THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GQEBERHA

Case No: PR324/2022

In the matter between:

PIETER JOHANNES DU PREEZ Applicant

and

SASOL MINING (PTY) LTD First Respondent

RAYMOND DIBDEN, N.O. Second Respondent

CCMA Third Respondent

2

Heard: 26 November 2025.
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email and publication on the Labour Court’s
website. The date for hand-down is deemed to be on 13 January 2026.


JUDGMENT


THYS, AJ

[1] This matter has its birth in the employment relationship between Mr . Pieter
Johannes Du Preez and his former employer, Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd. That
relationship ultimately disintegrated following allegations of misconduct levelled
against Mr. Du Preez and after a disciplinary process, the allegations culminated in
the termination of his employment contract.

[2] The dismissal gave rise to a dispute that was referred to the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and the Commissioner, Raymond
Dibden, having been duly appointed and after considering the evidence presented
by both parties, concluded that the dismissal was fair.

[3] Where part ies are unsuccessful at arbitration before the CCMA, or Bargaining
Councils, two fundamental choices confront them. The first is to accept the
outcome and bring the dispute to finality. The second is to challenge the award by
way of review before this Court. It is, in essence, a moment of flight or fight.

[4] Mr. Du Preez elected not to accept the Commissioner’s award and instead chose
to fight. His right to exchange blows does not ari se from sentiment but it is a n

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entitlement expressly conferred by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 (the Constitution) and statute. Section 23 of the Constitution guarantees
everyone the right to fair labour practice, and this foundational right is given effect
through the Labour Relations Act (the LRA)1. Section 145 of the LRA provides that
any party to arbitration proceedings who alleges a defect in the award may apply
to this Court for an order reviewing and setting it aside.

[5] This statutory provision ensures that CCMA (and Bargaining Council) arbitration
awards are not immune from scrutiny, but remain subject to judicial oversight
where misconduct, irregularities, jurisdictional errors, and so on is alleged.

[6] The necessary papers were duly exchanged between the parties, and the matter
was eventually set down for hearing before this Court.

[7] However, during the presentation of heads of argument, Sasol Mining raised a
preliminary issue, namely that the review application had been delivered out of
time.

[8] The law makes it clear that an offensive against an award cannot be launched at
leisure because Section 145 stipulates that the onslaught (in the form of a review
application) must begin within six weeks of receipt of the arbitration award.

[9] The six-week period constitutes the statutory window within which a litigant must
carefully scrutinise the arbitration award, consult the record, obtain legal advice
where necessary, discern and formulate any grounds of review, and prepare the
necessary papers and therein translate any perceived irregularities into a properly
pleaded review application.


1 Act 66 of 1995, as amended

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[10] Once that period closes, the right is lost, and any attempt to strike thereafter is
rendered legally impotent , save only for the issue of condonation, which may be
sought and granted.

[11] This ‘six-week’ provision is peremptory in nature and serves to balance the right of
employees to challenge arbitration awards with the need for finality in labour
disputes.

[12] In this matter the arbitration award was served to the parties on 7 November 2022.
This much is common knowledge or admitted by Mr. Du Preez. The question that
arises is whether the review application was filed within the statutory six -week
period, or whether it is late.

[13] To get the answer right is vital because the timeliness of a review application is not
a matter of mere formality. If the application is filed late, the Court is deprived of
jurisdiction to entertain it. This is for the reason that j urisdiction is the foundation
upon which judicial authority rests, and without it, any order issued would be a
nullity in law. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal unanimously in Vidavsky
v Body Corporate of Sunhill Villas
2 held that where there is an absence of
jurisdiction, the resultant adjudication is null and void. In Motala v Master of the
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria 3 the same court held that a judge who lacks
‘jurisdiction’ issues orders that are invalid.

[14] There is another reason why it is important to get the answer to the said question
right. This i s because our Courts have latitude to indulge non- compliance with
procedural ‘rules’. This means that even if there is no formal application for
condonation, the court may still choose to overlook the non- compliance. This
shows a degree of pragmatism and flexibility in handling procedural matters ,

2 [2005] 4 All SA 201 (SCA); 2005 (5) SA 200 (SCA).
3 2019 (6) SA 68 (SCA).

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especially in the case of Labour Court review applications which are in nature
considered urgent applications.

[15] However ‘statutory time frames ’ are more rigid because they relate to the C ourt’s
jurisdiction. This distinction give emphasis to the importance of adhering to
statutory deadlines, as failure to do so can result in the C ourt being unable to
entertain the case, without a formal condonation application.

[16] In the case of Joseph and Others v Minister of Police and Others 4 this Court
illustrates, this principle or conclusion by showing, how th is Court handled non-
compliance with procedural rules versus statutory time frames. This Court in this
regard, held that:

“[23] A distinction is to be drawn between condonation for non- compliance
with time frames provided for in the Rules and those in the Act. In a
case where there is non- compliance with the Rules, the court, in
general, has latitude to indulge and may do so, even where there is no
substantive application for condonation ...”

[24] The converse applies in cases involving time frames provided f or in a
statute. In statutory provisions, the issue of non- compliance is a
jurisdictional fact which needs to be satisfied before the court can
entertain the dispute. Thus where there is no compliance with
provisions of a statute, the court would have no jurisdiction to entertain
such a matter in the absence of condonation. This means that
application for condonation is mandatory for non- complaince with
statutory time frames unless provided otherwise.’

[17] Thus, the determination of whether the review was lodged within the prescribed
six-week period is not a peripheral issue but one that goes to the very competence

4 (15017/2017) [2023] ZAGPJHC 488 (17 May 2023).

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of this Court to adjudicate the matter. Only once this threshold is resolved can the
Court proceed to consider the merits and eventually issue a judgment.

[18] In order to meaningfully answer the question of timeliness, it is important to have
regard to the fact that the arbitration award was issued and received by the parties
(and by Mr . Du Preez in particular ) on 7 November 2022. From this date, the
statutory six-week period must be calculated. Section 145 of the LRA employs the
phrase “delivered within six weeks ,” which raises a subtle but important
interpretive question as to whether this statutory formulation alters the ordinary
reckoning of time and, if so, what consequence follows for the present application?

[19] Fortunately, this Court is not required to wrestle with the interpretive dilemma
unaided, because the Labour Appeal Court has already pronounced on the
meaning of the six -weeks in South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
(SATAWU) and Another v Tokiso Dispute Settlement and Others
5. In that matter,
the said Court carefully considered the computation of the six -week period and
clarified that the statutory wording does not displace the established principles of
time calculation. The Court had the following to say regarding the issue of s ix
weeks:

“[16] What remains is to determine whether the application was filed within
the period of six weeks after publication of the award to the parties on
the basis that 5 October 2005 was the date of publication of the award.
Mr Mphahlani initially submitted that the last day for delivery of the
award was 16 November 2005. But when it was pointed out to him that
this meant the application was delivered late, he submitted that 19
November was the last day. I do not agree with his second submission.

[17] The calculation of this period is done not in accordance with section 4 of
the Interpretation of Statutes Act 33 of 1957 by excluding the first and

5 (2015) 36 ILJ 1841 (LAC).

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including the last day unless the last day is a Sunday or public holiday
which is then excluded, but in terms of the civil method. See LC
Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette (Juta 1981 5
th Ed) at 174- 175. In terms of
this method, the first day is excluded so that the period runs from the
next day. Therefore the review application had to be filed before 17
November. As the application was filed on 17 November 2005, it was
not filed timeously. It was one day late. Strictly speaking an application
for condonation was required. Where an application is filed but a day or
two out of time then in the absence of prejudice an application from the
bar may have sufficed. Even this was not done.”

[20] The SATAWU v Tokiso judgment provides authoritative guidance on how the
six-week period must be reckoned, and it is to that precedent that this Court now
turns. In other words, applying the method of time calculation as confirmed in
SATAWU v Tokiso to the present matter, the computation unfolds as follows:

20.1 The date of receipt of the arbitration award was 7 November 2022.

20.2 In accordance with the civil method of computation, the first day is
excluded; accordingly, the period commenced on 8 November 2022.

20.3 From that date, a continuous period of six weeks (42 days) must be
counted, including weekends and public holidays, so that the calculation
properly reflects the statutory time frame. To illustrate the point:

20.3.1 8 November 2022 to 14 November (day seven, week one);
20.3.2 15 November 2022 to 21 November (day fourteen, week two);
20.3.3 22 November 2022 to 28 November (day twenty one, week three);
20.3.4 29 November 2022 to 5 December (day twenty eight, week four);
20.3.5 6 December 2022 to 12 December (day thirty five, week five);
20.3.6 13 December 2022 to 19 December (day forty two, week six).

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[21] On this reckoning, the final permissible day for lodging the review application was
19 December 2022. Any filing thereafter, including Mr . Du Preez’s application
which was on the parties ’ version “delivered” on 20 December 2022, falls outside
the statutory period. In other words, the arbitration award was served on 7
November 2022, which is excluded from the calculation, so the count commenced
on 8 November 2022. The forty -second day fell on 19 December 2022, being the
last permissible day to file the review. The papers were, however, “ delivered” on
20 December 2022, the forty-third day, rendering the application one day late.

[22] For practical purposes the six-week period within which a review application must
be launched is calculated as forty-two calendar days from the day following service
of the arbitration award. The day of service is excluded, and the count commences
on the next day. The forty -second day therefore serves as the yardstick for
determining whether a review application is timeous. Any application delivered on
the forty-third day or thereafter is late and requires condonation, regardless of how
minimal the delay may be.

[23] The court, in this regard, in Ellerine Holdings Ltd v CCMA and Others
6 held that
where the non- compliance relates to a statutory provision then failure to comply
with those provisions goes to jurisdiction.

[24] Therefore, even if the delay in this matter is but a single day, the principle remains
that statutory time limit must be respected.

[25] This Court thus cannot simply overlook Mr. Du Preez’s delay informally because it
compromised a statutory time period and jurisdiction is only properly engaged
once condonation is sought and granted.


6 (2002) 23 ILJ 1282 (LC).

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[26] The sum total of the above mentioned reality is that w ithout condonation, the
application is defective, cannot be entertained, and any judgment issued in its
absence would be a nullity. The future enquiry, if any, into condonation is therefore
unavoidable.

[27] It is important to note that while the present calculation indicates that the review
application was delivered one day outside the forty -two day period, this
determination is not cast in stone. This is for the reason that i t appears that
delivery, rather than service, may in fact have taken place after 20 December
2022. However, that issue can properly be addressed in the course of any
condonation application, should one be pursued in the future.

[28] It must in conclusion be appreciated that the order made here under does not
dispose of the matter on its merits. Accordingly, in the event that the merits of the
application are pursuant at a later stage, the issue of costs occasioned by this
application shall stand over for determination together with the merits.

[29] Should the merits not be pursuant, the employer may nonetheless set the matter
down, independently of and apart from the merits, for determination of the costs
occasioned by this application, in accordance with the rules of court.

[30] In the circumstances, and given the principles outlined, the following order is
made:

1. The review application is struck from the roll, for want of jurisdiction.

2. The costs of this application shall be costs in the cause.

_______
M. Thys
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

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Appearances:

For the Applicant: Mr. Ivan Lambrechts.
Instructed by Lovius Block Attorneys.

For the Respondent:

Mr. Chris Morkel
Instructed by JR Attorneys.