Clidet 526 (Pty) Ltd and Pamodzi Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd (10/LM/Mar05) [2005] ZACT 35 (31 May 2005)

70 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Merger Approval — Proposed merger between Clidet 526 (Pty) Ltd and Pamodzi Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd — Clidet, a special purpose vehicle, to acquire PIH, an investment holding company — Merger evaluated for competition concerns in the short-term insurance market — Alacrity Financial Services Ltd and FirstLink Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd, both with minimal market shares, involved — Tribunal found no substantial prevention or lessening of competition — Merger approved without public interest concerns or anticipated job losses.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
                                                                                                Case No.: 10/LM/Mar05
In the large merger between:
Clidet 526 (Pty) Ltd                                                                   Primary Acquiring Firm
and
Pamodzi Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd                                      Primary Target Firm
                                                  REASONS FOR DECISION
Approval
[1]     The Competition Tribunal issued a Merger Clearance Certificate on 23 March  
2005 approving the proposed merger between the abovementioned parties in terms  
of section 16(2)(a). The reasons for the approval of the merger appear below.
The Parties
[2]  The primary acquiring firm is Clidet No. 526 (Pty) Ltd (“Clidet”), a special purpose  
vehicle   whose   shareholders   are   RMB   Ventures   (Pty)   Ltd   (“RMB   Ventures”) 1  and  
certain   executives   (“the   executives”)   of   Pamodzi   Investment   Holdings   (Pty)   Ltd  
(“PIH”). RMB Ventures and the executives hold 40% and 60% of Clidet respectively. 2 
[3]     The   primary  target   firm  is   PIH,   an  investment   holding   company   focussing   on  
telecommunications,   information   technology,   financial   services,   food   and   related  
industries.3  PIH   controls   Alacrity   Financial   Services   Ltd   (“Alacrity”)   and   FoodCorp  
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“Foodcorp Holdings”). 4  
The transaction
1  RMB Ventures is 85% held by RMB Private Equity (Pty) Ltd (RMB Private Equity”) and as to 15%  
by FirstRand Ltd’s employees. 94% of the shares in RMB Private Equity are held by FirstRand Bank  
Holdings Ltd, which is 100% owned by FistRand Ltd. The merging parties submitted that from the  
FirstRand stable only the activities of FirstLink Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd (“FirstLink”) was relevant  
for competition analysis. 
2  The executives are Sifiso A. Msibi (“Msibi”); Ndaba A. Ntsele (“Ntsele”); and Jacobus J. du Plooy

(“du Plooy”) who own 20% each in Clidet. See pages 31­32 of the record. 
3  Certain   PIH   Executives   and   historically   disadvantaged   individuals   own   75.80%   shares   of   PIH.  
15.68% is owned by the Pambi Trust; 4.80% is held by the PIH Share Trust and 3.80% by the Pamodzi  
Trust.  See page 38 of the record. 
4  Pamodzi Ukuvikela Investments Ltd (“PUI”), a wholly owned subsidiary of PIH, holds 50% of the  
issued share capital of Alacrity. Foodcorp Holdings holds 100% of the shares in Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd  
(“Foodcorp”). See page 26 of the record as well as page 3 of the Commission report.

[4]   The proposed transaction entails the acquisition of PIH by RMB Ventures and  
certain executives of PIH (through Clidet, a special purpose vehicle). The investment  
acquired in PIH consists of the shares and claims in PIH and one ordinary share in  
the share capital of Shady Grove Investments (Pty) Ltd (“Shady Grove”), a vehicle
through   which   the   Pambi   Trust   holds   its   shares   in   PIH. 5  Post­merger,   Clidet   and  
Pambi Trust will own 31% and 8% respectively in PIH whilst 69% would remain in the  
hands of a vast array of individuals. 6 
[5]     The   merging   parties   consider   this   deal   as   a   greater   opportunity   for   black  
economic empowerment, because the beneficiaries of the Pambi Trust, who are a  
broad based historically disadvantaged persons (“HDP’s”) (group of 57 individuals),  
would remain with fully paid shares in PIH, thus consolidating the control of HDP’s in  
PIH.7 
Activities of the parties
[6]    Clidet   has been created mainly for this acquisition.   Alacrity   is involved in the  
brokerage   of   short­term   insurance   products.   FirstLink   is   an   insurance   company  
which   specialises   in   the   brokerage   of   short­term   insurance   products.   PIH  is   an  
investment holding company with interests in a variety of sectors.  Foodcorp is active  
in the production, marketing and distribution of foods.  
Competition Evaluation 
[7]     The   merger   does   not   give   rise   to   any   competition   concerns.   The   relevant  
companies   for   our   analysis   are   Alacrity   and   FirstLink.   Alacrity   and   FirstLink   are  
involved in the brokerage of short­term insurance products throughout South Africa.  
The market share figures provided to us by the merging parties revealed that Alacrity  
and FirstLink enjoy less than 3% and 5% respectively in the short­term insurance  
brokering market. Post­merger, they will enjoy market shares not in excess of 8%, a ­

brokering market. Post­merger, they will enjoy market shares not in excess of 8%, a ­  
relatively   small   share.   There   appear   to   be   a   number   of   major   competitors   with  
substantial market shares in the relevant market such as Alexander Forbes (22%),  
Glenrand   MIB   (14%),   ABSA   Brokers   (6%)   and   Standard   Bank   Insurance   Brokers  
(8%). The merger appears not to raise any vertical integrated concerns whatsoever. 
[8]   The transaction did not raise any public  interest concerns. In addition,  no job  
losses were anticipated post­merger.
Conclusion 
[9]     In   the   Tribunal’s   view,   the   transaction   will   not   prevent   or   lessen   competition  
substantially.  
5  For a detailed exposition of the steps involved in this acquisition, refer to page 42 of the record and  
page 4 of the Commission’s report.
6  In   his   testimony   to   the   Tribunal,   Mr   Msibi   pointed   out   that   there   would   not   be   a   controlling  
shareholder post­merger, but the shareholders’ agreement requires 75% of shareholders to agree on  
acquisitions   and/or   disposals.   He   further   testified   that   RMB   would   control   PIH   as   long   as   the  
preference shares remain in place. See Mr Msibi’s testimony, pages 2­4 of the transcript of 23 March  
2005. See also, page 432 of the record.
7  The merging parties pointed out that the shares to be held by the Pambi Trust would, post­merger, be  
unencumbered as opposed to the pre­transaction status where the Pambi Trust stands to lose its shares  
as it cannot meet its obligations to Advisory Services Ltd (“AMB”).
2

_____________                                                                                         31 May 2005
Yasmin Carrim                                                                                               Date
Concurring:  David Lewis and Norman Manoim
For the merging parties:   Adv.   Horace   Shozi   instructed   by   Mahlangu   Nkomo  
Mabandla Ratshimbilani Attorneys.  
For the Commission:  Hardin Ratshisusu  (Mergers & Acquisitions Division)  
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