Khumalo v Kansai Plascon (Pty) Ltd and Others (D67/24) [2026] ZALCD 3 (28 January 2026)

70 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Review of arbitration award — Applicant seeking review of arbitration award dismissing unfair labour practice claim — Applicant's claim barred by Voluntary Retrenchment Agreement (VRA) executed post-arbitration — Court finding that terms of VRA clearly waived applicant's right to pursue review application — Review application dismissed without consideration of condonation application.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an application in the Labour Court to review and set aside an arbitration award issued under the auspices of the National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry. The applicant also sought consequential relief in the form of a declarator that the bargaining council had jurisdiction to determine his unfair labour practice referral (the same referral in respect of which jurisdiction had been declined).


The parties were Sithembiso Innocent Khumalo as the applicant (an employee), Kansai Plascon (Pty) Ltd as the first respondent (the employer), Vanshee Naidoo N.O. as the second respondent (the arbitrator who issued the award under review), and the National Bargaining Council for the Chemical Industry as the third respondent (the bargaining council whose jurisdiction was in issue).


Procedurally, the dispute originated in arbitration proceedings before the bargaining council. A jurisdictional award was issued on 31 May 2022 under case number CHEM 47-21/22, finding that the bargaining council lacked jurisdiction. A subsequent referral on similar issues led to a further jurisdictional ruling on 2 June 2023 under case number CHEM 67-22/23, again finding lack of jurisdiction. The present review application was launched on 15 February 2024, and the applicant also sought condonation for the late filing of that review.


The general subject-matter underpinning the jurisdictional disputes was an alleged unfair labour practice relating to a shift agreement and standby policy, and the applicant’s claim for payment of allowances asserted to be due under those policies. In the Labour Court, however, the determinative issue became the effect of a Voluntary Retrenchment Agreement concluded during the pendency of the litigation.


2. Material Facts


On 31 May 2022, the arbitrator (second respondent) issued an arbitration award in CHEM 47-21/22 finding that the bargaining council (third respondent) lacked jurisdiction to determine the applicant’s unfair labour practice referral. The dispute described in that award concerned a shift agreement and standby policy, and a claim by the applicant for payment of allowances in terms of those policies.


On 6 October 2022, the applicant referred a further unfair labour practice dispute concerning the same issues and seeking the same relief. That matter was allocated case number CHEM 67-22/23. On 2 June 2023, following a hearing on 31 May 2023, an arbitrator issued a ruling in that matter again finding that the bargaining council lacked jurisdiction.


On 15 February 2024, the applicant instituted the present review application directed at the earlier award (CHEM 47-21/22). The applicant elected not to pursue a review of the later jurisdictional ruling in CHEM 67-22/23, and that ruling remained extant.


A further material development occurred on 9 June 2025, when the applicant and the first respondent concluded a Voluntary Retrenchment Agreement (VRA). The VRA was introduced into these proceedings through supplementary affidavits filed by both the first respondent and the applicant. It was common cause that the applicant did not challenge the validity of the VRA on recognised grounds such as duress or misrepresentation.


The court considered several provisions of the VRA as directly relevant. These included an express acknowledgment by the applicant that he entered the agreement freely and voluntarily with full understanding of its terms, and a full and final settlement clause providing that amounts paid were inclusive of any and all amounts the applicant “is or may be entitled” to receive from the employer. The agreement further recorded a waiver of all claims of any nature whatsoever, expressly including claims arising from alleged breaches of employment legislation and claims relating to alleged unfair labour practices. The VRA also contained an undertaking that the applicant had not instituted claims and would not institute claims in any forum related to alleged breaches of the employment contract and/or employment legislation and/or in respect of any amount not set out in the agreement.


The applicant disputed that the VRA barred the review application, contending (in substance) that the VRA did not specifically refer to the present review, that it was ambiguous, that statements made during negotiations suggested pending cases would not be affected, and that other external instruments (including a CCMA jurisdictional ruling concerning another employee and an agreement involving unions and non-unionised employees) supported the view that his dispute could proceed. The first respondent denied that such negotiation statements were made, and relied on the wording of the VRA as precluding continuation of the review.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, on the proper interpretation and effect of the Voluntary Retrenchment Agreement, the applicant had waived or extinguished the right to continue litigating the review application and the underlying dispute to which it related.


This was primarily a dispute concerning the application of law to fact, namely the legal consequences of an undisputed settlement agreement (the VRA) for pending litigation, assessed against the factual context that the VRA was concluded after the review had been launched and that it contained wide full-and-final settlement and waiver language. To the extent that the applicant alleged ambiguity or reliance on negotiation statements, the matter also implicated issues concerning the evaluation of alleged extrinsic assertions and whether they could affect the meaning or effect of the written settlement terms, as well as whether those assertions were admissible.


A consequential issue was whether it remained necessary for the court to determine the condonation application for the late review, given the asserted dispositive effect of the VRA. A further issue concerned the appropriate costs order, taking into account the Labour Court’s approach to costs.


Notably, although the papers sought a declarator about the bargaining council’s jurisdiction and the setting aside of the arbitration award, the court’s reasoning proceeded on the basis that these merits did not require determination if the VRA operated as a complete bar to the litigation.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court treated the VRA as central to the disposition of the matter. It noted that the VRA was placed before it by supplementary affidavits and that the applicant did not attack the VRA’s conclusion on recognised grounds such as duress or misrepresentation. In those circumstances, the court approached the dispute on the basis that the VRA was a valid agreement and that its plain wording had to be given effect.


On interpretation, the court held that the VRA’s language was clear and unambiguous and that it was framed broadly to encompass all claims of whatever nature relating to the applicant’s employment relationship with the first respondent. The court considered that the agreement’s full-and-final settlement provisions and express waiver clauses covered claims arising from employment legislation and included, specifically, alleged unfair labour practice claims. The court therefore concluded that the review application fell “squarely” within the category of matters that the applicant had agreed to waive.


The applicant’s contention that the VRA did not expressly mention the pending review application was rejected. The court reasoned that the breadth of the settlement terms did not require specific identification of each pending matter for the waiver to apply, given that the VRA expressly covered all claims of whatever nature relating to the employment relationship and expressly referred to unfair labour practice claims among the waived categories.


The court also rejected the contention that the VRA’s wording was ambiguous. It held that an alleged misunderstanding by the applicant could not override the agreement’s clear terms. The court further dealt with the applicant’s reliance on alleged negotiation statements that pending matters would not be affected. It recorded that the first respondent denied such statements and held that they had not been confirmed and amounted to inadmissible hearsay. The court added that, even if such statements had been made, they would not override the express terms of the written VRA as concluded.


The applicant’s reliance on a CCMA jurisdictional ruling concerning another employee was treated as non-determinative. The court held that such a ruling was not binding on the Labour Court and did not influence the interpretation of the VRA binding the applicant. The court also noted that, to the extent the ruling might be relevant, it was being taken on review. Similarly, the applicant’s reliance on an agreement concluded between certain unions and non-unionised employees was held to be of no significance to the present proceedings because the applicant was bound by the VRA he personally concluded.


Having found that the VRA encompassed and waived the claim pursued through the review, the court characterised the agreement as extinguishing the underlying dispute and constituting a complete defence to subsequent litigation concerning the same subject matter. On that basis, the court concluded that it was unnecessary to determine the condonation application.


In relation to costs, the court considered whether to depart from the approach that costs in the Labour Court do not necessarily follow the result. It was not persuaded that a departure was warranted, and therefore made no costs order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Labour Court dismissed the review application. The court made no order as to costs.


The court did not determine the merits of the jurisdictional ruling under review or the applicant’s request for a declarator on the bargaining council’s jurisdiction, because it held that the Voluntary Retrenchment Agreement barred the continuation of the litigation and extinguished the underlying dispute. The court similarly did not determine the condonation application because it found it unnecessary in light of the dispositive effect of the VRA.


Cases Cited


No cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended)


Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (as amended)


Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (as amended)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the applicant, by concluding a Voluntary Retrenchment Agreement containing clear full-and-final settlement and waiver provisions, abandoned or waived the right to pursue the pending review and extinguished the underlying dispute forming the subject matter of the litigation. The review application therefore could not proceed and was dismissed, and it was unnecessary to determine condonation. No costs order was made.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A valid settlement agreement concluded between an employee and employer, containing clear and comprehensive full-and-final settlement and waiver clauses, may operate to extinguish the underlying dispute and provide a complete defence to further litigation concerning the same subject matter, including pending proceedings, where no contractual term preserves the right to continue with such proceedings.


Where the terms of a written agreement are clear and unambiguous, an alleged subjective misunderstanding by a party cannot displace the agreement’s expressed meaning as adopted by the parties in writing.


Alleged negotiation-stage statements that contradict the express written terms of a settlement agreement, particularly where denied and not confirmed, may be treated as inadmissible hearsay and, in any event as addressed in the judgment, do not override the express provisions of the concluded agreement.


In costs determinations in the Labour Court, the court may adhere to the approach that costs do not necessarily follow the result, and may decline to award costs absent a sufficient basis to depart from that approach.

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, DURBAN
Case No: D67/24
In the matter between:`
SITHEMBISO INNOCENT KHUMALO Applicant
and
KANSAI PLASCON (PTY) LTD First Respondent
VANSHEE NAIDOO N.O Second Respondent
NATIONAL BARGAINING COUNCIL
FOR THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY Third
Respondent
Heard: 04 December 2025
Delivered: 28 January 2026

JUDGMENT

SEERY, AJ
[1] The applicant seeks the review and setting aside of an arbitration award
(CHEM 47-21/22, dated 31 May 2022) and, if successful, a declarator that the
(1) Reportable Yes/No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised

____________ ______________
Signature Date

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third respondent has jurisdiction to deal with and determine his unfair labour
practice referral made under the same case number.
[2] The applicant further seeks condonation for his late referral of the review
application.
[3] What follows is a chronology of relevant events:
3.1 31 May 2022 – the arbitration award (referred to above – CHEM 47-
21/22) was handed down with the second respondent finding that the
third respondent lacked jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s referral,
an unfair labour practice that related to a ‘shift agreement’ and ‘standby
policy’, and the applicant’s claim for payment of allowances in terms of
the policies.
3.2 6 October 2022 – the applicant referred an unfair labour practice
concerning the same issues as the aforementioned referral, and
seeking the same relief (referred to, above). The matter was allocated
case number CHEM 67-22/23.
3.3 2 June 2023 – pursuant to a hearing on 31 May 2023, the arbitrator
handed down a ruling in CHEM 67 -22/23 that the third respondent
lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
3.4 15 February 2024 – the applicant launched the present review
application.
3.5 9 June 2025 – the applicant and first respondent concluded a
VOLUNTARY RETRENCHMENT AGREEMENT (“VRA”).
[4] The applicant has chosen not to pursue a review of the arbitration award
handed down under case number CHEM 67-22/23, which award still stands.
[5] The practical problem that the applicant would have faced with the latter -
mentioned ‘live’ award will not manifest itself, given the manner in which this
court will determine the matter presently before it.
[6] As already stated, the applicant and the first respondent entered into a VRA
on 9 June 2025. The VSA was introduced into, and dealt with in these
proceedings by way of supplementary affidavits delivered by both the first
respondent and the applicant.
[7] The applicant has not challenged the conclusion of the VRA on any
recognised ground such as duress or misrepresentation.

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[8] Certain clauses of the agreement , dealt with below, have a direct bearing on
the proceedings before this court:
8.1 Clause 1 – the applicant agreed that he “has entered into (the)
Agreement freely and voluntarily, without any force or threat, and with
full understanding of the terms set out in (the) Agreement”.
8.2 Clause 16 – FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT.
8.3 Clause 16.1 – the applicant accepted and agreed “that the amounts
paid to him in terms of (the) Agreement are inclusive of any and all
amounts that (he) is or may be entitled from the (first respondent)”.
8.4 Clause 16.2 – the payments made and the benefits afforded to the
applicant in terms of the agreement “shall be in full and final settlement
of all or any claims of any nature whatsoever that the (applicant) …
may have against the (first respondent) … and the (applicant) waives
any claims / rights he may have in this regard”.
8.5 Clause 16.3 – In particular, but without limiting the above provisions:
8.6 Clause 16.3.1 – “(the applicant) shall have no claim against the (first
respondent) … arising from any breach of the Employment Contract
and / or any employment legislation, including but not limited to the
Labour Relations Act, 1995 as amended, the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, 1997 as amended and the Employment Equity Act,
1998 as amended; and”
8.7 Clause 16.3.2 – “(the applicant) shall have no claim against the (first
respondent) … arising from any alleged unfair or unlawful dismissal,
any alleged automatically unfair dismissal, and alleged unfair labour
practice and / or alleged unfair discrimination claims; and”
8.8 Clause 16.3.3 – “(the applicant) shall have no claim against the (first
respondent) … for any amount not set out in this Agreement”.
8.9 Clause 16.4 – “In addition, and without limiting the above provisions,
the (applicant) warrants that he has not instituted any claim against the
(first respondent), in any forum, tribunal or court for any reason

(first respondent), in any forum, tribunal or court for any reason
whatsoever, and he warrants and undertakes that he shall not do so for
any reason related to an alleged breach of his Employment Contract
and / or any employment legislation and / or in respect of any amount
not set out in this Agreement”.

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[9] The first respondent contends inter alia that the conclusion of the V RA
resulted in the applicant being prevented from pursuing the review application
presently before the court.
[10] The applicant challenged the first respondent’s contention, on the following
five grounds:
10.1 That the VRA made no specific reference to the review application
presently before the court : In this court’s view, the express wording of
the VRA covers all claims of whatever nature relating to the applicant’s
employment with the first respondent. Particular reference to this
review application was not required.
10.2 There is ambiguity in the wording of the VRA : In this court’s view, the
terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous; the applicant’s
alleged misunderstanding cannot override the clear terms of the VRA.
10.3 Reliance on alleged statements made in the negotiation process that
pending cases would not be affected (I assume the negotiation of the
VRA – the applicant’s supplementary affidavit is not clear in this
regard): Not only has the first respondent denied such statements, they
have not been confirmed in any way and the allegation in this regard
amount to inadmissible hearsay. In any event, and if there were such
statements, they would not have the effect of overri ding the express
terms of the VRA.
10.4 Reliance on a CCMA jurisdictional ruling concerning another employee
(that the referred dispute should proceed despite the conclusion of the
VRA): The ruling is not binding on this court, and does not influence the
court’s interpretation of the VRA that the applicant bound himself to. To
the extent that it may be relevant, the ruling is being taken on review.
10.5 Reliance on an agreement concluded between certain unions and non-
unionised employees: This agreement has no impact or significance in
these proceedings. The applicant is bound by the VRA that he
concluded.
[11] On the plain wording of the VRA, the applicant’s review application falls

concluded.
[11] On the plain wording of the VRA, the applicant’s review application falls
squarely within the category of matters that the applicant agreed to waive his
right to pursue. There is no clause that preserves the applicant’s right to
pursue this particular review that is the subject of these proceedings.

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[12] The applicant elected, when concluding the VRA, to abandon his right to
pursue his review application. The conclusion of the VRA extinguishes the
applicant’s underlying dispute and constitutes a complete defense to
subsequent litigation (such as this review) concerning the same subject
matter.
[13] Having regard to the above, i t is therefore not necessary for this court to deal
with the condonation application.
[14] I am not persuaded that the practice of this court that costs do not necessarily
follow the result should be departed from.
[15] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
1. The review application is dismissed.
2. There is no order in respect of costs.

________________
T. Seery
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

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Appearances:
For the plaintiffs : Adv S K Xulu instructed by Ntokozo Sibusiso Xulu Attorneys
For the respondent : Fluxmans Inc