NUMSA obo Dhludhlu and Others v Marley Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd (JS878/2017) [2026] ZALCJHB 13 (21 January 2026)

75 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Dismissal — Unprotected strike — Seven employees dismissed for participating in an unprotected strike following a wage agreement — Constitutional Court remitting matter for reconsideration of sanction after exoneration from assault charges — Court finding that dismissal was substantively fair based on deliberate misconduct, harm caused to employer, and lack of remorse, despite clean disciplinary records.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned remitted proceedings in the Labour Court to determine, afresh, the appropriate sanction for employees who had participated in an unprotected strike, after the Constitutional Court set aside findings relating to assault based on the doctrine of common purpose.


The plaintiffs were NUMSA acting on behalf of seven dismissed employees (Thabo Mphuthi, Vusi Mthimkulu, Moses Dhludhlu, Potia Mosekedi, Thabang Pitsi, Hopolang Khumalo and Sarah Mokoena). The defendant was Marley Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd.


The procedural history was central to the posture of the case. The dismissals followed events on 14 July 2017. The dispute proceeded to a Labour Court trial in 2019 (“the main trial”). Thereafter, the Constitutional Court delivered judgment on 22 August 2022, exonerating employees (including those relevant to this remittal) from liability for assault based on common purpose, while leaving intact the finding of participation in an unprotected strike. The Constitutional Court held that, once the assault was no longer part of the misconduct, sanction for participation in the unprotected strike had to be reconsidered, and the matter was accordingly remitted to the Labour Court to determine sanction afresh, constituted differently.


Although the remittal initially related to 41 employees, the remitted proceedings ultimately concerned seven employees only, because the balance were resolved by settlement. The remitted hearing proceeded on the basis of the 2019 trial record, supplemented by limited additional evidence confined to sanction and relief (if sanction were found unfair), as agreed between the parties.


The general subject matter was whether, on the remaining misconduct of participation in an unprotected strike (shorn of any violent dimension), dismissal remained a substantively fair and proportionate sanction under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the applicable Code of Good Practice: Dismissal.


2. Material Facts


A sectoral wage agreement applicable to the plastics industry was concluded on 13 July 2017 through sectoral bargaining. The agreement bound the defendant and its employees and was communicated to NUMSA shop stewards on the same day.


On the morning of 14 July 2017, NUMSA members nonetheless embarked on a work stoppage. Employees initially gathered in the canteen expecting an address by the defendant’s head of human resources, Mr Steffens. When he did not arrive, the group moved towards the administrative offices.


An incident occurred in which Mr Steffens was assaulted. However, for purposes of the remitted enquiry, the court treated it as established that the plaintiffs were exonerated of the assault allegation by the Constitutional Court (on the basis that common purpose did not establish their guilt in relation to the assault). The Labour Court therefore approached the matter on the basis that the misconduct to be sanctioned was participation in an unprotected strike only, without any violent dimension.


An ultimatum was prepared by the defendant. It was handed to two employees only, and evidence led at the main trial was that, during the process of issuing it, a shop steward instructed that the ultimatum should not be distributed further, after which the issuer returned to the office block. The defendant also obtained an order interdicting the unprotected strike and unlawful conduct associated with it.


The unprotected strike endured for approximately six hours.


In the remitted proceedings, the fact of participation in an unprotected strike was treated as common cause for purposes of sanction. The defendant led additional evidence at the remitted hearing regarding financial losses and operational disruption following the strike, although the court noted that not all losses could necessarily be attributed to the strike itself given the presence of other events (which were excluded from the sanction enquiry).


The plaintiffs’ approach to the litigation was also relevant to sanction. In the main trial, their pleaded case had been that employees were instructed to leave due to safety concerns and that they were locked outside, implying they had not participated in an unprotected strike. In the remitted trial, one plaintiff witness sought initially to attribute her non-working to departmental closure but later conceded she had joined the strike; another plaintiff witness acknowledged participation. The court treated the absence of candour and remorse as material to sanction.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, after excluding the assault and any violent dimension (because of the Constitutional Court’s exoneration), the defendant nonetheless proved that dismissal was a substantively fair sanction for participation in an unprotected strike.


A preliminary legal issue concerned the permissible scope of the remitted sanction enquiry: specifically, whether the court could have regard to violence associated with the strike despite the plaintiffs being exonerated of the assault. The court characterised and resolved this as a question about the proper basis on which sanction could be assessed following the Constitutional Court’s decision.


The dispute principally concerned the application of legal standards to established facts and the making of an overall value judgment on proportionality and fairness of dismissal as a sanction. It also involved evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors recognised in the Labour Relations Act framework and the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began by delimiting the enquiry in light of the Constitutional Court’s findings. It held that it could not consider violence associated with the strike, because the Constitutional Court made clear that the plaintiffs bore no responsibility for the assault on Mr Steffens, and the assault was the primary manifestation of violence. The court reasoned that reliance could not be placed directly or indirectly on the assault itself, any associated acts of violence, or the broader characterisation of the strike as violent. It therefore assessed sanction on the basis of participation in an unprotected strike alone, “shorn of any violent dimension”.


The court identified the relevant legal framework governing strike-related dismissals. It relied on section 192(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, placing the onus on the employer to prove the fairness of dismissal. It noted that section 68(5) expressly recognises that participation in an unprotected strike may constitute a fair reason for dismissal and requires consideration of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in Schedule 8. Although the Code had been repealed by the time of the remitted hearing, it remained applicable because it was in force at the time of the misconduct and throughout earlier litigation.


The court applied the Code’s two-stage enquiry as understood in authority, requiring consideration of item 6 (strike-specific factors) and item 7 (general misconduct principles). In evaluating item 6(1), the court treated the seriousness of the contravention as significant because the strike occurred the day after a binding sectoral wage agreement had been concluded and communicated to the union’s shop stewards. On that basis, the employees acted with full knowledge that the bargaining process had run its course and nonetheless withheld labour in defiance of the agreement and the statute. The court regarded the strike as deliberate and collective rather than arising from confusion.


The court accepted that duration was relevant but not decisive. Although the strike lasted about six hours, it held that a short stoppage could still be serious where it was calculated and deliberate. Under item 6(1)’s second factor (attempts to comply with the Labour Relations Act), the court found there were no attempts to comply: no referral to conciliation and no strike notice. It treated this as a wholesale disregard of statutory requirements rather than a technical failure.


Regarding the third item 6(1) factor (whether the strike responded to unjustified employer conduct), the court found the strike was not a response to unlawful or unjustified conduct by the defendant, but rather to dissatisfaction with the collective bargaining outcome.


The court then considered the ultimatum requirement in item 6(2). It held that an ultimatum had been prepared and issuance commenced, but further distribution was actively thwarted by a shop steward. Given that the plaintiffs could not reasonably have believed the strike was protected, the court concluded the defendant could not be faulted for failing to do more. The ultimatum factor was treated as neutral, at best for the plaintiffs.


Beyond the Code’s enumerated factors, the court also treated harm to the employer as relevant. Based on evidence led at the remitted hearing, it accepted there were substantial financial losses and operational disruption following the strike, while recognising not all losses could necessarily be attributed to the strike (because some might have flowed from excluded conduct). Nonetheless, it found the unprotected strike caused real harm and disrupted operational continuity, constituting an aggravating factor.


The court further treated absence of remorse as aggravating. It relied on the plaintiffs’ litigation stance—initially pleading a version inconsistent with participation in an unprotected strike, and later making belated concessions without explanation, justification, or demonstrated accountability. The court reasoned that lack of candour and remorse reduced the prospects that progressive discipline would rehabilitate the employment relationship.


As mitigation, the court accepted that the plaintiffs had clean disciplinary records, and also that the strike was of limited duration. However, it considered these factors insufficient to outweigh the aggravating considerations, particularly given that the strike was deliberate, in defiance of a binding agreement, and was followed by a lack of remorse.


The court described the overall determination as one involving weighing relevant considerations and making a value judgment on proportionality. On balance, it concluded the misconduct went beyond what progressive discipline could address and undermined the trust and discipline required for an ongoing employment relationship. It therefore held the employer discharged its onus of proving that dismissal was a proportionate and substantively fair sanction for participation in an unprotected strike in this matter.


On costs, the court considered law and fairness, and took into account that the remitted trial occurred because of the Constitutional Court’s order. It held that no costs order was warranted.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court declared that the dismissals of Thabo Mphuthi, Vusi Mthimkulu, Moses Dhludhlu, Potia Mosekedi, Thabang Pitsi, Hopolang Khumalo and Sarah Mokoena were substantively fair at the level of sanction, and it dismissed their unfair dismissal claims.


The court made no order as to costs.


Cases Cited


NUMSA obo Aubrey Dhludhlu and 147 Others v Marley Pipe Systems (SA)(Pty) Ltd [2022] ZACC 30; (2022) 43 ILJ 2269 (CC).


NUMSA v CBI Electric African Cables [2014] 1 BLLR 31 (LAC).


De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others [2000] 9 BLLR 995 (LAC).


Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers (Pty) Ltd [2010] 8 BLLR 830 (LAC).


Department of Labour v General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council & others (2010) 31 ILJ 1313 (LAC).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), section 192(2).


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), section 68(5).


Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, because the Constitutional Court exonerated the plaintiffs from the assault allegation, the sanction enquiry had to be conducted on the basis of participation in an unprotected strike only, and the court could not rely on the assault, any associated violence, the atmosphere in which it occurred, or any characterisation of the strike as violent.


Applying section 192(2) and section 68(5) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, the court held that the employer proved dismissal was a proportionate and substantively fair sanction given the deliberate nature of the unprotected strike in defiance of a binding wage agreement, the absence of attempts to comply with statutory strike requirements, the harm caused to the employer, and the absence of remorse, notwithstanding mitigating factors such as the strike’s limited duration and the plaintiffs’ clean disciplinary records.


The unfair dismissal claims were dismissed, and no costs order was made.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Participation in an unprotected strike may constitute a fair reason for dismissal, and in assessing substantive fairness the court must consider the requirements of section 68(5) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the guidance in the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (Schedule 8), applying the strike-specific enquiry under item 6 together with general misconduct principles under item 7.


Where a higher court’s findings exclude a component of misconduct (here, assault and any violent dimension), sanction must be assessed on the remaining misconduct alone, and the decision-maker should not rely directly or indirectly on excluded conduct in characterising the seriousness of the misconduct or the appropriateness of dismissal.


In evaluating sanction for an unprotected strike, relevant considerations include the seriousness of the contravention, whether employees attempted to comply with statutory requirements (including conciliation and notice), whether the strike responded to unjustified conduct by the employer, the issuing (or reasonable impossibility) of an ultimatum, the harm caused to the employer, and employee remorse and accountability, weighed together in an overall proportionality assessment that entails a value judgment.


The onus to prove the fairness of dismissal rests on the employer in terms of section 192(2), including where the dispute is narrowed to the fairness of sanction alone.

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: JS878/2017
In the matter between:
NUMSA OBO AUBREY DHLUDHLU & OTHERS Plaintiffs
and
MARLEY PIPE SYSTEMS (PTY) LTD Defendant
Heard: 11 & 12 August 2025 (closing arguments delivered on 26 August
2025)
Delivered: 21 January 2026

JUDGMENT

ITZKIN, AJ
Introduction
[1] On 22 August 2022, the Constitutional Court delivered a seminal judgment on
the principles on common purpose in the context of employee misconduct.
[2] In it, the Constitutional Court effectively exonerated a group of 41 employees
of misconduct entailing assault. It did so on the basis that the principles on the
doctrine of common purpose did not establish their guilt in relation to the
assault.
(1) Reportable: NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised

____________ ______________
Signature Date

2
[3] Those employees had also been dismissed for misconduct entailing
participating in an unprotected strike. With the assault conviction falling away,
the Constitutional Court took the view that the issue of sanction for their
participation in the unprotected strike ought to be considered afresh by this
Court.
[4] The Constitutional Court held as follows:
‘[38] A complicating factor is that the employees were convicted of assault
and participating in an unprotected strike. Despite the fact that the
latter conviction stands, that does not necessarily mean that dismissal
is the sanction that would have been imposed for it. The reality is that
the unprotected strike entailed violence. It is not inconceivable that
this fact had an influence on sanction. It seems to me that an
appropriate order is remittal to the Labour Court for a consideration of
what ought to be done with regard to sanction now that the
aggravating fact of a severe assault is out of the way.’
1
[5] The Constitutional Court’s orders included the following:
‘5. The matter is remitted to the Labour Court to consider a sanction
afresh on the charge of participation in an unprotected strike.
6. For purposes of paragraph 5, the Labour Court must be constituted
differently.’
[6] The Constitutional Court was not prescriptive regarding the manner of
adjudicating the remitted matter , and it made no directive regarding whether
the remitted matter should be determined based exclusively on the record of
evidence that was presented at the Labour Court trial, by way of a hearing de
novo, or otherwise.
[7] At the commencement of the remitted proceedings , the parties ’
representatives confirmed their agreement that the matter be determined by
having regard to the record of evidence that was presented at the Labour

1 NUMSA obo Aubrey Dhludhlu and 147 Others v Marley Pipe Systems (SA)(Pty) Ltd [2022] ZACC
30; (2022) 43 ILJ 2269 (CC).

3
Court trial held in 2019, supplemented by any additional evidence that they
may present during the remitted hearing. They also confirmed that any such
additional evidence would pertain to the issue of sanction for participating in
the unprotected strike (with such participation being common cause in the
remitted proceedings ), and to the issue of relief in the event of a finding of
substantive unfairness at the level of sanction being made.
[8] I saw no basis to depart from the parties’ agreed approach.
[9] Although the remittal order pertained to 41 dismissed employees, this was
pared down to seven in the remitted proceedings, as a settlement agreement
had been concluded with the balance in the context of the remitted
proceedings having been previously set down. The remaining persons to
whom the remitted proceedings pertain, are Thabo Mphuthi, Vusi Mthimkulu,
Moses Dhludhlu, Potia Mosekedi , Thabang Pitsi , Hopolang Khumalo and
Sarah Mokoena.
[10] References in this judgment to:
10.1 ‘the plaintiffs’, are references to these seven persons;
10.2 the ‘main trial’, are references to the trial proceedings that took place in
this Court in 2019; and
10.3 the ‘remitted trial’, are references to the proceedings held pursuant to
the Constitutional Court’s remittal order.
The factual matrix
[11] Key features of the factual matrix are usefully captured in the Constitutional
Court’s judgment.2
[12] The material facts may be briefly stated:

2 See paragraphs 3 to 9, 24 to 26 and 29 to 31. Whilst some of these paragraphs include details
regarding the assault incident (which is not germane to the issue under consideration, given the
Constitutional Court’s fundings), they also include details regarding the broader factual matrix.

4
12.1 On 13 July 2017, a wage agreement applicable to the plastics industry
was concluded pursuant to sectoral bargaining.
12.2 The agreement bound the defendant and its employees and was
communicated to NUMSA shop stewards on the same day.
12.3 On the morning of 14 July 2017, NUMSA’s members nonetheless
embarked on a work stoppage. They initially gathered at the canteen
awaiting an address by Mr Steffens, the defendant’s head of human
resources (who did not arrive at the canteen), and thereafter moved
towards the administrative offices.
12.4 An incident ensued involving the assault of Mr Steffens. The plaintiffs
have been exonerated of the allegation of assault (by common
purpose) by the Constitutional Court.
12.5 An ultimatum was prepared. It was issued by hand to two employees
only. Mr Chinner testified at the main trial that as he was issuing that
ultimatum, a shop steward told him that the ultimatum should not be
distributed further, whereupon he returned to the office block. He also
testified about certain threats having been uttered in that context.
12.6 The defendant obtained an order interdicting the unprotected strike and
the unlawful conduct associated with it.
12.7 The unprotected strike endured for approximately six hours.
The appropriate sanction for participation in an unprotected strike
[13] An issue requiring determination at the outset is whether any regard may be
had to violence associated with the strike, despite the fact that the plaintiffs
were exonerated of the assault by the Constitutional Court.
[14] In my view, the answer is “ no”. The Constitutional Court’s judgment makes it
clear that the plaintiffs bear no responsibility for the assault on Mr Steffens,
and the assault incident was the main manifestation of violence.

5
[15] It follows that no reliance may be placed, directly or indirectly, on the assault
itself, or on any associated acts of violence, when assessing the seriousness
of the misconduct in determining the fairness of dismissal.
[16] This includes any reliance on the atmosphere in which the assault occurred,
the defendant’s reaction to violence, or the broader characterisation of the
strike as violent. All such considerations are excluded from the enquiry.
[17] I therefore proceed with the assessment of sanction on the basis that the
misconduct under consideration is participation in an unprotected strike only,
shorn of any violent dimension.
[18] Section 192(2) of the Labour Relations Act
3 (the LRA) places the onus on the
employer to establish the fairness of a dismissal. For present purposes, the
fairness inquiry is confined to the issue of sanction.
[19] In strike -related dismissals, section 68(5) of the LRA expressly recognises
that participation in an unprotected strike may constitute a fair reason for
dismissal, and requires the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal contained in
Schedule 8 (the Code) to be taken into account in undertaking that
assessment.
[20] Although the Code has since been repealed, it was extant at the time of the
misconduct and throughout the litigation which preceded the remitted trial.
[21] The Code requires a two- stage enquiry . The first involves a consideration
under item 6 (strike-related factors), and the second a consideration of item 7
(general misconduct principles).
4
[22] Item 6(1) identifies three non- exhaustive factors relevant to substantive
fairness.
[23] With reference to the first factor in item 6(1) , being the s eriousness of the
contravention of the LRA, t he strike occurred the day after a sectoral wage

3 Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
4 NUMSA v CBI Electric African Cables [2014] 1 BLLR 31 (LAC).

6
agreement had been concluded and communicated. The employees ,
therefore, acted with full knowledge that the bargaining process had run its
course.
[24] The strike did not occur in a context of confusion. It was a deliberate and
collective decision to withhold labour in defiance of a binding agreement and
the LRA.
[25] Although the strike endured for only six hours, duration is not determinative. A
short but calculated stoppage, as occurred here, is a serious matter.
[26] With reference to the second factor in item 6(1), being the attempts made to
comply with the LRA, there were none. No dispute was referred to conciliation
and no strike notice was issued. This was not a technical or borderline failure
to comply with statutory requirements, but a wholesale disregard of them.
[27] With reference to the third factor in item 6(1), being whether or not the strike
was in response to unjustified conduct by the employer , the strike was not a
response to unjustified or unlawful conduct by the defendant . It arose from
dissatisfaction with the outcome of collective bargaining.
[28] Item 6(2) of the Code requires the issuing of an ultimatum , but provides that
where the employer cannot reasonably be expected to issue one, it may
dispense with this . An ultimatum was prepared and the process of issuing it
commenced. The evidence establishes that further distribution was actively
thwarted by a shop steward.
[29] In the circumstances, and given that the plaintiffs could not reasonably have
believed the strike to be protected, the defendant cannot be faulted for failing
to do more. The position relating to the ultimatum is therefore, at best for the
plaintiffs, neutral.
[30] A further factor of relevance is the harm to the defendant.
[31] At the remitted trial, t he defendant adduced evidence of substantial financial
losses and operational disruption following the strike. While not all losses can
necessarily be attributed to the unprotected strike itself (given that some may

7
well have flowed from the assault and associated conduct), it is clear that the
strike caused real harm and contributed to a breakdown in operational
continuity. This constitutes a meaningful aggravating factor.
[32] The absence of remorse on the part of the plaintiffs is also an aggravating
factor.
5
[33] In the proceedings at the main trial, the plaintiffs’ pleaded case was that all
employees were instructed to leave the premises based on concerns about
their safety, and while waiting outside the defendant’s premises, security
officers locked the gate. Their pleaded case was thus that they had not
participated in an unprotected strike.
[34] During the remitted trial, Ms Hopolang Khumalo (who testified for the
plaintiffs) sought to suggest that the reason she did not perform work on the
day of the strike was that her department was closed. She later conceded
(when pressed on the issue) that she had joined the strike. Ms Mosekedi (who
also testified for the plaintiffs ) acknowledged that she had participated in the
unprotected strike.
[35] Despite these belated concessions, the plaintiffs did not explain what
motivated their course of action in embarking on the unprotected strike, or
seek to justify it.
[36] The absence of candour and remorse undermines prospects of progressive
discipline being a viable means of rehabilitation, and weighs in favour of
dismissal.
[37] The plaintiffs’ clean disciplinary records are mitigating factors. They are not,
however, decisive, particularly where the misconduct strikes at the heart of
workplace discipline and operational stability.

5 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others [2000] 9 BLLR 995 (LAC) at para 25; Timothy v
Nampak Corrugated Containers (Pty) Ltd [2010] 8 BLLR 830 (LAC) at 835; Department of Labour v
General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council & others (2010) 31 ILJ 1313 (LAC) at para 33.

8
[38] On an overall basis, t he task of the Court is to weigh all relevant
considerations and make a value judgment.
[39] On the one hand, the strike was of limited duration, and the plaintiffs had
clean disciplinary records.
[40] On the other hand, the misconduct was deliberate and committed in defiance
of a binding wage agreement. It caused tangible harm, and it was followed by
a lack of remorse and accountability.
[41] In these circumstances, the misconduct went beyond warranting progressive
discipline. It fundamentally undermined the trust and discipline necessary for
the continuation of the employment relationship.
[42] I am therefore satisfied that the defendant has discharged its onus of proving
that dismissal was a proportionate and substantively fair sanction.
[43] Lastly, having regard to the requirements of law and fairness, and taking into
account the fact that the remitted trial was the result of the Constitutional
Court’s order, no order as to costs is warranted.
Order
1. It is declared that the dismissals of Thabo Mphuthi , Vusi Mthimkulu ,
Moses Dhludhlu, Potia Mosekedi , Thabang Pitsi , Hopolang Khumalo
and Sarah Mokoena were substantively fair (at the level of sanction) ,
and their unfair dismissal claims are therefore dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.

_______________________
R. Itzkin
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

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Appearances:
For the Applicants: MW Marweshe
Of: Marweshe Attorneys
For the Respondent: I De Vos
S Abdool Kareem
Instructed by: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc.