Ltd, Channel Management Services  
(Pty) Ltd, Alfinanz (Pty) Ltd, Kea Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd and Channel Group Limited.

2.1.1. The transaction involves firstly, the acquisition by Sanlam Life of 52% of  
the issued shares in Channel Life. Sanlam Life will then transfer its 55%  
stake   in   Safrican   Insurance   Company   Limited   to   Channel   Life,   in  
consideration for the issue to Sanlam Life of a further 8 million shares in  
Channel   Life   (constituting   approximately   2.8%   of   the   issued   share  
capital).   Post   merger   Sanlam   Life   will   own   and   control   approximately  
54.8% of the issued share capital of Channel Life. Although Channel Life  
will   own   and   control   55%   of   the   issued   share   capital   of   Safrican,  
ultimately   Sanlam   Life   will   control   Safrican   through   its   majority  
shareholding in Channel Life. Channel Life Holding and PSG will retain a  
non­controlling minority shareholding interest in Channel Life.
3. According to the parties, Sanlam Life wishes to harness the potential that Channel Life’s  
business has to generate good results in areas whether Sanlam Life is under­performing,  
namely new business growth in the entry­level market segment.
Impact on Competition
4. Both Sanlam Life and Channel Life are registered long­term insurers and offer individual and  
group insurance products.   While the Commission did not conclude on a relevant product  
market, it did base its assessment on both a narrow market (individual and group based  
products   which   may   be   further   segmented   into   individual   investment   and   insurance  
products, and lower income and middle and higher income segments) and a broader long­
term insurance product market. The markets were geographically defined as national.
5. The   Commission   found   that   from   a   narrow   or   broad   market   perspective,   Sanlam   Life’s  
market   share   does   not   increase   significantly   and   that   no   significant   changes   in   the  
concentration levels occur. The Commission also found that in the short­term, Sanlam Life

concentration levels occur. The Commission also found that in the short­term, Sanlam Life  
will compete with larger established players like Metropolitan Life, Liberty Active, Hollard Life  
Assurance   and   Clientele   Life   and   that   within   the   middle   to   long­term,   entry   will   become  
easier and more players will attempt to compete in the market. Furthermore, greater product  
innovation would result in increased competition. 
6. Although we agreed with the Commission’s conclusion, we were concerned that the market  
shares   submitted   by   the   merging   parties   and   on   which   the   Commission   based   its  
assessment, were outdated (July to December 2004). During the hearing held on the 18  
January 2006, the Tribunal requested the merging parties to provide it with more updated  
data. The merging parties subsequently submitted market shares for individual and group  
products for the period January 2005 to June 2005. 5 
7. The market shares for individual products based on total individual premiums received were:
Firm Market Share %
5  Correspondence with Tribunal dated 14 February 2006.
2

1 July 2004 to 
31 December 2004
1 January 2005 to 30 June  
2005
Sanlam Life 20 18
Safrican 0 0
Channel Life 1 0
African Life 2 2
Combined 22 20
Others 78 80
Total 100 100
Source: Life Office’s Association of South Africa
8. The market shares for group products based on total group premiums received were:
Firm Market Share %
1 July 2004 to 
31 December 2004
1 January 2005 to 30 June  
2005
Sanlam Life 11 9
Safrican 0 0
Channel Life 1 0
African Life 2 0
Combined 14 10
Others 86 90
Total 100 100
Source: Life Office’s Association of South Africa
9. The updated data reveals that the combined market shares of the merging parties in 2005  
decreases by 2% for individual products and by 4% for group products. Furthermore the  
market share accretion post merger is relatively small, namely 2% for individual products  
and 1% for group products.
10. For   these   reasons,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   merger   will   not   result   in   a   substantial  
lessening of competition and it is not necessary for us to make a definitive finding on the  
relevant markets.
Conclusion
11. We have no other concerns and are satisfied that there are no significant public interest  
issues, which arise, and we accordingly approve this transaction unconditionally. 
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9 March 2006
Y Carrim                          Date
Concurring:  N Manoim and T Orleyn
For the merging parties: J Oosthuizen (Sonnenburg Hoffmann Galombik)
For the Commission: L Lamola and S Nunkoo (Mergers and Acquisitions)
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