ApexHi Properties Ltd and Sasol Pension Fund (89/LM/Sep05) [2005] ZACT 85 (28 November 2005)

55 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger — Approval of merger between ApexHi Properties Ltd and Sasol Pension Fund — ApexHi acquiring Surrey Place property from Sasol — ApexHi's market share in Grade A Offices in Ferndale Node increasing from 2.4% to 7.2% post-transaction — Competition Commission finding no competition concerns due to low combined market share — No public interest issues arising from the merger — Merger approved by Competition Tribunal.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
       Case no.: 89/LM/Sep05  
In the large merger between: 
ApexHi Properties Ltd 
and 
Sasol Pension Fund
________________________________________________________________
Reasons
________________________________________________________________
Introduction
1. On   26   October   2005   the   Competition   Tribunal   approved   the   merger  
between  Apexhi Properties Ltd and Sasol Pension Fund. The reasons for  
this decision follow.
The transaction
2. The   transaction   involves   the   acquisition   by   ApexHi   Properties   Ltd  
(”ApexHi”)   of   the   Surrey   Place   Property   (“Surrey   Place”)   from   Sasol  
Pension Fund (“Sasol”). 
3. Surrey place is a rentable office property situated in the Ferndale Node in  
Gauteng.
4. ApexHi is a company listed on the JSE Stock Exchange and is a variable  
rate property loan stock company. No single firm controls ApexHi and its  
largest stakeholders are:
• Redefine Income Fund 10%
• Stanlib   7%

• Marriot Property Fund 13%
Rationale of the transaction
5. The acquisition presents ApexHi with an opportunity to grow its assets and  
earnings while Sasol wants to sell the asset because it wishes to improve  
the   risk   profile   of   its   investments   made   on   behalf   of   its   Pension   Fund  
beneficiaries. 
Impact on competition
6. The relevant market is defined as Grade A Offices in the Ferndale Node.  
Within this market ApexHi has approximately 2.4% market share, which  
will increase to 7.2% post the transaction. 
7. The Competition Commission is of the view that no competition concerns  
arise from the transaction since the combined market share of the merged  
entity in the Ferndale Node would be low. We agree with this conclusion.
Public interest
8. No public interest issues arise from the merger.  
    
   
____________ 28 November 2005
N Manoim Date
Concurring:  D Lewis, Y Carrim
For the merging parties: Ms Varni Chetty of Edward Nathan 
2

For the Commission:  Geffrey Mudzanani
3