THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: 2025-217468
In the matter between:
NUVEST CHEMICALS (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
CHARISCA MEYER First Respondent
TRANSMARE CHEMIE SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
Heard: 1 0 December 2025
Delivered: 22 January 2026
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties'
representatives by email. The date for hand- down is deemed to be 22 January
2026.
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________
MALULEKE, AJ
Introduction
[1] By way of an urgent application, the applicant (Nuvest ) sought an order
enforcing the restraint of trade obligation against the first respondent (Ms
(1) Reportable: NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised


__________ ______________
Signature Date

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Meyer), and for the period of 12 months. The restraint of trade obligations and
confidentiality undertakings are embodied in the employment contracts of 18
May 2023 and 20 December 2024. Both respondents are opposing the
application.
[2] The matter was initially enrol led for hearing on 20 November 2025 for
argument on the urgency challenged by the respondent (Transmare). The
preliminary point was argued, and urgency was granted on 28 November
2025. Both parties were afforded an opportunity to file their heads of
argument. The matter was enrolled on the urgent roll for hearing on 10
December 2025.
[3] On 4 December 2025, the a pplicant filed leave to supplement its founding
based on new facts that arose on 27 November 2025. The respondent did not
oppose the application. The Court granted leave to supplement their
answering affidavits and their heads of argument. The respondents, leave to
appeal was granted and the heads of argument were to be filed by 17
December 2025. After hearing on the merits, judgment was reserved. The
court deemed it was necessary to issue an interim order to meet the ends of
justice. Both parties addressed the court, and an interim order to maintain
status quo was issued pending final judgment.
Factual Background
[4] Parties’ submissions on papers as well as counsels’ arguments were
considered. The court does not intend to repeat the argument in any detail.
The facts of the parties are common cause. That the company, Nuvest Pty,
appointed Ms Meyer as an internal sales specialist was not in dispute. I n the
course of employment, Ms Meyer was then promoted to the position of a sales
representative.
[5] The contractual obligations are embodied in the restraint of trade clause 19.
Then copyright, inventions, and confidentiality obligations are embodied in
clauses 9 and 9.1-9.16, while non-solicitation of information and customers are
in clauses 10 and 10.8-10.8.1-10.8.3. 2. The restraint of trade is set to be for

in clauses 10 and 10.8-10.8.1-10.8.3. 2. The restraint of trade is set to be for
the period of twelve (12) months from the date of termination of service.

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[6] On 15 October 2025, Ms Meyer filed her resignation notice for the termination
of the contract of employment services . On 23 October 2025, the applicant
demanded an express written undertaking from her. On the same date, the
second respondent engaged the applicant and confirmed the role that Ms
Meyer will be occupying within their company. An undertaking to assist her to
cooperate with restraint was furnished.
[7] The discussion between the first respondent and the applicant was that she
will serve her notice period until the 30 th of November 2025. However , on 30
October 2025, Ms Meyer left the employment premises . She then provided
further undertakings on 31 October 2025 and 6 November 2025. She also
confirmed she left the applicant’s working resources and data. All
correspondences that occurred thereafter are not in dispute.
Issues to be decided
[8] The following issues are to be assessed and determined:
8.1. Whether the restraint of trade agreement and confidentiality
undertakings are reasonable and enforceable.
8.2. Whether the applicant has an interest that requires protection, and if it is
reasonable, and whether there was a breach or not.
[9] The first respondent challenges the restraint agreement on the ground that the
applicant (Nuvest) has no legitimate protectable interests that require the
extensive protection it seeks . That the restraint is unreasonable,
unenforceable, and against the public policy.
Legal Principles
[10] The applicants seek final relief in the first instance. For the final internal
interdict to succeed, first, there must be a clear right on the part of the
applicant. The applicant must prove on a balance of probabilities the right that
it seeks to protect. Secondly, whether there is an injury actually committed or
reasonably apprehended. Thirdly, there must be no other satisfactory remedy
available to the applicant. To the extent that there may be any factual disputes

available to the applicant. To the extent that there may be any factual disputes
arising from the papers, these must be resolved in terms of the Plascon -

4

Evans1 rule. Based on the general principles, a final order will be granted if the
facts averred in the applicants’ affidavit, which have been admitted by the
respondents, together with the facts alleged by the respondents, justify such
an order. It is also worth stating that, where there is a denial on the part of the
respondent which does not raise a real dispute of fact, it may also be granted.
[11] It is accepted that a party seeking to enforce a contract in terms of restraint of
trade is only required to invoke the restraint and prove a breach of its terms.
However, the onus remains on the respondents to prove the
unreasonableness of the restraint.
2
[12] In Jonsson Workwear (Pty) Ltd v Williamson and Another 3 (Jonsson), the
Court summarised the factors to be considered and held: “ In simple terms,
therefore, and what needs to be considered in determining whether or not the
enforcement of a restraint of trade would be reasonable, are five issues, being
(a) the existence of a protectable interest,
(b) the breach of such protectable interest,
(c) a quantitative and qualitative weigh-off of the respective interests of
the parties,
(d) general considerations of public interest, and
(e) whether the restraint goes further than necessary to protect the
relevant interest.
All these considerations need to be determined as a whole, as part of a value
judgment to be exercised, in order to finally conclude whether or not the
restraint should be enforced.” (Own emphasis)
[13] The test was set out in Basson v Chilwan and Others
4 (Basson) to determine
the reasonableness or otherwise of a restraint of trade provision is the
following:

1 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-G.
2 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis (Magna) 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) at 875H-I.
3 [2013] ZALCD 24; (2014) 35 ILJ 712 (LC) at para 44.
4 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) at 767G-H.

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13.1. Is there an interest of one party which is deserving of protection at the
termination of the agreement?
13.2. Is such interest being prejudiced by the other party?
13.3. If so, does such interest weigh up qualitatively and quantitatively
against the interest of the latter party that the latter should not be
economically inactive and unproductive?
13.4. Is there another facet of public policy having nothing to do with the
relationship between the parties but that requires that the restraint
should either be maintained or rejected?
[14] The court finds guidance from authorities that dealt with this specific issue.
more particularly, in the Aranda Textile Mills,
5 case, the court said:
‘A man’s skills and abilities are part of himself, and he cannot ordinarily be
precluded from making use of them by a contract in restraint of trade. It was
stated that such do not belong to the employer. Even if the employer spent
money on training the employees, what remains is that such information and
skills learned would be of such employee. The employer cannot have
proprietary interests in the workman, his know -how, or his skills. For the
employer to restrict such would be unreasonable and contrary to the public
policy.’
[15] In The court in Experia n6, the explanation about what is required for
information to be categorised as confidential and trade secret, and the
following was said:7
‘It is trite that the law enjoins confidential information with protection. Whether
information constitutes a trade secret is a factual question. For information to
confidential it must be capable of application in the trade or industry, that is, it
must be useful and not be public knowledge and property; known only to a
restricted number of people or a close circle, and be of economic value to the
person seeking to protect it.’

5 Aranda Textile Mills (Pty) Ltd v Hurn and Another (Aranda Textile Mills) [2000] 4 All SA 183 (E).

6 Experian South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Haynes and Another (2013) 34 ILJ 529 (GSJ).
7 See SGS South Africa Pty Limited v Pillay and Another (SGS South Africa) [2024] ZALCD 36 at para
42.

6

[16] It is settled law that an agreement in restraint of trade is enforceable unless it
is unreasonable and contrary to public policy or if it does not protect some
legally recognisable interest, in this case, that of the applicant.8
[17] The purpose of enforcing the restraint provisions, as restated in Sibex9 is to
protect an employer’s protectable proprietary interests. “ It is also a
requirement that when the court decide on restraint of trade, it must strike a
balance between the sanctity of a contract, and the freedom of the ex -
employee's ability and right to trade his or her labour, occupation, and
professional skills as protected under section 22 of the Constitution”.
Analysis and evaluation of submission
Existence of Contract
[18] The applicant's version is that the first respondent understood the terms of the
restraint and the contractual obligation associated with it. The restraint was
discussed with her at the beginning of her employment contract , and the
restriction is lawful, reasonable, and compliant with public policy. The
existence of the employment contract is not contested by the first respondent.
Her only argument is that she did not freely sign the employment contract with
the restraint clause.
[19] Despite the fact that this was her second contract, the first respondent testified
before the court that she had never before discussed this fear with her
employer. Despite having recourse under dispute resolution forums such as
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and the
Bargaining Council, the first respondent elected not to approach these forums .
This submission is unacceptable when it comes to this alleged fear as a
ground challenging the consultation process.
Nature and scope of the business of Nuvest Chemicals Pty Ltd and Transmare
Chemie South Africa (Pty) Ltd.
Assessment of proprietary interest

8 Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd (Reddy) 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) at para 14.

8 Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd (Reddy) 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) at para 14.
9 Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk and Another 1991 (2) SA 482 (T) at 502 J – 503B.

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[20] The applicant contends that because she has a protectable interest, the
restraint must be implemented. Additionally, it was found that the second
respondent supplies similar clients and operates in the same agricultural
sector after looking into their market. According to the applicant, Nuvest
Chemicals Pty Ltd and Transmare Chemie South Africa (Pty) Ltd are rivals in
the price-sensitive market. It was further argued that the competition extends
beyond the product or industry to include the development of “ know-how"
strategies and the market.
[21] In addition to receiving experience- building training, the first respondent was
also introduced to the applicant's internal pricing, procurement, and know -how
strategy. This alone puts the applicant's company at serious risk of "eroding
competitiveness and goodwill”.
[22] The applicant further argued that the first respondent's employment with the
second respondent alone constituted a breach based on nothing else. The
competition needs to be direct. It can also take place even if the event is an
indirect competition. Such is sufficient to pose a risk and harm to its business .
The first respondent should not be employed by the second respondent , at
least for the period of 12 months.
[23] The applicant's legitimacy and the availability of a protectable interest were
contested by the first respondent. The general goods that are readily available
to everyone via the internet, including Google, cannot be said to be proprietary
interests. She claims that since she started working for the applicant , she has
never had pricing or been taught, which could be considered a trade secret.
She never received instruction on how to determine the pricing of the products.
Especially since the applicant's prices vary from month to month as a result of
market and product price fluctuations. That she will have to go to management
every time she needs a price, and they will generate a price for her.

every time she needs a price, and they will generate a price for her.
[24] The imposition of the restraint is not justified even if it is determined that the
two parties' businesses are similar and may even be somewhat at odds. It is
necessary for the applicants to prove that their interests are protected.
[25] The first respondent argued that the restriction is irrational, unenforceable, and
against public policy. Only the elimination of the first respondent's economic

8

competition and trade is the goal of the entire nation's restraint. Rather than
being manufacturers, the applicant and the second respondent are distributors
of the products they sell. Their customers always know what they want and
when they approach Transamare or Nuvest, or any other company. In that
manner, they don't need to rely on the junior salesperson for direction.
[26] The second respondent claims that the applicant does not deal with
specialised products at all , but generic ones. The applicant's product line and
portfolio do not overlap with their company's exclusive focus on 80% of the
Clariant Products (emulsifiers, emollients, and solubilisers ). Their market
includes paints, building supplies, plastics, food, oil and gas, medications,
personal and household care items, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural
products.
[27] The second respondent confirmed that where industry and products overlap, it
may be covered by the previously given undertakings. However, restricting the
first respondent is against public policy, and she occupied a junior position at
the time while she was still with Nuvest.
[28] That their business is operating in both national and international markets.
Should the applicant have issues with their undertakings, the second
respondent may also be able to be in a position to assign Ms Meyer different
services in a different division, which she never handled before or whilst she
was still employed with Nuvest Pty Ltd.
[29] The applicant's argument could not challenge the second respondent on the
pharmaceutical, animal feed, and construction industries and that of Clariant.
The applicant also could not challenge the speciality of Transmare in this
regard. The applicant’s submission on training could not demonstrate what
skills exactly were obtained by Ms Meyer through such training.
[30] The applicant’s argument was that there was unlawful competition and it need
not be only direct. The strategies, formulation and training of the first

not be only direct. The strategies, formulation and training of the first
respondent on the know -how also mattered. In Aranda Textile Mills , it was
confirmed that training employees affords the employer no proprietary interest
in the workman, his know-how, or skills.

9

[31] The acquired training skills do not belong in any way to the employer, and the
use thereof cannot be subjected to restriction by way of a restraint of trade
provision. In Aranda Textile Mills ,
10 it was further held that a restriction
impending as it would on the workman’s ability to compete freely and fairly in
the marketplace is unreasonable and contrary to public policy.
[32] The applicant did not go much deeper into the issue of what renders their
industry and products as a speciality that deserves to be protected. The court
agreed with the respondents that such know -how and skills in the public
domain accessible by anyone cannot be said are proprietary interest.
[33] One of the fi ve factors to be considered, as stated in Jonsson,
11 is that there
must be an assessment on the existence of a protectable interest and trade of
secrecy. In the court, Experian explained what is required for information to be
categorised as confidential and a trade secret to be protected, and the
following was said:12
‘It is trite that the law enjoins confidential information with protection. Whether
information constitutes a trade secret is a factual question. For information to
confidential it must be capable of application in the trade or industry, that is, it
must be useful and not be public knowledge and property; known only to a
restricted number of people or a close circle and be of economic value to the
person seeking to protect it.’
[34] The second respondent showed that they have several and different industries
with that of the applicant. That there may be a 20% overlap on generics
offered by the applicant, since Transmare 80% of its offerings are specialized
goods. The applicant argued that it would be difficult to determine whether or
not products are similar without disclosing chemicals used. The court f ound
the applicant's evidence and argument about what might be a protectable
interest and know-how were unpersuasive on the balance of probabilities. As a

interest and know-how were unpersuasive on the balance of probabilities. As a
result, the first of the five factors listed in Jonsson 13 is neither applicable nor
present in this context.

10 See Aranda Textile Mills, note 5 above.
11 Jonsson at para 44.
12 See SGS South Africa; see also Sibex Engineering Services (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 1991 (2) SA 482
(T) at 486-488; Basson (above) at 769; Aranda Textiles Mills at 192.
13 Johnson, n 5 above.

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[35] The applicable test in Basson, 14, confirmed investigation required at
termination of contract of employment. One of the test sets is to assess if, is
there an interest of the one party, which is deserving of protection at the
termination of the agreement. Also to assess whether is such interest being
prejudiced by the other party. The court conf irms as per the contractual
employment and fur nished undertaking that there was agreement that there
are interests to be protected when it comes to the confidentiality and restraint
from soliciting clients, even though the court did not find a protectable
interests.
[36] It is a well- established legal requirement that employees carry out their
contractual duties, which include maintaining the confidentiality of information
without regard to time constraints. This court upholds the same principle. In
this case, there are interests that need to be safeguarded. Therefore, this court
acknowledges that the first respondent's undertakings, which were given as
early as October 2025 are valid and cannot be disregarded. The applicant's
interests resulting from contractual obligations will be prejudiced if this is done.
[37] In this instance, based on the presented evidence, there was no evidence
presented to demonstrate the speciality of the overlapping products. The
know-how also cannot be generic. No evidence on which industry and how
such impacts on the applicant’s business or make Transm are its competitor.
The court finds that there was no legitimate protectable interest proven that
necessitated triggering the restraint.
Breach
[38] It is also one of the factors set out in Jonsson
15 that the a pplicant is to
demonstrate and prove if there was breach. It is worth noting that at the
commencement of this proceeding there was no actual issue in dispute about
breach related to customers as envisaged on the supplementary affidavit.
Save to state , by the conduct of the first respondent, acceptance of

Save to state , by the conduct of the first respondent, acceptance of
employment from the second respondent, that on its own constituted a breach
because the second respondent is a competitor . The court already finds that
the issued undertakings are valid, more so , the respondents emphasised in

14 See Basson at 767G-H.
15 Johnson, n 4 above.

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many instances to honour such undertakings and issued such outside this
court. The court cannot take away this voluntary undertaking; doing so will
undermine the applicant’s contractual obligation. As stated above, when this
application was launched, undertakings were there; the court did not find a
breach at that stage.
[39] On the applicant’s supplementary affidavit, the applicant raised a new fact
alleged to have been triggered by correspondence of 27 November 2025,
which implied that there was a breach. To substantiate this argument , a copy
of the email correspondence of annexure SA2, screenshot was attached to
this effect. The applicant submitted that they will not have to provide full details
of the email, in the interest of protecting client. The submission was that the
first respondent, a former employee, is in contact with the applicant’s
customers. The evidence submitted by the applicant only showed list of
recipients but did not disclose the contents thereof. In absence of full
disclosure, the court could not attach value to such.
[40] The email contents had recipients which included the f irst respondent,
however, not as a sender. The applicant argues that whether she was a
sender or not cannot justify her being copied pending this litigation. Such was
a clear indication that the first respondent breached the restraint, and she is in
contact and soliciting the applicant’s customers. By so doing, the first
respondent breached clause 10.8 of the non-soliciting client; hence, even her
undertakings cannot be relied upon. The s econd respondent’s conduct of
copying first respondent confirms that they are participating in encouraging
first respondent to the breach her contractual obligation.
[41] The court accepts that the first respondent should not have been copied.
Indeed, it created an element of undermining the litigation process, which was
not an acceptable picture. As already stated, the screenshot provided by the

not an acceptable picture. As already stated, the screenshot provided by the
applicant did not provide much evidence except for the recipients. The court is
not inclined to find breach based on being a recipient. The second respondent
presented the full disclosure of the same email contents. Such sheds light to
the court also in the understanding of the value to be attached to the email on
whether there was a breach or not.

12

[42] The second respondent argument was that this email was correspondence to
a shared customer between Nuvest and Transmare. Second respondent also
proved that this customer had been known to them, and long before Ms Meyer
joined their company. The email also demonstrated that the product which was
being sought by this client was Genopal L30, which is one industry and
product that the applicant does not supply nor deal with nor supply.
[43] The evidence of the purchase orders, invoice and delivery note w ere
presented to prove on the balance of probabilities that this customer had (x4)
orders placed before. Also, it was evident that the first order had already been
supplied in March 2025, this email was the second order out of the four orders
placed. The court is satisfied that the employee did not solicit this customer.
The second respondent argued that it does not see how being a recipient
would constitute a breach of the restraint and undertakings furnished. The
court accepted this submission; it would have been the other way round if the
employee were the sender of this email. The applicant's submission on breach
is rejected.
[44] The court accepts that our laws obliged employees to comply with contractual
obligations; however, in this regard, the first respondent did not breach her
undertakings and contractual obligation of non- soliciting and confidentiality.
The product which was being sought by this customer in that email was
Genapol L A030, which is not supplied by the applicant but is a speciality of
Transmare. Also, this factor, which was required as stated in Johnson 16,of the
existence of protected interests is not present and applicable in this case.
Reasonableness and Public Policy
[45] The principles of contractual obligation, reasonableness, breach, and
compliance are trite in law. The parties' reference to the cases of Magna, 17
and Reddy,18were also echoing on the required principles of the restraint ,

and Reddy,18were also echoing on the required principles of the restraint ,
which is a settled law and not in dispute. H owever, each case is to be treated
on its own merits to assess the two primary principles: first, protectable interest
and second, existence of breach. What is in dispute was existence of a

16 Jonsson (supra) at para 64.
17 Magna (supra).
18 Reddy at para 14 at 498E-499.

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legitimate protectable interest and whether there was a breach or not. The
court already found that there are no protectable interests and there was no
breach; therefore, it would not be necessary to consider all other subsequent
factors thereto.19 The law encourages competition and supports an individual’s
right to exploit his/her own skill and knowledge, on the other, the law should
grant established businesses reasonable protection against unfair trade
practices.
[46] The question of onus is not relevant in motion proceedings, including
application proceedings, where enforcement of a restraint of trade agreement
is sought, as such enforcement will only be considered reasonable if it aims to
protect a legitimate interest. In the absence of a valid or legitimate protectable
interest and the pointed breach, granting of this application would violate
public policy, infringe upon the employee's right to trade freely, and undermine
the protection of professional skills as articulated in section 22 of the
constitution.
20
[47] The court found that enforcing this restraint would be against public policy ,
especially in this instance where the applicant failed to show that there was an
existence of a legitimate protectable interest , nor breach that the first
respondent solicited any of the applicant’s customers. There was no evidence
that the second respondent is a direct competitor of the second respondent in
a specialised industry or specialised products. The court finds that the
respondents’ argument and evidence have shown that the restraint is
unenforceable.
[48] The facts are established by application of the test established in Plascon
Evan,21 has the effect that an applicant seeking final relief can succeed in its
application only on the basis of the facts which are common cause. In this
case, disputed facts are to be determined in favour of the respondent . The
respondents’ versions were not far-fetched and not bare denial.

respondents’ versions were not far-fetched and not bare denial.
[49] When it comes to the issue of the obligation on the protection of confidentiality
and non-solicitation clauses. It was not the findings of the court ; however, the

19 Jonsson (supra) at para 64.
20 Act 108 of 1996, Constitution of RSA.
21 Plascon Evans.

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court would have to endorse those undertakings on the ground that the first
respondent had already conceded to such outside this court . Even at the time
of the proceeding she placed more value and emphasis on those
undertakings. It was still the same position, including on her answering papers.
Therefore, the court determines that she is obligated to uphold and adhere to
such voluntary commitments.
[50] Under the circumstances, I conclude that the applicant has not demonstrated
the existence of a protectable interest. This must conclude the matter for the
applicant. The presence of a protectable interest is essential in these kinds of
matters. This is primarily because it addresses the fundamental rights, which
are the initial prerequisite for achieving the final interdict it pursues.
22 The
court determines, on the balance of probabilities, that the granting of this
application favours the respondents. The application for a restraining order
against the first respondent's employment is dismissed.
Costs
[51] Both parties contested the liability for the legal costs incurred by one another
in this litigation. They both sought costs’ relief against each other to favour the
successful party, which is to include costs occasioned by the application for
leave to supplement and some by the late filing of papers by the respondents.
Following the presentation of the arguments and based on the submissions
presented by the parties, this court can determine that there was neither a
frivolous application nor unwarranted opposition.
[52] The late filling of papers due to the urgent nature with truncated timelines
affected the normal court process on services compliance and was therefore
condoned. The leave to supplement was also required due to circumstances
stemming from the email contained in annexure SA2 dated 27 November
2025. This court does not intend to discourage parties from seeking its
jurisdiction for future litigation, particularly burning issues concerning the

jurisdiction for future litigation, particularly burning issues concerning the
safeguarding of constitutional human rights, proprietary commercial interests,
and trade secrets. However, it will not be automatically applicable to all
matters alike. This finding does not intend to establish a precedent for all

22 Jonsson (supra) at para 64.

15

similar matters; each case will be decided based on the nature of the dispute
and its specific facts.
[53] In MEC for Finance, KwaZulu- Natal and another v Dorkin NO and another,23
Zondo JP summarised the position, regarding the awarding of costs in the
Labour Court, as follows:
‘The rule of practice that costs follow the result does not govern the making of
orders of costs in this Court. The relevant statutory provision is to the effect
that orders of costs in this Court are to be made in accordance with the
requirements of the law and fairness. And the norm ought to be that costs
orders are not made unless those requirements are met. In making decisions
on costs orders, this Court should seek to strike a fair balance between, on the
one hand, not unduly discouraging workers, employers, unions and
employers‟ organisations from approaching the Labour Court and this Court to
have their disputes dealt with, and, on the other, allowing those parties to
bring to the Labour Court and this Court frivolous cases that should not be
brought to court. That is a balance that is not always easy to strike but, if the
court is to err, it should err on the side of not discouraging parties to approach
these courts with their disputes. In that way, these courts will contribute to
those parties not resorting to industrial action on disputes that should properly
be referred to either arbitral bodies for arbitration or to the courts for
adjudication.’
[54] The court is echoing on the same principle above, that the applicant had a
valid employment contract embodied in restraint of trade which sought to
protect business proprietary interests, economic threats and prevention of an
unlawful competition. On the other hand, the first respondent is protecting her
constitutional right to trade and not to be unreasonably restrained from
exercising her skills of trade and professionalism. Therefore, the court
conclude to no order is to costs to this effect.

conclude to no order is to costs to this effect.
[55] T herefore, the following order is made:
Order

23 MEC for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal and another v Dorkin NO and another [2008] 6 BLLR 540
(LAC) at paras 19-20 at 551B-E.

16

1. The first respondent is interdicted and restrained for a period of twelve
(12) mo nths from the date of termination of employment, being 30
October 2025 until 1 November 2026. She is interdicted and restrained
from:
1.1. soliciting, canvasing, or dealing with any client, supplier, or
business associate of the Applicant with whom she had contact
or knowledge during her employment
1.2. disclosing or using any confidential information, trade secrets,
formulations, cost models, supplier data, or other proprietary
information belonging to the applicant, including any information
about the applicant’s pending patents.
1.3. from using, reproducing, communicating, or disclosing any of the
applicant’s confidential information to any third party.
2. Should there be any outstanding documents, data, or materials
belonging to the applicant, including any copies, extracts, or
reproductions thereof, in any form, then such are to be delivered to the
applicant within 24 hours of granting this order.
3. The first respondent is not restrained/prohibited from accepting
immediate employment with the second respondent.
4. No costs order is made.



______________
ZD Maluleke
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

17


Appearances:
For the Applicant: Advocate Shahnaaz Bismilla.
Instructed by: MC Inc Attorneys.
For the Respondents: Advocate Rozanne Kriek.
Instructed by: Malan Lourens Viljoen Inc.