Community Investment Ventures Holdings (Pty) Ltd / Community Investment Ventures (Pty) Ltd and Community Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd / CIE Group (Pty) Ltd (23/LM/Mar05) [2005] ZACT 43 (23 June 2005)

70 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Merger Approval — Community Investment Ventures Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Community Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd — The Competition Tribunal approved the merger between Community Investment Ventures Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Community Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd, which involved the acquisition of various telecommunications and ICT-related entities. The Tribunal found that the merger would not substantially lessen competition in the relevant markets, despite identified overlaps, due to low barriers to entry and the presence of countervailing buyer power. Additionally, no significant public interest concerns were raised, leading to the unconditional approval of the transaction.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no: 23/LM/Mar05
In The Large Merger Between: 
Community Investment Ventures Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Community Investment Ventures (Pty) Ltd                    Acquiring Firms
And
Community Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd
CIE Group (Pty) Ltd              Target Firms
Reasons for Decision
Approval
1. On 16 May 2005, the Competition Tribunal issued a Merger Clearance Certificate approving  
the  transaction  between   Community  Investment  Ventures  Holdings   (Pty)  Ltd  /Community  
Investment Ventures (Pty) Ltd and Community Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd / CIE Group  
(Pty) Ltd. The reasons for this decision follow. 
The Transaction
The Parties 
2. The parties to the transaction are Community Investment Ventures Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“CIV­
Holdings), Community Investment Ventures (Pty) Ltd (“CIV”), Community Investment  
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“CIH”), CIE Group (Pty) Ltd (“CIE”). 1
Structure of the transaction
3. CIV­Holdings and its subsidiary CIV are two special purpose vehicles established for the  
purpose of the transaction. The transaction constitutes two indivisible parts. Firstly, CIV will  
acquire the following investments from CIE and CIH: 
3.1. Tofo Public Cellular Payphones (Pty) Ltd (“Tofo”);
3.2. Cosource (Pty) Ltd; 
3.3. CIE Telecoms and its subsidiaries viz. 
3.3.1.MCT Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd and its subsidiaries Dartcom (Pty) Ltd and  
Mobile Data Telecommunication (Pty) Ltd;
3.3.2.CZ   Electronics   (Pty)   Ltd   and   its   subsidiary   CZ   Electronics   Manufacturing  
1  For more detail on the shareholding of the parties, see Page 6­9 of the Commission’s Report.

CIE 
Management
(“CZE Manufacturing”).
4. The   second   part   of   the   transaction   involves   CIV­Holdings   being   acquired   and   jointly  
controlled by CIE, CIH, RockIT Advisors (Pty) Ltd and Goldex 254 (Pty) Ltd. 2 
5. ABSA Bank Ltd holds a number of preference shares in CIV, CIV­Holdings’ wholly owned  
subsidiary.   In   terms   of   the   CIV­Holdings   Shareholders   Agreement,   ABSA   and   the  
shareholders of CIV­Holdings are afforded certain minority protections, the result of which is  
that ABSA, CIE, CIH, RockIT Advisors and Goldex will, post merger, exercise joint control  
over CIV and the investments transferred to it by CIE and CIH. In addition, CIV will sign a  
management   agreement   with   RockIT   Advisors   in   terms   of   which   RockIT   Advisors   will  
manage the business of CIV. The post merger the structure of the merged entity will be as  
follows:
2  See page 790 of the record.
CIERockit 
Advisors Goldex
100% Crossroads
CIH
100%
Pref. 
Shares
Inkonkoni 
Investment 
Mantokozo 
Investment 
Merino 
Investment
30%
Ordinary 
Shares
70%
Ordinary 
Shares
Malesela Power &  
Energy
CIV­Holdings
CIV
ABSA
MTSM­Tec
MPP&EMT&D
ConlogNu­Lec
Malesela 
Telecommunications
MCT Telecoms CZ Electronics
MDT
CIE TelecomsCosourceTofo
Dartcom CZE Manufacturing
Jasco Sukuma
TelescienceWebb 
Industries
2

Rationale for the transaction
6. According to the parties, CIE and CIH have entered into the transaction in order to comply  
with   BEE   requirements.   The   parties   anticipate   the   transaction   to   provide   a   platform   for  
becoming more meaningful participants in the ICT sector. 3
The Parties’ Activities
7. CIV­Holdings,   CIV   and   Goldex   are   newly   established   companies   and   therefore   did   not  
conduct any activities pre­merger. CIE is an investment holding company and is structured  
across two main strategic portfolios, being telecommunications and information technology  
(IT) applications. The telecommunications portfolio is operated through CIE Telecoms and  
its subsidiaries, CZ Electronics, MCT Telecoms and Dartcom, while the IT applications are  
conducted   through   Cosource,   Tofo   and   NetraLink   (Pty)   Ltd. 4  As   will   shown   below,   only  
Dartcom is relevant for our analysis. Dartcom is a specialist assembler and distributor of  
fibre optic communications components, radio frequency sub­systems and accessories.
8. CIH is an investment holding company and comprises of three main portfolios viz. 
8.1. Community Logistics & Transport, 
8.2.  Malesela Power & Energy and 
8.3. Malesela Telecommunications. 
9. The Community Logistics and Transport portfolio comprises Crossroads Distribution (Pty)  
Ltd, a logistics company. A number of firms constitute the Malesela Power & Energy and the  
Malesela   Telecommunications  portfolios  of  CIH,  however  only Malesela   Taihan  Electrical  
Cable (“M­Tec”) and Jasco Electronics Holding Ltd (“Jasco”) are relevant for our purposes. 5
10. M­Tec manufactures power and telecommunications cables as well as non­ferrous power  
cables,   overhead   conductors,   bare   copper  wire,   strip   products  and   optical   cables.   Jasco  
operates via three divisions viz. telecommunications, security and manufacturing. It consists

operates via three divisions viz. telecommunications, security and manufacturing. It consists  
of   two   main   businesses   namely   Telesciences   and   Webb   Industries.     However,   Webb  
Industries   is   the   only   firm   relevant   for   the   purpose   of   the   analysis.   Webb   Industries   is  
involved   in   the   design,   manufacturing   and   supply   of   telecoms   products,   two­way   radio  
markets,  GSM  markets,  other  wireless  access product  markets  and the establishment   of  
communication hi­sites throughout South Africa.
3  Page 789 of the record.
4  NetraLink is a subsidiary of CIE Telecoms and will remain with CIE post merger.
5  See the page 8­11 of the Commission's Report for more detail on the subsidiaries of CIH.
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11. The Commission found that the activities of CIH’s two subsidiaries viz. M­Tec and Jasco,  
overlapped with the activities of CIE’s subsidiary, Dartcom. 
Impact on competition
Horizontal analysis
12. The Commission found overlaps in the following markets:
12.1. Market for Wireless Connectivity
12.2. Market for Fibre Optic Cables
12.3. Market for the manufacturing of Masts
13. The Commission’s Report provided the following market shares for the above markets:
Market shares in the national market for wireless connectivity
Players Market share
Dartcom 20%
Andrew Corporation 20%
Siemens 11%
Ericsson 11%
Webb Industries 5%
RFS 5%
Comscope 5%
NK Cables 5%
Cisco 5%
Alvarion 5%
Alcatel 5%
Leonie 2%
Rosenburger 1%
Total 100%
Source: the merging parties
Market shares in the international market for fibre optic cables
Players Market share
M­Tec 55%
Aberdare 19%
ATC 17%
Perelli 2%
Samsung 2%
Tank Industries 2%
Dynamic Cables 2%
Dartcom 1%
Total 100%
Source: the merging parties
Market shares in the international market for infrastructure hardware
4

Players Market share
Siemens 51%
Ericsson 10%
Alcatel 10%
Plessey 9%
Andrew Satcom 6%
Webb Industries 3.5%
Kathrein 2.6%
Radio Frequency Systems 2.6%
Sectional Poles 2.6%
Dorbyl 2.6%
Dartcom 0.2%
Total 100%
Source: the merging parties
14. The   post   merger   market   shares   in   the   above   markets   will   be   25%,   56%   and   3.7%  
respectively.
15. The Commission was of the view that even though in the first two markets above, the post  
merger   market   shares   of   the   merging   firms   would   be   high,   no   significant   competition  
concerns would likely arise due to the following factors:
15.1. Barriers   to   entry   are   low   with   room   for   new   entrants   to   expand   their   markets.  
Products are easily transportable, compatible and interoperable across brands
15.2. The geographic  markets are international and even though exclusive agreements  
between suppliers and value­added distributors (VAD) occur, VAD’s may enter into  
as many exclusive agreements as they like. Furthermore, VAD’s commonly second  
source6 and suppliers are allowed to terminate exclusive arrangements on relatively  
short notice. 
15.3. Since customers are brand­driven and VAD’s source as many brands as possible,  
customers   liberally   negotiate   preferred   terms   and   conditions,   settlements   and  
discounts.   Accordingly,   the   Commission   is   of   the   view   that   customers   exercise  
countervailing power.
16. In the market for the supply of masts, the Commission found that the increment in Webb  
Industries market share will be less than 1% and is therefore insignificant. 
17. Without making a definitive finding on the relevant markets, we agree with the Commission  
that the horizontal overlaps do not raise any competition concerns.
Vertical analysis
18. The Commission also identified two sets of vertical relationships, which prevailed, viz. 
18.1. In the market for the supply of wireless connectivity, Dartcom and Webb Industries  
source from each other;

source from each other;
18.2. In the market for fibre optic cables, M­Tec is a manufacturer of fibre optic cables and  
6  According to the Commission, this is a common practice arrangement by which VAD’s arrange for an  
alternative source should the original supplier not perform or deliver on time.
5

Dartcom is a reseller (Value added distributor).
19. The   Commission,   however,   was   of   the   view   that   the   vertical   relationships   raised   no  
concerns. The Commission found that Dartcom and Webb Industries source less than 1% of  
their total supplies of wireless cables and connectors from each other. The low percentage  
therefore   negates   sound   rationale   for   foreclosure.   In   the   market   for   fibre   optic   cables,  
Dartcom has approximately 1% of the local market and therefore is not significant enough to  
result   in   foreclosure.   The   Commission   concluded   that   the   vertical   relationships   would  
unlikely prevent or lessen competition in a significant way. We agree with the Commission’s  
analysis.
Public Interest
20. According to the parties, the transaction will have no adverse effect on employment due to  
the fact that the businesses will continue to operate post merger as they did before. The  
parties submit that the merger increases the ability of small businesses or firms controlled  
by or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to become competitive. 7
Conclusion
21. Having   regard   to   the   above,   we   conclude   that   the   merger   will   not   lead   to   a   substantial  
lessening of competition and there are no significant public interest concerns.   Accordingly,  
we  agree with  the  Commission’s   recommendation  that   the  transaction  be unconditionally  
approved.
23June 2005
D Lewis   Date
Concurring: N Manoim and Y Carrim
For the merging parties: J Katz (Webber Wentzel Bowens)
For the Commission:  O Strydom (Mergers and Acquisitions)
7  Section 12A (3)(c).
6