IN THE COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no.: 52/LM/Jul04
In the large merger between:
Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd
and
Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd
Reasons for Decision
________________________________________________________________
APPROVAL
On 1 October 2004 the Competition Tribunal conditionally approved the merger
between Cherry Creek Trading 14 (Pty) Ltd and Northwest Star (Pty). The reasons
appear below.
The Parties
1. The primary acquiring firm is Cherry Creek Trading (“CCT”, also known as
“Bojanala”), a newly formed company. Its shareholders include Unitrans,
Tans Africa Holdings (“TAH”) and Mvelaphanda Holdings (“Mvela”).
2. The target firm, Northwest Star (Pty) Ltd (“NWS”), is a government owned
public transport company. The shares of NWS are owned by Northwest
Transport Investments (“NTI”). NTI’s shares, in turn, are held as to 65.5%
by the North West Provincial Government (“NWPG”) and as to 33.5% by
the Public Investment Commissioner. One of NWS’ divisions, the Tlhabane
business, is the division being transferred to CCT in terms of this
transaction.
The Merger Transaction and Rationale
c. In March 1999 both NWS and its holding company, NTI were
placed under judicial management. The judicial managers were
advised that, in order to extinguish the judicial debt, the various
businesses comprising NWS should be disposed of in terms of
a public tender process. This transaction arises in pursuance of
this process. Commuter transport in this area is subsidized by
the North West Provincial Government. The subsidy therefore
constitutes guaranteed income for CCT for a sevenyear period.
The consumers also pay a fare (the ‘cash fare’) calculated in
terms of an agreed formula and subject to regular annual
increases.
4. The business being transferred to CCT comprises:
i.government contract to supply subsidized commuter bus services from
two depots in North West Province, namely the Tlhabane depot and the
Mogwase depot.
ii.186 buses that services these routes.
5. The transaction provides for the establishment of a share trust, all the
beneficiaries of which are employees of the acquiring firm of whom 95% are
historically disadvantaged persons. Originally, the share trust was to hold a
15% interest directly in CCT.
6. The transaction structure changed during the course of
negotiations. In terms of the revised structure, the parties split
the rights and obligations of CCT amongst the two primary
shareholders, Class A Trading (“CAT”) (on behalf of TAH) and
Expectra (on behalf of Mvela and Unitrans). Accordingly, the
Share Trust would no longer hold a direct interest in CCT, but
would instead hold an indirect interest in CCT via their 15%
respective shareholdings in CAT and Expectra. The finalised
transaction structure is represented below:
Revised Transaction Structure
7. Although this change of structure has no bearing on the
competition issues related to this transaction, it does impact on
the public interest considerations. This is dealt with more fully
below.
The relevant product and geographic markets
8. Cherry Creek is a newly formed entity. Unitrans is a diversified transport,
distribution and logistics group. TAH provides a broad range of road
transportation services. Mvela is a BEE firm which has no previous
involvement in commuter transport services.
9. The target’s business that is being disposed of comprises contracts
for the supply of subsidized commuter bus services from various depots in
North West Province (specifically, in the Rustenburg, Koster, Thabazimbi,
Bethanie and Mafikeng areas).
10. Although some of the shareholders of CCT also provide subsidized
commuter bus services, there is, as is evident from the table below, no
geographic overlap with those services offered by the target firm.
Operators of Government Commuter Subsidized Services in the Various
Regions
Firm OFS Gauteng Mpumalanga Limpopo W
Cape
KZN E.
Cape
N
Cap
e
NW
Provinc
e
Unitrans √ √
TAH √ √
CCT/NW
S
√
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
11. Since there is no geographic overlap of the respective subsidized commuter
bus services, there are no competition concerns which need detain us.
However, a number of public interest concerns were raised by various
participants at the merger hearing.
PUBLIC INTEREST CONCERNS
12. The following parties made representations at the hearing:
i.NWS Management Forum representing retrenched employees,
ii.The Coalition Group Against the Unfair Process of the Privatisation of
NTI, (“the Coalition Group”) represented by Mr Mahlangu,
iii.The Transport and Allied Workers' Union (“TAWU”), representing some
6.72% of the employees of the business.
13. Just before the commencement of the hearing, we were advised in writing
by the Management Forum that they no longer had any concerns and that
they consequently withdrew their objection to the merger. We will deal with
each of the other two concerns separately.
The Coalition Group’s Concerns
14. Both the Coalition Group and TAWU attended and made representations at
the hearing. The Coalition Group’s complaints focused on the process of
privatising NTI. They also complained that the commuters had not been
consulted or involved in the process. They alluded to certain allegedly
irregular practices taking place and requested that the entire process be
reviewed.
15. The contract with the North West government gives CCT the exclusive right
to provide a bus service on the routes for the sevenyear period. Given that
the only alternatives to consumers on the routes in question are taxi
services, which the Commission did not consider an adequate substitute
because of their relatively high prices to those of buses, the parties have
been granted a monopoly by the North West Government. However the
parties point out that prior to the merger, NWS enjoyed the same
monopoly, so that nothing has changed except the identity of the party that
enjoys the exclusivity. They also make the point that consumers are
enjoys the exclusivity. They also make the point that consumers are
protected in two respects. Firstly, because as we have noted, the service is
subsidized and secondly, that the rate the parties may charge consumers is
regulated in terms of the agreement.
16. What the merger does change is the incentive of the holder of the exclusive
contract. Prior to the merger the contract was the responsibility of a
parastatal, now it is in private hands. For this reason the protection afforded
consumers in the contract needs to be made transparent to consumers so
that they can, if need be, enforce their rights. For this reason, given the
opaque nature of the process thus far, we believe that it is in both the
interests of competition and the public interest (See section 12(3)(a)) to
impose a condition to ensure price transparency for consumers in the
affected region. Hence condition 1.2 in our order that requires the merging
parties to make known to consumers by way of either an advertisement in
the newspapers or a notice on the buses of the contractual stipulation
insofar as they relate to fares the merging parties may charge to consumers
during the contract.
Employment Concerns
17. Employment concerns were raised by TAWU, which represents a minority
of the employees in the target firm. Whether because of the nature of a
tender process or a very poor communications strategy or both, the
merging parties’ treatment of employees belonging to the minority union
has been unfortunate. Not surprisingly they have viewed the process with
suspicion and looked to the public interest considerations in the Act to
afford them some protection. 1
18. Initially, according to their tender proposal, the merging parties were going
to utilise CCT as the operating company. It would have the contract, take
over the employees and operate the routes. T he employees were being
transferred in terms of Section 197(2) of the Labour Relations Act. In the
Sale Agreement their rights to employment were further guaranteed for a
minimum of one year. 2
19. Subsequently, it appears that the shareholders have decided to divide the
business between them. TAH would run certain routes and Expectra the
rest. CCT would remain solely to own the rights in the contract. It appears
that this created some difficulties as to where to house the employees and
this was the query, which in frustration, TAWU’s attorney sought clarity on
at the hearing. Only then did it emerge that notwithstanding the apparent
at the hearing. Only then did it emerge that notwithstanding the apparent
division of the routes into the separate entities, all the employees would be
employed by Expectra. The Commission rightly pointed out that the
undertakings not to retrench had been made by CCT and since this
company was no longer the employer, the Commission questioned what the
undertaking was worth.
20. We sought clarity on this issue from the merging parties and a further
memorandum was filed subsequent to our hearing. In this memorandum
1 The parties informed us at the hearing that the Northwest Province Government takes a very special
interest in protecting the employees and they referred us to the suspensive conditions of the Sale of
Business Agreement, specifically suspensive condition 3.1.1. The condition ensures that the parties have
satisfy the
Northwest Province Government that the 15% interest in Cherry Creek is beneficially held for and on behalf
of the employees and that the HDI obligation is complied with.
2 As per clause 14.8 of the Sale of Business Agreement.
Expectra gave an undertaking to respect the one year moratorium on
retrenchments that CCT had given. Although we welcome this undertaking
we nevertheless are of the view that given the history of the transaction
thus far it would be appropriate to protect employees by ensuring that the
undertaking ‘bites’ and hence we have made it a condition of the approval
of the merger. Note that in this case the moratorium is an agreement
between buyer and seller and therefore not something that an individual
employee could enforce. The peculiar arrangements in this transaction
justify making the undertaking a condition. In this respect we have followed
our approach in the large merger between Telkom SA Ltd and Praysa
Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd .3
21. It remains for us to consider another issue raised by TAWU. The union is
unhappy with the oneyear moratorium on retrenchments and feels that this
period is too short. TAWU points out that given that the company has a
guaranteed contract for seven years, which includes a subsidy, there is no
reason why workers should not receive a far longer period of protection
since the risk to the business going forward is minimal. The merging parties
argued that there was still a risk inherent in the business going forward and
substitute transport modes such as taxis may well become a greater
competitive risk to them than they are now.
22. They also point out that the majority union, SATTAWU, which represents
approximately 90% of the workers in the target firm, has accepted the
undertaking. In this respect we have received correspondence from
SATTAWU confirming that this is the case. Whilst we are not unsympathetic
to the argument raised by TAWU, we do as we have said in the past, have
to respect the outcomes of collective bargaining. To alter an arrangement
to respect the outcomes of collective bargaining. To alter an arrangement
agreed to would undermine that process and lead to uncertainty for both
employees and employers. Accordingly we decline to extend the period
given in the undertaking. Although we decided to refrain from extending the
period given in the undertaking in this instance, every case will be assessed
on its own merits. If circumstances are compelling, we would vary
arrangements that are made for employees.
23. We further urge the North West Provincial Government, if their concern
really is for employee rights, to ensure that these are adequately protected.
Conclusion
3 See Telkom SA Ltd, TPI Investments and Praysa Trade 1062 (Pty) Ltd 81/LM/Aug00. In that case the
history of collective bargaining suggested that employees would be better protected by a condition to the
merger, as a condition in the sale agreement was a term of contract between the merging parties, Telkom and
TFMC and, as such, was not readily enforceable by the individual employees if not honoured.
We conclude that the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of
competition. The Tribunal however approves the transaction conditionally, in
deference to the public interest issues that arise in this case. The conditions are
contained in the Order attached hereto.
_____________ 20 October 2004
D. H. Lewis Date
Concurring: N. Manoim, M. Mokuena
For the merging parties: A. Gotz, instructed by Tabacks Attorneys
For the Commission: M. van Hoven, Competition Commission