COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 77/LM/Oct02
In the large merger between:
South African Airways (Pty) Ltd
and
Air Chefs (Pty) Ltd
_______________________________________________________________________
Reasons
_______________________________________________________________________
Approval
The Competition Tribunal issued a Merger Clearance Certificate on 25 October 2002
approving the merger without conditions. The reasons are set out below.
The merger
The transaction
South African Airways (Pty) Ltd (“SAA”) is buying all the remaining shares in Air Chefs
(Pty) Ltd. This is a vertical merger where the customer, SAA, is acquiring an upstream
service provider, Air Chefs.
The parties to the transaction
Transnet Ltd, a public company of which the South African Government is the sole
shareholder, controls SAA.
The primary target firm is Air Chefs (Pty) Ltd., a joint venture established between
Transnet Ltd (holding 51% of the issued share capital) and Fedics Strategic Investments
(Pty) Ltd (holding the remaining 49%).
An evergreen management agreement vested control of Air Chefs with Fedics.
Rational for the transaction
SAA is concerned that it was paying too much for the catering services supplied by Air
Chefs due to the Evergreen Management agreement, which contains a costplus 250%
mechanism. It was also not satisfied with the service levels, that Air Chefs supplied.
The Cabinet subcommittee on Restructuring recommended that the most viable
restructuring option for SAA would be the acquisition of Air Chefs by SAA.
Evaluating the merger
Relevant market
SAA operates in the airline passenger services market, with a generally limited
accompanying freight and cargo service. SAA is the largest domestic airline in the
country.
Air Chefs operates in a market upstream from that of SAA, providing inflight catering
services to domestic, regional and international airlines, which entails, inter alia, the
provision of meals, loading services, stock storage, chilling facilities and sanitation.
SAA offers flights to, from and within South Africa. Air Chefs operates kitchens in
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and George.
According to the parties the various inflight caterers have kitchens in the following
South African cities:
Table 1
Air Chefs Gate
Gourmet
LSG
Skychefs
Dyasons Ferucci Ground
Crew
Johannesburg Johannesburg Johannesburg Johannesburg
Cape Town Cape Town Cape town Cape Town
Durban Durban Durban
George George
Port
Elizabeth
East
London
Lanseria
2
The Commission, in its recommendation to us, indicates that one needs to consider the
direct cost of transport, as well as the indirect cost, when deciding the geographic market
because of e airlines stipulations such as the hygiene and freshness of the food they serve.
They say that airlines would thus be reluctant to source from any geographic location
other than the departing airport. Most of the caterers also have kitchens either within the
airport or very close to the airports that they service.
Taking into account all the above we agree with the Commission that SAA operates, for
the purposes of this analysis, in a domestic, a regional and an international market and
that in the case of the market for inflight catering and related services each airport
constitutes a separate geographic market.
Vertical effects on competition
The effect of the merger is to further integrate Air Chefs activities as a supplier into that
of its customer, SAA. It is thus only the potential vertical effects of the merger that we
need to be concerned about. More specifically we will focus on foreclosure and whether
it would be possible for SAA to raise its rivals’ costs or raise the barriers to entry, after
the merger.
There are currently 6 inflight caterers, which compete in some or all of the geographic
markets namely Air Chefs, Gate Gourmet, LSG Skychefs, Dyasons, Ferucci and Ground
Crew. According to the parties Air Chefs caters for 28 different airlines, Gate Gourmet
for 15, LSG Skychefs for 12, Daysons for 4, Ferucci for 3 and Grand Crew for 3.
Air Chefs, as indicated in table 1 above, is not present in Port Elizabeth, East London or
Lanseria either before or after the merger. Dyasons, Ferucci and Ground Crew 1 service
these smaller airports and the merger would, thus, not affect these geographic markets.
We will therefore focus on the remaining airports namely Johannesburg, Cape Town
Durban and George.
Durban and George.
The parties submitted the following market share data with regard to inflight catering,
per geographic market:
Table 2.
Air Chefs Gate
Gourmet
LSG
Skychefs
Dyasons Ground
Crew
HHI
Johannesbur
g
43% 20% 30% 7% 3198
1 Both Dyasons and Ferucci are small players that service niche markets and Gate Gourmet is a new
entrant.
3
Cape Town 32% 16% 37% 16% 2905
Durban 56% 25% 19% 4122
George 60% 40% 5200
As can be seen in table 2 the remaining geographic markets are all highly concentrated. 2
In the larger cities there are 3 to 4 players present at each airport while at smaller centers
only 2, depending on the amount of air traffic that the airport carries. 3 Smaller airports
just don’t have the economies of scale to support more than two inflight caterers.
According to the parties some airlines use the services of two or more inflight caterers,
Air Chefs plus another, as shown in table 3. One of the reasons for this is that Air Chefs
is not present at the smaller airports such as Port Elizabeth Airport, East London Airport
and Lanseria Airport, which are serviced by niche players. These players, according to
the parties, although presently not located at the larger airports, nevertheless pose a threat
of entry to their larger competitors, should they raise prices excessively or render poor
service.
Table 3
Air Chefs Gate
Gourmet
LSG
Skychefs
Dyasons Ferucci Ground
Crew
SAA SAA SAA
Comair Comair
SA Express SA Express SA Express SA Express
Nationwide Nationwide
SA Airlink SA Airlink SA Airlink
Air Namibia Air Namibia
Air Mauritius Air Mauritius
The Commission, however, found the barriers to entry into the inflight catering market
2 A postmerger HHI above 1800 is generally considered to be highly concentrated, see the US merger
guidelines.
3 According to the parties a route such as the one to and from George, for example, is too small to
accommodate more than two competing inflight caterers.
4
to be high because, according to evidence provided to them by other players, it was not
easy to get premises close to the airport. They were told that the nature of the product and
the supply chain necessitates the inflight caterer to be located on or very close to the
airport and the Johannesburg airport, for instance, does not have space to accommodate
new players.
The parties submitted a different view. According to them it is not necessary to be present
at the airport. LSG, for example, which is the second largest caterer, has premises close
to the Johannesburg and Cape Town Airports buy not in the airports. 4 Furthermore,
Ground Crew, a new player in the market, has secured premises in Johannesburg Airport.
In light of this we find that entry into the inflight catering market is not difficult.
According to the parties it is not uncommon for airlines to integrate backwards, some of
the major international airlines own inflight catering services such as Lufthansa, which
owns LSG Skychefs and Air France, which owns Serve Air. As is the case with LSG
Skychefs, SAA has indicated that it will maintain Air Chefs as a competitor of LSG
Skychefs and others because this industry relies on economies of scale to cover its costs.
Even a small reduction in the use of its capacity will have a drastic effect on its profits.
The parties therefore argue that a foreclosure strategy would be counterproductive as it
would lead to a decrease in Air Chefs sales and thus an increase in its costs and hence
SAA’s . SAA would thus have increased its own costs, whilst its rivals would be able to
turn to alternative sources for supply.
The parties also argued that another class of likely entrants are food and catering
companies, many of which are large concerns who could easily adapt their business
models to enter if supra –competitive prices were being charged.
Thus, although this is a concentrated market, the merger is unlikely to facilitate a rational
Thus, although this is a concentrated market, the merger is unlikely to facilitate a rational
foreclosure strategy or to increase barriers to entry, because there are alternative non
integrated players with sufficient capacity in the market, including a real threat of entry
by smaller niche players. Secondly, barriers to entry are low.
The Commission, furthermore, points out that countervailing power exists in the inflight
catering market. Customers of the inflight catering companies are suppliers of airline
passenger services, which are mostly large entities that have the ability to exercise a
measure of buying power. These customers can easily switch between suppliers since the
switching cost in this industry is low. Airlines have told the Commission that poor
service would induce a company to change its inflight catering company rather than
price. This is due to the fact that the fixed catering cost per passenger represents a very
small part of the total price of an air flight ticket. 5
4 The Commission was not aware of this.
5 For example catering costs per passenger represents only 2.5% of the total cost on the JohannesburgCape
5
Taking into consideration all the above factors we agree with the Commission that the
merger will not substantially prevent or lessen competition.
Public Interest
The parties submit that the transaction will not give rise to any public interest concerns.
_____________ 12 November 2002
N. Manoim Date
Concurring: D. Lewis, U. Bhoola
Counsel: D Unterhalter
Attorneys: Bowman Gillfillan D Dingley
Cliffe Dekker Jean Meijer
A Coetzee for Competition Commission
Town route.
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