Ocean Echo Properties 203 CC v Grootman Trade and Investment (PTY) Limited Trading as Jimmys Killer Prawns (010985/2025) [2026] ZAGPJHC 54 (27 January 2026)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Eviction — Lease agreement cancellation — Applicant seeking eviction of respondent for breach of lease due to non-payment of rent — Respondent arguing invalid cancellation due to improper notice — Court finding that the applicant validly cancelled the lease and eviction was justified despite respondent's claims regarding deregistration — Eviction order granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an application for the eviction of a commercial tenant from leased premises, brought in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg. The relief was sought on the basis that the lease had been validly cancelled due to the tenant’s breach, and that the respondent was thereafter unlawfully holding over.


The applicant was Ocean Echo Properties 203 CC, described as a property management entity authorised to manage commercial property on behalf of Lezmin 2358 CC (the owner/lessor). The respondent was Grootman Trade and Investment (Pty) Limited trading as Jimmys Killer Prawns, which conducted a restaurant business from the premises.


The matter originated in the urgent court, where it was removed from the roll due to lack of urgency. It subsequently served before the court in the present proceedings as an eviction application grounded in contractual cancellation.


During the hearing, a postponement was sought informally by the deceased director’s mother (an alleged executrix), without papers; that postponement application was dismissed for, among other reasons, lack of locus standi. In addition, a further issue emerged concerning the respondent company’s deregistration, which was raised as a point in limine and led to supplementary heads being requested on that topic.


The dispute concerned the continued occupation of specified units at Ormonde Shopping Centre following cancellation of a fixed-term commercial lease, with the respondent resisting eviction principally by attacking the validity of the cancellation notice and raising the effect of the company’s deregistration.


2. Material Facts


The parties concluded a fixed-term lease agreement in or about July 2023, commencing on 1 August 2023 and expiring on 31 July 2026. The respondent occupied Units F[…] , F[…] and Shop 1[…] at the Ormonde Shopping Centre, Johannesburg, as business premises for its restaurant operations.


It was treated as common cause that by July 2024 the respondent was in arrears in an amount stated as R102,885.15, placing it in breach of its payment obligations under the lease. The applicant’s case was that the cancellation followed two letters of demand which afforded the respondent a 7-day period to remedy the breach, as required by the lease, and that the respondent failed to do so.


On 29 November 2024, the applicant sent a letter of cancellation by email, informing the respondent that the lease was cancelled and requiring it to vacate immediately, or no later than 31 December 2024. On the same date, the applicant signed a lease with a new tenant intended to take occupation on 1 March 2025.


After receiving the notice of cancellation, the respondent engaged with the applicant, including holding a meeting and making a payment of R20,000. The respondent also requested a move to different premises within the same property, but that option was not pursued as viable. The applicant persisted in treating the lease as cancelled and sought eviction; the respondent refused to vacate.


During the hearing, it emerged that the respondent’s sole shareholder and director, Mr Noufill Caseem Hossem, had died on 27 May 2025. It also emerged (and was accepted as common cause in argument) that the respondent company had been deregistered for failure to file annual returns in terms of the Companies Act. However, the court noted that deregistration had not been placed before it by way of the parties’ affidavits, and that the point was raised in limine in the course of proceedings rather than being properly foreshadowed on the papers.


As to disputed matters, the respondent advanced explanations for its arrears, including business difficulties (such as price increases and renovation/rebranding expenditure) and alleged hostility by the applicant. The court’s determination did not turn on those explanations, but rather on whether the breach existed, whether contractual cancellation requirements had been met, and whether the cancellation notice was effective notwithstanding the respondent’s objection to email delivery.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were, first, whether the lease was validly cancelled so as to justify eviction for holding over, and specifically whether the cancellation was defective because notices were sent by email contrary to a contractual clause excluding email for “formal notice”.


A second legal question arose from the respondent’s deregistration: whether, given the respondent’s dissolution following deregistration in terms of the Companies Act, the eviction proceedings ought to be stayed, and whether any order granted against a deregistered company would be a nullity.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles to largely common-cause facts, including contractual breach and the mode by which notice was sent. It also involved procedural and evidential aspects of motion proceedings, including the propriety of relying on an additional affidavit filed without leave, and an evaluative assessment of whether the parties’ conduct demonstrated a shared understanding that valid notice had been given.


4. Court’s Reasoning


Deregistration and the effect on proceedings


The court dealt first with deregistration. It rejected the applicant’s contention that the court was functus officio because deregistration had been mentioned during the (dismissed) postponement attempt; the deregistration issue was treated as requiring substantive consideration.


The court accepted as common cause that the respondent company had been deregistered for failure to comply with the annual returns requirement under section 82(3) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The court set out the statutory consequences: deregistration results in dissolution as of the date of removal from the register, while preserving certain liabilities of former directors/shareholders and allowing, under section 82(4), interested persons to apply to court for an order declaring the dissolution void or otherwise just and equitable relief. The court referred to authority recognising the retrospective effect of reinstatement and to authority indicating that proceedings instituted against a dissolved entity, absent validating relief, may be a nullity.


On the court’s approach, because a deregistered company “is no longer in existence”, an order against it would ordinarily be a nullity, and a stay would therefore be appropriate in principle. However, the court declined to dispose of the matter on that basis in the present case because the deregistration point had not been properly raised on the affidavits and had not been introduced through a party’s pleaded case; it arose in an irregular manner during proceedings. For that reason, the court was “not inclined to finalise” the application solely on deregistration and proceeded to determine the eviction on the cancellation issue.


Validity of cancellation and the notice objection


The court identified the “trite” requirements for a party relying on cancellation due to breach: the cancelling party must allege and prove the breach; show that the right to cancel has accrued (either because the breach is material or because the contractual cancellation clause has been complied with); and show that clear and unequivocal notice of cancellation was conveyed, unless notice is dispensed with by the contract.


The respondent’s principal challenge was that cancellation was invalid because formal notices were sent by email, allegedly contrary to clause 12.3.5, which recorded that while the parties might correspond by email for operational reasons, “no formal notice required” under the agreement could be given via email. The respondent sought an interpretive approach referencing Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality, contending that the language of the contract required a different mode of delivery for formal notices.


The court noted that the affidavit raising the irregularity in service and notice procedure was itself raised irregularly, being filed without leave after the answering affidavit stage, and emphasised the usual limitation in motion proceedings to three affidavits (founding, answering, replying). This procedural point weighed against the respondent’s late attempt to build a formal notice challenge beyond the ordinary framework of the papers.


In any event, the court reasoned that, on the undisputed evidence, two letters of demand were sent and the respondent reacted to them, including meeting the applicant to seek relaxed payment terms and requesting relocation within the premises. This conduct was treated as materially relevant to whether there was a shared understanding that effective notice had been given.


The court invoked the principle that subsequent conduct can, within limits, be used as an interpretive aid to determine the parties’ intended meaning, relying on Kooij and Others v Middleground Trading 251 CC and Another. Applying that approach, the court found that the evidence indicated a common understanding between the parties that a valid cancellation notice had been issued and that the respondent acted on it. On that basis, the court rejected the respondent’s contention that the email mode of delivery rendered the cancellation ineffective in the circumstances presented on the papers.


Having concluded that cancellation was valid and that the respondent remained in occupation thereafter, the court held that the eviction application had to succeed.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted an eviction order against the respondent and all those occupying through or under it in respect of Units F[…] , F[…] and Shop 1[…] at Ormonde Shopping Centre, Johannesburg.


The respondent and those holding under it were directed to vacate the premises by 6 February 2026, failing which the Sheriff (or a lawful deputy) was authorised to effect eviction.


Costs were awarded against the respondent on scale C.


Cases Cited


Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA).


Newlands Surgical Clinic (Pty) Ltd v Peninsula Eye Clinic (Pty) Ltd (A29/13) [2013] ZAWCHC 57; 2013 (4) SA 194 (WCC); [2013] 3 All SA 34 (WCC) (19 April 2013).


ABSA Bank Ltd v Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South African and Others (citation not provided in the judgment text).


Kooij and Others v Middleground Trading 251 CC and Another (1249/18) [2020] ZASCA 45 (23 April 2020).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 33.


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 82(1)–(4), with particular reference to section 82(3) and section 82(4).


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited in the judgment text.


Held


The court found that, despite the respondent’s belated contention that formal notice could not be delivered via email, the undisputed facts and the parties’ subsequent conduct demonstrated a shared understanding that the respondent had received and acted upon the demand and cancellation notices. The lease was therefore treated as validly cancelled and the respondent’s continued occupation as unlawful, justifying eviction.


Although deregistration of the respondent company was accepted as common cause and was recognised as raising the possibility that an order against a deregistered company could be a nullity, the court declined to decide the matter on that basis because deregistration had not been properly raised on the affidavits and the point was introduced irregularly in limine.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A party relying on cancellation for breach must establish the breach, establish that the right to cancel has accrued (including compliance with any contractual cancellation machinery), and establish that clear and unequivocal notice of cancellation was conveyed to the other party unless the contract dispenses with notice.


In motion proceedings, the ordinary sequence of affidavits is confined to a founding affidavit, an answering affidavit, and a replying affidavit; additional affidavits require leave, and belated attempts to introduce substantive issues may be treated as irregular.


Subsequent conduct may be used as a limited aid to contractual interpretation where it is indicative of a common understanding of the contract’s meaning, is used to interpret rather than alter the words of the contract, and is approached conservatively.


Deregistration under section 82(3) of the Companies Act results in dissolution of the company, with statutory mechanisms in section 82(4) for interested persons to seek an order declaring the dissolution void or other just and equitable relief; proceedings against a dissolved entity may be a nullity in the absence of appropriate remedial orders, although the court in this matter did not finally dispose of the case on that basis given how the issue was raised.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG


CASE NO: 010985/2025


(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED.

…………..………….............

SIGNATURE DATE




In the matter between:

OCEAN ECHO PROPERTIES 203 CC APPLICANT

And

GROOTMAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT (PTY) LIMITED TRADING AS
JIMMYS KILLER PRAWNS
RESPONDENT

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This Judgment was handed down electronically and by circulation to the parties’
legal representatives by way of email and shall be uploaded on Caselines. The
date for hand down is deemed to be on 27 January 2026.
JUDGMENT
MALI J
Introduction
[1] This application for eviction from a commercial property originates from
the urgent court where it was removed from the roll due to lack of
urgency. The eviction is based on the cancellation of the lease
agreement.
[2] The applicant is the property management company which is duly
authorized to manage commercial property for Lezmi n 2358 CC (Lezmin).
Lezmin lets out commercial space for rental, among others Shops 17 and
FC7 and FC8, Ormonde Shopping Centre situated at 1[…] C[…] Road,
O[…] , Johannesburg (the property).
[3] The respondent is a duly registered company trading as a restaurant and
occupies Units F[…] F[…] and Shop 1[…] at the property (the business
premises).
Background facts

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[4] On or about July 2023 the parties entered into a fixed term lease
agreement commencing on 1 August 2023 expiring on 31 July 2026. On
or about July 2024 the respondent was in arrears in the amount of
R102,885. 15, thus in breach of the terms of the lease agreement . On 29
November 2024, the Applicant sent the respondent a letter of cancellation
via email correspondence informing the respondent about the cancellation
of the lease agreement. In the same correspondence the respondent was
asked to vacate the business premises immediately or by no later than 31
December 2024. On 29 November 2024 the applicant signed a lease
agreement with a new tenant, which intended to take the occupation on 1
March 2025.
[5] The respondent shortly after receiving the notice of cancellation held a
meeting with the applicant and made a nominal payment of R20 000. The
respondent also requested to move the business premises to another part
of the property . The parties concluded that, that option was not viable.
Applicant insisted on the cancellation of the lease and eviction. The
respondent refused; hence the applicant launched this application in the
urgent court.
Application for postponement
[6] Mr Noufill Caseem Hossem was the sole shareholder and Director of the
respondent. D uring the hearing of this application, it transpired that Mr
Hossem died on 27 May 2025. This information was brought to light by his
mother, an executrix of his estate when she just appeared in court and
applied for postponement of the application, w ithout filing any papers .
One of the reasons she advanced was that the company had been

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deregistered, but she had intentions to continue with the business. I
dismissed the application for postponement by Mrs Hossem , among
others for the want of l ocus standi in the proceedings. The hearing
proceeded accordingly.
Issue
[7] The initial issue for determination was whether the cancellation of the
lease agreement was valid thus justifying the eviction. However,
because of the information about the deregistration, the respondent’s
counsel raised the point in limine that the proceedings be stayed against
the respondent company as it had been deregistered . At the end of the
hearing, I requested that both parties file supplementary heads of
argument regarding the issue of deregistration.
Arguments

[8] The applicant’s case is that the respondent has breached the terms of the
contract therefore the implementation of clause 7 of the agreement was
applicable. Clause 7 provides as follows:
“Cancellation & Holding Over
7.1 Should the Lessor cancel this lease, the Lessee shall be obliged to
immediately vacate the leased premises, failing which the Lessor shall be
entitled to obtain an urgent court order for ejection of the Lessee or any person
or persons who occupy the leased premises on its behalf or who may be on the
leased premises without impairing the right of the Lessor to claim outstanding

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rental as well as any other amounts which may be due to it or compensation for
damages resulting from the breach of the lease by the Lessee.
7.2 Should the Lessee remain in occupation of the leased premises after the
contract of lease agreement has been cancelled as mentioned above, the
Lessee shall be liable to pay further rental and other charges for the duration of
the occupation, which amount paid shall constitute liquidated damages payable
by the Lessee to the Lessor.”

[9] Furthermore, it is not in dispute that when the lease was terminated, the
respondent was in arrears with its payment obligations. This immediately
vested the applicant with entitlement to validly cancel the Lease. The
cancellation of the Lease was preceded by 2 letters of demand affording a
7-day notice period for the respondent to remedy its breach, as required in
terms of the lease. The respondent failed to remedy the breach.
[10] The submission made on behalf of the respondent in the answering
affidavit was that the arrears were not due to its own fault. Amongst others
was the increase in potato prices and that it spent money on renovations
in the process of rebranding the restaurant. It is also stated that the
applicant has vendetta against the respondent. Belatedly technical points
were raised on behalf of the respondents. First, the respondent’s
cancellation of the lease agreement is invalid due to non-compliance with
clause 12.3. 5 of the lease agreement. Secondly, the respondent
company is deregistered thus the proceedings against the respondent
must be stayed.

[11] Although respondent does not dispute that the applicant has a right to
cancel the lease, t he m ain challenge is th at the lease was not properly

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cancelled because it was not properly hand delivered and/or sent via the
(sic) pre -paid registered mail" . This is in breach of Clause 12.3.5 which
provides that : "The parties record that whil st they may correspond via e-mail
during the currency of this agreement for operational reasons, no formal notice
required in terms of this Agreement, or any amendment of or variation of this
agreement may be given or concluded via e-mail.”
[12] In essence is that the notices and cancellation letters were sent via e-mail
thus not formal enough. The applicant has not pleaded cancellation within
the context of materially defective notice. This non-compliance renders
the cancellation invalid. As earlier indicated t his argument is belatedly
made in the supplementary which was filed after the applicant’s answering
affidavit without the leave of the court.
[13] The court was urged to embark on the interpretation exercise. In
reference to Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
1, the
submission on behalf of the respondent is clear from the language of the
lease agreement that a cancellation procedure requires a formal written
notice. It is also clear that whilst the parties may correspond via e- mail for
practical commercial and operational purposes, no formal notice required
in terms of the agreement may be given via e- mail. The requirement of
formal notice in the event of a breach and for cancellation purposes
indicates that the drafters of the lease agreement intended that where
actions whose consequences would be material to the existence of the
contract, a formal procedure needed to be followed.

1 2012] ZASCA 13; [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA) para 18

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[14] Regarding the de-registration of the respondent company, respondent
argued for the stay of proceedings. The argument is that because the
respondent company has been de – registered in terms of 82(3) of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 ("the Companies Act" ), therefore the
proceedings should be stayed with no order as to costs.
Discussion
[15] I first deal with deregistration. The argument proffered on behalf of the
applicant is that the information about the deregistration was part of the
postponement application, which was dismissed, thus this Court is functus
officio. Any issue arising from the dismissed postponement application
must be disregarded.
[16] It is common cause that the respondent company has been deregistered
for failure to comply with the annual returns requirement in terms of section
82(3) of the Companies Act. Section 82(3) states that:
"In addition to the duty to deregister a company contemplated in subsection (2)(b), the
Commission may otherwise remove a company from the companies register only if -
(a)(ii) the company has failed to file an annual return in terms of section 33 for two or
more years in succession."

[17] The effect of removal of company from register is that (1) :A company is
dissolved as of the date its name is removed from the companies register unless
the reason for the removal is that the company’ s registration has been
transferred to a foreign jurisdiction, as contemplated in section 82(5). see
Subsection (2) provides that the removal of a company’s name from the
companies register does not affect the liability of any former director or

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shareholder of the company or any other person in respect of any act or
omission that took place before the company was removed from the register.
Furthermore subsection (3) provides that any liability contemplated in
subsection (2) continues and may be enforced as if the company had not been
removed from the register.
[18] Subsection (4) provides that at any time after a company has been
dissolved-
“(a) the liquidator of the company, or other person with an interest in the
company, may apply to a court for an order declaring the dissolution to have
been void, or any other order that is just and equitable in the circumstances; and
(b) if the court declares the dissolution to have been void, any proceedings may
be taken against the company as might have been taken if the company had not
been dissolved.
[19] In this application no one has shown interest. In my view maybe the
applicant would have applied for the declaratory envisaged in (a) above. In
Newlands Surgical Clinic (Pty) Ltd v Peninsula Eye Clinic (Pty) Ltd, it is
held that the ‘reinstatement’ in s 82(4) has automatic retrospective effect.2 In
ABSA Bank Ltd v Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of
South African and Others it is held that:
“Although no order has been sought in that regard, I should perhaps make clear that
the order to be granted in this appeal does not validate the default judgment which
Absa purported to take against the dissolved Voigro or the liquidation proceedings

2 (A29/13) [2013] ZAWCHC 57; 2013 (4) SA 194 (WCC); [2013] 3 All SA 34 (WCC) (19
April 2013) para 66

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which Absa instituted against Voigro in April 2012. Since Voigro did not exist at the time
the default judgment was granted or at the time the liquidation proceedings were
instituted and the provisional order granted, the default judgment is a nullity as are the
liquidation proceedings and the provisional order.3 Mr Vivier accepted that this would be
the position and did not ask for a validating order.”
[20] The respondent company is no longer in existence, thus any order
against it would be a nullity. Therefore, to grant the order for the stay of the
proceedings would be appropriate. Nevertheless, the deregistration of the
respondent company is not in the affidavits of any of the parties . This point in
limine was not brought through a party in the proceedings. Because of the
manner this point was introduced I am not inclined to finalise this application
based on the deregistration. I turn to deal with the validity of the cancellation.

[21] It is trite that a party wishing to rely on the cancellation of an agreement
because of its breach – must allege and prove: (i) the breach of the agreement;
(ii) that the right to cancellation has occurred because the breach was material
or if the agreement contains a cancellation clause, that its provisions have been
complied with; and (iii) that clear and unequivocal notice of rescission was
conveyed to the other party, unless the agreement dispenses with such notice.

[22] As indicated above, the affidavit dealing with the alleged irregular
procedure in serving the letter to the respondent was raised irregularly on
its own. The affidavit was filed without the leave of the court. It is trite that
there are three affidavits allowed in motion proceedings, (i) the founding
affidavit (ii) the answering affidavit and (iii) the replying affidavit.
[23] Even if I am wrong in the above regard, it is not in dispute that the
applicant sent two letters of demand to the respondent. The respondent

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reacted to both by amongst others holding meetings with the applicant for
relaxed payment terms and requesting the change of shop within the
same premises.
[24] The argument proffered on behalf of the respondent is that the court in
embarking on the interpretation exercise must not consider the notice sent
via email correspondence. This disregards the use of another tool that
must employed in the process of interpretation, viz the trite principle which
is the examination of the subsequent conduct of the parties. In Kooij and
Others v Middleground Trading 251 CC and Another 3, the SCA held
as follows:
“ It is true that a Court can, when interpreting a contract, have regard to the
parties’ subsequent conduct in order to determine what they intended.[9] This
Court has, however, made it clear that the use of such evidence is
circumscribed. It laid down that such evidence may be accepted subject to three
provisos. First, the evidence must be indicative of a common understanding of
the terms and meaning of the contract. Second, the evidence may be used as an
aid to interpretation and not to alter the words used by the parties. Third, that
evidence must be used as conservatively as possible.”
[25] There is undisputed evidence that the there was a common
understanding between the parties that a valid cancellation notice was
issued against the respondent. The respondent further acted upon it.

3 (1249/18) [2020] ZASCA 45 (23 April 2020) para

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[26] For the foregoing reasons the application for eviction must succeed.
ORDER
In the result the following order is granted.
1. The respondent and all those occupying the leased premises by, through
or under it, be evicted from the leased premises situated at: Units F […] ,
F[…] and Shop 1[…] Ormonde Shopping Centre, 1[…] C[…] Road, O[…] .
2. The respondent and all those holding by, through or under it, are ordered
and directed to vacate the leased premises by no later than 6 February
2026.
3. Failing the r espondent complying with prayer 2 above, the Sheriff, or
his/her lawfully appointed deputy is authorised and directed to evict the
Respondent and all those occupying the leased premises by, through or
under it, from the leased premises.
4. The respondent is ordered and directed to pay the costs of this
application on scale C.

_______________________
N.P. MALI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION

APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Applicants: Adv. A Laher
Applicants attorney: Harris Incoporated
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv. R Mufamadi

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Respondent attorney: Daswa Shandukani Attorneys
Hearing date: 24 July 2025
Final Heads filed: 8 August 2025
Delivered: 27 January 2026