Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (30/LM/May05) [2005] ZACT 30 (20 May 2005)

70 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger Approval — Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd — The Competition Tribunal approved the merger between Standard Bank and Safika, where Standard Bank will acquire 20% of Safika's issued share capital and joint control over its operations. The merger was evaluated for its impact on competition in the financial services sector, particularly in asset financing and private equity. The Tribunal concluded that the merger would not substantially lessen or prevent competition and identified no public interest concerns that would affect the approval.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
     Case No: 30/LM/May05
In the large merger between: 
The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited 
and
Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Reasons for Decision
________________________________________________________________
APPROVAL
On 16 May 2005 the Competition Tribunal issued a Merger Clearance Certificate  
approving   the   merger   between  the   Standard   Bank  of  South   Africa  Limited   and  
Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd in terms of section 16(2)(a). The reasons for the approval  
of the merger appear below.
The Parties
1. The   acquiring   firm   is   the   Standard   Bank   of   South   Africa   Ltd   (“Standard  
Bank”). It is part of the Standard Bank Group Limited, a public company  
listed on the JSE.
2. The   primary   target   firm   is   Safika   Holdings   (Pty)   Ltd   (“Safika”),   a   black­
owned   investment   holding   company.   It   has   a   number   of   subsidiaries  
engaged in financial and non­financial services.   Those that need concern  
us are the following that are engaged in the business of providing financial  
services: 
a. Safika Asset Finance (Pty) Ltd – provides asset financing solutions  
for office and IT equipment.
b. Quantum   Leap   Investments   740   (Pty)   Ltd   –   Safika   has   a   51%  
interest in this firm, which in turn has a 25% interest in Stanlib.  The

other   shareholders   of   Stanlib   are   Standard   Bank   and   Liberty   Life.  
Stanlib provides asset management services.
c. Andisa   Consortium   (Pty)   Ltd   –   Safika   has   a   29%   interest   here.  
Andisa   provides   financial   services   which   range   from   corporate  
finance to treasure to project finance to private equity.
d. Safika   Resources   (Pty)   Ltd   –   Its   financial   services   relate   to   the  
Natural Resources Empowerment Fund through which Safika raises  
third   party   capital   for   equity   related   investments   in   the   natural  
resources sector. 
e. Safika Investments (Pty) Ltd – A wholly­owned Safika subsidiary, this  
is   a   private   investment   company   involved   in   private   equity  
investments.
f. Tandem   Capital   (Pty)   Ltd   –   A   broad­based   investment   company,  
controlled   by   Safika,   RMB   Corvest   and   a   BEE   Trust.   The   parties  
describe it as an independent fund 1.
The Merger Transaction
3. Standard Bank will effectively acquire 20% of the issued share capital of  
Safika.   It   will   also   acquire   certain   rights   in   terms   of   the   shareholders’  
agreement, including the right to appoint a Director to the Board and the  
right to veto certain of Safika’s decisions, including the annual strategic plan  
and   annual   budget.     In   consequence,   Standard   Bank   will   be   able   to  
“materially influence” the policy of Safika, to trigger the change of control as  
required by section 12(2)(g) of the Act. Standard Bank is therefore acquiring  
joint control over Safika.
4. Post­merger, the only change to the pre­merger structure is that Standard  
Bank will have an interest in Safika, being represented by one director on  
the Board.
Rationale for the Transaction 
 5. The   transaction   will   facilitate   Standard   Bank   to   enter   into  
various BEE transactions, insofar as Safika is an empowered firm.

various BEE transactions, insofar as Safika is an empowered firm. 
1  Independent funds are explained more fully below.  Tandem Capital is an investment vehicle, owned 60%  
by a broad based trust, 30% by RMB Corvest and 10% by Safika Holdings. D uring the hearing a concern was  
raised about Standard Bank having representation on this board but the parties assured the Tribunal that this  
would not be the case. Safika would continue to have an operational representative on the Board of Tandem  
Capital.

The relevant product market
6. Both parties are engaged in the financial services sector. The  
product overlaps occur in various types of financial services. The only  
areas   of   overlap   which   are   relevant   for   this   merger   are   the   asset  
financing (office and IT equipment) and private equity. 
Asset Financing
7. The   Commission   evaluated  the   market  for  the   financing  of  office   and   IT  
equipment throughout South Africa. Standard Bank  finances a wide range  
of   new   and   used   moveable   assets,   but   predominantly   is   involved   with  
vehicle   financing.     Safika’s   asset   financing   relates   to   IT   and   office  
equipment.   It does this via Safika Asset Finance.     At   a horizontal level,  
Safika   has   a   market   share   of   approximately   3%.   Standard   Bank   only  
provided market share figures for the broad asset financing market which is  
22%.   Since   the   proportion   of   office   equipment   financing   conducted   by  
Standard   Bank   is   minimal   relative   to   the   other   type   of   asset   financing   it  
conducts,   the   combined   market   share   is   unlikely   to   exceed   10%   post­
merger. 
Vertical Analysis
8. The commission noted some vertical issues within this market, since both  
parties operate at different functional levels of the market. Safika acts as a  
“broker” between the bank and the client and ultimately retains ownership of  
the   equipment.   Standard   Bank   will   either   finance   the   purchase   of   the  
equipment   directly,   or  contract   with  a  broker   like   Safika.  However   unlike  
Safika, Standard Bank does not retain ownership of the asset.  What seems  
clear is that Safika and other brokers are frequently customers of all the  
banks in obtaining financing, hence the vertical relationship.
9. The   Commission   found   that   in   both   the   markets   for   provision   of   asset  
financing (upstream) and for the brokering of IT and office equipment, the

financing (upstream) and for the brokering of IT and office equipment, the  
parties’   market   shares   are   low   and   neither   can   be   construed   to   be  
dominant.   Therefore,   no   foreclosure   concerns   are   likely   to   arise.  
Furthermore, the merging parties assured that the fact that Safika conducts  
the majority of its client business with Standard Bank, will not   mean that  
post­merger Safika will favour Standard Bank over other banks as Safika  
Asset Finance does go to various other banks to get terms and in future,  
this will be conducted on an arm’s length basis. In their competitiveness  
report, the parties confirm that in future, it is likely that Safika Asset Finance  
will discount its leases with a more diverse number of banks.

Private Equity
10. The   second   area   of   overlap   between   the   parties   is   in   private   equity  
investing.   This activity comprises providing private enterprises with equity  
capital.   They   are   classified   as   captive   or   as   independent   funds.   Captive  
funds make investments exclusively on behalf of a parent company   and  
funds are drawn from a pool available within the group. Independent funds  
comprise funds made from third party investors, but managed by the private  
equity firm. The parties advised that a separate sub­market exists for BEE  
funds, wherein these funds assist businesses to fulfill their empowerment  
objectives. Standard Bank is not involved in this type of funding and we do  
not find it necessary to delve further into this sub­market.
11. Since   both   captive   and   independent   funds   make   capital   available   for  
recipients and have the same objectives, it might be possible to view both  
types of funds as forming part of one market. We however  agree with the  
Commission’s approach to avoid any detailed description of the market as  
no concerns arise on even a narrower market definition.
12. Post­merger   the   combined   market   share,   based   on   total   funds   under  
management, is under 3% (independent funds) and 4.3% (captive funds).  
The combined market share for total private equity investments is 3.58%.
Conclusion
We conclude that the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening or prevention  
of competition.  
The Tribunal therefore approves the transaction unconditionally. There are no  
public interest concerns which would alter this conclusion.
__________
20 May 2005
Y. Carrim    Date
Concurring: M. Mokoena, U. Bhoola 
For the merging parties:   P.Cleland, Routledge Modise Moss Morris Attorneys

For the Commission:  S. Nunkoo, Competition Commission