• Law Reports
  • Timac Agro South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Botes …

Timac Agro South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Botes NO (4909/2020) [2026] ZAFSHC 24 (22 January 2026)

70 Reportability
Civil Procedure
View PDF SAFLII Source
Share WhatsApp LinkedIn X Email

Brief Summary

Settlement Agreement — Enforcement — Application for court order to make settlement agreement an order of court — Respondent alleging undue influence in signing settlement — Court finding no evidence of duress or undue influence — Settlement agreement valid and enforceable — Court makes settlement an order of court in terms of Uniform Rule 41.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings took the form of an application in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein, seeking primarily to have a written settlement agreement made an order of court under Uniform Rule 41. Although the notice of motion initially also sought authorisation for a writ of execution against the movable goods of the deceased estate, that relief was expressly abandoned at the earlier hearing.


The applicant was Timac Agro South Africa (Pty) Ltd, a creditor which had supplied fertiliser on credit. The respondent was Daria Botes N O, cited in her representative capacity as the executrix of the deceased estate of the late Dawie Grobbelaar, who had been the defendant in the original action and who, according to the will, had appointed the respondent as sole beneficiary and heir.


Procedurally, the dispute originated in action proceedings instituted on 11 December 2020 against Mr Grobbelaar for payment of an outstanding debt, interest, and costs. After Mr Grobbelaar’s death on 24 October 2021 and the respondent’s appointment as executrix on 20 January 2022, the action was settled by written agreement on 13 October 2022. When the respondent did not pay the agreed settlement amount by 23 January 2023, the applicant brought the present Rule 41 application to have the settlement made an order of court.


The application served before Van Zyl J on 15 June 2023, when the respondent initially had raised issues of undue influence and authority but later abandoned those points at the hearing. A further objection was raised that the Master of the High Court had a direct and substantial interest and ought to have been joined or served. The application was removed from the roll and the Master was directed to report. The Master filed a report on 29 November 2023. The matter later came before Ntanga AJ on 24 April 2025, when it was postponed to 5 June 2025 to enable the respondent to approach Legal Aid. At the final hearing the respondent appeared in person, and the matter was determined on the legal enforceability of the settlement and the effect of estate administration rules.


The general subject-matter concerned the enforceability of a settlement agreement relating to a civil debt claim against a deceased estate, and whether making that settlement an order of court was compatible with the statutory framework governing payment of creditors from deceased estates.


Material Facts


During 2019 the applicant sold and delivered fertiliser to Mr Grobbelaar. It was common cause that Mr Grobbelaar failed to pay the purchase price, leading to the institution of action proceedings for the outstanding balance, interest, and costs.


Mr Grobbelaar died on 24 October 2021 while the action was pending. The respondent was appointed executrix by the Master on 20 January 2022, and was also the sole beneficiary and heir in terms of the will. The litigation then continued in the context of the estate administration.


On or about 13 October 2022 the applicant and the respondent concluded a written settlement agreement. The material terms recorded by the court included that the respondent would pay R920 879.00 in full and final settlement of the action, that payment was due on or before 23 January 2023, that upon default the full outstanding amount as claimed in the particulars of claim would become immediately due and payable, and that the applicant would be entitled to approach court to have the settlement made an order of court under Rule 41.


It was undisputed that the respondent did not pay the settlement amount by the due date. The respondent provided explanations for the non-payment and accepted that the amount remained due, but sought to resist the consequence of making the settlement an order of court on the basis of the estate administration process and sought indulgence to pay by instalments. Those considerations did not amount to a substantive defence to the enforcement of the settlement as recorded by the court.


A disputed issue re-emerged at the final hearing when the respondent asserted that the settlement was not concluded freely and voluntarily, alleging that she was told that if she did not sign the settlement, her assets would be attached and the farm sold. The court treated this contention through the lenses of undue influence and duress, particularly in light of what had been pleaded in the answering affidavit (namely that the applicant threatened to proceed with the pending case if she did not sign).


The Master’s report raised the operation of section 35(12) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, namely that payment of claims against a deceased estate ordinarily occurs only after the liquidation and distribution account has lain open for inspection and is free from objections.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the settlement agreement met the requirements for enforcement under Uniform Rule 41(4) and could therefore be made an order of court, and whether any defence existed that would justify refusing that relief.


Within that enquiry, the court was required to determine whether the respondent had established undue influence or duress sufficient to render the settlement unenforceable, which primarily involved the application of established legal tests to the facts alleged.


A further legal question was whether making the settlement an order of court would be inconsistent with section 35(12) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, given that the debtor was a deceased estate and creditor payment is regulated by the liquidation and distribution process. This was principally a question of law and its application to the procedural posture of the relief sought (a judgment confirming the settlement, as opposed to execution).


Finally, the court had to determine appropriate costs orders, including wasted costs for prior appearances, which involved an evaluative and discretionary judgment guided by procedural responsibility (including the applicant’s role as dominus litis) and the history of postponements and removals.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter through the framework of Uniform Rule 41(4), which permits a party to a written settlement, signed by the parties or their legal representatives and not carried out, to apply for judgment in terms thereof on at least five days’ notice to all interested parties. The court noted the principle that the settlement contemplated must be one intended to bring an end to the suit as a whole, as articulated in the cited authority. On the facts, the settlement was written, signed, aimed at final settlement of the action, and had not been performed due to non-payment by the due date.


The respondent’s attempt to resist the order on the basis that she needed to explain why payment had not been made, or that she wished to pay in instalments, was treated as not constituting a legal defence to the relief sought. The court explained that the grant of relief depended on legal entitlement rather than an open-ended discretion to accommodate the respondent’s preferred payment arrangement.


On the allegation that the settlement was not entered into freely and voluntarily, the court considered the law of undue influence, identifying it as improper pressure inducing a contract. The judgment applied the test in Patel v Grobbelaar and emphasised that a party resisting enforcement must establish an influence obtained over them, that the influence weakened their resistance rendering their will compliant, and that the influence was used unscrupulously to procure a prejudicial transaction that would not have been concluded with normal freedom of will.


The court also considered the allegation through the lens of duress, focusing on the requirement that the threat must be contra bonos mores. The court accepted the principle that a threat to do something one is legally entitled to do, including a threat to sue or proceed with litigation, is ordinarily not contra bonos mores. Applying this to the respondent’s allegation, the court reasoned that if the applicant conveyed that it would proceed with the pending action if the settlement was not signed, this amounted to a statement of a lawful course of action rather than improper coercion. The court also took into account that the respondent was represented by her attorney during negotiations and conclusion of the settlement agreement. On this basis, the court found there were no reasonable grounds to conclude that duress or undue influence was present when the settlement was concluded.


The court then addressed the Master’s concern regarding section 35(12) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, which regulates when creditors may be paid from a deceased estate and requires the liquidation and distribution account to have lain open for inspection and to be free from objections. The court distinguished between obtaining a judgment (including a judgment embodying a settlement agreement) and executing upon that judgment against estate assets. It emphasised that the applicant had abandoned the prayer seeking a writ of execution, meaning it was not attempting to extract payment outside the statutory process. Instead, the judgment would establish the claim in a form capable of being dealt with in the liquidation and distribution account as a claim against the estate. Accordingly, elevating the settlement agreement to an order of court was held not to transgress section 35(12).


On costs, the court revisited the earlier removal from the roll which had occurred because the Master had not been joined or served, despite having a direct and substantial interest. The court reasoned that it was the applicant’s responsibility as dominus litis to ensure proper joinder or service. Exercising its discretion, it ordered the applicant to pay the wasted costs for that earlier hearing (as reflected in the order), including counsel’s costs on the specified scale. The court also addressed costs arising from the later postponement and the final hearing, awarding costs consistent with the outcome and the prior postponement order, and specifying the applicable taxing scales for counsel where relevant.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted the principal relief and made the settlement agreement concluded on 13 October 2022 an order of court in terms of Uniform Rule 41. The court did not grant any execution-related relief, and the application proceeded only on the basis of the prayer to have the settlement made an order of court and a costs order.


The costs orders were structured as follows. The applicant was ordered to pay the wasted costs of the earlier hearing date identified in the order, including counsel’s costs taxed on Scale B. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the subsequent hearing date identified in the order, including counsel’s costs taxed on Scale A. Subject to those specific costs orders and other previous costs orders, the respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application, including counsel’s costs (if employed), to be taxed on Scale C.


Cases Cited


Siebert & Honey v Van Tonder 1981 (2) SA 146 (O) was cited for the proposition that a settlement relied upon under Rule 41 must be one intended to bring an end to the suit as a whole.


Patel v Grobbelaar [1974] 1 All SA 518 (A); 1974 (1) SA 532 (A) was cited for the requirements that must be proved to resist enforcement of a contract on the ground of undue influence.


BOE Bank Bpk v Van Zyl 2002 (5) SA 165 (KPA) was cited for the requirement, in the context of duress, that the threat or intimidation must be contra bonos mores.


Legislation Cited


The Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, particularly section 35(12), was referenced in relation to the timing and permissibility of payments to creditors of a deceased estate within the liquidation and distribution process.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 41(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court was applied as the procedural basis for obtaining judgment in terms of an unperformed written settlement agreement.


Held


The court held that the written settlement agreement between the applicant and the respondent met the requirements for enforcement under Uniform Rule 41(4) and was properly capable of being made an order of court because it was intended to settle the underlying action and had not been carried out.


The court further held that the respondent had not established facts justifying a conclusion of duress or undue influence, particularly where the alleged pressure amounted in substance to a threat to pursue litigation which the applicant was legally entitled to pursue, and where the respondent had been represented during settlement negotiations.


The court also held that making the settlement an order of court did not offend section 35(12) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, because the application (especially after abandonment of execution relief) sought only judgment embodying the settlement, not payment or execution outside the statutory estate-administration framework.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A written settlement agreement intended to resolve litigation in full, signed by the parties or their legal representatives, and not carried out, may be enforced by an application for judgment in terms of Uniform Rule 41(4), provided proper notice is given to interested parties and the agreement is of the kind that ends the suit as a whole.


A party resisting enforcement of a contract on the basis of undue influence bears the burden of proving the recognised elements, including the existence of an influence, that it weakened resistance and rendered the will compliant, and that the influence was used unscrupulously to procure a prejudicial transaction not entered into with normal freedom of will, as articulated in Patel v Grobbelaar.


In assessing duress, a key requirement is that the threat must be contra bonos mores. A threat to take lawful action, including pursuing litigation one is entitled to pursue, does not ordinarily meet that requirement, consistent with BOE Bank Bpk v Van Zyl and the principle relied upon by the court that the courts are open to all and a threat to sue is not generally improper.


In the context of deceased estates, section 35(12) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 regulates the timing of payment of creditors and requires the liquidation and distribution account to lie open for inspection free of objections before payment occurs. The granting of a judgment that confirms a claim (including by making a settlement agreement an order of court) is conceptually distinct from execution or payment, and may be treated as establishing a claim to be addressed within the liquidation and distribution process rather than as a circumvention of section 35(12).


Costs remain a discretionary matter. Where a procedural defect such as failure to join or serve an interested party necessitates removal from the roll or additional steps, the litigant responsible for the defect, particularly the dominus litis, may be ordered to pay wasted costs occasioned thereby, with further costs orders reflecting success in the main application and responsibility for postponements.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN

Not Reportable
Case no: 4909/2020

In the matter between:
TIMAC AGRO SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD APPLICANT
[Registration No. 2011/005705/07]

And

DARIA BOTES N O RESPONDENT
[In her capacity as Executrix of the deceased estate of
Dawie Grobbelaar (ID no. 9[…] )]

Neutral citation: Timac Agro South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Botes N O (4909/2020) [2026]
ZAFSHC 24 (22 January 2026)
Coram: VAN ZYL J
Heard: 5 June 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives by e- mail and released to SAFLII. The time and date for hand-down is
deemed to be 14h15 on 22 January 2026.
Summary: Uniform rule 41 of the Uniform Rules of Court application – settlement
agreement to be made an order of court – no duress or undue influence – not contra s
35(12) of Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965.

______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
1 The settlement agreement concluded between the applicant and the respondent on
13 October 2022 is made an order of court in terms of Uniform rule 41.

2

2 The applicant is to pay the wasted costs of 5 June 2023, with counsel`s costs to be
taxed on Scale B.
3 The respondent is to pay the costs of 5 June 2025, with counsel`s costs to be
taxed on Scale A.
4 Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 above and other costs orders previously made, the
respondent is to pay the costs of the application, with costs of counsel, if and when
employed, to be taxed on Scale C.
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
Van Zyl J
[1] The applicant approached this Court for an order in the following terms:

‘1. That the settlement agreement concluded between the Applicant and Respondent on 13
October 2022 be made an order of court in terms of Rule 41 . . .
2. That a Writ of Execution be authorized against the movable goods of the deceased estate.
3. Costs of the application.’

Background
[2] The applicant sold and delivered fertilizer to the late Mr Dawie Grobbelaar (Mr
Grobbelaar) during 2019. Mr Grobbelaar failed to pay the purchase price to the
applicant, whereupon the applicant instituted action against Mr Grobbelaar , on 11
December 2020, for payment of the outstanding balance, with interest and costs. Mr
Grobbelaar defended the action and filed a special plea and plea, in response whereto
the applicant filed a replication.

[3] On 24 October 2021, Mr Grobbelaar passed away. On 20 January 2022, the
respondent was duly appointed as the executrix of the deceased estate of Mr
Grobbelaar by the Master of the High Court, Bloemfontein (the Master). In terms of Mr
Grobbelaar’s will, the respondent was appointed as the sole beneficiary and heir of Mr
Grobbelaar’s estate.

[4] On or about 13 October 2022, the applicant and the respondent concluded a
settlement agreement in respect of the aforesaid action. In terms of the settlement

3

agreement attached to the founding affidavit as annexure ‘TS1’, the parties, inter alia ,
agreed as follows:

‘(a) That the Respondent makes payment to the Applicant in the amount of R920 879.00 in full
and final settlement of the aforesaid action.
(b) That the Respondent undertakes to pay the settlement amount on or before 23 January
2023.
(c) Should the Respondent fail to make the aforesaid payment, the full outstanding amount as
claimed by the Applicant in its particulars of claim in the action will become immediately due and
payable.
(d) That the Applicant will be entitled to approach Court to have the settlement agreement
made an order of Court in terms of Rule 41.’

[5] The respondent failed to make payment of the settlement amount by 23 January
2023, whereupon the applicant issued the present application. The respondent opposed
the application and an answering affidavit and replying affidavit were duly filed.

The previous hearing of the application
[6] The application previously served before me on 15 June 2023. During the hearing,
both parties enjoyed legal representation.

[7] At the commencement of that hearing, Mr Zietsman, appearing on behalf of the
applicant, indicated that the applicant is not persisting with prayer 2 of the notice of
motion and is only seeking an order in terms of prayers 1 and 3 of the notice of motion.

[8] Although the respondent initially averred, in her answering affidavit, that she signed
the settlement agreement under undue influence and also questioned the authority of
the deponent to the founding affidavit to have deposed to the said affidavit, Mr Ploos van
Amstel, appearing on behalf of the respondent, indicated, at the commencement of that
hearing, that the respondent is no longer persisting with these two points of opposition.

[9] During that hearing, the point was raised by and on behalf of the respondent that
the applicant should have either cited the Master as a party to the application or served

the applicant should have either cited the Master as a party to the application or served
the application on the Master since the Master has a direct and substantial interest in the
subject matter of the application. Although Mr Zietsman contended the contrary on

4

behalf of the applicant, I agreed with their contention that the Master has a direct and
substantial interest in the application.

[10] I subsequently handed down a judgment in terms whereof I, inter alia , removed the
application from the roll, ordered the applicant to serve a copy of the application papers
and the parties’ respective heads of argument on the Master and requested the Master
to file a report in respect of the application. I further ordered that the wasted costs of 15
June 2023 stand over for later adjudication.

The next hearing
[11] The Master duly filed a report on 29 November 2023.

[12] From the contents of the file, it is evident that the matter again served before Court
on 24 April 2025. By that time, the respondent’s attorneys had withdrawn as attorneys
of record. The respondent consequently appeared in person. On that day , the matter
served before Ntanga AJ.

[13] From a perusal of the court order that was issued on that day, it is evident that
there was an application for postponement by the respondent, which application was
granted ‘for purposes of affording Respondent opportunity to approach Legal Aid for
legal assistance within 14 days of this order’. It was further ordered that the matter was
postponed to 5 June 2025 and, should the respondent fail to secure legal representation
by then, the applicant shall be entitled to proceed with the application. The respondent
was ordered to pay the wasted costs.

The present hearing
[14] The applicant was represented by Mr Verhoef and the respondent appeared in
person. I enquired from the respondent about Legal Aid South Africa (Legal Aid)
assistance for her, but she responded that, although she did approach Legal Aid, they
indicated that, because she had not been cited in her personal capacity in the matter,
Legal Aid cannot assist her.

[15] Mr Verhoef indicated that he holds instructions to request that the application

[15] Mr Verhoef indicated that he holds instructions to request that the application
proceeds in accordance with the court order of 24 April 2025. The respondent
consequently indicated that she will be representing herself and requested an

5

opportunity to address the Court to explain how it came about that the amount owed to
the applicant has not been paid.

[16] I allowed the respondent to address me as requested. Although the facts and
events which she related to me indeed explained why the amount due to the applicant
has not been paid, being circumstances which were also explained in the answering
affidavit, same did not constitute a defence and she admitted that the outstanding
amount is still due and payable to the applicant. She, however, requested that I consider
not making the settlement agreement an order of court , since that , according to the
respondent, will result in the applicant having to be paid before the administration of the
estate has been finalised. She also requested that she be allowed to pay the
outstanding amount in instalments. I explained to her that it is not in my discretion
whether to make an order or not, since I must adjudicate the matter on legal basis and,
should I find that the applicant is legally entitled to an order, I am compelled to grant an
order in its favour.

[17] Uniform rule 41(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court determines as follows:

‘Unless such proceedings have been withdrawn, any party to a settlement which has been
reduced to writing and signed by the parties or their legal representatives but which has not
been carried out, may apply for judgment in terms thereof on at least five days’ notice to all
interested parties.’

[18] Such a settlement must be a settlement which intend to bring an end to the suit as
a whole. (See Siebert & Honey v Van Tonder 1981 (2) SA 146 (O) at 148D.)

[19] In the respondent ’s address to Court , the respondent raised that the settlement
agreement was not concluded freely and voluntarily. In this regard, she indicated that
the applicant’s attorneys indicated that, should she fail to sign the settlement agreement,
the applicant will attach her assets and sell the farm. This is despite the fact that it was

the applicant will attach her assets and sell the farm. This is despite the fact that it was
previously indicated by Mr Ploos van Amstel, on behalf of the respondent, that the
respondent is not persisting with this point of opposition.

[20] Undue influence is a form of improper pressure brought to bear upon a person in
order to induce him or her to enter into a contract. The test formulated for undue

6

influence was articulated in the matter of Patel v Grobbelaar [1974] 1 All SA 518; 1974
(1) SA 532 (A) at 534A, where the Court set out concisely what must be proved by a
respondent/defendant who resists enforcement of a contract on the ground of undue
influence:

(a) That the other party obtained an influence over him or her;
(b) That this influence weakened his or her powers of resistance and rendered his or
her will compliant; and
(c) That the other party used his influence in an unscrupulous manner to persuade him
or her to agree to a transaction which:
(i) was prejudicial to him or her; and
(ii) which he or she would not have concluded with normal freedom or will.

[21] In the answering affidavit , the respondent averred that the applicant threatened to
proceed with the pending court case should she not agree to sign the settlement
agreement.

[22] If what was conveyed to the respondent by the applicant’s attorney is to be
considered a ‘threat’, it should also be considered against the requirements for duress.

[23] One of the required elements of duress is that the threat or intimidation must be
contra bonos mores. (See BOE Bank Bpk v Van Zyl 2002 (5) SA 165 (KPA) at 177B-C.)

[24] In the discussion of this requirement as set out in G B Bradfield’s Christie’s Law of
Contract in South Africa 8 ed (2022) at 374, the following is set out:

‘A person who is legally and morally entitled to do something to another should not suffer at the
hands of the law for doing it, nor for threatening to do it, and it follows that, if such a threat
induces another to contract with such person, the person induced to contract by such threat
cannot be heard to complain. So a threat to dismiss an employee lawfully is not duress in the
eyes of the law, nor is a threat to sue, since the courts are open to all and the only penalty for
rash litigation is costs.’ (My emphasis.)

[25] Had the respondent not signed the settlement agreement, the applicant would

[25] Had the respondent not signed the settlement agreement, the applicant would
have been entitled to continue with its litigation which was pending at that stage. The

7

‘threat’ of continuing with the litigation, which may have resulted in the attachment of
assets, was therefore not contra bonos mores.

[26] I am also mindful of the fact that it is stated in the replying affidavit, in response to
the allegations in the answering affidavit, that , throughout the negotiations and the
conclusion of the settlement agreement, the respondent was represented by her
erstwhile attorney of record.

[27] There is, in my view, consequently no reasonable grounds to conclude that duress
or undue influence was present during the conclusion of the settlement agreement.

Section 35(12) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (the Act)
[28] In terms of s 35(12) of the Act, creditors of a deceased estate are paid only after
the liquidation and distribution account has lain open for inspection and is free of
objections.

[29] In this regard, the Master states as follows at paragraph 6 of his report:

‘Payment of the claim can however only occur once the account has lain for inspection free from
objections in terms of Section 35(12) of the Administrations of Estates Act, supra.’

[30] As pointed out in the supplementary heads of argument filed on behalf of the
applicant, there should be a difference drawn between a judgment in terms of the
settlement agreement and execution of the judgment against the deceased estate.
Considering that the applicant abandoned prayer 2 of the notice of motion, the applicant
is not attempting to execute its claim against the deceased estate, but merely to obtain a
judgment against the estate which would then be dealt with in the liquidation and
distribution account as a claim against the estate.

[31] The elevation of the settlement agreement to a judgment of Court, as agreed in the
settlement agreement, will therefore not constitute a transgression of s 35(12) of the Act.

Conclusion
[32] The applicant is consequently entitled to an order in terms of prayer 1 of the notice
of motion.

8


Costs
[33] As previously indicated, the wasted costs of 15 June 2023 stood over for later
adjudication.

[34] In my previous judgment, paragraph 14 thereof, I stated as follows:

‘With regard to the wasted costs of 15 June 2023 Mr Ploos van Amstel submitted that the
applicant should be ordered to pay same, since the applicant is dominus litis and consequently
had the obligation to have either cited the Master or to have served the application upon the
Master. Mr Zietsman, on the other hand, submitted that the wasted costs should stand over for
later adjudication, since the contents of the Master’s report may have an influence when
considering an appropriate cost order.’

[35] During the present hearing, Mr Verhoef, on behalf of the applicant, requested that
the respondent be ordered to pay such wasted costs.

[36] In my view , the Master should indeed initially have either been cited as a party to
the application or the application should have been served on the Master. It was the duty
of the applicant, being dominus litis , to have done so, which the applicant failed to do.
Therefore, in the exercise of my discretion, I am of the view that the applicant should be
ordered to pay the wasted costs of 15 June 2023. Considering that it was Mr Ploos van
Amstel who appeared on behalf of the applicant, considered in accordance with the
applicable relevant principles, I am furthermore of the view that such costs should
include the costs of counsel, taxed on Scale B.

[37] With regard to the costs of the appearance on 5 June 2025, the applicant, as the
successful party in the application, is entitled to these costs. I agree with the contention
of Mr Verhoef that such costs are to include costs of counsel, taxed on scale A.

[38] In respect of the costs of the application as such, the counsel involved, if and when
employed, was Mr Zietsman and therefore where costs of counsel are applicable in
relation thereto, such costs are to be taxed on Scale C.

Order

relation thereto, such costs are to be taxed on Scale C.

Order
[39] The following order is made:

9


1 The settlement agreement concluded between the applicant and the respondent on
13 October 2022 is made an order of court in terms of Uniform rule 41.

2 The applicant is to pay the wasted costs of 5 June 2023, with counsel`s costs to be
taxed on Scale B.

3 The respondent is to pay the costs of 5 June 2025, with counsel`s costs to be
taxed on Scale A.

4 Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 above and other costs orders previously made, the
respondent is to pay the costs of the application, with costs of counsel, if and when
employed, to be taxed on Scale C.

______________________
C VAN ZYL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances

For the applicant: A A Verhoef
Instructed by: Muller Gonsior Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For the respondent: In person.

Back to Law Reports