Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd and Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd (52/LM/Jul04) [2004] ZACT 67; [2004] 2 CPLR 281 (CT) (20 October 2004)

78 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Merger Approval — Conditional approval of merger between Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd and Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd — Cherry Creek, a newly formed company, acquires Northwest Star, a government-owned public transport entity, as part of a public tender process to extinguish judicial debt — No competition concerns identified due to lack of geographic overlap in services — Public interest concerns raised regarding employment and transparency of fare structures — Tribunal imposes conditions to ensure price transparency for consumers and protects employees through a moratorium on retrenchments for one year.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned large merger proceedings before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa under case number 52/LM/Jul04, relating to a transaction in which Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd (the acquiring firm, also referred to as “CCT” or “Bojanala”) acquired a division of Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd (the target firm, “NWS”), namely the Tlhabane business.


CCT was described as a newly formed company whose shareholders included Unitrans, Trans Africa Holdings (“TAH”), and Mvelaphanda Holdings (“Mvela”). NWS was described as a government-owned public transport company, with its shares held by Northwest Transport Investments (“NTI”), which in turn was held as to 65.5% by the North West Provincial Government (“NWPG”) and 33.5% by the Public Investment Commissioner.


The Tribunal conditionally approved the merger on 1 October 2004, and subsequently furnished its reasons for decision dated 20 October 2004. The proceedings were marked by a finding that the merger raised no competition concerns due to a lack of geographic overlap, but that it warranted conditions addressing public interest considerations, particularly relating to consumer transparency and employment protections.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the acquisition of a subsidised commuter bus service business operated under a government contract in the North West Province, including issues arising from the privatisation/disposal process and the employment consequences of the transaction structure.


2. Material Facts


In March 1999, both NWS and its holding company NTI were placed under judicial management. The judicial managers were advised that, in order to extinguish the judicial debt, NWS’s various businesses should be disposed of through a public tender process. The transaction under consideration arose pursuant to that disposal process.


The business transferred to CCT comprised the government contract to supply subsidised commuter bus services from two depots in the North West Province, namely the Tlhabane depot and the Mogwase depot, together with 186 buses servicing those routes. The Tribunal accepted that commuter transport in the area was subsidised by the NWPG, and that the subsidy constituted guaranteed income to the operator for a seven-year period. Consumers also paid a cash fare calculated by an agreed formula and subject to annual increases.


A further material fact was the creation of an employee share trust intended to benefit employees of the acquiring firm, of whom 95% were historically disadvantaged persons. The Tribunal treated as material that the transaction structure changed during negotiations: the employee share trust would no longer hold a direct 15% interest in CCT, but instead would hold an indirect interest through 15% shareholdings in two entities, Class A Trading (“CAT”) (on behalf of TAH) and Expectra (on behalf of Mvela and Unitrans). The Tribunal accepted that this structural change did not affect the competition analysis, but did affect the public interest considerations.


As regards competitive conditions, the Tribunal relied on the fact that although some shareholders of CCT provided subsidised commuter bus services elsewhere, there was no geographic overlap between those services and the services offered by the target business being acquired in the North West Province.


Concerning participation at the hearing, the Tribunal recorded that the NWS Management Forum (representing retrenched employees) initially raised concerns but withdrew its objection in writing immediately before the hearing commenced. Two other participants made representations: the Coalition Group Against the Unfair Process of the Privatisation of NTI and the Transport and Allied Workers’ Union (“TAWU”), representing approximately 6.72% of employees in the business.


On employment consequences, the Tribunal relied on the sequence that the parties initially intended that CCT would be the operating company and the employer, with employees transferring in terms of section 197(2) of the Labour Relations Act, and that employee rights to employment were further guaranteed for a minimum of one year in the sale agreement. The Tribunal also relied on the later clarification that, notwithstanding a division of routes among entities, all employees would be employed by Expectra, creating uncertainty about the enforceability of undertakings originally made by CCT.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions before the Tribunal were whether the merger would result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition, and, notwithstanding the absence of competition harm, whether public interest considerations justified conditional approval of the transaction.


The competition component largely concerned the application of law to fact, namely whether the absence of geographic overlap between subsidised commuter bus services meant there were no competition concerns requiring further intervention.


The public interest component required evaluative judgments about how to address concerns arising from (i) the grant and transfer of an exclusive right to provide a bus service on particular routes for seven years, including whether transparency protections should be imposed for consumers, and (ii) the adequacy and enforceability of employment-related undertakings in light of changes to the transaction’s operating and employment structure.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On the competition assessment, the Tribunal proceeded from the factual premise that there was no geographic overlap between the acquiring group’s existing subsidised commuter bus services and the routes covered by the target business. On that basis, it concluded that the merger raised no competition concerns requiring extended analysis, and that the merger would not lead to a substantial lessening of competition.


However, the Tribunal treated public interest considerations as requiring specific attention. It recorded complaints by the Coalition Group and TAWU. The Coalition Group’s concerns related to the privatisation process of NTI and alleged irregularities, including a complaint that commuters were not consulted or involved. The Tribunal did not indicate that it would review the tender or privatisation process as such; instead, it focused on the effects of the merger on consumers and public interest considerations within its merger assessment framework.


A key factual and evaluative premise was that the government contract gave CCT the exclusive right to provide bus services on the relevant routes for seven years. The Tribunal accepted that taxi services were the only alternative on those routes, and noted the Commission’s view that taxis were not an adequate substitute due to their relatively higher prices compared to buses. It accepted the parties’ submission that NWS had enjoyed the same monopoly before the transaction, meaning the exclusivity was not newly created by the merger, but transferred in identity.


The Tribunal nevertheless reasoned that the merger changed the incentives of the exclusive rights-holder because the contract moved from a parastatal to a private operator. It therefore considered it important that consumer protections contained in the contract (including the regulated fare arrangements) should be transparent to consumers to enable them to enforce their rights if necessary. In that context, and expressly linking the condition to competition and public interest considerations (with reference to section 12(3)(a)), the Tribunal imposed a condition requiring the merging parties to disclose the relevant contractual stipulations on fares to consumers through a newspaper advertisement or notices on buses.


On employment, the Tribunal treated as material the confusion and mistrust generated among employees represented by the minority union (TAWU), which it attributed to the nature of the tender process, communications, or both. It accepted that initial undertakings regarding a one-year moratorium on retrenchments and other employee protections were given in a context where CCT was expected to be the employer, but that the revised structure placed employment in Expectra. This raised the practical question, also raised by the Commission, of what value an undertaking by CCT had if CCT was no longer the employer.


The Tribunal required further clarification after the hearing and received a memorandum in which Expectra undertook to respect the one-year moratorium on retrenchments that had been associated with CCT. While welcoming the undertaking, the Tribunal considered that, given the history and the peculiar transactional arrangements, it was appropriate to ensure the undertaking was enforceable by making it a condition of merger approval. The Tribunal’s stated rationale was that the moratorium was otherwise an agreement between buyer and seller, not something an individual employee could readily enforce, and that this justified conditioning the merger to ensure that the undertaking “bites”. In adopting this approach, it referred to its prior approach in the Telkom/Praysa merger.


TAWU also sought a longer protection period than one year, arguing that the seven-year subsidised contract reduced future business risk and justified longer employment protection. The Tribunal accepted that the merging parties contended that risk remained, including the possibility that taxis could become a greater competitive risk. The Tribunal placed weight on the fact that the majority union, SATTAWU, representing approximately 90% of workers, accepted the undertaking, and it received correspondence confirming this. The Tribunal reasoned that it had to respect outcomes of collective bargaining, and that altering an agreed arrangement would undermine that process and create uncertainty. On that basis, it declined to extend the period beyond one year, while indicating more generally that each case would be assessed on its own merits and that variations could occur where circumstances were compelling.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal found that the merger would not lead to a substantial lessening of competition and approved the transaction, but did so conditionally in deference to the public interest issues identified.


The approval was accompanied by conditions directed at consumer price transparency and employment protection. The Tribunal indicated that one condition required the merging parties to make known to consumers, by newspaper advertisement or a notice on buses, the contractual stipulations concerning the fares that may be charged during the contract period. It also made the one-year moratorium on retrenchments a condition of approval, to ensure enforceability notwithstanding the revised employment arrangements placing employees in Expectra.


The reasons provided do not set out any separate costs order, and the Tribunal’s conclusion focused on conditional approval with conditions contained in an attached order (not reproduced in the provided text).


Cases Cited


Telkom SA Ltd, TPI Investments and Praysa Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd (Competition Tribunal case no. 81/LM/Aug00).


Legislation Cited


Competition Act 89 of 1998, section 12(3)(a).


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, section 197(2).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the provided reasons.


Held


The Competition Tribunal held that, because there was no geographic overlap between the acquiring group’s subsidised commuter bus services and those of the target business being acquired, the merger raised no competition concerns and would not substantially lessen or prevent competition.


The Tribunal further held that public interest considerations warranted conditional approval, particularly because the exclusive, regulated, subsidised contract would pass from a parastatal to a private operator, making consumer transparency regarding fare regulation important, and because revised transaction arrangements created a risk that employee protections would be inadequately enforceable unless embodied as merger conditions.


The Tribunal therefore approved the merger subject to conditions requiring disclosure to consumers of fare-related contractual stipulations and making the one-year moratorium on retrenchments a condition of approval, while refusing to extend the moratorium beyond one year in light of collective bargaining outcomes.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Tribunal applied the principle that where a merger entails no competitive overlap in the relevant markets, it may be found not to result in a substantial lessening of competition, permitting approval on competition grounds.


The Tribunal applied the principle that merger control under the Competition Act may justify conditions addressing public interest considerations, including under section 12(3)(a), even where competition harm is not established, provided the conditions are directed at relevant public interest effects arising from the merger.


The Tribunal applied the principle that where employment-related protections are embodied in arrangements that may not be readily enforceable by individual employees—particularly due to transaction structures separating contract ownership from the identity of the employer—it may be appropriate to make those protections conditions of merger approval to ensure practical enforceability.


The Tribunal further applied the principle that, in considering whether to alter negotiated employment protections, weight may be given to the outcomes of collective bargaining, and that extending or changing agreed moratoria may be declined to avoid undermining bargaining processes and creating uncertainty, while acknowledging that such decisions remain context-specific.

IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
        Case no.: 52/LM/Jul04  
In the large merger between: 
Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd 
and 
Northwest Star  (Pty) Ltd
Reasons for Decision
________________________________________________________________
APPROVAL
On 1 October 2004 the Competition Tribunal conditionally approved the merger  
between Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd and Northwest Star (Pty). The reasons  
appear below.
The Parties
1. The primary acquiring firm is Cherry Creek Trading (“CCT”, also known as  
“Bojanala”),   a  newly   formed   company.   Its   shareholders   include   Unitrans,  
Tans Africa Holdings (“TAH”) and Mvelaphanda Holdings (“Mvela”).  
2. The target firm, Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd (“NWS”), is a government owned  
public   transport   company.   The   shares   of   NWS   are   owned   by   Northwest  
Transport Investments (“NTI”). NTI’s shares, in turn, are held as to 65.5%  
by the North West Provincial Government (“NWPG”) and as to 33.5% by  
the Public Investment Commissioner. One of NWS’ divisions, the Tlhabane  
business,   is   the   division   being   transferred     to   CCT   in   terms   of   this  
transaction.

The Merger Transaction and Rationale
c. In   March   1999   both   NWS   and   its   holding   company,   NTI   were  
placed under judicial management. The judicial managers were  
advised that, in order to extinguish the judicial debt, the various  
businesses comprising NWS should be disposed of in terms of  
a public tender process. This transaction arises in pursuance of  
this process. Commuter transport in this area is subsidized by  
the North West  Provincial  Government. The subsidy  therefore  
constitutes guaranteed income for CCT for a seven­year period.  
The   consumers  also  pay  a   fare   (the   ‘cash   fare’)   calculated   in  
terms   of   an   agreed   formula   and   subject   to   regular   annual  
increases.
4. The business being transferred to CCT comprises:
i.government contract to supply subsidized commuter bus services from  
two depots in North West Province, namely the Tlhabane depot and the  
Mogwase depot.
ii.186 buses that services these routes.
5. The   transaction   provides   for   the   establishment   of   a   share   trust,   all   the  
beneficiaries of which are employees of the acquiring firm of whom 95% are  
historically disadvantaged persons. Originally, the share trust was to hold a  
15% interest directly in CCT.
6. The   transaction   structure   changed   during   the   course   of  
negotiations. In terms of the revised structure, the parties split  
the   rights   and   obligations   of   CCT     amongst   the   two   primary  
shareholders, Class A Trading (“CAT”) (on behalf of TAH) and  
Expectra   (on   behalf   of   Mvela   and   Unitrans).   Accordingly,   the  
Share Trust would no longer hold a  direct interest in CCT, but  
would   instead   hold   an   indirect   interest   in   CCT   via   their   15%  
respective   shareholdings   in   CAT   and   Expectra.   The   finalised  
transaction structure is represented below:
Revised Transaction Structure

7. Although   this   change   of   structure   has   no   bearing   on   the  
competition issues related to this transaction, it does impact on  
the public interest considerations. This is dealt with more fully  
below. 
The relevant product and geographic markets
8. Cherry Creek is a newly formed entity.   Unitrans is a diversified transport,  
distribution   and   logistics   group.   TAH   provides   a   broad   range   of   road  
transportation   services.   Mvela   is   a   BEE   firm   which   has   no   previous  
involvement in commuter transport services. 
9. The target’s business that is being disposed of comprises contracts  
for the supply of subsidized commuter bus services from various depots in  
North West Province (specifically, in the Rustenburg, Koster, Thabazimbi,  
Bethanie and Mafikeng areas).
10. Although   some   of   the   shareholders   of   CCT   also   provide   subsidized  
commuter   bus   services,   there   is,   as   is   evident   from   the   table   below,   no  
geographic overlap with those services offered by the target firm.
Operators of Government Commuter Subsidized Services in the Various  
Regions
Firm OFS Gauteng Mpumalanga Limpopo W 
Cape 
KZN E. 
Cape

Cap

NW 
Provinc
e
Unitrans √ √
TAH √ √
CCT/NW
S

COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
11. Since there is no geographic overlap of the respective subsidized commuter  
bus   services,   there   are   no   competition   concerns   which   need   detain   us.

However,   a   number   of   public   interest   concerns   were   raised   by   various  
participants at the merger hearing.
PUBLIC INTEREST CONCERNS
12. The following parties made representations at the hearing:
i.NWS Management Forum representing retrenched employees,
ii.The Coalition Group Against the Unfair Process of the Privatisation of  
NTI, (“the Coalition Group”) represented by Mr Mahlangu,
iii.The Transport and Allied Workers' Union (“TAWU”), representing some  
6.72% of the employees of the business.
13. Just before the commencement of the hearing, we were advised in writing  
by the Management Forum that they no longer had any concerns and that  
they consequently withdrew their objection to the merger. We will deal with  
each of the other two concerns separately.
The Coalition Group’s Concerns
14. Both the Coalition Group and TAWU attended and made representations at  
the hearing. The Coalition Group’s complaints focused on the process of  
privatising  NTI.   They  also  complained   that   the   commuters   had  not   been  
consulted   or   involved   in   the   process.   They   alluded   to   certain   allegedly  
irregular practices  taking  place and requested that the  entire process be  
reviewed.
15. The contract with the North West government gives CCT the exclusive right  
to provide a bus service on the routes for the seven­year period. Given that  
the   only   alternatives   to   consumers   on   the   routes   in   question   are   taxi  
services,  which the Commission did not  consider an  adequate substitute  
because of their relatively high prices to those of buses, the parties have  
been   granted   a   monopoly   by   the   North   West   Government.   However   the  
parties   point   out   that   prior   to   the   merger,     NWS   enjoyed   the   same  
monopoly, so that nothing has changed except the identity of the party that  
enjoys   the   exclusivity.   They   also   make   the   point   that   consumers   are

enjoys   the   exclusivity.   They   also   make   the   point   that   consumers   are  
protected in two respects. Firstly, because as we have noted, the service is  
subsidized and secondly, that the rate the parties may charge consumers is  
regulated in terms of the agreement. 
16. What the merger does change is the incentive of the holder of the exclusive  
contract.   Prior   to   the   merger   the   contract   was   the   responsibility   of   a  
parastatal, now it is in private hands. For this reason the protection afforded  
consumers in the contract needs to be made transparent to consumers so  
that they can, if need be, enforce their rights. For this reason, given the  
opaque   nature   of   the   process   thus   far,   we   believe   that   it   is   in   both   the

interests   of   competition   and   the   public   interest   (See   section   12(3)(a))   to  
impose   a   condition   to   ensure   price   transparency   for   consumers   in   the  
affected region. Hence condition 1.2 in our order that requires the merging  
parties to make known to consumers by way of either an advertisement in  
the   newspapers   or   a   notice   on   the   buses   of   the   contractual   stipulation  
insofar as they relate to fares the merging parties may charge to consumers  
during the contract.
Employment Concerns
17. Employment concerns were raised by TAWU, which represents a minority  
of the employees in the target firm. Whether because of the nature of a  
tender   process   or   a   very   poor   communications   strategy   or   both,   the  
merging   parties’   treatment   of   employees   belonging   to   the   minority   union  
has been unfortunate. Not surprisingly they have viewed the process with  
suspicion   and   looked   to   the   public   interest   considerations   in   the   Act   to  
afford them some protection.  1
18. Initially, according to their tender proposal, the merging parties were going  
to utilise CCT as the operating company. It would have the contract, take  
over  the   employees  and  operate  the   routes.   T he   employees  were  being  
transferred in terms of Section 197(2) of the Labour Relations Act. In the  
Sale Agreement their rights to employment were further guaranteed for a  
minimum of one year.  2
19. Subsequently, it appears that the shareholders have decided to divide the  
business between them.   TAH would run certain routes and Expectra the  
rest. CCT would remain solely to own the rights in the contract. It appears  
that this created some difficulties as to where to house the employees and  
this was the query, which in frustration, TAWU’s attorney sought clarity on  
at the hearing. Only then did it emerge that notwithstanding the apparent

at the hearing. Only then did it emerge that notwithstanding the apparent  
division of the routes into the separate entities, all the employees would be  
employed   by   Expectra.   The   Commission   rightly   pointed   out   that   the  
undertakings   not   to   retrench   had   been   made   by   CCT   and   since   this  
company was no longer the employer, the Commission questioned what the  
undertaking was worth.
20. We   sought   clarity   on   this   issue   from   the   merging   parties   and   a   further  
memorandum  was  filed  subsequent  to  our  hearing.  In  this  memorandum  
1   The parties informed  us at the hearing that the Northwest Province  Government  takes a very  special  
interest   in   protecting   the   employees   and   they   referred   us   to   the   suspensive   conditions   of   the   Sale   of  
Business Agreement, specifically suspensive condition 3.1.1. The condition ensures that the parties have  
satisfy the
Northwest Province Government that the 15% interest in Cherry Creek is beneficially held for and on behalf  
of the employees and that the HDI obligation is complied with. 
2  As per clause 14.8 of the Sale of Business Agreement.

Expectra   gave   an   undertaking   to   respect   the   one   year   moratorium   on  
retrenchments that CCT had given. Although we welcome this undertaking  
we nevertheless are of the view  that given the history of the transaction  
thus far it would be appropriate to protect employees by ensuring that the  
undertaking ‘bites’ and hence we have made it a condition of the approval  
of   the   merger.   Note   that   in   this   case   the   moratorium   is   an   agreement  
between buyer and  seller  and therefore not something that  an  individual  
employee   could   enforce.   The   peculiar   arrangements   in   this   transaction  
justify making the undertaking a condition. In this respect we have followed  
our   approach   in   the   large   merger   between   Telkom   SA   Ltd   and   Praysa  
Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd .3
21. It remains for us to consider another issue raised by TAWU. The union is  
unhappy with the one­year moratorium on retrenchments and feels that this  
period is too short. TAWU points out that given that the company has a  
guaranteed contract for seven years, which includes a subsidy, there is no  
reason   why  workers  should  not   receive  a  far   longer   period   of  protection  
since the risk to the business going forward is minimal. The merging parties  
argued that there was still a risk inherent in the business going forward and  
substitute   transport   modes   such   as   taxis   may   well   become   a   greater  
competitive risk to them than they are now. 
22. They also point out that the majority union, SATTAWU, which represents  
approximately     90%   of   the   workers   in   the   target   firm,   has   accepted   the  
undertaking.   In   this   respect   we   have   received   correspondence   from  
SATTAWU confirming that this is the case. Whilst we are not unsympathetic  
to the argument raised by TAWU, we do as we have said in the past, have  
to respect the outcomes of collective bargaining. To alter an arrangement

to respect the outcomes of collective bargaining. To alter an arrangement  
agreed to would undermine that process and lead to uncertainty for both  
employees   and   employers.   Accordingly   we   decline   to   extend   the   period  
given in the undertaking.  Although we decided to refrain from extending the  
period given in the undertaking in this instance, every case will be assessed  
on   its   own   merits.     If   circumstances   are   compelling,   we   would   vary  
arrangements that are made for employees.  
23. We   further   urge   the   North   West   Provincial   Government,   if   their   concern  
really is for employee rights, to ensure that these are adequately protected. 
Conclusion
3  See  Telkom SA Ltd, TPI Investments and Praysa Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd  ­  81/LM/Aug00. In that case  the 
history of collective bargaining suggested that employees would be better protected by a condition to the  
merger, as a condition in the sale agreement was a  term of contract between the merging parties, Telkom and  
TFMC and, as such, was not readily enforceable by the individual employees  if not honoured.

We   conclude   that   the   merger   will   not   lead   to   a   substantial   lessening   of  
competition.   The   Tribunal   however   approves   the   transaction   conditionally,   in  
deference to the public interest issues that arise in this case. The conditions are  
contained in the Order attached hereto.
_____________ 20 October 2004
D. H. Lewis     Date
Concurring: N. Manoim, M. Mokuena
For the merging parties:   A. Gotz, instructed by Tabacks   Attorneys
For the Commission:  M. van Hoven,   Competition Commission