Thabazimbi Local Municipality v Home-Grown Business Integrations and Another (2025/213496) [2026] ZALMPPHC 10 (7 January 2026)

70 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Contempt of Court — Urgent application for contempt against First Respondent and its director — Applicant seeking incarceration of director for failure to comply with court order — Court finding that director must be joined as a party to the proceedings due to direct and substantial interest in the matter — Non-joinder of director resulting in dismissal of contempt application.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings took the form of an urgent application in the High Court of South Africa, Limpopo Division, Polokwane, in which the Thabazimbi Local Municipality (the applicant) sought an order declaring Home-Grown Business Integrations (Pty) Ltd (the first respondent) and Mr Thaisi Shale (described as a director of the first respondent) to be in contempt of court. The relief sought included the incarceration of Mr Shale for 12 months.


The application arose from an earlier court order granted by Acting Judge Magane on 11 December 2025, which directed the first respondent, within two court days, to provide specified operational and transactional information in accessible electronic format, to pay over monies constituting prepaid electricity revenue collected on behalf of the municipality but not remitted, to submit outstanding invoices/statements/reports required under a service level arrangement, and to provide third-party vending contracts.


The first respondent opposed the contempt application. Eskom Holdings SOC Limited (the second respondent) did not oppose, and no substantive relief was sought against it. The matter was argued on the urgent roll, and the court (Burnett AJ) dealt first with preliminary procedural issues before reaching any merits.


The general subject-matter concerned alleged non-compliance with a court order relating to prepaid electricity vending administration and revenue, including the municipality’s access to customer and transaction data, vendor arrangements, and the remittance of prepaid electricity revenue.


2. Material Facts


On 11 December 2025, the High Court (per Magane AJ) granted an order directing the first respondent to deliver, within two court days, a complete prepaid electricity customer “dump file” with customer and meter details and classifications, a one-year transactional history report of prepaid electricity vending transactions, and an updated third-party vendor list including commission or fee structures. The order further directed the first respondent to pay over to the municipality, within two court days, all prepaid electricity revenue collected on the municipality’s behalf that had not been remitted, and to provide invoices, statements, and reports required under the service level arrangement and its addendums, together with contracts concluded with third parties for prepaid electricity vending or related services.


The applicant thereafter launched the present proceedings on an urgent basis alleging that the first respondent had not complied with the 11 December 2025 order and seeking contempt relief. The applicant sought an order that included the incarceration of Mr Shale, identified as a director of the first respondent.


It was not in dispute that Mr Shale was a director of the first respondent. However, the court noted that the applicant did not attach a company search to the founding affidavit, with the result that it was not apparent from the papers whether the first respondent had other directors. This factual feature was treated as relevant to the procedural objection taken.


The first respondent raised a procedural objection that Mr Shale could not be held in contempt because he was not a cited party to the contempt proceedings. The court treated this as a point in limine which had to be decided before any consideration of the merits of alleged contempt.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions the court was required to determine were procedural and preliminary in nature, rather than a determination of the substantive elements of contempt.


The first issue was whether the contempt application was properly enrolled and should be entertained as urgent in terms of Rule 6(12), which required an assessment of whether the applicant had set out circumstances rendering the matter urgent and why substantial redress could not be obtained in due course.


The second, and ultimately dispositive, issue was whether there was non-joinder of a necessary party (or parties), specifically whether Mr Shale and/or the directors of the first respondent ought to have been joined because of a direct and substantial interest in the order sought, particularly given that the applicant sought a punitive committal order of imprisonment.


These issues concerned the application of established legal principles to the procedural facts before the court, including the categorisation of non-joinder as a procedural defect that should be dealt with before any merits, and the distinction between striking a matter from the roll and dismissing it.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On urgency, the court applied the principle that Rule 6(12) is not there “for the taking” and that an applicant must explicitly set out the circumstances rendering a matter urgent and why substantial redress in the ordinary course is not available. The court accepted the proposition, supported by authority, that contempt proceedings are generally urgent, with the degree of urgency depending on the facts.


The court emphasised the public interest implicated by allegations of ongoing disregard of a court order, particularly where the order concerns the functioning of public administration and the public purse. It reasoned that non-compliance with court orders undermines the rule of law and the legitimacy and effectiveness of the judicial system, and that this public element supports urgent adjudication where an alleged ongoing contempt is said to persist. The court also referred to the constitutional principle that court orders bind all persons and organs of state to whom they apply, grounding urgency in part in the constitutional obligation to comply with court orders.


However, despite accepting urgency, the court held that it was necessary to address the point in limine of non-joinder before any consideration of contempt on the merits. The court treated non-joinder as a procedural matter that must be adjudicated first, because a court should not make orders prejudicially affecting persons who were not parties before it.


In assessing whether Mr Shale ought to have been joined, the court applied the test whether the person has a direct and substantial interest in the matter and the outcome. It reasoned that, because the applicant sought incarceration, Mr Shale plainly had a direct and substantial interest: the relief sought was aimed at depriving him of liberty, and the applicant expressly recognised that a juristic person cannot be incarcerated and thus sought committal of a director instead. The court held that it is trite that an order cannot be granted against a person who is not a party to the proceedings.


The court further accepted that directors may, in appropriate circumstances, be held liable for a company’s non-compliance with a court order, but held that procedural fairness requires that a director sought to be held liable must be cited as a party, and that a basis must be laid in the founding papers explaining why that specific director is targeted. The court considered that failure to do so would cause substantial prejudice, particularly given the punitive nature of the relief sought.


Having found non-joinder, the court exercised the procedural course indicated in authority: it struck the matter from the roll, rather than dismissing it on the merits. In doing so, it relied on the distinction that striking from the roll is not a final determination of the dispute and does not preclude re-enrolment after correction of the procedural defect. The court expressly indicated that once the directors are joined and the matter is re-enrolled, the merits may then be adjudicated.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court condoned non-compliance with the ordinary forms, service, and time periods and directed that the matter be heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12).


The court did not determine whether the first respondent (or any director) was in contempt of the order of 11 December 2025. Instead, it held that the contempt application was procedurally defective due to non-joinder.


The application was struck from the roll due to the non-joinder of the directors of the first respondent.


The applicant was ordered to pay the wasted costs of the first respondent on a party and party scale B.


Cases Cited


East Rock Trading (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite and Another (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196.


Protea Holdings Ltd v Wright and Others 1978 (3) SA 865 (W).


Victoria Park Ratepayers Associates v Greyvenouw CC and Others [2004] 3 All SA 623 (SE) (11 April 2003).


Rhweba Butterworth (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lubabalo Brown Mntonga & Others (5368/2021) [2022] ZAECMHC 9 (3 May 2022).


Stonehill Property Fund Proprietary Limited v Shongwe and Another (20421/2024) [2024] ZAWCHC 311 (16 October 2024).


Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A).


Turner and Another v Ntintelo and Another (A248/22) [2023] ZAWCHC 51 (8 March 2023).


Skhosana and Others v Roos t/a Roos se Oord and Others 2000 (4) SA 561 (LCC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 165(5).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(12).


Held


The court held that contempt proceedings are generally capable of being heard urgently, particularly where ongoing non-compliance with court orders implicates the rule of law and public interest, and accordingly treated the matter as urgent under Rule 6(12).


The court further held that where an applicant seeks punitive relief in contempt proceedings against a specific natural person, particularly incarceration, that person has a direct and substantial interest and must be joined as a party. Because the applicant sought committal of a director who was not cited, and because the application was framed in a manner that required the joinder of the first respondent’s directors, the application was procedurally defective for non-joinder.


On that basis, the court struck the application from the roll and ordered the applicant to pay the wasted costs of the first respondent on a party and party scale B, leaving the applicant at liberty to re-enrol the matter after joinder.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A party seeking relief on an urgent basis under Rule 6(12) must set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and must explain why substantial redress cannot be obtained at a hearing in due course. In contempt matters, the public interest in the enforcement of court orders and the administration of justice may provide an added element of urgency, particularly where alleged non-compliance is ongoing.


Non-joinder is a procedural defect that should be determined as a preliminary issue. A court should not make orders that may prejudicially affect persons who were not joined, where those persons have a direct and substantial interest in the subject-matter and in the outcome of the proceedings.


Where incarceration is sought in contempt proceedings against a director or other natural person associated with a juristic entity, that person’s liberty interests establish a direct and substantial interest requiring joinder. Although directors may, in appropriate cases, be held responsible for non-compliance by a company, procedural fairness requires that the director be properly cited and that a basis be laid in the founding papers for the relief sought against that director.


Striking a matter from the roll due to a procedural defect such as non-joinder is distinct from dismissal. Striking is not a determination of the merits and permits the matter to be re-enrolled once the defect has been remedied.

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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO DIVISION , POLOKWANE
(1)
(2)
(3)
REPORT ABLE: YES/NO
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED.
2026/01/07 DATE ......................... SIGNATURE. ... .
In the matter between:
THABAZIMBI LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
and
HOME-GROWN BUSINESS INTEGRATIONS (PTY) LTD
ESKOM HOLDINGS SOC LIMITED
JUDGMENT
CASE NO: 2025-213496
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT

BURNETT. AJ
INTRODUCTION
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[1 ] T his is an urgent application to hold the First Respondent and Mr. Thaisi Shale (a
director of the First Respondent) in contempt of the order handed down by his
Honourable Acting Judge Magane on 11 December 2025. The Applicant seeks the
incarceration of Mr. Shale for a period of 12 (twelve) months.
[2] T he order of 11 December 2025 states inter alia that: -
[2.1) The First Respondent is directed to deliver to the Applicant, within two court
days of the granting of this order, the following information and date in
accessible excel or CVS format: -
[2.1.1)
[2.1.2)
A complete Prepaid Electricity Customer "Dump File" containing
all prepaid customer details on the First Respondent's system
for the municipality, including customer names, addresses,
meter numbers, applicable tariff codes, and classifications of
each customer including indigent, commercial, domestic or
larger-power users, as applicable.
A transactional history report covering at least one year of all
prep-paid electricity vending transactions conducted for the
municipality, including transaction dates, meter or customer
details, amounts and vending tokens or references for each
transaction.

[2.1.3)
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An updated third-party vendor list reflecting all third-party
vendors currently or recently vending electricity on the
Municipality system, including for each vendor their physical
address, contact person and details, and the current
commission rate or fee structure applicable to that vendor.
[2.2) That the First Respondent is directed to pay over to the Applicant, within two
court days of the granting of this order, all monies constituting prepaid
electricity revenue collected on behalf of the Applicant which the First
Respondent has not yet remitted to the Municipality's designated bank
account.
[2.3) The First Respondent is directed to submit and hand over to the Applicant all
invoices, statements, and reports required under the Service Level
Agreement and the Addendums thereto, including but not limited to all
invoices for its services and any periodic reports not yet furnished, such
submission to be completed within two court days of the granting of this order.
[2.4) The First Respondent is directed to furnish the Applicant with all contracts
concluded with third parties for the vending of prepaid electricity or any
related services on behalf of the municipality, within two court days of the
granting of this order.
[3] The First Respondent opposed the application. The Second Respondent did not
oppose the application; however, no relief is sought against it. Counsel for the
Applicant and the First Respondent filed heads of argument and appeared on the

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day of hearing to advance oral arguments. It must be noted that both counsels
argued their cases diligently.
URGENCY
[4] I n urgent applications, the first issue to consider is whether the matter is urgent.
The test for urgency was articulated in East Rock Trading (PTY) Ltd and Another
v Eagle Valley Granite and Another 's (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 at
paragraph 6 where Justice Notshe AJ held that "The import thereof is that the
procedure set out in Rule 6(12) is not for taking. An applicant must set forth
explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent. More
importantly, the applicant must state the reasons why he claims that he cannot be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course." It was submitted by the
Applicant that contempt of court applications are by their very nature urgent.
[5] I t was held in Protea Holdings Ltd v Wright and Others 1978 (3) SA 865 (W) 868
A - H that: -
"The element of urgency would be satisfied if in fact it is shown that the respondents
were continuing to disregard the order, if this be so, the applicant is entitled, as a
matter of urgency, to attempt to get the respondents to desist by the penalty referred
to being imposed."
[6] I n Victoria Park Ratepayers Associates v Greyvenouw CC and Others [2004] 3
All SA 623 (SE) (11 April 2003) the court found that: -
"That contempt of court has obvious implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy
of the legal system and the judicial arm of government. There is thus a public

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interest element in each and every case in which it is alleged that a party has wilfully
and in bad faith ignored or otherwise failed to comply with a court order. This added
element provides to every such case an element of urgency .... It is not only the
object of punishing a respondent to compel him or her to obey an order that renders
contempt proceedings urgent, the public interest in the administration of justice and
the vindication of the constitution also renders the ongoing failure of refusal to obey
an order a matter of urgency. This in my view, is the starting point, all matters in
which an ongoing contempt must be dealt with as expeditiously as the
circumstances and the dictates of fairness follow.
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[7] I t was held in Rhweba Butterworth (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lubabalo Brown
Mntonga & Others (5368/2021) [2022] ZAECMHC 9 (3 May 2022) that: -
"Contempt of court proceedings are, as a general rule, urgent and the degree of
urgency will always depend on the facts of each case.
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[8] The failure to abide by a court order is a v iolation of section 165 (5) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that: - ''An order or decision
issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies.
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I agree that contempt applications are by their very nature urgent because it
concerns the rule of law. A society that is allowed to disregard court orders is a
society in disarray. Contemp t of court applications are especially urgent, as in this
case, when the public p urse is being affected. An urgent application such as the
one at hand, does not just affect the right of the Applicant, but thousands of
residents within its area of jurisdiction. It is in the public interest that the matter be
dealt with as a matter of urgency. The allegations that are levelled against the First

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Respondent are severe. It is alleged that the First Respondent has misappropriated
public funds and continues to do so. The First Respondent was, inter alia, ordered
to pay certain public funds over to the Applicant, however, has not abided by the
court order. For as long as the court order is not adhered to, confidence in the rule
of law diminishes. The public will not regain this confidence through substantial
redress in due course. A failure to deal with an attack on the rule of law urgently, will
set a precedent of leniency in these kinds of matters.
NON-JOIN DER
[9] T he First Respondent is a juristic person. The Applicant seeks to hold the First
Respondent and a director thereof, namely Mr. Thaisi Shale, in contempt. It is not
in dispute that Mr. Shale is a director of the First Respondent, however it must be
noted that the Applicant did not attach a Company Search to his Founding Affidavit,
and it is thus unknown whether First Respondent has any other directors. This
ought to have been done.
[1 O] The First Respondent argues that Mr. Shale cannot be held in contempt of court
because he is not a party to these proceedings. In the matter of Stonehi/1 Property
Fund Proprietary Limited v Shongwe and Another (20421/2024) [2024]
ZAWCHC 311 (16 October 2024) at paragraph 20, 27 and 28 it was held that: -
"It should be observed that it is important to remember that when a court pronounces
a judgment it should do so without prejudice to the rights and interests of persons
who were not parties before it. In that context, it is peremptory that the issue of

7
prejudice must be considered in the determination of necessary non-joinder .... the
non-joinder of a necessary party is a defect in a pleading that can simply be
remedied by a joinder. Accordingly, a deficiency in pleadings had nothing to do with
the merits but is related to procedure. Put differently, a non-joinder cannot defeat
the merits, as it may be a reversible error dependant of course, upon circumstances.
To hold otherwise would be to extend the scope of and effect of a non-joinder. In
the circumstances, it seems entirely reasonable to suppose that, in an application, if
the court finds there is a non-joinder of a necessary party, it is competent for the
court to strike the matter from the roll. In any event, nothing prevents this Court from
striking the matter from the roll due to non-joinder. This is even the case as the
matter is not an action but an application. In this matter, it is however significant to
note that the respondents are not applying for joining of the parties, but they are
rather objecting to the non-joinder of parties."
[1 1] The non-joinder of a party to legal proceedings is a matter of procedure which must
be adjudicated as a point in limine before the merits of the matter are entertained.
[12] To ascertain whether Mr. Shale ought to have been joined as a party to the
proceedings, one must consider whether he has a direct and substantial interest in
the matter.
[13] The Appellant Division held in Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of
Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 A at page 659 that: -
"Indeed is seems clear to me that the Court has consistently refrained from dealing
with issues in which a third party may have a direct and substantial interest without

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either having that party joined to the suit or if the circumstances of the case admit of
such a course, taking other adequate steps to ensure that its judgment will not
prejudicially affect that party's interests."
[14] In the matter of Stonehi/1 Property Fund Proprietary Limited v Shongwe and
Another (20421!2024) [2024] ZAWCHC 311 (16 October 2024) at paragraph 20, 27
and 28 it was held that: -
"It should be observed that it is important to remember that when a court pronounces
a judgment it should do so without prejudice to the rights and interests of persons
who were not parties before it. In that context, it is peremptory that the issue of
prejudice must be considered in the determination of necessary non-joinder .... the
non-joinder of a necessary party is a defect in a pleading that can simply be
remedied by a joinder. Accordingly, a deficiency in pleadings had nothing to do with
the merits but is related to procedure. Put differently, a non-joinder cannot defeat
the merits, as it may be a reversible error dependant of course, upon circumstances.
To hold otherwise would be to extend the scope of and effect of a non-joinder. In
the circumstances, it seems entirely reasonable to suppose that, in an application, if
the court finds there is a non-joinder of a necessary party, it is competent for the
court to strike the matter from the roll. In any event, nothing prevents this Court from
striking the matter from the roll due to non-joinder. This is even the case as the
matter is not an action but an application. In this matter, it is however significant to
note that the respondents are not applying for joining of the parties, but they are
rather objecting to the non-joinder of parties."

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[15] In Herbstein & Van Winsen "The Civil Practice of the High Courts of South
Africa" 5th edition (2009) at page 208, the learned author stated that following: -
"Apart from considerations of convenience, however there are circumstances in
which it is essential to join a party because of the interest that party has in the
matter. When such an interest becomes apparent the court has no discretion and
will not allow the matter to proceed without joinder or the giving of judicial notice of
the proceedings to that party. The reason for this is that it is a principle of our law
that interests parties should be afforded an opportunity to be heard in matters that
they have a direct and substantial interest .... A third party who has, or may have, a
direct and substantial interest in any order the court might make in proceedings or if
such an order cannot be sustained or carried into effect without prejudicing that
party, is a necessary party and should be joined in the proceedings .... A direct and
substantial interest has been held to be an interest in the right which is the subject
matter of litigation and not merely a financial interest in such litigation. It is a legal
interest in the subject matter of litigation, excluding an indirect commercial interest
only. The possibility of such an interest is sufficient, and it is not necessary for the
court to determine that in fact it exists. For a joinder to be essential, the parties to be
joined must have a direct and substantial interest not only in the subject matter of
litigation, but also in the outcome of it. It is important to remember that a
constitutionally protected right is legally enforceable and gives rise to a legal interest
which may require a joinder. Thus, whenever an order which may infringe upon the
constitutional rights of any person, those persons should be joined or given judicial
notice of the proceedings."

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[16] Having regard to the above authorities, Mr Shale does have a direct and substantial
interest in t he matter. The Applicant is seeking incarceration. The Applicant
acknowledges that a juristic person cannot be incarcerated and thus wants Mr.
Shale to be incarcerated instead. The fact that the Applicant wants Mr. Shale to be
incarcerated, means that he has a direct and substantial interest in the matter and
accordingly must be joined as a party to the proceedings. It is trite that a court
cannot grant an order against someone that is not a party to the proceedings.
[17] Counsel for the applicant is correct in his submission that a director of a company
can be held liable for the company's non-compliance with the court order; however,
that director that the Applicant seeks to hold liable, must be cited as a party to the
proceedings. The Applicant also needs to lay a basis in his founding papers as to
the reasons why this specific director must be held liable. A failure to do this would
cause substantial prejudice to Mr. Shale, especially having regard to the fact that the
Applicant seeks his incarceration. If there is contempt, the directors of the First
Respondent must bear the consequences, however that does not entitle to Applicant
to disregard the rules of procedure.
[18] In the matter of Turner and Another v Ntintelo and Another (A248/22) [2023]
ZAWCHC 51 (8 March 2023) at paragraph 63 in relaying on Skhosana and Others
v Roos Va Roos se Oord and Others 2000 (4) SA 561 (LCC) at paragraph 19 it
was held that: -
"The difference between striking a matter off the roll and dismissal is that in the case
of dismissal, the matter is disposed of and can no longer be set down on the roll
again. If the applicant wishes to proceed with the matter, he will have to start the

11
matter de novo. While on the other hand, striking the matter off the roll has nothing
to do with the merits of the case. It is not aimed at terminating the proceedings but
merely suspends the hearing pending an application for reinstatement."
[19] Having regard to the principle embodied in the Turner and Skhosana cases, the
matter is accordingly struck from the role for the directors of the First Respondent to
be joined as parties to the proceedings. Once the directors have been joined as
parties to the proceedings and the matter is re-enrolled for hearing, the merits of the
matter can be adjudicated.
ORDER
[20] I accordingly make the following order: -
[20.1] That the rules of the above Honourable Court pertaining to forms, service and
time periods be condoned and/or dispensed with, and the matter be heard as
one of urgency in terms of Rule 6 (12).
[20.2] The application is struck from roll due to the non-joinder of the directors of the
First Respondent.
[20.3] The Applicant to pay the wasted costs of the First Respondent on a party and
party scale B.
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT ,
POLOKWANE ; LIMPOPO DIVISION

APPEARANCES
FOR THE APPLICANT:­
INSTRUCTED BY:-
FOR THE :
INSTRUCTED BY:-
DATE OF HEARING:­
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-
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ADV. MAUNATLALA
WAKABA AND PARTNERS
ADV. GEYER
SWANEPOELATTORNEYS
30 DECEMBER 2025
7 JANUARY 2026