Old Mutual Bank Limited and Permanent Division of Nedbank Limited a division of Nedcor Bank Limited (03/LM/Jan02) [2002] ZACT 19 (10 April 2002)

78 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Merger Approval — Merger between Old Mutual Bank Limited and Permanent Division of Nedcor Bank Limited approved without conditions — Old Mutual Bank, a subsidiary of Old Mutual Holdings, and Nedcor Bank, a subsidiary of Nedcor Limited, aimed to create a joint venture to enhance financial services — Market shares of merging parties in relevant sub-markets for retail deposit taking and mortgage bonds were minimal, indicating no substantial lessening of competition — Public interest concerns addressed, with unions supporting the merger and job losses attributed to efficiency measures rather than the merger itself — Merger not likely to lead to substantial lessening or prevention of competition, and no significant public interest issues warranting prohibition or conditions.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings concerned the approval of a large merger before the Competition Tribunal of South Africa. The merger was between Old Mutual Bank Limited (described in the reasons as the acquiring firm, operating through the Old Mutual Group’s banking structure) and the Permanent Division of Nedcor Bank Limited (referred to as the target business, being a division of Nedcor Bank Limited, itself a subsidiary within the Nedcor group).


The Tribunal approved the merger without conditions on 7 March 2002, and subsequently furnished written reasons dated 10 April 2002. The reasons recorded the Competition Commission’s investigation and recommendation that the merger be approved without conditions, and then explained the Tribunal’s agreement with that recommendation.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the transaction was likely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in any relevant market for retail banking services, and whether any public interest considerations, particularly employment effects, warranted prohibition or conditions.


2. Material Facts


Old Mutual Holdings Bank Limited (“OMBH”) was described as a bank holding company with no interests other than its shares in Old Mutual Bank Limited (“OMBL”), which was a wholly owned subsidiary of OMBH. Old Mutual (SA) Limited (“OMSA”) owned 100% of the issued share capital in OMBH and was itself a wholly owned subsidiary of Old Mutual plc.


Nedcor Bank Limited was a wholly owned subsidiary of Nedcor Limited. The reasons recorded that OMSA owned 15% of the shares in Nedcor Limited, and that a wholly owned subsidiary of OMSA (OMLACSA) held 36% of the shares in Nedcor Limited. On that basis, the reasons stated that OMSA controlled Nedcor Limited, and therefore indirectly controlled Nedcor Bank. The Tribunal observed that it therefore appeared that OMSA controlled both the acquiring and target firms.


The transaction arose after Nedcor Bank decided to rationalise its Permanent Division due to perceived stagnancy. Instead of closing the business entirely, Nedcor Bank and the Old Mutual Group entered into a joint venture arrangement. Through the transaction, 45 branches of the Permanent Division were to be injected into OMBL.


Post-merger, it was intended that Nedcor and OMBH would each own 50% of OMBL. The mechanism recorded was that Nedcor Bank would acquire from OMSA 50% of the entire issued share capital of OMBH, with the remaining 50% retained by OMSA. Since OMBH would continue to own and control OMBL, this would result in joint ownership and control of OMBL by Nedcor Bank and OMSA. The reasons also recorded provisions allowing either party to become a majority shareholder by acquiring one share from the other, although the parties characterised the arrangement as essentially a 50/50 structure.


Branding and business rationale were also recorded. The Permanent Bank brand was intended to run in parallel with the Old Mutual brand during integration, after which the Old Mutual brand would be used exclusively. Nedcor Bank viewed the merger as a revenue-growth initiative rather than a cost-cutting exercise.


In defining the relevant market, the Tribunal recorded that both firms participated in the broader market for financial services, and identified the relevant product market as the market for personal retail banking services, subdivided into cash/cheque and transmission accounts, deposits, overdraft facilities, mortgages, and credit cards. The overlaps relied upon were in retail deposit taking, the provision of mortgages, and asset-backed loans. The Tribunal recorded that the services were provided throughout South Africa through various channels, and that there was no evidence of local or regional competition, leading to the finding that the relevant geographic market was national.


The Tribunal recorded market shares in the relevant sub-markets. In retail deposit taking, Nedcor’s estimated market share (including Perm) was 17.9%, while OMBL’s was 0.03%. In mortgage bonds, Nedcor’s estimated market share (including Perm) was 17.7%, while OMBL’s was 0.07%.


A limited factual dispute was recorded regarding asset-backed loans. The merging parties stated that it was not possible to compute market shares because the product was not identified for DI return purposes, and asserted that OMBL’s market share would be 0% (i.e., it did not participate). The Competition Commission, however, stated it had evidence that OMBL did participate and estimated its market share at approximately 0.017%, based on lending figures over December 2001/January 2002 compared to total loans in South Africa over that period.


On public interest, the Tribunal recorded that Perm employed 1085 individuals in South Africa, with 588 employed in the sold business and 497 in branches not forming part of the sold business. It was stated that all employees of the sold business would continue to be employed by OMBL, while those employed in the other branches would lose their jobs. The parties contended that these job losses were not directly attributable to the merger but to an efficiency drive by Nedcor Bank, and asserted that absent the transaction all 1085 employees would lose their jobs due to closure.


The Tribunal further recorded that there would be job losses at OMBL as well, with the parties estimating that a maximum of 200 employees would be retrenched as a result of the merger, split between senior managerial and clerical staff. The unions representing employees, IBSA and SASBO, indicated they had no objection to the merger, and the merging parties undertook to explore alternatives to compulsory retrenchments through measures such as redeployment, retraining, and voluntary early retirement, in consultation with the unions. The unions were recorded as being satisfied that the Labour Relations Act provided sufficient protection for their members.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the merger was likely to lead to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in any relevant market, assessed through the Tribunal’s identification of the relevant product and geographic markets and the competitive effects within the relevant sub-markets where overlap existed.


A further legal question was whether there were substantial public interest issues arising from the transaction that warranted either the prohibition of the merger or the imposition of conditions, with the employment effects being the primary public interest consideration addressed.


The dispute therefore primarily concerned the application of competition-law standards to the economic facts (market definition, market shares, concentration and competitive constraints), together with an evaluative assessment of public interest considerations as recorded in the reasons.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On market definition, the Tribunal accepted that although both firms operated broadly in financial services, the relevant market for competitive assessment was personal retail banking services, with further attention to the specific sub-markets where there was overlap, namely retail deposit taking, mortgages, and asset-backed loans. The Tribunal also accepted a national geographic market, reasoning that the services were provided throughout South Africa and that there was no evidence of competition occurring at a local or regional level for purposes of the analysis presented.


On competitive effects, the Tribunal aligned itself with the Competition Commission’s assessment that the merger was unlikely to create competition problems given the small market share of OMBL and the correspondingly insignificant increase in concentration levels attributable to the transaction. The market-share evidence recorded in the reasons demonstrated that, in the overlapping sub-markets of retail deposit taking and mortgage bonds, OMBL’s pre-merger presence was minimal relative to Nedcor’s position.


Regarding asset-backed loans, the Tribunal noted the parties’ inability (as they presented it) to compute shares and their assertion that OMBL was not active in that segment, but also recorded the Commission’s contrary evidence suggesting OMBL did participate at a very small scale. The Tribunal accepted the Commission’s view that, regardless of the precise market share attributed to OMBL in asset-backed loans, a merger involving a competitor with a market share as low as that attributed to OMBL was highly unlikely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition.


The Tribunal added an additional competitive constraint consideration beyond market shares and concentration. It emphasised that the parties faced very strong competition in the broad retail banking services market, identifying ABSA Bank, Standard Bank and First National Bank as the biggest players. The Tribunal reasoned that the presence of such strong competitors across the identified sub-markets precluded the possibility that the merged entity would be able to behave anti-competitively.


On public interest, the Tribunal recorded job-loss implications and the parties’ characterisation of certain employment losses as arising from an efficiency drive rather than being directly caused by the merger. The Tribunal also took into account that the unions had no objection to the merger and that there were undertakings to consult and explore alternatives to compulsory retrenchments, with reliance placed on the protection afforded by the Labour Relations Act. In the circumstances described, the Tribunal concluded that there were no substantial public interest issues warranting prohibition or conditions.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Tribunal held that the merger between Old Mutual Bank Limited and the Permanent Division of Nedcor Bank Limited was not likely to lead to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. It further held that, taking account of the circumstances, there were no substantial public interest issues that warranted either prohibition or the imposition of conditions.


The merger was accordingly approved without conditions. The reasons did not record any order as to costs.


Cases Cited


No cases were cited in the Tribunal’s reasons.


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act (as referred to in the reasons; full statutory citation not provided in the text).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the Tribunal’s reasons.


Held


The Competition Tribunal approved, without conditions, the large merger involving the injection of 45 branches of Nedcor Bank’s Permanent Division into Old Mutual Bank Limited, concluding that the transaction was unlikely to substantially lessen or prevent competition in the national market for personal retail banking services (including the overlapping sub-markets of retail deposit taking, mortgages, and asset-backed loans). The Tribunal further found that no substantial public interest issues, including those related to employment, warranted prohibition or conditional approval.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The Tribunal applied the principle that merger analysis requires identification of an appropriate relevant product market and relevant geographic market, followed by an assessment of whether the transaction is likely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition within the markets affected by the merger.


In evaluating competitive effects, the Tribunal relied on standard competition assessment considerations reflected in the reasons, including the merging parties’ market shares, the change in concentration attributable to the transaction, and the presence of competitive constraints from strong existing competitors in the relevant market.


The Tribunal further applied the principle that merger control entails consideration of public interest factors, including effects on employment, and that where the circumstances and stakeholder positions (including organised labour’s stance and consultation undertakings) do not indicate substantial public interest harm warranting intervention, approval without conditions may be appropriate on the facts presented.

COMPETITION TRIBUNAL 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 03/LM/Jan02
In the large merger between: 
Old Mutual Bank Limited 
and
Permanent Division of Nedbank Limited, a division of Nedcor  
Bank Limited
_______________________________________________________
Reasons
_______________________________________________________
Approval
1. We   approved   without   conditions   the   merger   between   Old   Mutual  
Bank Limited and the Permanent Division of Nedcor Bank Limited, a  
division of Nedcor Limited on 07 March 2002. Below we give the  
reasons for the approval.
The Parties
2. Old   Mutual   Holdings   Bank   Limited   (“OMBL”)   is   a   wholly­owned  
subsidiary of Old Mutual Holding Limited (“OMBH”). OMBH is a  
bank holding company, it has no other interests apart from its shares  
in OMBL. Old Mutual (SA) Limited owns 100% of the issued share  
capital in OMBH. Old Mutual (SA) is a wholly­owned subsidiary of  
Old Mutual plc.
3. Nedcor   Bank   is   a   wholly­owned   subsidiary   of   Nedcor   Limited.  
OMSA owns 15% of  the shares  in Nedcor Limited, and a wholly­
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owned   subsidiary   of   OMSA,   OMLACSA   has   a   36   %   share   in   the  
same   company.   OMSA   therefore   controls   Nedcor   Limited,   and  
therefore indirectly controls Nedcor Bank. It would appear therefore  
that OMSA controls both the acquiring and target firms.
The transaction
4. Early   last   year   Nedcor   Bank   took   a   decision   to   rationalise   its  
Permanent Division because of perceived stagnancy. As an alternative  
to total closure of the business, Nedcor Bank and Old Mutual Group  
entered into a joint venture to attempt to change the fortunes of the  
business.   Through   this   transaction,   45   branches   of   the   Permanent  
Division of Nedbank are being injected into OMBL. It is intended that  
post the merger, Nedcor and OMBH will each own 50% of OMBL.  
The   mechanism   for   achieving   this   end   is   that   Nedcor   Bank   will  
acquire from OMSA 50% of the entire issued share capital of OMBH,  
the other 50% will remain in the hands of OMSA. As OMBH will  
continue to own and control OMBL, Nedcor Bank and OMSA will  
have   joint   ownership   and   control   of   OMBL.   There   are   provisions  
allowing   either   of   OMBL   or   Nedcor   Bank   to   become   majority  
shareholder   by   acquiring   one   share   from   the   other,   but   the   parties  
submit   that   the   transaction   is  essentially   aimed  at  creating  a  50/50  
arrangement between the OMBL and Nedcor Bank.
5. It is intended that the Permanent Bank brand will run in parallel with  
the   Old   Mutual   Brand   and   the   Old   Mutual   Brand   will   be   used  
exclusively once the businesses have been integrated. Nedcor Bank  
views this merger as a revenue­growth initiative, rather than a cost­
cutting exercise. 
The Relevant Market
6. Both   firms   are   involved   in   the   broad   market   for   the   provision   of  
financial   services.   The   target   firm   provides   the   following   services:

financial   services.   The   target   firm   provides   the   following   services:  
home   loans,   asset­based   finance,   overdraft,   deposits,   investments,  
current accounts, savings accounts and credit and debit cards. 
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7. OMBL   was   established   to   enhance   the   financial   services   products  
offered by the Old Mutual Group and the retention of funds within the  
Group. It aims to leverage the Old Mutual brand, its client base and its  
distribution   and   support   infrastructures.   Its   business   strategy   is   to  
provide services and products that supplement and enhance the core  
business and strategies of the Old Mutual Group. It provides deposits  
and lending products. OMBL’s initial focus is on short­ and medium­
term deposit products. With regard to lending products, OMBL offers  
housing loans, mortgages and asset­backed loans. In addition, OMBL  
aims to launch a new innovative product called “Universal Product”  
later   in   the   year   which   will   provide   its   customers   with   multiple  
services in the financial sector. 
8. The relevant product market is therefore the market for the provision  
of   personal   retail   banking   services.   This   market   is   subdivided   into  
cash/cheque and transmission accounts, deposits, overdraft facilities,  
mortgages and credit cards. The overlaps between the services of the  
merging   parties   occur   in   the   following   sub­marjkets:   retail   deposit  
taking; provision of mortgages and asset­backed loans.
9. The   parties   provide   the   above   services   throughout   the   Republic   of  
South Africa through a range of channels. There is no evidence of  
competition between the banks at local or regional level. The relevant  
geographic market is therefore national. 
Impact on competition
                                                             
10. In   the   sub­market   for   retail   deposit   taking   the   Nedcor’s   estimated  
market   shares   (including   Perm 1)   is   17,9%   and   0,03%   for   OMBL.  
Nedcor (including Perm 2) has an estimated market share of 17.7% of  
the sub­market for the provision of mortgage bonds, OMBL’s share is

the sub­market for the provision of mortgage bonds, OMBL’s share is  
0,07%.   The   merging   parties   claimed   that   it   was   not   possible   to  
compute the market shares of the various companies in the sub­market  
for   asset­backed   loans   because   it   is   not   a   statutory   requirement   to  
identify   this   product   for   DI   return   purposes.   They   claimed,  
furthermore, that the market share of OMBL in this sub­market would  
1  Perm’s share of this sub­market is 1,4%.
2  Perm’s share of this sub­market is 5,7%.
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be   0%,   in   other   words,   they   are   not   in   the   market   at   all.   The  
Commission, however, claims to have evidence that OMBL in fact  
participates in this sub­market and has an estimated market share  of  
about 0,017%. 3
11.The Commission found that that the parties’ share  in the sub­markets  
for the provision of retail deposit taking and mortgage bonds make it  
unlikely   that   the   merger   will   result   in   competition   problems.  
Furthermore, regardless of the market share of Nedbank in the sub­
market for asset­backed loans, it is highly unlikely that a merger with  
a competitor with a market share as low as that of OMBL will result  
in   the   substantial   lessening   or   prevention   of   competition   in   any  
market. The Commission therefore recommended that the merger be  
approved without conditions.
12.We agree with the above finding by the Commission. In addition to  
the   small   market   share   of   the   parties   and   insignificant   increase   in  
concentration levels as a result of the merger, the parties are faced  
with   very   strong   competition   in   the   broad   retail   banking   services  
market. The biggest players in this market are ABSA Bank, Standard  
Bank   and   First   National   Bank.   The   presence   of   these   very   strong  
competitors in the three sub­markets identified above precludes the  
possibility that the merged entity may behave anti­competitively. 
Public Interest issues
13.Perm   employs   1085   individuals   in   South   Africa,   588   of   them   are  
employed in the sold business and 497 belong to the branches that do  
not   form   part   of   the   sold   business.   Pursuant   to   the   merger,   all  
employees   of   the   sold   business   will   continue   to   be   employed   by  
OMBL. Those who are employed in the other branches of Perm will  
lose their jobs. The parties argue that the job losses are not directly  
attributable to the merger but arise as a result of an efficiency drive on

attributable to the merger but arise as a result of an efficiency drive on  
the part of Nedcor Bank. The parties point out that if this transaction  
does   not   go   ahead,   all   1085   employees   of   Perm   employed   in   the  
various branches would lose their jobs.
3  The Commission believes that OMBL in fact advanced R1,5 million over the period December  
2001/January 2002; the total amount of loans over this period in South Africa was about R85 billion.
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14.There  will   be  job   losses   at  OMBL   businesses   as   well.   The   parties  
estimate that a maximum of 200 employees will be retrenched as a  
result of this merger. Half of the retrenched employees will be senior  
managerial staff, and the other half, clerical staff.
15.The Unions representing the employees of the merging firms, IBSA  
and SASBO, agree with the merging parties’ submission with regard  
to   employment   and   have   no   objection   to   the   merger.   The   merger  
parties   have   undertaken   to   explore   all   possible   alternatives   to  
compulsory   retrenchments   through   redeployment,   retraining,  
voluntary early retirement and other measures in consultation with the  
Unions. The Unions are satisfied that the provisions of the Labour  
Relations Act provides sufficient protection for their members. 
Finding
16.The merger  between  Old  Mutual  Bank  Limited  and the  Permanent  
Division of Nedcor Bank Limited, a division of Nedcor Limited is not  
likely to lead to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition.  
Taking into account the circumstances of this merger, we believe that  
there are no substantial public interest issues that warrant a prohibition  
or the imposition of any conditions on the merging parties.        
   
_____________ 10 April 2002
N.M. Manoim Date
Concurring: S. Zilwa; D.H. Lewis
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