Comair Limited and Competition Commission South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (83/CR/Oct04) [2005] ZACT 20; [2005] 1 CPLR 273 (CT) (6 April 2005)

78 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Intervention — Application for leave to intervene in complaint proceedings — Comair Limited seeks to intervene in proceedings initiated by the Competition Commission against South African Airways (SAA) — SAA opposes the intervention and applies for condonation for late filing of its answering affidavit — Tribunal must determine whether to grant condonation and whether Comair has a sufficient interest not adequately represented by the Commission — Tribunal condones late filing and finds Comair has demonstrated a material interest in the proceedings as a competitor and original complainant, allowing its intervention.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The decision concerns an application for leave to intervene in complaint referral proceedings before the Competition Tribunal in terms of section 53(1)(a)(ii) of the Competition Act and Tribunal Rule 46(1). The intervention application was brought by Comair Limited (the applicant in the intervention proceedings), which was the original complainant whose complaint formed the basis of the Competition Commission’s referral against South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (SAA).


The parties in the intervention application were Comair Limited as applicant; the Competition Commission as first respondent (which had referred the complaint to the Tribunal); and South African Airways (Pty) Ltd as second respondent (the respondent in the referred complaint proceedings). SAA opposed Comair’s intervention. Separately, SAA applied for condonation for the late filing of its answering affidavit in the intervention application, which Comair opposed.


Procedurally, Comair lodged its complaint with the Commission on 13 October 2003. The Commission referred the complaint to the Tribunal on 12 October 2004 under section 50 of the Act, alleging prohibited conduct by SAA. Comair then filed the intervention application on 17 November 2004. SAA’s answering affidavit in the intervention application was due on 1 December 2004 but was only filed on 2 February 2005, leading to the condonation application.


The general subject-matter of the underlying dispute (the complaint referral) concerned alleged anti-competitive conduct by SAA in relation to payments to travel agents, including allegations of abuse of dominance and prohibited agreements. The immediate dispute decided in this ruling, however, was whether Comair should be permitted to participate as an intervening complainant in the referral proceedings and, if so, on what scope; and whether SAA’s late filing should be condoned.


Material Facts


Comair submitted a complaint to the Commission on 13 October 2003. The Commission referred the matter to the Tribunal on 12 October 2004 in terms of section 50. The Commission alleged that SAA engaged in prohibited conduct in terms of section 8(d)(i) alternatively section 8(c) of the Act, and that agreements between SAA and travel agents were prohibited in terms of section 5(1).


The Commission sought relief declaring that SAA’s contracts with travel agents—whereby SAA paid amounts over and above the normal 7% commission—were prohibited practices for purposes of section 65, and sought the imposition of an administrative penalty of up to 10% of annual turnover in South Africa, payable to the National Revenue Fund contemplated in section 213 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.


Comair sought to intervene on the basis that the Commission’s requested relief did not adequately address the alleged ongoing anti-competitive harm affecting Comair (as competitor) and other competitors. If permitted to intervene, Comair indicated it would seek relief including an interdict against SAA’s conduct; declaratory relief that specific override commissions and trust payments (and similar loyalty-based arrangements) constituted prohibited practices for purposes of section 65; and an order declaring relevant agreements between SAA and travel agents void.


It was also relevant background that there was an earlier complaint referral involving SAA brought by Nationwide Airlines (referred to as the “Nationwide complaint”), which was still being considered by the Tribunal. SAA raised a preliminary contention in the intervention proceedings that the Comair complaint referral was not properly before the Tribunal because it allegedly related substantially to the same conduct as the Nationwide complaint, and that the later matter would be res judicata once the earlier matter was decided. The Commission and Comair contended that this objection was not appropriately determined within the intervention application and that the complaints related to different time periods.


On the condonation issue, it was common cause that SAA filed its answering affidavit 43 business days late, and that it did so after a written request from the Tribunal dated 25 January 2005. SAA advanced reasons for delay including the December holiday period and internal restructuring, but the Tribunal found the explanation factually inadequate in important respects.


Legal Issues


The Tribunal was required to determine three central questions. The first was whether condonation should be granted to SAA for the late filing of its answering affidavit opposing intervention, which required an evaluative decision on whether good cause had been shown.


The second question was whether Comair had demonstrated, for purposes of section 53(1)(a)(ii)(bb) of the Act (read with Rule 46(1)), that its interest in the complaint referral proceedings was not adequately represented by another participant, particularly the Commission. This question involved the application of statutory standards to the procedural position and the nature of the relief sought.


The third question was the scope of intervention to be permitted if Comair met the statutory threshold, including whether and how the Tribunal should limit Comair’s participation “only to the extent required” for its interests to be adequately represented, and whether it was appropriate at that stage to impose any substantive limitation.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of law to fact and the exercise of the Tribunal’s procedural discretion regarding participation and condonation, rather than the merits of the underlying prohibited practice allegations.


Court’s Reasoning


The Tribunal approached the intervention application through the framework of section 53 of the Competition Act, read with Tribunal Rule 46(1). It treated Rule 46(1) as the general procedural rule for intervention in Tribunal proceedings and accepted that a complainant whose complaint formed the basis of a referral would ordinarily have a sufficient material interest. Referring to The Competition Commission of South Africa and Anglo American Medical Scheme and Engen Medical Fund and United South African Pharmacies and Members of United South African Pharmacies and further Respondents – 4/CR/Jan02, the Tribunal reiterated that alleging complainant status in relation to the referral is sufficient to establish the requisite interest. On the facts, Comair had demonstrated a direct and material interest both as complainant and as competitor of SAA.


The Tribunal then dealt with SAA’s preliminary objection that the Comair complaint was not properly before the Tribunal because of overlap with the Nationwide complaint. It accepted the Commission’s submission that this kind of objection should be raised and determined in the hearing of the complaint proceedings, not within the intervention application. The Tribunal reasoned that to decide intervention it was not required to determine whether the Comair complaint was valid, whether it differed from the Nationwide complaint, or whether it would ultimately be barred; intervention depended on whether Comair’s interests were inadequately represented, not on the merits or procedural viability of the referral.


Turning to whether Comair’s interests were adequately represented by the Commission, the Tribunal treated the difference in relief sought as central. It found material divergence between the Commission’s relief and the relief Comair wished to pursue. The Commission’s relief was directed to a declaration that SAA’s conduct to date was unlawful and to an administrative penalty. Comair, by contrast, sought an interdict aimed at constraining alleged ongoing (future) anti-competitive conduct, reflecting a different remedial focus.


The Tribunal also accepted that Comair sought declaratory relief directed specifically at the “loyalty incentives” (override and trust payments), whereas the Commission’s formulation referred generally to commissions paid above a standard 7% and did not specifically identify the loyalty incentives in the same way. It further noted that Comair sought an order declaring relevant contracts void, relief not sought by the Commission. The Tribunal considered these remedial differences to be related to addressing the effects of the alleged prohibited practice on Comair’s commercial interests and found that the Commission had neither sought nor indicated it intended to seek that relief. The fact that the Commission did not oppose the intervention application was also part of the context considered.


In addressing SAA’s contention that complainant intervention should not be allowed merely because the Commission did not refer the complaint in identical terms, the Tribunal relied on both Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court authority. It referred again to the Anglo American Medical Scheme decision, where the Tribunal had found that different relief sought by an intervening complainant could demonstrate an interest not adequately represented by another participant. It also relied on the Competition Appeal Court’s decision in American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission 2003(5) SA 633, which held that participation rights are not limited to questioning witnesses or inspecting documents but include the right to address the Tribunal, make representations, and formulate and claim relief. In addition, the Tribunal referred to authority confirmed in American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission 2003(5) SA 633 that a complainant seeking interdictory relief need not allege or prove damages at that stage.


The Tribunal rejected SAA’s public policy argument that intervention should not be permitted where a complainant seeks declaratory relief in order to support a future damages claim. It reasoned that the Competition Act itself contemplates that an affected party may pursue damages only after the Tribunal has made a finding of prohibited conduct and then only in the High Court under section 65. Because the scope of prohibited conduct found by the Tribunal would circumscribe a later civil claim, the Tribunal considered that section 53 exists precisely to ensure that a complainant can participate where necessary so that its interests are adequately represented. It thus held that there was nothing improper in a complainant seeking intervention to ensure it could later pursue its interests within the statutory scheme.


On the evaluative balance between efficiency and participation, the Tribunal acknowledged that intervention could slightly prolong proceedings, but held that the Act requires the Tribunal to encourage ventilation of issues and to give particular attention to a complainant’s interests. In that context, the Tribunal stated it was required to err on the side of caution when considering a complainant’s interests. It accordingly held that Comair’s interests were not adequately represented by the Commission or any other participant, and granted intervention without needing to decide Comair’s additional grounds based on differences between the complaint and the referral.


On the scope of intervention, SAA argued it should be limited only to the extent of inadequate representation, and that the hearing should be limited to aspects differing from the Nationwide complaint. The Tribunal declined to impose such limitations at that stage. It reasoned that the ambit of intervention was difficult to determine because SAA had not yet filed its response to the Commission’s referral, and premature limitation could undermine the public interest that participation is meant to serve. It emphasised that the Commission remained dominus litis in the complaint proceedings and could be expected to prevent unnecessary duplication and undue protraction.


Finally, the Tribunal addressed condonation. It applied section 58(1)(c) (“good cause”) and stated that it has a discretion which may be informed by High Court principles. Citing United Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd v Hills and Others 1976 (1) SA 717 (A), it identified relevant considerations including the degree of non-compliance, the explanation, prospects of success, importance of the case, convenience, and avoiding delay, while stressing that the list is not exhaustive and that the Tribunal acts in the public interest. Although it found SAA’s delay “extreme” and its explanation unsatisfactory (including the absence of confirmatory affidavits), it nevertheless concluded that the public interest would be better served by allowing SAA’s arguments on intervention to be considered, and therefore granted condonation, coupled with an adverse costs order against SAA. The Tribunal considered Comair’s opposition to condonation reasonable, relying on Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 18 (A) for the costs principle where opposition to condonation is reasonable.


Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal granted condonation to SAA for the late filing of its answering affidavit in the intervention application, notwithstanding the inadequacy of the explanation, on the basis that it was in the public interest to consider SAA’s legal arguments, and it marked the indulgence with a costs order.


The Tribunal granted Comair leave to intervene as a participant in the complaint proceedings under case number 83/CR/Oct04. The intervention was granted with broad participatory rights, including attendance at pre-hearing conferences, adducing evidence and argument in support of the relief it sought, requesting the Tribunal to direct or summon persons and the production of documents or items, cross-examination, inspection of materials presented, and participation in interlocutory proceedings affecting Comair’s relief.


The Tribunal ordered Comair to file a statement of particulars of complaint within ten business days of the order. SAA was granted the right to answer those particulars and Comair the right to reply, with Tribunal Rules 15 to 17 to apply mutatis mutandis. The Tribunal also confined Comair’s relief to orders contemplated by sections 58(1)(a)(i), 58(1)(a)(v), and 58(1)(a)(vi) of the Act.


On costs, the Tribunal ordered SAA to pay the costs of Comair’s opposition to the condonation application (including the costs of two counsel) and to pay the costs of the intervention application (also including the costs of two counsel).


Cases Cited


The Competition Commission of South Africa and Anglo American Medical Scheme and Engen Medical Fund and United South African Pharmacies and Members of United South African Pharmacies and further Respondents – 4/CR/Jan02.


Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (2) [2004] 1 CPLR 235 (CT).


American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission 2003(5) SA 633.


The Competition Commission and Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd and Another v American Natural Soda Ash Corp 49/CR/Apr00 and 87/CR/Sep00.


United Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd v Hills and Others 1976 (1) SA 717 (A).


Independent Estate Agents Action Committee v KwaZulu-Natal Property Service Ltd (25/CR/Apr02).


Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 18 (A).


Michaels v Wells NO 1967 (1) SA 46 (C).


Van Deventer v Louw 1980 (4) SA 105 (O).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), section 213.


Competition Act (sections 5(1), 8(c), 8(d)(i), 49C, 49D, 50, 53, 58(1)(a)(i), 58(1)(a)(v), 58(1)(a)(vi), 58(1)(c), and 65), as referenced in the decision.


Rules of Court Cited


Competition Tribunal Rule 15.


Competition Tribunal Rule 16.


Competition Tribunal Rule 17.


Competition Tribunal Rule 43(1).


Competition Tribunal Rule 46(1).


Competition Tribunal Rule 54(1).


Held


The Tribunal held that, for purposes of participation in complaint referral proceedings, a complainant such as Comair has a sufficient material interest and may be permitted to intervene under section 53(1)(a)(ii)(bb) where its interests are not adequately represented by the Commission or another participant. The Tribunal found that the differences between the Commission’s relief and the relief Comair sought—particularly the pursuit of an interdict addressing ongoing conduct and further declaratory and contractual invalidity relief—demonstrated inadequate representation.


The Tribunal held that objections such as allegations of overlap with other proceedings and potential res judicata consequences are matters to be determined in the complaint hearing and were not decisive in deciding whether the intervention should be granted.


The Tribunal held that, while SAA’s delay in filing was extreme and inadequately explained, condonation could be granted in the public interest, and that this indulgence should be accompanied by a costs order against SAA given the reasonableness of Comair’s opposition to condonation.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 53(1)(a)(ii)(bb) of the Competition Act contemplates complainant participation in Commission-referred complaint proceedings where the presiding member considers that the complainant’s interests are not adequately represented, and the participation is then permitted to the extent required for adequate representation. This provision is directed at situations where the Commission’s referral may not mirror the complainant’s complaint in all respects, including differences in relief sought.


Tribunal Rule 46(1) permits intervention by any person with a material interest in the matter, and complainant status in relation to the referred complaint provides a sufficient basis to establish such interest, consistent with the approach in The Competition Commission of South Africa and Anglo American Medical Scheme and Engen Medical Fund and United South African Pharmacies and Members of United South African Pharmacies and further Respondents – 4/CR/Jan02.


Participation rights for an intervening complainant are not confined to procedural acts such as questioning witnesses and inspecting documents, but extend to addressing the Tribunal, making representations, and formulating and claiming relief, consistent with American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission 2003(5) SA 633.


A complainant does not need to allege or prove damages as a precondition to seeking interdictory relief in the Tribunal, as recognised in the authorities referenced and confirmed in American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission 2003(5) SA 633. The statutory damages scheme in section 65 frames damages as a subsequent High Court process dependent on a Tribunal finding of prohibited conduct, which informs why complainant participation may be necessary to ensure adequate representation of interests.


Condonation under section 58(1)(c) requires good cause, and the Tribunal exercises a discretion informed by fairness and factors articulated in United Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd v Hills and Others 1976 (1) SA 717 (A). Even where delay is serious and explanation inadequate, the Tribunal may grant condonation where the public interest in properly determining the matter warrants it, while using costs orders to address the prejudice and to mark disapproval of non-compliance, consistent with the costs approach exemplified in Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 18 (A).

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 83/CR/Oct04
In the matter between :  
Comair Limited Applicant
and
The Competition Commission First Respondent
South African Airways (Pty) Ltd Second Respondent
In re:
The Competition Commission Applicant
And
South African Airways (Pty) Ltd Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER 
1. The applicant in this matter seeks leave to intervene in terms of section 53(1)
(a)(ii)   and   Rule   46   (1).     The   intervention   is   sought   in   complaint   referral  
proceedings   (“complaint   proceedings”)   which   have   been   instituted   by   the  
Competition   Commission   (“Commission”)   against   second   respondent. 1  The  
applicant, Comair Ltd, is the complainant in the original complaint that forms  
the basis of the Commission’s complaint referral.  Second respondent, South  
African Airways (Pty) Ltd (“SAA”), has opposed the intervention application.  
Second respondent has also applied for condonation for the late filing of its  
answering   affidavit   in   the   intervention   application.     The   condonation  
1  The parties are referred to as applicant and respondents as cited in the intervention application.
1

application has been opposed by Comair.  
2. The Tribunal is required to decide –
2.1. whether   it   should  grant   condonation  to  second  respondent   for  the  late  
filing of its answering affidavit;
2.2. whether the applicant has demonstrated an interest that is not adequately  
represented by the Commission; and if so
2.3. the scope of applicant’s intervention in the complaint proceedings.
Background
3. The applicant submitted a complaint against SAA to the Commission on 13  
October 2003.  The Commission referred the matter to the Tribunal in terms  
of s50 of the Act on 12 October 2004.   The Commission alleges that second  
respondent has been engaged in conduct that is prohibited in terms of s8(d)(i)  
of the Act, alternatively s8(c). It also alleges that the agreements between the  
second respondent and travel agents are prohibited in terms of s5(1) of the  
Act.2    For   ease   of   convenience   this   complaint   will   be   referred   to   as   the  
Comair   complaint.       Second   respondent   was   given   an   extension   until   26  
November 2004 by the Commission to respond to the Complaint referral.   It  
has not yet done so.
4. Applicant filed an application to intervene with the Tribunal on 17 November  
2004.  Second respondent has opposed the intervention application.
5. Second   respondent   was   required   to   file   its   answering   affidavit   to   the  
intervention application by 1 December 2004.    Second respondent only filed  
its answering affidavit on 2 February 2005.   Second respondent has applied  
2  Complaint referral para 9.4 & 10.4
2

for   a   condonation   by   this   Tribunal   for   late   filing   of   its   affidavit   and   non­
compliance   with   the   Rules.       Applicant   has   opposed   second   respondent’s  
application for condonation for late filing of its answering affidavit.
6. The Commission has not opposed the intervention application but has made  
submissions in these proceedings.  
7. Prior   to   the   referral   of   the   Comair   complaint   by   the   Commission,   the  
Commission had referred another complaint against the second respondent  
to the Tribunal during May 2001. The complainant in that complaint referral is  
Nationwide Airlines.   For ease of convenience that matter will be referred to  
herein as the Nationwide complaint.   The Nationwide complaint is currently  
being considered by the Tribunal.  
Basis of application
8. Applicant seeks leave to intervene in these proceedings in terms of s53(1)(a)
(ii)3 on two bases.  The first basis for its application is that the relief sought by  
the Commission in the complaint referral  does  not adequately address the  
ongoing   anti­competitive   harm   that   second   respondent’s   conduct   would  
occasion on itself (a competitor of second respondent) and other competitors  
in the relevant market.  
9. The Commission seeks relief against SAA as follows­ 
9.1. it is declared that SAA’s contracts with travel agents whereby it paid (or  
pays)   to   travel   agents   amounts   over   and   above   the   normal   7%  
commission payments, are prohibited for the purposes of section 65 of  
3  Applicant states that the application is brought under s53(1)(ii) which would include (aa) and  
(bb). Applicant does however rely on the threshold set out in 53(1)(ii)(bb).  
3

the Act; 
9.2. SAA is to pay an administrative penalty to the National Revenue Fund  
contemplated in section 213 of the Constitution of the Republic of South  
Africa,   Act   108   of   1996,   in   the   amount   up   to   10%   of   SAA’s   annual  
turnover in South Africa. 4 
10. The relief that applicant will seek if it is allowed to intervene is an order­ 
10.1.interdicting second respondent’s conduct;
10.2.declaring in terms of s58(1)(a)(v) of the Act that the override 
commissions and trust payments that form the basis of Comair’s  
complaint, and any other agreements in terms of which payments  
made to travel agents are based on considerations of loyalty rather  
than efficiency benefits, constitute prohibited practices for purposes  
of section 65; and
10.3.declaring the relevant agreements concluded between SAA and 
travel agents void in terms of section 58(1)(a)(vi) of the Act
11. The second basis of intervention by the applicant is that there are differences  
between its complaint referral and that of the Commission in respect of the  
definition  of the  relevant  market   and  the nature  and  the  effect   of  the  anti­
competitive   conduct   of   the   second   respondent   and   that   each   of   the  
differences   between   its   complaint   and   the   complaint   referral   by   the  
Commission   constitutes   an   area   in   which   its   interests   are   not   adequately  
represented by the Commission.  
12. Second respondent has opposed the application for intervention on a number  
of grounds.  Its first ground of opposition is a point in limine in which it alleges  
that   the   Complaint   referral   is   not   properly   before   the   Tribunal   because   it  
4  p129 of the Record
4

relates   substantially   to   the   same   conduct   in   the   Nationwide   complaint.     It  
argues that if the Comair complaint cannot go ahead due to a decision by the  
Tribunal   in   the   Nationwide   complaint,   i.e.   it   is   res   judicata ,   then   Comair’s  
intervention should also be disallowed. 
13. A second basis of opposition by second respondent is that the relief sought  
by applicant  for  all  practical  purposes is no different  to  that  sought  by  the  
Commission.   Second respondent alleges that s53 is not intended to broaden  
the ambit of the complaint referred to the Tribunal by the Commission. It is  
sufficient   that   the   Commission   represent   the   complainant’s   interests  
adequately   and   not   completely   and   hence   there   is   no   basis   to   allow   a  
complainant to intervene on the basis that the Commission has not referred  
the complaint to the Tribunal in  identical terms.
14. The Tribunal has condoned the late filing of second respondent’s answering  
affidavit and will accordingly deal with the application for intervention first.
Application for intervention
15. Section 53  of  the  Act,   read  with  rule  46 are  the relevant  provisions under  
which a person may approach the Tribunal to seek participation in hearings  
before the Tribunal.
16. Section 53 (1)(a)(ii)(aa) and (bb) provide­
53(1) Right to participate in hearing.—The following persons may  
participate in a hearing, in person or through a representative, and  
may put questions to witnesses and inspect any books, documents  
or items presented at the hearing:
(a)If the hearing is in terms of Part C—
(i)the Commissioner, or any person appointed by the Commissioner;
5

(ii)the complainant, if—
(aa)the   complainant   referred   the   complaint   to   the  
Competition Tribunal; or
(bb)in   the   opinion   of   the   presiding   member   of   the  
Competition   Tribunal,   the   complainant’s   interest   is   not  
adequately   represented   by   another   participant,   and   then  
only to the extent required for the complainant’s interest to  
be adequately represented;…”
17. Rule 46(1) provides
Intervenors.—(1)    At any time after an initiating document is  filed  
with  the  Tribunal,  any person  who  has  a  material   interest  in  the  
relevant matter may apply to intervene in the Tribunal proceedings  
by filing a Notice of Motion in Form CT 6, which must—
(a) include a concise statement of the nature of the person’s  
interest   in   the   proceedings,   and   the   matters   in   respect   of  
which the person will make representations; and
be served on every other participant in the proceedings .
18. Rule 46(1) is a general rule which applies to intervention applications in all  
proceedings   before   the   Tribunal.   It   provides   that   any   person   who   has   a  
material interest in the relevant matter may apply to intervene in the Tribunal  
proceedings. In  Anglo American Corporation Medical Scheme ,5 this Tribunal  
held that, in order for an application to satisfy the requirement of interest in  
Rule  46(1),  it  would  be  sufficient  for  an  applicant  to  allege  that  it  was  the  
complainant whose complaint had formed the basis or part of the basis for the  
complaint   referral   since   a   complainant   is   assumed   to   have   the   necessary  
interest   in   such   proceedings. 6    In   this   application   the   applicant   has  
demonstrated   a   material   and   direct   interest   in   the   outcome   of   these  
proceedings both as complainant and competitor of the second respondent  
and has satisfied the requirement of interest contained in Rule 46(1). 7

and has satisfied the requirement of interest contained in Rule 46(1). 7 
5  The Competition Commission of South Africa and Anglo American Medical Scheme and Engen  
Medical Fund And United South African Pharmacies and Members of United South African  
Pharmacies and further Respondents  – 4/CR/Jan02
6  Ibid at page 4.
7  See Applicant’s Founding Affidavit para 5
6

19. We deal first with the point of limine raised by second respondent as a ground  
of opposition to the intervention application.  Second respondent alleges that  
the   Comair   complaint   is   not   properly   before   the   Tribunal   because   the  
Nationwide complaint relates substantially to the same conduct as the Comair  
complaint.     According   to   second   respondent,   once   the   Tribunal   has  
adjudicated   upon   the   Nationwide   complaint,   the   issues   in   the   Comair  
complaint will also be adjudicated upon.    
20. The Commission submits that it is not appropriate for second respondent to  
raise such exception in the intervention proceedings as this exception should  
be   properly   raised   in   the   hearings   of   the   complaint   proceedings.     The  
Commission argues further that the Nationwide and Comair complaints are  
different complaints as they relate to different time periods of the alleged anti­
competitive   behaviour   on   the   part   of   second   respondent.   8    Counsel   for  
applicant argued that this is an issue properly considered at the hearings of  
the   complaint   proceedings   and   cannot   be   a   basis   for   opposing   the  
intervention application. 
21. It may be that the Comair complaint is different to the Nationwide complaint.  
The Comair complaint relates to a different time period of the alleged anti­
competitive conduct and it may be that the competitive dynamics of that time  
period will differ from that of the Nationwide complaint. But we need not go  
there in this application.  In order for the Tribunal to decide to grant applicant  
leave to intervene in this matter it only has to decide whether the applicant  
has   demonstrated   an   interest   that   is   not   adequately   represented   by   the  
8  In  Competition Commission v SAA (Pty) Ltd  (2) [2004] 1 CPLR 235(CT) the Competition  
Tribunal decided against an application for joinder of the Nationwide and Comair complaints.  At

that time the Comair complaint had not yet been referred to the Tribunal and was not yet an  
action that could be consolidated with the Nationwide complaint.  
7

Commission.     In   such   an   enquiry   the   Tribunal   does   not   have   to   consider  
whether   there   are   any   differences   between   the   Nationwide   and   Comair  
complaints, whether the complaint is valid or not or to  consider the merits of  
the Comair complaint. Those are matters to be dealt with during the hearing  
of the complaint itself.
22. We turn to consider the relief sought by applicant. If we decide that the relief  
sought   by  applicant   is   sufficient   to  demonstrate   an  interest  not   adequately  
represented by the Commission, the matter rests there and there is no need  
for us to consider the second basis of applicant’s application.  If we allow an  
intervention based on the relief sought, the applicant will in any event have to  
make all the necessary allegations to support such relief.   Such allegations  
may   deal   with   the   definition   of   the   relevant   market   and   the   effect   of   the  
alleged anti­competitive conduct.  
23. The relief sought by the applicant in this matter differs from that sought by the  
Commission in a number of respects.  An important and obvious difference is  
to  be  found  in  the  interdict  sought  by applicant.  Whereas  the  Commission  
seeks to declare the second respondent’s conduct  to date  unlawful, applicant  
seeks to constrain the  ongoing (future)  alleged anti­competitive conduct of the  
second respondent. 
24. Furthermore the applicant seeks a declarator to prohibit the specific override  
and   trust   payments   (“loyalty   incentives”)   of   the   second   respondent   which  
have   formed   the   basis   of   the   complaint   and   complaint   referral.   The  
Commission   on   the   other   hand   seeks   only   to   prohibit   the   payment   of  
commissions by second respondent to travel agents in excess of the standard  
7%.   The   Commission’s   relief   does   not   refer   specifically   to   the   loyalty  
incentives.  
8

25. The   relief   sought   by   applicant   is   related   to   addressing   the   effects   of   the  
alleged   prohibited   practices   of   the   second   respondent   on   its   own   (the  
applicant’s) commercial interests.  The Commission has not sought the relief  
that the applicant has, nor has it indicated that it intends to seek such relief.  
In addition, the Commission has not opposed the application for intervention.  
26. The Commission has not sought an order to declare the contracts void while  
the applicant does.
27. Counsel for second respondent argued in a somewhat circular fashion that a  
complainant   was   not   permitted   to   intervene   in   a   complaint   referral   if   the  
Commission was adequately representing its interests.  In other words it was  
not   permissible   for   the   applicant   to   seek   intervention   in   the   matter   simply  
because the Commission had not referred the complaint in identical terms or  
that   the   Commission   had   not  sought   the  relief   in   the  terms  sought   by   the  
applicant.
27.1.1.1.The extent of a complainant’s participation envisaged in s53  
has already been decided by this Tribunal and the Competition  
Appeal   Court.   In   the   Anglo   American 9  case,   the   Tribunal  
considered the requirements of s53(1)(ii)(bb) and held that the  
different   relief   sought   by   an   applicant   in   that   case   was   prima  
facie  related to addressing the effects of the prohibited practice  
should it be proven and that it had accordingly demonstrated an  
interest   that   was   not   adequately   represented   by   another  
9  The Competition Commission of South Africa and Anglo American Medical Scheme and  
Engen Medical Fund And United South African Pharmacies and Members of United South  
African Pharmacies and further Respondents  – 4/CR/Jan02
9

participant.   This approach, sympathetic to an intervenor’s right  
to claim relief, is also found in the Competition Appeal Court’s  
decision in  ANSAC10.  In that case the Court held that the right  
to participate in hearings is not limited to the right to questioning  
witnesses   or   examining   documents   but   “includes   the   right   to  
address the Tribunal, make representations to it and  to formulate  
and   claim   relief” .11    (Our   emphasis)   Furthermore,   the   Appeal  
Court confirmed a decision by this Tribunal  12 that a complainant  
need   not   allege   or   prove   any   damages   in   order   to   seek  
interdictory relief. 13   
28. Contrary to the argument made by Counsel for second respondent, a textual  
analysis of s53(1)(a) contemplates a situation where the Commission may not  
refer a complaint to the Tribunal in identical terms to that of the complaint.  It  
is   precisely  in   anticipation   of   such   differences   that   s53(1)(ii)(aa)   and   (bb)  
provide  for  a complainant to seek  intervention so that its interests  may be  
adequately represented.  
29. The Act seeks to encourage rather than curtail the participation of interested  
parties, especially complainants, in proceedings before the Tribunal.  To this  
extent,   s53   itself   entitles   persons   other   than   the   complainant   to   seek  
intervention   in   proceedings   of   the   Tribunal   on   the   basis   set   out   in   that  
section.14   In s53(1), a complainant may intervene on more than one basis.  
The Act also makes provision for a complainant’s interests to be addressed in  
10  American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission  2003(5) SA 633
11   American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission  2003(5) SA 633 at paragraph [4] at  
639G­I
12  The Competition Commission and Botswana Ash(Pty) Ltd and Another v American Natural  
Soda Ash Corp  49/CR/Apr00 and 87/CR/Sep00
13  American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission  2003(5) SA 633 para [5] at 640B/C­D

13  American Soda Corporation v Competition Commission  2003(5) SA 633 para [5] at 640B/C­D
14  See provisions of s53(1)(a)(i)­(iv).
10

other proceedings before the Tribunal. 15 
30. At   the   hearing   Counsel   for   second   respondent   placed   great   emphasis   on  
public policy considerations for not permitting interventions by complainants.  
Counsel submitted that applicant was seeking the declarator in its notice of  
motion simply in order to pursue a claim of damages in the High Court.   The  
argument   seemingly   went   as   follows.     The   Commission   acts   in   the   public  
interest   in   prosecuting   anti­competitive   behaviour.     The   Commission’s  
prosecutorial   role   would   be   undermined   by   allowing   complainants   to   seek  
relief that was in pursuit of a personal interest of claiming damages in a High  
Court.   Counsel   for   second   respondent   suggested   that   there   is   “something  
wrong” in a complainant pursuing its interests in this way.
31. The arguments put forward by second respondent’s Counsel do not take into  
account the provisions of the Competition Act in relation to a complainant’s  
right to claim damages.  While the Tribunal and the Commission are enjoined  
to exercise a public function by the Act, the Act also grants an affected party,  
who is usually a complainant, the right to pursue its personal (commercial)  
interests by a claim of damages.  But an affected party can do this only once  
this Tribunal has made a finding of prohibited conduct in a particular matter  
and then only in the High Court. 16  Hence a complainant’s right to pursue a  
civil   claim   in   the   High   Court,   and   the   nature   and   extent   of   the   prohibited  
conduct   in   respect   of   which   it   may   claim   damages,   is   circumscribed   or  
determined  by the nature and extent of the conduct that it is found by this  
Tribunal to constitute a prohibited practice.  A complainant seeking to pursue  
a claim of damages in the High Court will have to prove the nexus between

a claim of damages in the High Court will have to prove the nexus between  
15  See for example s49D which requires that a complainant to be consulted in the event of a consent order  
application and for damages to be agreed, s49C which provides for interim relief proceedings by a party  
affected (usually a complainant) by alleged anti­competitive conduct.
16  See the provisions of s65.  A complainant could of course obtain damages by agreement in a consent  
order as contemplated in s49D but that is not relevant for the purposes of this discussion.
11

the prohibited conduct (as declared unlawful by the Tribunal) and the harm  
suffered by it.  It is conceivable that, in a particular matter, the formulation of  
the   relief   sought   by   the   Commission   and   granted   by   the   Tribunal   in   the  
exercise   of   their   public   function   may   provide   very   little   or   no   relief   to   a  
complainant seeking damages in the High Court. It is precisely this possible  
type   of   outcome   that   s53   seeks   to   address   by   entitling   a   complainant   to  
intervene in proceedings before this Tribunal if its interests are not adequately  
represented   by   the   Commission   or   another   party.     Hence   there   is   nothing  
“wrong”   in   a   complainant   making   application   to   intervene   in   these  
proceedings in order to ensure that it is able to pursue its personal interests in  
the High Court subsequent to a finding by this Tribunal. 
32.   Whilst an intervention by a complainant could result in a slight protraction of the  
hearings which may not always be in the public interest, the Act requires the Tribunal  
to   encourage   ventilation   of   all   the   issues   and   to   give   particular   attention   to   a  
complainant’s interests. In the circumstances the Tribunal is required to err on the  
side of caution when considering a complainant’s interests.  Accordingly, we hold  
that the applicant has demonstrated that its interests are not adequately  
represented by the Commission  or any  other party  to the proceeding  
and the application for intervention is granted.   
33. There   is   no   need   for   us   to   decide   whether   any   of   the   other   differences  
between the complaint and the complaint referral constitute separate grounds  
of application for intervention.
Scope of intervention
34. Counsel for second respondent argued that the scope of the intervention by  
12

applicant   should   be   limited   only   to   the   extent   that   its   interests   are   not  
adequately represented by the Commission.  Counsel argued further that the  
scope of the hearing in the Comair complaint should be limited only to that  
aspect of the Comair complaint which differs from the Nationwide complaint.  
While   an   intervention   by   a   party   may   cause   some   degree   of   extended  
proceedings,  it is difficult  to determine  the  ambit  of the intervention at this  
stage of the complaint proceedings.   This is especially so in light of the fact  
that second respondent has not yet filed its response to the Commission’s  
complaint   referral.     Any   limitation   on   the   extent   of   the   intervention   by   the  
applicant   at   this   stage   may   in   fact   undermine   the   public   interest   that   the  
Tribunal seeks to promote by granting leave to intervene.  The Commission is  
dominis litis in the complaint proceedings and it is expected that it will seek to  
prevent any unnecessary duplication of witnesses or undue protraction of the  
proceedings due to the applicant’s intervention.
35. Accordingly, applicant is hereby granted leave to intervene as participant in  
the  complaint  proceedings   held  under  case  number  83/CR/Oct04  (“Comair  
complaint”), such intervention to include, without limitation, the right to­
35.1.attend all pre­hearing conferences in this matter;
35.2.adduce evidence and make argument in support of the relief it 
seeks;
35.3.request the Tribunal to direct, summon and/or order any person to 
appear at the hearing, or to produce any book, document or item  
for purposes of such hearing;
35.4.cross­examine witnesses;
35.5.inspect any books, documents and other items presented at the 
hearing; and
35.6.participate in any proceedings concerning objections to the 
Commission’s   complaint   referral   and   in   any   other   interlocutory  
13

proceedings, which may affect the relief sought by the applicant.
36. It   is   further   ordered   that   the   applicant   is   required   to   file   a   statement   of  
particulars of complaint within ten business days of the date of this order. The  
second   respondent   is   entitled   to   file   an   answer   to   such   particulars   of  
complaint and the applicant is entitled to file a reply thereto.  Tribunal rules 15  
to 17 inclusive will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the applicant’s particulars, the  
second respondent’s answer and to applicant’s reply.   The applicant’s relief  
will be confined to seeking an order contemplated by sections 58(1)(a)(i), (v)  
and (vi) of the Act.  
Application for condonation
37. We are left to deal with second respondent’s application for condonation of  
the late filing of its answering affidavit.
38. It   is   common   cause   between   the   parties   that   second   respondent   filed   its  
answering   affidavit   with   this   Tribunal,   in   opposition   to   the   application   for  
intervention   43   business   days   later   than   it   was   due.     The   applicant’s  
intervention  application  was  filed   and  served   on   second  respondent   on   17  
November 2004.  In terms of Tribunal Rule 46, read with Rule 43(1), second  
respondent   was   required   to   file   an   answer   (if   any)   to   the   intervention  
application by 1 December 2004.   Second respondent filed its answer on 2  
February 2005, 43 business days late and pursuant to a written request from  
the Tribunal on 25 January 2005.
39. Section 58(1)(c) requires a party seeking condonation to show “good cause”.  
The Tribunal has the discretion to grant condonation, on good cause shown.  
In considering applications for condonation the Tribunal, when exercising its  
14

discretion, may have regard to the rules of the High Court.   The High Court  
has held that the “ the court has discretion to be exercised judicially upon a  
consideration of all the facts and that in  essence it is a question of fairness to  
both sides.  In this enquiry, relevant considerations may include the degree of  
non­compliance with the Rules, the explanation therefore, the prospects of  
success on appeal, the importance of the case…the convenience of the Court  
and the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.  The  
list is not exhaustive”. 17   When exercising its discretion in terms of section  
58(1)(c)   read   with   Rule   54(1)   the   Tribunal   has   to   have   regard   to   all   the  
circumstances   of   the   case.     The   list   of   relevant   factors   to   consider   is   not  
exhaustive.  The Tribunal may have regard to the degree of non­compliances  
and explanation therefor but also the importance of the case, the convenience  
of the Tribunal, prejudice to the other side and the extent to which the public  
interest is served by granting condonation.   The Tribunal acts in the public  
interest.
40. In its condonation application second respondent advances several reasons  
for the delay.  While the December holiday season and second respondent’s  
internal restructuring may have contributed to some delay (and we make no  
finding   in   that   regard),   in   our   view   the   condonation   application   does   not  
contain   a   satisfactory   factual   explanation   for   second   respondent’s   extreme  
delay.   The affidavit by Mr Prosper Chavarika, the executive legal  counsel  
does not set out a full and detailed account of the cause of the delay and  
does   not   contain   any   confirmatory   affidavits   by   persons   he   claims,   under  
oath, for whom he was required to wait.  
41. The Tribunal has previously stated that it is becoming “increasingly concerned

41. The Tribunal has previously stated that it is becoming “increasingly concerned  
at the cavalier approach adopted by the many practitioners and their clients to  
17  United Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd v Hills and Others  1976 (1) SA 717 (A) at 720E­G
15

the time frames provided in the Act and the Rules and to the formulaic nature  
of many of the applications for condonation”. 18 
42. Indeed the Tribunal is of the view that the second respondent’s extreme delay  
and   unsatisfactory   explanation   for   the   causes   thereof   is   particularly  
concerning.   It   seems   particularly   inexplicable   that   a   publicly   owned  
corporation should conduct itself with such cavalier disregard of the rules of a  
statutory body such as the Tribunal.  Nevertheless, the Tribunal’s public role  
would   be   better   served   by   having   regard   to   second   respondent’s   legal  
arguments   in   respect   of   the   application   for   intervention.   In   this   particular  
instance we are of the view that the public interest is better served by granting  
second respondent condonation with an appropriate order of costs against it.  
In  Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd   1962 (3) SA 18 (A) at p25 the Court  
held that “As the opposition to the application [for condonation] was in the  
circumstances reasonable, applicant must pay the costs of opposition”. 19   In  
the   circumstances   of   this   case,   applicant’s   opposition   to   the   condonation  
application is found to be reasonable.
Costs
42.1.1.Second respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the applicant’s  
(Comair’s) opposition to  the condonation application,  such  costs  to  
include costs of two counsel.   Second respondent is also ordered to  
pay the costs of the application for intervention such costs to include  
the costs of two counsel.
18  Independent Estate Agents Action Committee v KwaZulu­Natal Property Service Ltd  (25/CR/Apr02)  
p2
19  See also Erasmus,  Superior Court Practice  at B1­367, fn 10;  Michaels v Wells No  1967 (1) SA 46  
C at 53 D­F;  Van Deventer v Louw  1980 (4) SA 105 (O) at 107D.
16

_____________ 6 April 2005
Y. Carrim
  
Date
Concurring: D. H. Lewis, N. Manoim
For the complainant:   D.   Unterhalter   SC   instructed   by   Webber   Wentzel  
Attorneys
For the respondent: A. Subel SC instructed by Knowles Hussein Lindsay
For the Commission:  J. Campbell  SC, instructed by Cheadle  Thompson  
and Haysom
17