About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
>>
2026
>>
[2026] ZANCHC 7
|

|

Matlala v Sol Plaatje Local Municipality and Others (Reasons) (2026-004539) [2026] ZANCHC 7 (28 January 2026)

THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
Reportable
/
Not Reportable
Case
no:
2026-004539
In
the matter between:
BARTHOLOMEW
SERAPELO MATLALA
Applicant
and
SOL
PLAATJE LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
First
Respondent
MARTHA
BARTLETT N.O.
(Executive
Mayor: Sol Plaatje Local
Municipality)

Second Respondent
DIPUO
PETERS N.O.
(Speaker:
Sol Plaatje Local
Municipality)

Third Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Matlala
v
Sol
Plaatje Local Municipality and 2 Others
(Case no 2026-004539).
Coram:
Tyuthuza AJ.
Heard:
16 January 2026.
Reasons
Available:
28
January 2026.
Summary:
Principle
of legality – precautionary suspension of municipal manager –
non-compliance with Regulation 6 of the Local
Government:
Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010 – failure to
afford opportunity to make written representations
– suspension
effected after automatic lapse of earlier suspension – council
resolution and suspension notice unlawful
and invalid –
suspension set aside – personal costs order against Executive
Mayor and Speaker for
mala
fide
and
unlawful conduct.
REASONS
FOR ORDER
Tyuthuza
AJ
Introduction:
[1]
On
16 January 2026, I granted the following order in the urgent court:
1.1.
That the
application is urgent, and the
rules relating to
forms, service and time periods, as prescribed by the Uniform Rules
of Court are dispensed with.
1.2.
That the
suspension notice served on and against the applicant on the 8
th
of January 2026 is declared unlawful, null and void and is set aside.
1.3.
That the
applicant resumes his duties as the Municipal Manager of the 1
st
Respondent with immediate effect and on the date of the making of
this order of court.
1.4.
That the
second and third respondents be ordered to pay the cost of this
application in their personal capacities.
[2]
On
19 January 2026, the respondents filed a request for reasons for the
order granted on 16 January 2026. These are my reasons.
[3]
On
13 January 2026, the applicant (Mr Matlala) launched this urgent
application, wherein he sought the following relief:
3.1.
That this
application be heard as an urgent application and that the
applicant’s non-compliance with the Rules of Court insofar
as
it pertains to service and time periods be condoned as envisaged in
Rule 6(12)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
3.2.
That the
suspension notice served on and against the Applicant on the 8th of
January 2026 be declared unlawful, null and void and
be set aside.
3.3.
Setting aside
the suspension of the Applicant.
3.4.
Directing that
the Applicant resume his duties as the Municipal Manager of the first
respondent with immediate effect and on the
date of making this an
order of court
3.5.
That the
first, second and third respondents be directed to comply with the
Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior
Managers, 2010,
in particular Regulation 6 (a) regarding the automatic lapse of the
applicant’s suspension and his resumption
of duty as the
Municipal Manager.
3.6.
That the
second and third respondents be ordered to pay the costs of this
application in their personal capacities.
[4]
The respondents
opposed the application on 14 January 2026, and the matter proceeded
on an opposed basis on 16 January 2026.
[5]
In essence, the
applicant seeks an order for the setting aside of his suspension on 8
January 2026 on the basis that it is unlawful
due to a lack of
compliance with Regulation 6 of the Local Government: Disciplinary
Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010 (“the
disciplinary
regulations”).
Relevant
Background
:
[6]
The applicant is
employed as the Municipal Manager of the Sol Plaatje Local
Municipality, the first respondent. By virtue of his
appointment as
municipal manager, the applicant is a senior manager and as such his
employment is subject to the provisions of
the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“the Systems Act”) and
the Disciplinary Regulations for Senior
Managers, 2010.
[7]
It
is common cause that the applicant was placed on precautionary
suspension on 16 September 2025 following allegations of misconduct

levelled against him. Following his suspension, the first respondent,
the Sol Plaatje Local Municipality, failed to commence with
the
disciplinary inquiry within the three months provided for in the
disciplinary regulations, and as such, his suspension lapsed
by
operation of the law.
[1]
[8]
It is also common
cause that after numerous correspondence between the parties
regarding the applicant’s return-to-work date
after the
automatic lapse of his suspension, the applicant returned for duty on
5 January 2026. However, he was unable to resume
his duties as
Municipal Manager on that date, as he was denied access to his office
due to the keys and/or locks having been changed.
Subsequently, an
agreement was reached between the applicant’s and respondents’
attorneys that the applicant resume
work on 6 January 2026. On 7
January 2026, the applicant became aware that the Speaker, the third
respondent, had issued a notice
to convene a special council meeting
scheduled for 8 January 2026. According to the agenda, the business
of the said meeting was
“
1.
Report by the Executive Mayor, M Bartlett, on Progress of
Administrative and Compliance Processes relating to the Municipal
Manager, BS Matlala; and 2. Supplementary reports
”.
The applicant then instructed his attorneys to send correspondence to
the first respondent querying the status of the said
meeting and
seeking clarity thereon.
[9]
A special Council
meeting was convened on 8 January 2026, whereat
a resolution was
adopted to suspend the applicant with immediate effect pending the
finalisation of disciplinary proceedings against
him. The resolution
came to the applicant’s attention by way of a suspension notice
from the respondents’ attorneys
dated 8 January 2026.
[10]
The applicant
contends that the suspension letter and/or resolution of Council,
which suspended him with immediate effect, did not
afford him any
opportunity to make written representations to the municipal council
as to why he should not be suspended as required
in terms of
Regulation 6(2) of the disciplinary regulations, within 7 days of the
Council having taken the decision to suspend
him. Accordingly, the
suspension letter or Council resolution that sought to suspend him
with immediate effect, did not afford
him the opportunity to make
representations. Furthermore, the ‘new’ suspension is not
an extension of his earlier suspension
beyond the three-month period,
which in any event, is not allowed in terms of the Regulations.
[11]
The applicant
contends further that the respondents’ suspension of him beyond
the three-month period and/or seeking to suspend
him without
affording him an opportunity to make representations is an act of
gross unfairness and a brazen act of unlawfulness.
[12]
The respondents filed
an answering affidavit, which was deposed to by the Executive Mayor,
the second respondent, and a confirmatory
affidavit from the third
respondent. At the onset, the respondents dispute that the matter is
urgent and aver that the urgency
is self-created.
[13]
The
respondents contend that the second respondent is empowered by
section 56 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act
[2]
(“ the Structures Act”), read with section 59 of the
Systems Act, to ensure effective administration, good governance,
and
the protection of municipal operations. The respondents aver that the
applicant threatened the safety of employees, disrupted
municipal
administration and undermined public confidence, and as such, the
second respondent was obliged to intervene to safeguard
the integrity
of the Municipality.
[14]
The respondents aver
that, consistent with the existing statutory framework, the municipal
council is entitled at any point to suspend
a municipal manager whose
conduct is objectively disruptive, intimidatory, or detrimental to
the proper functioning, stability
and intergrity of the Municipality,
provided that such suspension is lawful, rational and procedurally
fair. The respondents further
concede that the disciplining of
municipal managers is regulated by the Regulations.
[15]
It is common cause
that the first respondent instituted an urgent application in this
court on 7 January 2026, wherein it sought,
amongst others, to
interdict and restrain the applicant from entering the municipal
premises accompanied by armed private security
guards; intimidating,
threatening, obstructing or interfering with municipal officials,
employees, councillors or sevice providers;
and  disrupting the
ordinary administrative, executive and operational functions of the
municipality, pending the finalisation
of the disciplinary hearing
scheduled for 13 January 2026. The first respondent withdrew the said
application before same could
be ventilated. Upon reading the
abandoned application, it is clear that the reasons advanced therein
for the relief sought are
the same reasons for which the applicant
was subsequently suspended on 8 January 2026.
[16]
The respondents
persist that the suspension on 8 January 2026 was a lawful, rational
and procedurally fair decision of the Council
in response to the
applicant’s conduct.
Urgency:
[17]
This
matter
arises from the decision of the respondents to suspend the applicant
on 8 January 2026, which suspension the applicant submits
is an abuse
of power and a violation of the disciplinary regulations. In
Apleni
v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another
[3]
,
the
Court
acknowledged that allegations concerning the abuse of power by public
officials warrant prompt judicial attention and observed
as follows:
‘
.
. . the applicant also relies on urgency, with reference to specific
examples, by stating that the suspension of a Director-General
has a
substantial negative effect on service delivery and critical projects
that the Government Department was carrying out. Certain
of those
critical functions require experience and institutional knowledge,
and are not functions that should be fulfilled by someone
acting in
the position of Director-General. It is that context also that
applicant alleges that it was critical that the unlawful
and
irrational suspension be set aside as a matter of urgency. There were
significant projects that were being delayed and hampered
because of
the instability that his suspension has caused. He also alleged that
the Minister was abusing her powers, and was clearly
attempting to
remove him from his position so that she could influence the
operational decisions of the department. I hold that
the application
is urgent.
Where
allegations are made relating to abuse of power by a Minister or
other public officials, which may impact upon the Rule of
Law, and
may have a detrimental impact upon the public purse, the relevant
relief sought ought normally to be urgently considered
.’
[18]
Further
in
Letsholonyane
v Minister of Human Settlements and Another
[4]
it
was stated:
‘
When
political heads are alleged to have subverted the rule of law, or
undermined the express provisions of valid agreements or
binding
procedures, and unleashed lawlessness on the people they are supposed
to lead, courts of law should hasten, when called
upon, to intervene
- on good cause. Failure by the courts in that situation would lead
to a perpetuation of the lawlessness and
embolden those in power to
continue acting with impunity.’
[19]
The
respondents contend that, given that the applicant has been suspended
on full pay and with full benefits, the matter lacks urgency.

Thus,the applicant has failed to demonstrate any irreparable harm or
prejudice that cannot be remedied in due course. It is also
the
respondents’ case that the applicant has adequate and effective
remedies available to him and that this court lacks the
necessary
jurisdiction to entertain the relief sought. The respondents contend,
without more, that the applicant is an employee
as contemplated in
“labour legislation”, and that any challenge to the
lawfulness or fairness of his suspension constitutes
a labour dispute
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the specialised labour
forums.
[5]
Furthermore, the
respondents contend that the applicant has failed to demonstrate the
existence of exceptional circumstances warranting
the intervention of
this Court, particularly as the applicant continues to receive his
full remuneration and benefits. Accordingly,
this Court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain the relief sought.
[20]
It
has been accepted that a person’s suspension from their
workplace prejudicially impacts on their freedom to work and their

dignity.
[6]
In
South
African Municipal Workers Union obo Matola v Mbombela Local
Municipality
[7]
said
the following:
‘
The
harm that the applicant suffers pending the finalisation of the
disciplinary hearing is not financial because he receives his
salary
during the suspension. The irreparable harm that he suffers has to do
with his dignity and freedom to work. The impact of
the suspension on
the freedom to work and dignity of the suspended employee was stated
in
Minister
of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka and Others,
[8]
in the following terms:
“
The
freedom to engage in productive work – even where that is not
required in order to survive – is indeed an important
component
of human dignity, as submitted by the respondents’ counsel, for
mankind is pre-eminently a social species with
an instinct for
meaningful association. Self-esteem and the sense of self-worth –
the fulfilment of what it is to be human
– is most often bound
up with being accepted as socially useful.’
[21]
I was satisfied that
the matter is urgent based on the underlying basis of the
application, which is predicated on the failure by
the respondents to
properly give effect to regulation 6.
Discussion:
[22]
The respondents dispute the jurisdiction of
this Court, and aver that the dispute concerns the lawfulness or
fairness of the applicant’s
suspension, and thus constitutes a
labour dispute falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
specialised labour forums. The
respondents failed to appreciate that
the applicant lodged this application under the principle of
legality, and as such, this
Court is vested with jurisdiction.
[23]
It
is trite that a lawful suspension must be substantively and
procedurally fair.
[9]
-
Furthermore, it is indeed a fundamental principle of the rule of law,
recognised widely, that the exercise of public power is
only
legitimate where lawful.
[10]
[24]
In
Mogothle
v Premier of the North West Province & Another
[11]
,
the Labour Court identified three criteria for a valid suspension:
‘
(a)
The employer must have a justifiable reason to believe, prima facie
at least,
that the employee has engaged in serious misconduct;
(b)
There is some objectively justifiable reason to deny the employee
access
to the workplace;
(c)
The employee must be heard before a decision to suspend him/her is
taken.’
[25]
It
is common cause that all disciplinary steps, including precautionary
suspension, which the Municipality instituted or intends
to institute
against the applicant, must be in compliance with the disciplinary
regulations. Failure to comply with the disciplinary
regulations
renders any action or step taken by the municipality to be
unlawful.
[12]
[26]
The “resolution” taken by the
respondents in the meeting on 8 January 2026 to suspend the applicant
with immediate effect,
as reflected in the unsigned agenda and
minutes annexure “MB3” and the subsequent notice served
on the applicant annexure
“FA12”, is unlawful.
[27]
In
Manamela
v Department of Co-Operative Governance, Human Settlements and
Traditional Affairs, Limpopo Province
and
Another
[13]
, it was held thus:
‘
A
suspension would be unlawful in instances where the right or power of
the employer to effect a suspension is prescribed by specific

regulation and these regulations are not complied with by the
employer. The unlawfulness is founded on the employer not complying

with its own rules. This regulation (rules) can be done in the form
of a disciplinary code and procedure, collective agreement,
statutory
provisions, or other regulatory provisions.
This
kind of regulation is prolific in the public service as evidenced by
the fact that the law reports are permeated with
judgments
relating to urgent applications by senior employees in the public
sector to uplift suspensions on the basis that such
suspensions are
unlawful. As will be further and specifically addressed hereunder,
the issue of the lawfulness of the suspension
must be based solely on
the provisions of the regulatory provisions themselves, as defined
therein, and thus only concern the interpretation
and application of
the actual regulatory provisions in order to assess and determine
compliance by the employer
.
[14]
[28]
The process for a suspension of a senior
manager is prescribed in regulation 6, which determines as follows:
‘
Precautionary
suspension
(1)
The municipal council may suspend a senior manager on full pay if it
is
alleged that the senior manager has committed an act of
misconduct, where the municipal council has reason to believe that—
(
a
)
the presence of the senior manager at the workplace may—
(i)
jeopardise any investigation into the alleged misconduct;
(ii)
endanger the well-being or safety of any person or municipal
property; or
(iii)
be detrimental to stability in the municipality; or
(
b
)
the senior manager may—
(i)
interfere with
potential witnesses; or
(ii)
commit further
acts of misconduct.
(2)
Before a senior manager may be suspended, he or she must be given an
opportunity
to make a written representation to the municipal council
why he or she should not be suspended, within seven days of being
notified
of the council’s decision to suspend him or her.
(3)
The municipal council must consider any representation submitted to
it
by the senior manager within seven days.
(4)
After having considered the matters set out in subregulation (1), as
well
as the senior manager’s representations contemplated in
subregulation (2), the municipal council may suspend the senior
manager
concerned.
(5)
The municipal council must inform—
(
a
)
the senior manager in writing of the reasons for his or her
suspension on or before the date
on which the senior manager is
suspended; and
(
b
)
the Minister and the MEC responsible for local government in the
province where such suspension
has taken place, must be notified in
writing of such suspension and the reasons for such within a period
of seven days after such
suspension.
(6)(
a
)
If a senior manager is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must
commence within three months after the date
of suspension, failing
which the suspension will automatically lapse.
(
b
)
The period of three months referred to in paragraph (
a
)
may not be extended by council.’
[15]
[29]
In
Lebu
v Maquassi Hills Local Municipality & others
[16]
van Niekerk J stated the following regarding regulation 6:
‘
The
procedure relevant to the suspension of a senior manager in terms of
regulation 6 can be summarised as follows:
(a)
A municipality is entitled to suspend a senior manager on full pay,
if
it reasonably believes that a senior manager has committed an act
of serious misconduct.
(b)
The municipality must have reason to believe that the continued
presence
of the senior manager at the workplace will either
jeopardise any investigation into the alleged misconduct, or endanger
the well-being
or safety of any person or municipal property. It will
also be sufficient that the municipality believes that the manager’s

continued presence in the workplace will be detrimental to stability
in the municipality, or that the manager may interfere with
potential
witnesses, or commit further acts of misconduct. The purpose of any
suspension must be rational, and a municipality must
be in a position
to establish the reasonableness of its belief.
(c)
A municipality may do no more than
take a decision in principle, before affording the affected senior
manager at least seven days’
notice of its intention to suspend
him or her
. The notice must contain
at least a description of the misconduct that the manager is alleged
to have committed, and the council’s
justification for its
in-principle decision, and invite representations in relation to
both. Both the nature of the misconduct
alleged and the purpose of
the proposed suspension must be set out in terms that are
sufficiently particular so as to enable the
senior manager to make
meaningful representations in response to the proposed suspension.’
(own emphasis)
[30]
In
South
African Municipal Workers Union obo Matola (supra)
,
the Court (
per
Molahlehi J), also dealing with a suspension and compliance with
regulation 6, stated the following at paragraphs 25 to 26:
‘
It is apparent
from a reading of the various judgments of this court that suspension
is a serious matter which has serious implications
for the employee.
It is for this reason that suspension has been equated to an arrest.
An employer should therefore not rush to
suspend an employee whenever
allegations of misconduct are raised against the employee.
It
is of course well-established approach in our law that the employer
would be justified in suspending an employee for serious
misconduct
allegations or whenever it is clear that the employee may, pending
the investigation of discipline, interfere with witnesses
or
information relevant to the investigation. However, before taking a
decision to suspend the employer is enjoined by the principles
of
natural justice to afford the employee the opportunity to be heard.
In other words the employer has a duty to show that there
exist
justifiable reasons for suspending an employee.’
[31]
Having
regard to various judgments regarding the disciplinary regulations
and the peremptory nature thereof, there can be no doubt
that the
respondents, in not affording the applicant an opportunity to make
written representations, failed to comply with the
audi
alterem partem
rule.
Thus, the respondents disregarded the applicant’s right to be
heard. Counsel for the respondents conceded that there
was no
compliance with Regulation 6.
[32]
The
respondents failed to notify the applicant of their intention to
suspend him prior to the meeting of 8 January 2026, whilst
the
respondents should have provided the applicant with basic particulars
as to what motivated the intention to suspend him, and
provide him
with an opportunity to submit representations as to why he should not
be suspended. The opportunity to submit representations
must have
been conveyed to the applicant within seven days of being notified of
the Municipal Council’s decision to suspend
him. The Municipal
Council ought to have then considered any representations submitted
by the applicant within seven days. In terms
of Regulation 6(4), and
after having considered the factors in Regulation 6(1)(
a
)
and (
b
),
together with the applicant’s representations, it may then
suspend the applicant. It is common cause that this procedure
was not
followed.
[33]
Counsel
for the applicant referred me to
Mere
v Tswaing Local Municipality and Others
[17]
wherein the Court referred to the reasoning of Snyman AJ in
Mere
v Tswaing Local Municipal and Another
[18]
in respect of regulation 6, and confirmed that:
‘
In
Mojaki v
Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality and Others
(2015) 36 ILJ 1331
(LC) at para 29
the
Court held as follows:
‘
The
object of regulation 6 of the regulations is to afford an employee a
hearing before the decision to suspend him or her is taken.
That
object is achieved by calling on the employee to show cause why he or
she should not be suspended pending an investigation
or disciplinary
hearing. ….’
Regulation
6 thus contemplates the opportunity to make representations before
the final decision is taken to suspend a senior manager.
That
means that the senior manager must at least be placed in a position
where he or she is able to make such representations.
In
Lebu
v Maquassi Hills Local Municipality and Others
,
the Court held as follows insofar as it concerns this notice:
“
The
notice must contain at least a description of the misconduct that the
manager is alleged to have committed, and the council's
justification
for its in-principle decision and invite representations in relation
to both. Both the nature of the misconduct
alleged, and the
purpose of the proposed suspension must be set out in terms that are
sufficiently particular so as to enable the
senior manager to make
meaningful representations in response to the proposed suspension. .
. . ”.’
[34]
This court has considered the binding nature of the Disciplinary
Regulations as examined in several
cases, and without exception, the
mandatory nature of the obligations cast upon municipalities by
virtue of the Disciplinary Regulations
has been confirmed. In
Biyase
v Sisonke District Municipality and Another
(2012) 33 ILJ
598 (LC), the Court observed thus:
‘
These
regulations impose obligations on municipalities with regard to
procedural steps in disciplinary proceedings that are far
more
stringent than those imposed by the
Labour
Relations Act – and
arguably
unnecessary and out of line with the objectives of the LRA –
but the first respondent is bound by them.’
[19]
[35]
Furthermore, the respondents’ contention that its 8 January
2026 decision is lawful, rational
and procedurally fair and based on
the objective disruptive conduct of the applicant and was protective
rather than punitive, is
fallacious. The respondents have conceded
that the applicant is subject to the disciplinary regulations and as
such the municipality
must comply with the regulations even when the
alleged misconduct is serious.
[36]
In
Penxa
v Beaufort West Municipality and Others
[20]
,
the
Court observed as follows:
‘
Furthermore,
the respondents’ contention that there was a substantial
compliance with Regulation 6(2) is fallacious.
It
cannot be overstated that ‘suspension is a measure that has
serious consequences for an employee, and is not a measure
that
should be resorted to lightly’. Moreover, when suspending the
Accounting Officer, an act that would invariably interrupt
leadership
and in turn
impedes
the rendering of the Municipal services, the Municipality must comply
with Regulation 6(2) to the letter; which is not insuperable

obligation, in any event.’
[37]
In this matter, there can be no doubt that the respondents, in
suspending the applicant, had
failed to comply with the requirements
of regulation 6 and, in doing so, had infringed on the right of the
applicant not to be
suspended without a prior hearing. The manner in
which the suspension of the applicant was conducted demonstrates a
complete disregard
for the applicant’s rights and the first
respondent’s statutory obligations.
[38]
It follows that the “resolution” and/or recommendations
to suspend the applicant
on 8 January 2026 and the suspension notice
served on him are unlawful and stand to be set aside.
Costs:
[39]
The
applicant argued for a punitive costs order against the second and
third respondents in their personal capacities, based on
the fact
that the second and third respondents had acted in brazen violation
of the law, have legal representation and are senior
and experienced
members of Council. I am of the view that these submissions have
merit, and I must exercise my discretion based
on the papers before
me and the submissions made. Counsel for the respondents failed to
make any submissions regarding the awarding
of costs on a punitive
scale.
[40]
Despite numerous
authorities unequivocally expressing the peremptory nature of the
disciplinary regulations, the second and third
respondents proceeded
to move for the suspension of the applicant. In the meeting on
8 January 2026, members of Council expressed
their concerns, but
the second and third respondents chose to ignore those concerns and
proceeded to implement the decision to
suspend the applicant.
Furthermore, the applicant drew the respondents’ attention to
the issues and also advised that “the
attempt to undermine the
law and to create underhand methods to make his return to work
unbearable is punishable in law, including
through the imposition of
punitive personal costs”. Despite this warning, they continued
to act in violation of the law.
[41]
I
agree that the second and third respondents, who were always legally
represented and who are senior and experienced council members,
ought
to have had regard to the regulations and the peremptory nature
thereof. I am of the view that their persistence in suspending
the
applicant in the manner they did and in defending these proceedings
is
mala
fide
and an abuse of Court process.
[21]
[42]
In
light of the foregoing considerations, I was and am still of the view
that it would be fair and consistent with the interests
of justice,
and to safeguard the public purse by ordering the second and third
respondents to personally bear the costs of this
application.
T
TYUTHUZA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
Appearances:
On
behalf of the Applicant:
Adv
JL Olivier
On
the instruction of:
Matome
G Mashao Inc.
c/o
Engelsman Magabane Inc.
On
behalf of the Respondents:
Adv
S Kunene
On
the instruction of:
Kopano
Mothibi Attorneys
[1]
See
Regulation 6(6)(
a
)
of the
Local
Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, GN 344,
GG
34213, 21 April 2011.
[2]
117
of 1998.
[3]
[2017] ZAGPPHC 656;
[2018]
1 All SA 728
(GP) para 10.
[4]
[2023]
ZALCJHB 147;
[2023]
8 BLLR 796
(LC); (2023) 44 ILJ 1740 (LC)
para
30.
[5]
See generally,
Baloyi
v Public Protector and Others
2022 (3) SA 321
(CC) paras 21- 33.
[6]
Molibeli
v Speaker of the Municipal Council: Fezile Dabi District
Municipality and Others
[2022] ZAFSHC 332
;
[2023]
1 All SA 199
(FB) para 25.
[7]
[2014]
ZALCJHB 434;(2015) 36 ILJ 1341 (LC) para 29.
[8]
2004
(4) SA 326
(SCA) para 27.
[9]
HOSPERSA
and Another v MEC for Health, Gauteng Provincial Government
[2008] ZALC 45
;
[2008]
9 BLLR 861
(LC); (2008) 29 ILJ 2769 (LC); see also
Barnard
v Kannaland Municipality and Others
[2019]
JOL 42657
(LC) para 15.
[10]
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional
Metropolitan Council and Others
[1998] ZACC 17
;
1999
(1) SA 374
(CC) para 56
.
[11]
[2009]
4 BLLR 331
(LC) para 39.
[12]
Biyase
v Sisonke District Municipality and Another
[2011] ZALCD 9;
(2012)
33 ILJ 598 (LC)
para
20.
[13]
(J1886/2013)
[2013] ZALCJHB 225 (5 September 2013).
[14]
At
para 20.
[15]
Local
Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, GN 344,
GG
34213, 21 April 2011.
[16]
[2012]
4 BLLR 411
(LC);
(2012)
33 ILJ 653 (LC) at para 16.
[17]
2024 JDR 1870 (NWM) para 20.
[18]
[2015]
ZALCJHB 193
;
[2015] 10 BLLR 1035 (LC); (2015) 36 ILJ 3094 (LC) (7 July 2015).
[19]
At para 1.
[20]
(C77/22) [2022] ZALCCT 16 (5 April 2022) para 21.
[21]
Public
Protector v South African Reserve Bank
2019
(6) SA 253
(CC).