Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd and Calcium Carbide Division of Sentrachem Limited (63/LM/Sep02) [2003] ZACT 3 (15 January 2003)

55 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition Law — Merger Approval — Unconditional approval of merger between Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd and Calcium Carbide Division of Sentrachem Limited — Merger involves acquisition of acetylene carbon black and calcium carbide businesses — No product overlap between merging parties, with vertical integration present but unlikely to lead to market foreclosure — Public interest concerns not negatively impacted, with no adverse effects on employment — Tribunal concludes merger will not substantially lessen competition and approves transaction unconditionally.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
        Case No: 63/LM/Sep02
In the large merger between: 
Silicon Technology (Pty) Ltd 
and
Calcium Carbide Division of Sentrachem Limited
_______________________________________________________________________
Reasons for Decision
_______________________________________________________________________
Approval
On   6   November   2002   we   unconditionally   approved   the   merger   between   Silicon  
Technology   (Pty)   Ltd   and   Sentrachem   Limited   in   respect   of   Sentrachem   Limited’s  
Calcium Carbide Division. The reasons for our decision follow. 
The transaction
This transaction entails an acquisition by Silicon Technology (“Siltech”) of certain  
businesses from Sentrachem Limited (“Sentrachem”). Siltech will acquire the acetylene  
carbon black and calcium carbide businesses of Sentrachem as going concerns. The sale  
constitutes one indivisible transaction. 
The primary acquiring firm is Siltech, a private company subsidiary of Lion Invest AG,  
ultimately controlled by Glencore International AG.
The primary target firms are the businesses of Sentrachem, a subsidiary of the Dow  
Chemical Company.
Sentrachem is disposing of all its non­core businesses hence this transaction.

Evaluating the merger
Siltech   produces   “75%   Ferrosilicon”,   an   alloy   of   iron   and   silicon,   as   well   as   its   by­
products, ferrosilicon slag and silica fume. However, its parent company, Glencore, is  
widely involved in the mining, smelting, refining and processing of metals and minerals.  
In South Africa, Glencore also produces anthracite.
Sentrachem is the only producer of calcium carbide in South Africa. Calcium carbide is  
manufactured   from   anthracite,   pitch   coke,   metallurgical   coke,   lime   dolomite   and  
electricity. It is used extensively as a desulphuriser in the steel and metallurgical industry,  
in   the   manufacture   of   calcium   cyanide   and   acetylene   for   the   welding   and   cutting  
industries. The sale of calcium carbide as a desulphuriser constitutes approximately 50%  
of the turnover of this part of the target business.
Sentrachem’s acetylene carbon black business uses calcium carbide to produce high  
purity elemental acetylene carbon black (“ACB”). ACB is distinguishable from the  
carbon black, which is used in manufacture of automobile tyres. At the hearing the parties  
submitted that ACB is currently not imported and the only customer for ACB in South  
Africa is Gillette, which manufactures zinc carbide batteries. Sentrachem has an  
evergreen supply contract with Gillette, which is subject to annual price negotiation. 
It is clear that the products produced by the acquirer and those produced by the target  
businesses are not substitutable and do not compete in the same market. Although there is  
no product overlap between the merging parties, the transaction does give rise to vertical  
integration since the target company consumes anthracite in its production process and  
the acquiring group produces anthracite. In fact, the target purchases 50% of its anthracite  
requirements from the acquiring group and the remaining part thereof from the Ingwe  
Coal Group.

Coal Group.
However, the target company’s purchases from the acquiring group constitute less than  
1% of the total market. Furthermore, the extent of this vertical integration is substantially  
diluted by the fact that the target company’s purchase of anthracite is determined by the  
actual  properties  of the anthracite  that  is required.  Thus foreclosure  of this market  is  
unlikely  because the target requires a particular blend of anthracite  that the acquiring  
group, by itself, cannot provide. 
Public interest concerns
The transaction will not impact negatively on employment. 
Conclusion
We conclude that the merger will not lead to a substantial lessening of competition.  The  
Tribunal therefore approves the transaction unconditionally. There are no public interest  
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concerns, which would alter this conclusion.
15 January 2003
N. Manoim Date
Concurring: F. Fourie, M. Holden
For the acquiring firm:    Werksmans
For the target firm: Bell Dewar & Hall Inc. 
For the Commission:  J. Mokwana, Legal Services Division, Competition  
Commission
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