COMPETITION TRIBUNAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 49/1R/Jul02
In the matter between:
Nkosinauth Ronald Msomi 1 st Applicant
T/a Minnie Cigarette Wholesalers
Marian Cigarette Wholesalers 2nd Applicant
Cigarette City (Pty) Ltd 3rd Applicant
Singh’s Cigarette Distributors 4th Applicant
PTH Investments (Pty) Ltd 5th Applicant
South Coast Cigarette Agency 6th Applicant
Courtesy Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 7th Applicant
I.H. Randeree 8th Applicant
Jamadars Wholesale 9th Applicant
Everlast Cigarette Distributors 10th Applicant
Noorgat Wholesalers 11th Applicant
and
British American Tobacco Respondent
South Africa (Pty) Ltd
1
________________________________________________________________
Reasons for Tribunal Decision
________________________________________________________________
1. This in an interim relief application, which we heard on the 31st July on the
basis of urgency. The applicants, all distributors of the respondent’s
products, seek relief to prevent the respondent from terminating the
existing distribution agreement and replacing it with a new agreement
which the applicants maintain constitutes a prohibited practice.
2. On the 31 st July 2002 we dismissed the application. Our reasons for that
decision follow.
INTRODUCTION
3. The applicants are eleven firms, based in KwaZulu Natal, engaged in the
business of distributing cigarettes for the respondent, the dominant
cigarette producer in the country. 1
4. All of them have entered into distribution agreements with the
respondent’s predecessor, Rothmans International of South Africa, or its
associates2. Although we were advised that the agreements differ in some
respects we were informed that for the purpose of this application their
material terms are the same as those contained in annexure NRM 2. (For
convenience we will refer to this class of agreement as the ‘old
agreement’.)
5. In May 2002, the respondent advised its distributors that it intended giving
notice to terminate the old agreements as of the end of June 2002 and to
replace them with a new agreement. 3 (For convenience we refer to this
class of agreement as the ‘new agreement’.) After consultation with some
of its distributors this period of notice was extended until the end of July
1 The applicants more formally describe themselves as wholesalers and distributors of cigarettes
and allied products.
2 According to the applicants the respondent merged or acquired the entire shareholding of
2 According to the applicants the respondent merged or acquired the entire shareholding of
Rothmans. It is not disputed that the respondent is the correct party to be cited in this matter.
3 This is to be found in the Record at page 285, Annexure AS 13 to the answering affidavit of Mr
Schenk. The applicants had attached as annexure NRM 3 the new agreement, but according to
the respondent this was an earlier draft and the AS 13 is the most recent draft. Nevertheless, the
distinction between the versions has not been relevant for our purposes.
2
2002. 4 The respondent requires its distributors to enter into the new
agreement if they wish to distribute its products after 31 July 2002.
6. The new agreement has changed the manner in which distributors are
compensated and reduced the margin of compensation for some
distributors. The applicants contend that certain terms of the new
agreement contravene sections 5(1), 5(2) and 8(c) of the Competition Act.
For this reason they have approached us by way of urgency to restore the
status quo prior to the expiration of the notice period. 5 By agreement with
the parties we heard this matter on the 31 st July, the last day of the notice
period.
RELIEF SOUGHT
7. The applicants seek the following relief:
That the respondent:
be interdicted and restrained from giving effect to its notice of
intention to cancel the distributorship agreements concluded by the
Applicants with Rothmans International of South Africa (Pty) Ltd or
its associate companies (“existing agreements”);
be directed to continue trading with the applicants on the terms and
conditions set out in the existing agreements. 6
8. During the course of the hearing the applicants indicated that they would
in the alternative agree to relief being granted in a more restrictive form.
As the concession was relevant only to whether the relief sought in its
original form was overbroad and not to whether any form of relief is
competent, which we have found it is not, it is not necessary for us to
analyse it any further. 7
4 In terms of the agreement the respondent can cancel the agreement by giving a distributor 30
days notice. See annexure NRM 2 paragraph 4.1.
5 Note that in the normal course an applicant for urgent relief does not have to establish grounds
for urgency. It is only when the applicant seeks to shorten the time periods for hearing an interim
relief application, from those set out in the Tribunal ‘s Rules, that the basis for ‘urgent
circumstances’ needs to be alleged. (See Rule 28(3) of the Tribunal Rules.)
6 The applicants asked that the order apply until the complaint has been finalised or for a period
of 6 months, whichever occurs earlier. (See page 31 of the Transcript)
7 See page 33 of the transcript. The applicants’ concession related to the fact that they would
have no objection to the respondent removing any distinction between the various categories of
distributor, provided for in the old agreement, which we discuss more fully below.
3
9. The respondent opposed the granting of relief contending that the
applicants had not met any of the requirements for interim relief in terms of
section 49 C. The amended form of relief offered at the hearing did not
cure its objections.
10. The respondent also took an in limine point that relief in its original form
imposed upon the respondent a contractual relationship with the
applicants in circumstances where the contractual relationship had been
terminated. This, the respondent contends, offends against common law
principles.8
REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERIM RELIEF
11. In terms of section 49 C (2)(b) the Tribunal:
“...may grant an interim order if it is reasonable and just to do so,
having regard to the following factors:
The evidence relating to the alleged prohibited practice;
The need to prevent serious or irreparable damage to the applicant; and
The balance of convenience.
12. In an application in terms of section 49 C, an applicant is required to make
out a prima facie case of a restrictive practice. As we observed in the York
Timbers 9 case:
“Applying this analysis to our Act means that we must first establish
if there is evidence of a prohibited practice, which is the Act’s
analogue of a prima facie right .We do this by taking the facts
alleged by the applicant, together with the facts alleged by the
respondent that the applicant cannot dispute, and consider whether
having regard to the inherent probabilities, the applicant should on
those facts establish the existence of a prohibited practice at the
hearing of the complaint referral.
If the applicant has succeeded in doing so we then consider the
“doubt’ leg of the enquiry. Do the facts set out by the respondent in
contradiction of the applicant’s case raise serious doubt or do they
constitute mere contradiction or an unconvincing explanation. If
constitute mere contradiction or an unconvincing explanation. If
8 See Shenk's affidavit paragraph 6, Record page 155.
9 See York Timbers v SA Forestry Company Ltd : Tribunal Case No 15/IR/Feb01.
4
they do raise serious doubt the applicant cannot succeed.” 10
13. In this matter we have found that the applicants have not made out a
“prima facie case though open to some doubt”. It is therefore not
necessary for us to deal with the remaining requirements of section 49C
viz. irreparable harm and the balance of convenience or to decide the in
limine point.
EVIDENCE OF A PROHIBITED PRACTICE
Introduction
14. In brief, the applicants ’ case is that the new agreement contains
requirements, not present in the old agreement, that alter the manner in
which distributors are compensated for their services by the respondent in
such a way as to both reduce their margins and to raise their costs. In
short the procompetitive status quo will be transmogrified into an
anticompetitive one under the new agreement.
15. The applicants are all in business as distributors of cigarettes and tobacco
products. For several years they have all distributed the respondent’s
products in terms of the old agreement or an agreement that for our
purposes was materially the same.
16. Crucial to this agreement was the manner in which distributors were
compensated for their services. Under the old agreement the distributor
was entitled to certain rebates and discounts on the respondent’s listed
wholesale price. The largest part of this form of compensation comprised
the socalled “service fee”. This fee was determined by the categorization
of the distributor in question, irrespective of the service levels or
performance of the distributor. Three categories of distributors were
created namely specialists, general wholesalers and cash and carry
operations.
17. The highest form of compensation was paid to specialist distributors who
were defined as firms who derived 80% of their income from cigarette and
were defined as firms who derived 80% of their income from cigarette and
tobacco sales. Six of the applicants were classified as specialist
distributors.
18. The respondent seeks in the new agreement to eliminate these
10 See paragraphs 6465 of the York Timbers decision.
5
distinctions, which it argues are outmoded. 11
19. The respondent justifies moving to the new system on the basis, firstly,
that there were flaws in the old system and, secondly, that the
environment in which it operated had changed.
20. According to the respondent:
“.. since 1995 annual cigarette consumption in South Africa has fallen
by some ten billion cigarettes, or 30%. This fall could be ascribed to
the following:
A sharp rise in the real retail price of cigarettes principally due to
increased excise duties on tobacco.
Progressively tighter regulation and prohibition of tobacco advertising.
Regulation of smoking in the workplace and public spaces.
Concerted campaigns to educate the public about the longterm health
risks associated with smoking tobacco. 12
21. The respondent, which was formed as a result of the merger in 1999
between the tobacco interests of the Rembrandt Group and those of
British American Tobacco, is the largest cigarette manufacturer in the
country with, by its own admission, 93,3% of the market. Its nearest rival,
Japan Tobacco International which makes Camel cigarettes locally, has
only 4,6% of the market. 13
22. In 2000 the respondent launched a twoyear study of what it describes as
its ‘secondary supply chain’ i.e. the supply from the manufacturer to the
distributor. According to the respondent it is this study that led to the
redesign of its distribution system that now finds legal form in the new
agreement.
23. It is certainly common cause between the experts of both sides that trends
11 The reason that specialist distributors received this preferred form of compensation is
testimony, not to the bargaining power of these firms at the time the old agreements were
concluded, but to the way the distribution function has changed. The applicants point out that it
was the respondent who created the specialist category of distributor because at the time it
wanted to encourage dedicated specialist distributors of its products . As stated earlier the
applicants at the hearing sought to amend their relief in a manner that would allow the respondent
to eliminate this distinction, as they had no objection to that part of the respondent’s justification
for the new agreement.
12 See Report of Malherbe, Annexure AS 2 to the respondent’s answering affidavit, Record page
220.
13 See Report of Malherbe, Record page 221.
6
in logistics have resulted in a major shake up of how manufacturers of fast
moving consumer goods distribute their products.
24. Manufacturers now demand more of their supply chain than simply getting
their product from the factory warehouse to the retailer’s shelf. It is these
new imperatives, not a desire to reduce competition among its distributors
that has, according to the respondent, informed its decision to terminate
the old agreement and require its distributors to enter into the new one.
25. The applicants retort is that the respondent’s procompetitive justifications
for the new system, which range from claims from improved efficiencies,
promoting empowerment of Black business to ensuring the integrity of the
tax system, are a superficial attempt to mask its real intentions – to
squeeze an extra R92 million from the distribution system for itself. 14 The
cost of doing, they maintain, is to make the distribution system less
competitive.
Content of the agreements
26. In terms of the old agreement the distributors were paid a fee depending
on what category of distributor they fell into and the category of product
that they were distributing. 15 This fee can be broken down according to
the applicants as follows:
A service fee of – 15.00
An EFT 16 incentive of – 0.60
Settlement discount of – 3,83
Total 19,43 17
14 See page 347 and 380 of the record where the Applicant expresses the hope that the
Respondent will explain to the Tribunal why it is necessary to retain an amount of R92 million per
year in order to make a onceoff payment of R16.7 million for an empowerment program. In its
heads of argument the respondent concedes “It is also plain that the respondent stands to profit
financially from the new structure.” (See respondents’ heads of argument paragraph 7)
15 Answering affidavit paragraph 37.4.
16 EFT stands for Electronic Funds Transfer. This method of payment entails that the distributors
deposit the payment they receive from retailers into their own accounts and then transfer the
funds electronically to BATSA’s account. Under this system the bank charges for cash deposits,
accrue to the distributor not the respondent. Apparently a high proportion of the distributors’
customers pay in this form making the costs of this system not insignificant for small businesses.
17 See Annexure NRM 4 PG 124. This is the fee for the specialist distributor. The respondent
attached a different document Annexure AS 7 in which the settlement discount is higher, R 4.19
giving a total of R 19,79. Nothing turns on this difference however and as the respondent used
NRM 4 to make its arguments we shall stick to those figures.
7
27. According to the applicants on average about half of this amount, R 9,72,
which amounts to a discount of 2,5% of the wholesale price, is passed on
to retailers who in turn pass about 1 % of that on to the consumer. The
respondent denies that the discount is passed on to the consumer and
claims that prices remain unaffected at retail level.
28. According to Mr. Schenk, the respondent’s marketing director:
“The benefits of discounted price to retailers are, accordingly not passed to
consumers and, save for increased profits to retailers, no efficiency is
achieved from this discount and the resources are entirely wasted.” 18
29. The new agreement has altered the mode of compensation in two ways.
Firstly it reduced the fee to the distributor and secondly it changed the way
the distributor is paid for its services. Under the new system the distributor
is rewarded incrementally on the basis of complying with the respondent’s
prescribed requirements.
30. The new system will reward a distributor for the following performances by
paying a performance reward of:
1) R1.34 per thousand cigarettes for warehousing, taking into
account storage, security and logistically efficient receiving and
dispatch of product.
2) R2.15 per thousand cigarettes for complying with BATSA’s
requirements regarding stock inventory to be held at a given time.
3) R4.92 per thousand cigarettes for timeous payment by electronic
fund transfer (EFT) of accounts.
4) R4.39 per thousand cigarettes for delivering a minimum of 100
delivery customers per week.
5) R0.39 per thousand cigarettes for using the BATSA’s information
system to which BATSA must have access.
TOTAL 13,19 per thousand cigarettes 19
31. According to the respondent the philosophy behind the new system is that
distributors are rewarded in relation to specific efficiencies that they
18 See answering affidavit paragraph 37.5.2
18 See answering affidavit paragraph 37.5.2
19 The R 13,19 per thousand cigarettes is highest total performance reward that a distributor
could qualify for.
8
introduce to the system. 20
32. The applicants maintain that the respondent is intent on eliminating their
ability to pass on discounts to retailers. They rely for this proposition on
not only the operational effect of the new system, but also a statement in a
document emanating from the respondent, which explains its motives for
the introduction of the new system. In this document the respondent
states:
“The current operating environment has resulted in the wholesale industry
offering retail discounts and rebates off the established pricing structure.
Wholesalers have been competing on their pricing ability and service
levels have suffered as a result. The discount element will therefore be
removed from the pricing structure between British American Tobacco
South Africa and the wholesaler.” 21
33. According to the applicants:
“…the decreasing of the performance rewards in order to render it
impossible for distributors to allow discounts is per se anti
competitive.” 22
34. The respondent does not deny its intention to inhibit discounting, but
denies that this is anticompetitive. On the contrary it argues that
distribution will become even more competitive as distributors will be
competing on performance and not on discounts given to retailers out of
their service fee. 23
35. The respondent goes on to argue that under the new system the
distributors will be better off as they will pocket the entire distribution fee of
R 13,19, assuming of course that they qualify for the maximum fee,
instead of the R9, 72 24 that they received under the old system because
they gave away half their fee to the retailers. 25 This conclusion should be
20 The approach to rewarding efficiencies is not entirely consistent as not all requirements are
rewarded. See Malherbe report page 231 – which indicates that some efficiencies are treated as
contractual prerequisites e.g. the requirement of minimum purchase of 100 000 cigarettes per
order, and are not rewarded, whilst others are rewarded by the agreement. The contract also
indiscriminately rewards some variable and some fixed costs
21 See pag e 121 of the Record.
22 See Paragraph 29.1 of the complaint Record pg 49.
23 See paragraph 37.8.2 of the respondent’s answering affidavit, Record page 187and the report
of the respondent’s expert paragraph 75, page 446.
24 The assumption is based on a specialist distributor.
25 See paragraph 37.82 of the respondent’s answering affidavit, page 187.
9
treated with a healthy degree of scepticism, as no doubt the applicants
would not be at our door if they saw their selfinterest being furthered in
the same way. Certainly the specialist distributor who was privileged under
the old system will be worse off under the new. 26
36. Another important change brought about by the new agreement is the
reduction in the wholesale price that the respondent charges to the
distributors for its products. Under the old system a distributor was in the
position of a classic wholesaler who would buy from the respondent at the
wholesale price less an effective fee/ discount on the wholesale price, part
of which would be passed on to the retailer. Since the wholesale price was
known to retailers they would expect at the very least to be offered the
wholesale price or something less than that by the distributor. The
distributor would utilise the difference between the wholesale price and the
de facto discount it received on it, to bargain with the retailer. 27 On
average for the specialist distributor, who received a “service fee discount
of 37%” more than other wholesalers performing the same service 28, this
worked out to R9,72 given a margin of R19.43 per 1000 cigarettes.
37. By lowering the discount and decreasing the distribution fee 29 (for which
we read discount) the respondent has narrowed the distributor’s room to
manoeuvre in its negotiations with retailers. Since under the new system
retailers will also be aware of the revised wholesale price they will again
have expectations that they will pay at most the wholesale price for the
respondent’s products. The likely outcome is that distributors will cease
discounting to the retailers and sell at the revised wholesale price keeping
the reduced distribution fee for themselves this seems to be the outcome
that the respondent seeks.
that the respondent seeks.
38. Assuming then, at best for the applicants, that the scheme under the new
agreement leads to:
less price competition between distributors and thus retailers;
the elimination of certain distributors who are no longer profitable
under the new system; and /or
26 See applicants replying affidavit par 81(c) page 378.
27 In this case under the old system it appears that distributors received a flat fee although it is
commonly understood and referred to by both parties as a discount because the fee
approximated at least on the applicants version to a certain percentage of the wholesale price
See paragraph 23 of the applicants complaint page 46.
28 The monetary difference between the discount of a Specialist and that of a “Cash and Carry”
distributor was R5.95 per 1000 cigarettes.
29 In the old system this was called a service fee.
10
the likelihood that the respondents’ wholesale price will be
‘maintained’, that is, that it will be the minimum price at which the
distributors will uniformly sell to retailers, bar some exceptions. 30
39. We then have to ask the question whether those outcomes amount to
contraventions of the Act by the respondent in the manner alleged or
merely the reflection of the respondent ‘s ability to exercise its leverage
over the supply chain to its best advantage? Put another way, to borrow
an expression used by respondent’s counsel, does utilising one’s
dominance to squeeze, amount to utilising one’s dominance to abuse?
40. We will now consider this in relation to each of the prohibited practices
alleged by the applicants.
Section 5(1)
41. Section 5(1) states:
An agreement between parties in a vertical relationship is
prohibited if it has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening
competition in a market, unless a party to the agreement can prove
that any technological, efficiency or other procompetitive, gain
resulting from that agreement outweighs that effect.
42. It is common cause that the applicants are in a vertical relationship with
the respondent. According to the applicants the relevant market is the
market for the distribution of cigarette products. The applicants’ complaint
is that the new agreement, because of the cumulative effect of the
features, which we referred to earlier, substantially lessens or prevents
competition in the relevant market in that:
(a) it will make it impossible for them as small traders to remain in the
market and a fortiori, with fewer participants, the market will
become less competitive; and/or
(b) it will eliminate price and service competition amongst distributors.
43. We will examine each of these propositions separately.
43. We will examine each of these propositions separately.
44. In order to succeed with the first proposition, the applicants need to
30 The respondent alleges that in some places such as Mpumalanga retailers purchase above
the recommended wholesale price. See page 183, par. 37.3.1 of the Record.
11
demonstrate that the new system will lead to the elimination of distributors
and secondly that this reduction in the number of competitors will lessen
competition. Whilst typically competition is premised on a plurality of
competitors there is no optimum number of participants in a market and
indeed an efficient market often leads to the culling of inefficient
competitors.
45. The respondent has made much of what they see as a concession by the
applicants’ expert that under the new system there will be intense
competition amongst wholesalers. 31 This concession, if it amounts to that,
is coupled with the expert’s observation that the smaller and specialist
wholesalers will be detrimentally impacted. This perhaps goes to the heart
of the applicants’ theory in this case – viz. that competition law is there to
protect competitors and hence any scheme that could have as its effect
the elimination of competitors is therefore anticompetitive. This is not so. It
is trite law, as was observed by the United States Supreme Court in the
Brown Shoe case, and has since then been elevated to a sacred mantra
by competition authorities universally, that competition law is there to
protect the competitive process not competitors. 32 Whilst markets function
properly if they ensure competitive prices and services, they also function
properly if they eliminate inefficient players. The applicants seek to
sacrifice the latter requirement on the altar of the former.
46. Nevertheless the first proposition is not supported by the applicants’ own
figures. In Annexures “SR 2”/4 to SR4/6 33 the applicants show that the
new agreement is not viable for small distributors who distribute less than
100 cases of cigarettes per week. However, distributors who distribute 400
cases are profitable provided that they do not pass on any portion of their
cases are profitable provided that they do not pass on any portion of their
fee as a discount. Distributors who distribute 1000 cases per week were
profitable even if they passed on a discount of 1,5 % although not a
discount of 2%. Indeed for this class of distributor the applicants’ figures
show that if the firm did not pass on a discount it would earn R75 570
under the new system as opposed to R53 290 under the old.
47. However their figures show that the small distributor 34 is also not viable
under the present system i.e. the old agreement. It therefore cannot be
said with any certainty on these facts that the new system will lead to a
greater reduction of distributors than would the old system, and even if it
would, the applicants have failed to indicate how much the market would
31 See report of Mr Moodley pg 446.
32 See Brown Shoe Co v US 370 US 294, 320 (1962 ).
33 See page 461 of the Record.
34 A small distributor buys approximately 100 cases per week. See page 459 of the record.
12
be foreclosed as a result. Indeed as we have observed elsewhere the
applicants have provided no evidence of the extent of the market for which
they account, or indicated which of the applicants is less likely to survive
the new regime. As the respondent’s have argued, we cannot assume that
all the applicants are in the same commercial position. What little evidence
of distinction between them that we have is that of the eleven, six are
specialist distributors and the others are not. 35
48. The first proposition is therefore not sustainable.
49. To sustain their second proposition the applicants have attempted to make
out a case that the new system will lead to a reduction in discounts that
the distributors will pass on to retailers and hence retailers will not be able
to pass on lower prices to consumers. Now it is a widely accepted in
competition law that a reduction in intrabrand competition is not ordinarily
a matter of concern unless there is a reduction in interbrand
competition.36 This is not the case that the applicants have sought to
make on the papers although it can be inferred from some of the evidence
that they have adduced. Certainly given the pervasive presence of the
respondent in the cigarette manufacturing market and its size relative to
that of its competitors, we can conclude that interbrand competition is
weak and hence their should be a heightened concern about intrabrand
competition. Even if we accept that prima facie the applicants have a
persuasive case for claiming that one of the effects of the new agreement
is that discounts to retailers will be eliminated, especially in the face of the
respondents stated intention to achieve this, the evidence of a lessening
of competition is hardly compelling. On their own version the best that the
of competition is hardly compelling. On their own version the best that the
applicants can show is that retailers may no longer pass on to consumers
the discount of 1%. This is too trivial a figure to amount to meet the
requirement of “substantiality” laid down in section 5(1).
50. What seems more likely on the facts is that this is about a margin squeeze
and not about a lessening of competition.
51. Accordingly the second proposition also fails and hence the complaint in
terms of section 5(1) has not been established.
35 See applicants replying affidavit par. 81(d), page 378 of the Record (The applicants refer to
“six o ut of twelve applicants” , we assume this is an error as there are only eleven applicants.)
36 See Competition Tribunal Case No: 44/LM/Jul01, DaimlerChrysler SA (Pty) Ltd and Sandown
Motor Holdings (Pty) Ltd where we discuss inter versus intrabrand competition, as well as
Competition Law by Richard Wish, fourth edition, Butterworths, page 541542 where he considers
the interplay between interbrand and intrabrand competition concluding that a restriction of intra
brand competition is likely to raise concerns only where interbrand competition is weak.
13
Section 5(2)
52. Section 5(2) states:
The practice of minimum resale price maintenance is prohibited.
53. The applicants at the outset correctly concede that the new agreement
does not amount to a legal imperative from the respondent imposing
minimum resale price maintenance. Rather they argue the cumulative
effect of the new agreement is such that, de facto as opposed to de iure,
the distributors will be forced to resell at the same price, namely the
respondents wholesale price and that this is a minimum price and hence
we have minimum resale price maintenance.
54. Whilst the argument that a minimum resale price may be unlawfully
maintained, even in the absence of a legally enforceable obligation, may
be correct, we do not need to decide this point. At best for the applicants
the case law suggests that there must be some evidence of coercion on
the reseller in order for it to be a suggestion that a price is being
maintained.37 On the facts there is nothing to prevent the distributors from
discounting the wholesale price. 38 Certainly they have less largesse to
spread, given the austerity of their new form of compensation, but there is
37 In Carlson Machine Tools, Inc. v American Tool 678 F.2D 1253; 1982 U.S. App. (1982) the
Court of Appeals summarised the decisions taken on suggested list prices as follows: “In United
States v Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed.992 (1919 ) the Court said that “The
mere suggestion of list prices by a manufacturer, however, is not enough to establish the
existence of resale price’”. Resale price maintenance occurs “when a price is announced and
some course of action is undertaken or threatened contingent on the willingness or unwillingness
of the retailer to adopt the price …(resale price maintenance) must involve making a meaningful
event depend on compliance or noncompliance with the “suggested” or stated price”. Aladin
Oil, supra, 603F.2d at 111718 . ln Yentsch v Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1980) the
Second Circuit of the US Appeals Court said ‘Evidence of exposition, persuasion, argument, or
pressure on the part of the manufacturer is insufficient, without more, to establish coercion
required for resale price maintenance’.”
The European Court of Justice held in Pronuptia de Paris v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis
[1986] ECR 353, [1986] 1 CMLR 414 that the recommendation of prices would not, in itself,
infringe Article 81(1). In the Commission’s Guidelines on Vertical Restraints , (2000/C291/01)
paragraph 47, it notes: “However, RPM (resale price maintenance) can also be achieved through
indirect means. Examples of the latter are an agreement fixing the distribution margin, fixing the
maximum level of discount the distributor can grant from a prescribed price level, making the
grant of rebates or reimbursement of promotional costs by the supplier subject to the observance
of a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the resale prices of competitors,
threats, intimidation, warnings, penalties, delay or suspension of deliveries or contract
terminations in relation to observance of a given price level.”
38 There was some evidence that the respondent’s employees enforced a system of maximum
resale price maintenance but that is not a contravention of the Act. See page 373 of the record
where Randeree says that at one stage the Respondent’s sales representative called him and
14
nothing preventing the distributors from doing so. The applicants’ figures
which show increasing returns to higher volume distributors suggesting
that some distributors will be able to continue to discount even with the
thinner margins of the new system.
55. We thus find that there is no evidence that the new agreement amounts to
the imposition of minimum resale price maintenance in contravention of
section 5(2).
Section 8(c)
56. Section 8(c) states:
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed
in paragraph (d), if the anticompetitive effect of that act
outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro
competitive gain;
57. In order to succeed with this allegation the applicants need to show that
the new agreement will be exclusionary in that it either excludes
competitors of the respondent from the market or the applicants
themselves. The applicants have not relied on the former and therefore we
only need consider the latter. In passing we observe, in relation to the
former, that all distributors, including the applicants, distribute the products
of the respondent’s competitors.
58. The applicants argue that the reduction of their margins and the increased
costs of complying with the new system will prevent them from expanding
in the cigarette distribution market and similarly that these requirements
will prevent new entry into the market. 39
59. As we stated in our analysis of the section 5(1) claim, it may be a
consequence of the new agreement that certain firms will no longer be
viable in the market. The reduction in the number of distributors does not
on its own amount to evidence of an exclusionary act. An exclusionary act
is defined in the Act as one “that impedes or prevents a firm entering into,
or expanding within, a market” . 40 It cannot mean that every harshly
or expanding within, a market” . 40 It cannot mean that every harshly
informed him to stop selling products to retailers at 20 cents a carton more than the
recommended wholesale price.
39 See Applicants Heads of Argument paragraphs 34.23.
40 Section 1(1)(x) of the Act.
15
imposed commercial term by a dominant firm constitutes an exclusionary
act because it makes life more difficult for the firm imposed upon. As we
stated in York Timbers 41:
“ It is not enough to show that a given practice is a product of
market power. It must also be shown that the act complained of
actually extends that power or creates new sites of power.”
The evidence in this case is that the dominant firm wants to squeeze its
distribution network not to destroy it. On the contrary even though it does
some of its own direct distribution 42 it intends because of the vast scale of
its distribution system to maintain independent distributors. What is
changing is its method of distribution, which will affect some firms more
than others because they were privileged by the old system. On the
evidence before us there is nothing to suggest that they are seeking to
engage in an exclusionary strategy.
60. In relation to new entrants to the market the evidence that the new
requirement will inhibit new entry is unconvincing. The respondent has
shown that firms already acting as general distributors of consumer goods
will be better placed than they were under the old agreement to enter the
cigarette distribution market by virtue of the cessation of the privileged
position of the specialist distributors. The respondent is also embarking on
a program of encouraging a new class of empowerment distributors with
favourable financing conditions. 43
61. This evidence suggests that whilst the profile of the cigarette distribution
industry might change, entry barriers have not been raised indeed it is
more probable that they have been lowered.
62. We find no evidence that the new agreement amounts to an abuse of a
dominant position by the respondent and accordingly this complaint also
fails.
Conclusion
dominant position by the respondent and accordingly this complaint also
fails.
Conclusion
63. In view of the fact that the applicants have failed to make out a prima facie
41 See York Timbers Ltd and South African Forestry Company Ltd, Tribunal Case No:
15/IR/Feb01, par. 99 of the decision.
42 See page 199, par. 41.7.2 of the Record.
43 Here we refer to what the respondent calls its Independent Distributor Project, described as an
investment in small to medium business enterprises owned or controlled by historically
disadvantaged persons. See Annexure AS 8 and AAS 9 to the respondent’s answering affidavit,
Record, pages 256264.
16
case that the new agreement will have an anticompetitive effect, for the
purpose of section 8(c), or cast in the language of section 5(1)
substantially lessen or prevent competition, it is not necessary for us to
consider the respondent’s claims that the new agreement has
technological, efficiency or other procompetitive gains that outweigh the
anticompetitive effect.
64. Nor as we stated earlier have the applicants succeeded in establishing
their complaint in terms of section 5(2).
65. The application is accordingly dismissed.
ORDER
66. We make the following order:
1) The application for interim relief is dismissed.
2) The Applicants, jointly and severally are responsible for the
respondent’s costs on a party and party basis including the costs of
two legal representatives.
30/08/2002
N. Manoim Date
Concurring: D. Lewis, F. Fourie
For the applicants: Adv CJ Pammenter and RG Reddy
For the respondents: M van der Nest and Mr Snyckers
17