Letang v Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Roodepoort and Another (2026/006355) [2026] ZAGPJHC 45 (29 January 2026)

60 Reportability

Brief Summary

Spoliation — Unlawful dispossession — Owner surrendering pet to SPCA for care — Owner claiming spoliation after SPCA refuses return — Court finding that consent to surrender negated claim of unlawful dispossession — Application for spoliation dismissed as lacking merit.

2

At some point – Mr. Haricharan says it must have been at least three days
before he found Bitsy – Bitsy fell down the drain and became trapped there.
Because Bitsy, like many dogs of his age and size, suffers from arthritis, he
did not have the strength to jump out of the drain.
2 By the time Mr. Haricharan found him, Bitsy was in a dreadful state. Bitsy was
starving, dehydrated, infested with ticks and fleas and suffering from flystrike
in his ear. Flystrike a particularly distressing condition that appears to involve
the deterioration of tissue as a result of the gestation of larvae hatched from
eggs planted underneath the skin. Bitsy needed urgent veterinary attention.
3 Mr. Haricharan managed to obtain Mr. Letang’s telephone number. He
contacted Mr. Letang and told him of Bitsy’s state. Mr. Letang said that he was
not in a position to provide Bitsy with the veterinary attention he needed. Mr.
Haricharan then asked Mr. Letang if he wanted to surrender Bitsy to the SPCA.
Mr. Letang agreed. He sent a WhatsApp message to Mr. Haricharan stating
that "I John Michael letang [sic] of [address] do hereby surrender Bitsy to
SPCA roodepoort... thank you". Mr. Letang’s daughter, who was present or
arrived at the property during Mr. Haricharan’s visit, also signed a form
indicating that all “ownership rights” over Bitsy were being relinquished.
4 Just under an hour after “surrendering” Bitsy to the SPCA, Mr. Letang
contacted Mr. Haricharan again, stating “Hi Eugene,kindly [sic] note that Bitsy
is being surrendered to SPCA ROODEPOORT for treatment and please
inform us when Bitsy is ready for collection thank you”. Mr. Haricharan did not
reply. The next day, Mr. Letang sent another message: “Hi Eugene, any news

3

on Bitsy please. We are concerned.” There is no reply to this message on
record either.
5 By the following Wednesday, 7 January, it had dawned on Mr. Letang that the
SPCA had no intention of returning Bitsy to him. On that date, Mr. Letang’s
legal representatives sent a letter to the SPCA demanding Bitsy’s return. On
the same day, and relying on Bitsy’s putative surrender to Mr. Haricharan, the
SPCA responded that Bitsy would not be returned to Mr. Letang. Bitsy was
now the property of the SPCA, the letter said, having been rescued from Mr.
Letang’s neglect and surrendered to the SPCA because Mr. Letang could not
provide the care and treatment Bitsy needed.
6 Aggrieved, Mr. Letang placed an urgent application for Bitsy’s return on my
roll for 27 January 2026. In that application, Mr. Letang claimed that he had
been spoliated, because the SPCA unlawfully dispossessed him of Bitsy when
Mr. Haricharan took the dog away on 2 January. At the outset of the hearing,
I asked Ms. Simelane, who appeared for Mr. Letang, whether that case could
survive Mr. Letang’s admission that he surrendered Bitsy to Mr. Haricharan
when he was invited to do so. Ms. Simelane argued that, even though Mr.
Letang had surrendered Bitsy, he meant neither to give up his ownership, nor
to permanently give over possession of Bitsy to the SPCA. Ms. Simelane
adverted to Mr. Letang’s message to Mr. Haricharan, asking to be informed
when Bitsy is “ready for collection”.
7 But that submission missed the point. The question is not whether Bitsy’s
surrender to the SPCA amounted to a waiver of ownership, or whether Mr.
Letang intended to place Bitsy permanently in the SPCA’s care. The only

4

question is whether, at the point Mr. Haricharan took control of Bitsy, he did
so with Mr. Letang’s consent. Clearly, he did.
8 The question of whether that consent permanently altered the rights that could
be exercised over Bitsy is irrelevant to these spoliation proceedings, since
spoliation is only concerned with whether a transfer of possession took place
lawfully. Whether that transfer resulted in a right of retention or a change in
ownership can be explored in separate proceedings. But once Mr. Letang
conceded, as he had to, that he voluntarily placed Bitsy with the SPCA, there
could have been no question of the SPCA having unlawfully dispossessed
him. There may have been a basis for vindicatory relief (though that claim, too,
would in my opinion have faced formidable obstacles), but that is not the
application Mr. Letang brought.
9 For these reasons, the spoliation application must fail. Mr. Kohn, who
appeared for the SPCA asked for attorney and client costs, on the basis that
this application was so lacking in merit that it should never have been brought
in the first place. It is true that this application was based on an elementary
misconception of law, but I do not think that mistake can be attributed to Mr.
Letang. This is not the first time I have been constrained to observe that the
legal representatives currently acting for Mr. Letang have brought a
fundamentally misguided claim before the urgent court (see Kruger Ranch
Farms Investments (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Limited [2026] ZAGPJHC 19 (19
January 2026) (“Kruger Ranch”), paragraph 13).
10 The mistakes made in litigating both Mr. Letang’s case and the Kruger Ranch
case were so fundamental that it seems to me that the representation provided