COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 84/LM/Oct04
In the matter concerning the large merger between:
Momentum Group Ltd
and
Bonheur 94 General Trading (Pty) Ltd
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Reasons
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Introduction
1. On 29 April 2005 the Competition Tribunal approved the merger between
Momentum Group Ltd and Bonheur 94 General Trading (Pty) Ltd,
provided that the merger transaction is the transaction as reflected in the
following two agreements:
1. The Sale of Business Agreement between Medscheme Holdings
(Pty) Ltd (of the first part, as seller) and Sovereign Health (Pty) Ltd
(of the second part, as purchaser) dated 25 April 2005.
2. The Sale of Shares Agreement between Medscheme Holdings
(Pty) Ltd (of the first part, as seller) and Southern Life Healthcare
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (or its nominee) (of the second part, as
purchaser) in relation to ordinary shares in the issued share capital
of Sovereign Health (Pty) Ltd dated 25 April 2005.
2. The reasons are set out below.
Background
3. The transaction, which the Competition Commission originally filed with
the Tribunal on 14 January 2005, involved the establishment of a joint
venture between Momentum Group Ltd (“Momentum”) and Medscheme
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“Medscheme”) through the sale of 50% of the issued
share capital by Medscheme to Momentum of the business of Sovereign
Health (Pty) Ltd (“Sovereign”), a division of Medscheme. To achieve this
Medscheme intended to transfer its Sovereign business to Bonheur, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Medscheme. Then, in terms of a Sale of
Shares agreement, Momentum would purchase 50% of the issued shares
in Bonheur from Momentum.
4. The First Rand Group Ltd controls both the acquiring firm Momentum and
Discovery Health. Discovery and Medsheme are the two largest
administrators of medical schemes, with shares of 22% and 17%
respectively. The retention of rivalry between these two administrators is
an important concern.
5. During the hearing on 9 February 2005 the Tribunal raised certain
concerns that the structural links between Momentum and Discovery on
the one hand and Medscheme on the other, as a competitor and joint
venture partner, could facilitate the sharing of competitive sensitive
information between them. In light of this the Tribunal requested the
parties to submit a draft condition that would cure its concerns.
6. The parties, in response to the Tribunal’s request, submitted the following
draft condition on 14 February 2005:
For so long as a firm in the Medscheme Group (i.e. Medscheme
Ltd or any firm that is controlled by Medscheme Ltd) and a firm in
the FirstRand Group (i.e. FirstRand Group Ltd or any firm that is
controlled by FirstRand Group Ltd) own shares in Sovereign Health
(Pty) Ltd (“Sovereign Health”), no person that is a director or an
(Pty) Ltd (“Sovereign Health”), no person that is a director or an
employee of any firm in the Medscheme group or the FirstRand
group shall be appointed to the Board of Directors of Sovereign
Health.
7. The Competition Commission, in commenting on the above proposal,
indicated that it remained concerned that the proposed condition would
delay rather than eliminate the possible sharing of information between
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the independent directors on the one hand and the parties’ shareholders
on the other hand. It therefore proposed, as an alternative, the formation
of a “blind trust” whereby Momentum opens an account with an
independent investment firm, which then holds and manages Momentum’s
interests in Sovereign on behalf of Momentum. Structurally, Momentum
would then operate separately from Sovereign and/or Medscheme, which
in the Commission’s view would address the postmerger concern.
8. The Tribunal requested the parties to comment on the Commission’s
proposal. On 22 March 2005 the merging parties informed the Tribunal
that they had agreed to restructure the transaction. In terms of the new
proposal Momentum will acquire all the issued shares in Bonheur and not
only 50% as was originally intended. Momentum, through its subsidiary
Southern Life, will thus acquire 100% control over the business of
Sovereign Health. Thus Medscheme will post merger have no further
interest in Sovereign Health.
9. The concern that the joint venture could serve as an information sharing
vehicle between competitors is thus eliminated. The Commission was
satisfied that the change to the transaction would eliminate its concerns. It
was also satisfied that the transaction, although altered, did not need to be
renotified.
Effect of the transaction on competition
10. Sovereign Health is an administrator of medical aid schemes. 1 Its services
entail the managing of financial aspects of medical aid schemes, including
contribution collection and adjudication and payments of claims. It also
attends to queries by members and medical service providers and handles
other aspects related to fund management.
11. Momentum, the acquiring firm, and its sister company Discovery Health
both provide healthcare funding products. Momentum also markets and
both provide healthcare funding products. Momentum also markets and
distributes a medical aid scheme called Pulz, for which Sovereign acts as
the administrator. Discovery Health is the administrator of its own
Discovery medical aid scheme, which accounts for 95% of its business,
external medical schemes account for the remaining 5%. 2
1 It provides services to the following open schemes: National Medical Plan, Topmed Medical Scheme,
Meridian Health, Pulz and part of Medshield Medical Scheme and to the following closed schemes: Anglo
American Corporation Medical Scheme, Bepmed, Midmed, Nampak Group Medical Society, Netcare
Medical Scheme, PG Group Medical Scheme and SA Breweries Medical Aid Society.
2 The only open scheme that Discovery manages is its own Discovery Medical scheme. The other schemes
are all closed schemes, namely Quantum Medical Aid Society, Medisense Medical Scheme, Anglovaal
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12. Services overlap in only one product market, the market for medical aid
administration, in which both Discovery Health and Sovereign compete
nationaly.
13. Discovery’s medical aid scheme is by far its administrative arm’s largest
customer. Based on the historical relationship between the administrator
and the medical aid scheme, the Commission is of the view that chances
are slight that Discovery’s trustees would switch administrators. 3 The
Commission argues that 95% of Discovery’s 22% market share is
uncontested, with customers highly unlikely to switch when the SSNIP test
is applied, leaving Discovery with only 1% market share in the contestable
part of the market. 4 Whether this approach is correct is not something we
need to decide.
14. Sovereign Health’s market share is 5%. Post–merger the combined
entity’s market share in the Momentum stable would thus be 6%.
15. However, should one include Discovery’s market share of 22%, the First
Rand Group’s market share would be 28%. Its closest rivals are
Medscheme with a market share of 17% and Metropolitan Health with 9%.
16. The merging parties have argued that Momentum and Discovery are
managed separately and would have a competitive relationship albeit both
are ultimately controlled by First Rand. Although access to their internal
strategy documentation bears this out this arrangement represents
FirstRand’s present business choice. It must not be forgotten that
Discovery was once owned by First Rand via Momentum. If First Rand
has a change of mind, it could prefer cooperation between its health care
interests in the future. We must therefore assess the merger on the
assumption that Momentum and Discovery belong to a single economic
entity.
17. In assessing the strength of competition in the market we found that there
entity.
17. In assessing the strength of competition in the market we found that there
are more than 17 medical scheme administrators that compete in this
market, with market shares ranging from 1% to 9%.
Group Medical Scheme, Retail Medical Scheme, Edcon Medical Aid Scheme, CSIR Medical Scheme, IBM
(SA) Medical Aid Society and Southern Sun Medical Aid Scheme.
3 According to the parties trustees of medical aid schemes ultimately decide on the preferred administrator.
In terms of the Medical Schemes Act, medical schemes may change administration and managed care
providers on 6 months notice.
4 The SSNIP test, also called the hypothetical monopolist test, tests the effect that a small but significant
nontransitory increase in price, usually between 510%, would have on customers.
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18. Secondly, strong countervailing power exists. The trustees of a medical
scheme choose the preferred administrator. In terms of the Medical
Schemes Act, a medical scheme may, on giving 6 months notice, replace
its administrator with another. Since trustees of medical schemes are
aware of the Registrar of Medical Schemes’ drive to reduce the non
healthcare expenditure of medical schemes they use this as leverage in
negotiating fees with medical scheme administrators. 5 However, in the
event of excessive prices, medical schemes could always selfadminister.
19. Finally, barriers to entry are relatively low. Due to the minimal regulation
that applies to administrators such as accreditation in terms of the Medical
Schemes Act and relatively low sunk costs entry is relatively easy. During
the past 3 years eight new competitors entered the market. 6
20. In light of the above we conclude that the merger is unlikely to
substantially prevent or lessen competition.
Public interest issues
21. According to the parties the merger would not result in any retrenchments,
since the business of Sovereign will continue to operate as a separate
discreet business.
____________________ 2 June 2005
N Manoim Date
Concurring: D Lewis and Y Carrim
5 According to the parties, the Council’s current guidelines provide that administration costs should not
exceed 10% of member contributions and there is a great deal of pressure on administrators to bring their
fees in line with these guidelines.
6 See page 569 of the record.
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