1
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE
(1)
(2)
(3)
REPORTABLE : YES/NO
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED.
~'
DATE: 19/01/2026 SIGNATURE .. -
In the matter between :
CASE NO: 4684/2025
PHOTI GQ INVESTMENTS t/a TOTAL ENERGIES NOBODY Applicant
And
65 TWIN CITY PROPERTY 2 (PTY) LTD
CAT MAN 65 (PTY) LTD
CONTROLLER OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
MINISTER OF MINERALS AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS Fourth Respondent
POLOKWANE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
NETWORTH PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
SAND HAWKS (PTY) LTD
Fifth Respondent
Sixth Respondent
Seventh Respondent
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Delivered: This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties through their legal representatives' email addresses. The date for the hand­
down is deemed to be 19 January 2026.
JUDGMENT
Makoti AJ
Introduction
[1] This application first came before me on an urgent basis. I heard the matter
from 4 July 2025. Things shifted during the first day of the hearing. At the
hearing, it happened that one of the parties introduced what was said to be
freshly obtained evidence which had material implications for the case. The
evidence was a supposed official document which had the potential to render
the application, as it stood then, moot. The production of this document
resulted in the parties agreeing to stand the matter down to allow each of them
an opportunity to study it and to deal with its contents. Each party was to
supplement their filed papers as necessary.
[2] I will later deal with the substance of this document. For now it suffices to say
that I could no longer treat this application as urgent. I will therefore not
address urgency in this judgment. In any case, considering the voluminous
nature of the documents involved in this matter, I stood the matter down to be
heard on 25 July 2025.
[3] For the sake of convenience I start by identifying the dramatis personae in this
matter as follows:
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(3.1] Photi GQ Investments CC t/a Total Energies Nobody (Photi), the
applicant;
(3.2] Controller of Petroleum Products (the CPP), the first respondent;
(3.3] 65 Twin City Property 2 (Pty) Ltd {Twin City), the second respondent;
(3.4] Cat Man 65 (Pty) Ltd (Cat Man), the third respondent;
(3.5] The Minister of Minerals and Petroleum Products (the Minister), the
fourth respondent;
(3.6] The Polokwane Local Municipality (the Municipality), the fifth
respondent;
(3.7] Networth Properties (Pty) Ltd (Networth), the sixth respondent; and
(3.8] Sand Hawks (Pty) Ltd (Sand Hawks), the seventh respondent.
[4] At the heart of this application are official decisions allegedly taken by the CPP
and which Photi avers it has taken on appeal. The decisions will become clear
when I delve into the substance of the application.
The facts serving before me
[5] Photi is a known business entity which plies its trade in the petroleum industry.
Its operational base is at Ga-Mothiba (Nobody) which lies along the R71
provincial road. The company is aggrieved by the development of a petroleum
retail station to the east of Polokwane, at or near Dalmada which lies on the
R71. Photi seeks to bring to a temporary halt the processes undertaken by
Twin City, Cat Man and/ or Networth to construct a petroleum station. It seeks
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extensive interdictory orders against the first two respondents in this
application.
[6] The application is brought under the auspices of the Petroleum Products Act1
(the Act), which regulates the production and sale of petroleum products in the
Republic. Both the Minister and the Controller are the functionaries who are
reposed with legislative powers under the Act. The Minister and the Controller
have not filed any papers, possibly because the interdictory relief does not
directly affect them. Twin City, Cat Man, Networth and the Municipality filed
papers to oppose the application. Sand Hawks also did not oppose the
application.
[7] The construction of the petroleum station is being undertaken by or on behalf
of Twin City and Cat Man on a property known as Portion 68 of East Ridge
Extension 3, Krugerburg 993 LS (the Dalmada station).
[8] The location of the petroleum station under construction is approximately 10
kilometres eastwards from Polokwane's city centre. The R71 is said to carry
sizeable daily traffic into town and outwardly, and is used for various purposes
including travelling to and from work. By way of approximation, the distance
from Polokwane city centre to the Dalmada station is 26 kilometres.
[9] I mention these distances as they became topical when counsel finally
presented their arguments.
[1 O] In essence, the purpose of the application is to interdict the commencement
of construction of the Dalmada station. In the alternative, Photi seeks to stop
continuing construction of the petroleum by way of interdict. Photi's reasons
for seeking interdictory relief is premised on an appeal that it alleges it has
Act No. 120 of 1977.
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lodged against the decision of the Controller to grant, permit, license or
authorise Twin City and Cat Man to develop the Dalmada station.
[11] This said, the relief sought is not limited to the development and construction
of the Dalmada station. Photi prays for additional orders interdicting Twin City
and Cat Man, or anybody else operating in concert with them, from
commencing with the retailing of petroleum products on the station. As I
alluded to earlier, the interdictory relief prayed for is interim in nature pending
final determination of the dispute which Photi alleges to be before the
Minister2. It was submitted that Photi is intent on pursuing the dispute further
through the courts should it not get a favourable decision from the Minister.
[12] For obvious reasons, I cannot foretell what the decision will be. Thus,
considering the human and legal limitations I am subject to, I intend to
adjudicate the matter based only on its merits as disclosed in the facts before
me and the law. Also, my view is that it will be in the best interests of justice
that a case of this nature is dealt with in that fashion so as to avoid the prospect
of any of the parties returning to Court if I make a decision based on
tech n ica I ities.
[13] On a further note, in customary fashion, Photi seeks that costs of the
application be awarded against Twin City and Cat Man, and any of the
respondents that may join them in opposition. So, on the tenor of the notice of
motion, it appears that the Minister, the Controller and Sand Hawks are
inoculated from a potentially adversecosts order.
[14] I earlier mentioned a decision by the parties that the matter must be stood
down. Upon the matter standing down the first and second respondents
lodged an application for leave to file a further affidavit in order to introduce
2 Section 12A of the Petroleum Products Act.
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new evidence. The test for filing a further affidavit was set out in Hano Trading
CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another3 where it was held that Rule
6(5)(e):
"establishes clearly that the filing of further affidavits is only permitted with
the indulgence of the court. A court, as arbiter, has the sole discretion
whether to allow the affidavits or not. A court will only exercise its discretion
in this regard where there is good reason for doing so."
[15] As I understand it, the document with new information contained a decision to
extend the license that was granted to the first and second respondents. It
clearly had a bearing on the application and it was appropriate that it be
introduced into the proceedings, even belatedly.
[16] In any event I gave the parties an opportunity to address me on the document's
contents. Having heard counsel, I am happy to permit this new evidence.
Summary of the defenses raised by the respondents
[17] All the opposing respondents took issue with urgency. I have already said that
I will not be deal with this issue. The question of urgency simply no longer
arises.
[18] The first and second respondents jointly filed a single answering deposed to
by a Mr. Maphiri. Standing atop their answer is a technical objection regarding
the composition of the founding affidavit. They contended that the deponent
to the founding affidavit was not authorised to institute the application on
behalf of Photi. The point is dismissed as it was raised unprocedurally.
3 2013 (1) SA 161 SCA.
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[19] I am fortified in reaching the decision above based on the dictum in Limpopo
Provincial Council of the Legal Practice Council v Chueu Incorporated and
Othe~ where the Court said that:
"[21] Since then, the issue of authority has been dealt with in a number of decisions
of this Court. The position is now established that the manner to challenge
the authority of a litigant is to utilise rule 7(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
The original understanding of rule 7(1) was that it only applied to the mandate
provided to attorneys. However, this Court in Unlawful Occupiers, School Site
v City of Johannesburg ( Unlawful Occupiers}, citing Eskom v Soweto City
Council and Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd, held that the remedy
for a respondent who wishes to challenge the authority of a person allegedly
acting on behalf of the purported applicant is provided for in rule 7(1 )."
[20] I must then proceed to deal with the merits of the application.
[21] On the merits the first two respondents contended that Photi failed to satisfy
the requirements for interim interdicts. This contention is a theme amongst the
respondents, albeit based on different premises. The first two respondents
specifically argued that no harm would befall Photi on the mere basis that the
construction of the petroleum station continues.
[22] Connected to the point of harm, they further disputed that the noting of an
appeal in terms of section 12A had the effect of halting construction of the
petroleum retail premises.
[23] The Municipality, being implicated on this score, asked for condonation for the
late delivery of its answering affidavit. I am inclined to grant it. Its affidavit
addressed the history of the various processes and decisions that were taken
since the development of the petroleum station was first conceived. Like Twin
City and Cat Man, the Municipality also pleaded that the interim interdict asked
for should not be granted on the mere basis that there is a pending appeal.

for should not be granted on the mere basis that there is a pending appeal.
4 Limpopo Provincial Council of South African Legal Practice Council v Chueu Incorporated Attorneys and
Others (459/2022) (2023) ZASCA 112 (26 July 2023).
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According to it too, Photi has failed to satisfy the requirements for interim
interdicts.
[24] Networth's opposition was also grounded on the contention that the
application did not satisfy the requirements for interim interdict. Additionally, it
raised a point that there was no pending internal appeal before the Minister.
Over and above that, it argued that Photi was not directly affected by the
impugned decision(s). Networth also complained about non-service or what it
called ineffective service. This last point is dismissed as it has has filed an
answering affidavit in any event.
[25] Importantly, the parties differed as to the legal implications of section 12A of
the Act. Thus, the statutory provision is the best place to begin as I consider
the merits. I will, upon deciphering the effect of the legislative stipulation, deal
with the contentions concerning the requirements for interim interdicts.
Legislative framework
[26] Section 12A of the Act is central to the dispute in this matter. Most of the
parties dealt with the provision in their papers - most certainly Photi. It reads
thus:
"(1) Any person directly affected by a decision of the Controller of Petroleum
Products may, notwithstanding any other rights that such a person may have,
appeal to the Minister against such decision.
(2) An appeal in terms of paragraph (a) shall be lodged within 60 days after such
decision has been made known to the affected person and shall be
accompanied by-
(a) a written explanation setting out the nature of the appeal;
(b) any documentary evidence upon which the appeal is based.
(3) The Minister shall consider the appeal, and shall give his or her decision
thereon, together with written reasons therefor, within the period specified in
the regulations."
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[27] The provision first identifies who may raise an appeal. To that extent the words
used in section 12A of the Act admit no controversy. Three important things
must be said here. First, it is that an appeal procedure is open to anyone who
is directly affected by the decision. Second, the decision must be that of the
Controller. And third, the appeal in term of this provision is made to the
Minister. Section 12A lucidly communicates the question of who may appeal.
[28] Our jurisprudence tells us that the words used in statutes must play a role in
determining the meaning or intention of legislative provisions.5 Words used in
statutes, considered within context, are pivotal in the exercise of judicial
interpretation. 6
[29] Simply, section 12A requires a party filing an appeal to show how it is affected
by the decision. Photi identified itself as a close corporation which owns Total
Energies Nobody, a petrol station at Ga-Mothiba. It trades in petroleum
products pursuant to a license that it has held since 28 August 2008. Its trade
in petroleum products began in 2012.
[30] For its business, Photi feeds off traffic travelling on the R71 provincial road. It
seems to me undeniable that its business will be affected by the impugned
decision. Fortunately, that is not for me to decide and I can only leave it to the
Minister's when it deals with the appeal.
[31] However, a legislative lacuna exists, one may say, in that the Act does not say
whether the lodging of an appeal suspends the Controller's decision. As I
understand it, it is for that reason that the respondents contended that the
lodgment of an appeal does not have the effect of suspending the decision of
the Controller. That issue recently exercised the SCA in Gensinger and Neave
5
6
Finbro Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Bloemfontein 1985 (4) SA 773 (A).
Novartis v Maphil (20229/2014) [2015) ZASCA 111; 2016 ( 1) SA 518 (SCA); [2015) 4 All SA 417 (SCA)
(3 September 2015) paras 26 - 28.
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CC and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy .7 There, that Court
answered the question by stating that:
"[30] The Act grants a person, who is directly affected by the Controller's decision,
the right to appeal to the Minister. The Act does not provide that an appeal
against the Controller's decision does not suspend that decision. It follows
that the Controller's decision will be suspended when a person, who is
directly affected by the Controller's decision, appeals to the Minister against
the Controller's decision . ... The common law principle is applicable to the
facts of this case, with the result that the appellants' appeal in terms of s 12A
of the Act suspends the Controller's decision ... "
[32] The fact here is that there is an appeal pending before the Minister. I say this
even though there was a contrary argument by Networth in its papers and
orally before me. The argument was to suggest that the appeal was not
properly filed with the Minister and therefore there was no appeal to begin with.
That contention is without merit. I say this based on the evidence before me,
which evidence shows the manner in which the appeal was lodged, belying
that argument.
[33] Relying on the famed Oudekraa/8 principle, the Municipality's argument was
that the decision sought to be interdicted retains validity until it is set aside.
The argument is misplaced as it is not applicable for the present purposes.
Here Photi is dealing with the temporary restraining of processes of
construction and retailing in petroleum products because it has lodged an
appeal and not a review The argument cannot fly in the wake of Gensinger.
[34] The Municipality's next contention was that the decision in City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another9 was against Gensinger. If
that was correct, it would never be possible to grant interdicts against organs
7
8
9
Gensinger and Neave CC & Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy [2024) ZASCA 49; 2025

(4) SA 84 (SCA) (15 April 2024).
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA).
2016 (6) SA 279 (CC).
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of State. As I understand that case, Afriforum could not sustain its argument
that it stood to suffer irreparable harm, and also that the balance of
convenience did not favour the granting of the interdict orders which it had
applied for.
[35] There is another contention which deserves mention, being that Photi cannot
be granted the interdict without challenging the Controller's decision. I struggle
to understand this as I understand an appeal to be just that, a challenge to the
substance of the impugned decision. I say this because the Minister, when
sitting as appeal authority, may alter or set aside the decision on the merits.
What Photi is expecting is that the decision will be overturned. This is a remedy
established in terms of the legislation. Most certainly, it is necessary that the
internal remedy in the form of appeal be embarked upon before the decision
may be challenged in Court proceedings.10
Whether Photi has made out a case to be granted interim interdict
[36] All the participating respondents contend that interim interdict should not be
granted as Photi has failed to satisfy the requirements. They come to that
position from different vantage points. The strongest point of opposition was
that the sale of petroleum products was already taking place at the
development site, which was refuted on behalf of Photi.
[37] It is obvious why that point was made, and I deal with it even before I pay
attention to the individual requirements that an applicant for interdictory relief
must meet. Tokota J eruditely explained in Bikitsha v Bikitsha and Others11
that an interdict is intended to prevent future conduct, not conduct that has
passed. He did so echoing the tenor of Moseneke DCJ, who wrote in National
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11
Koyabe and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others (CCT 53/08) (2009] ZACC 23; 2009 (12)
BCLR 1192 (CC) ; 2010 (4) SA 327 (CC) (25 August 2009).
Bikitsha v Bikitsha and Others (2807/21) (2022] ZAECMHC 13 (17 May 2022).
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Treasury and Others v Opposition Against Urban Tolling Alliance and Others12
that:
"50. Under the Setlogelo test, the prima facie right a claimant must establish is not
merely the right to approach a court in order to review an administrative
decision. It is a right to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable
harm would ensue. An interdict is meant to prevent future conduct and not
decisions already made. Quite apart from the right to review and to set aside
impugned decisions, the applicants should have demonstrated a prima facie
right that is threatened by an impending or imminent irreparable harm. The
right to review the impugned decisions did not require any
preservation pendente lite."
[38] The principle cited is accurate but the dearth of evidence to back up the
contention is palpable. The evidential burden is borne by the party alleging to
provide sufficient proof that trading was already taking place. I am not so
persuaded. In any case, this ground of opposition addresses only the prayer
in paragraph 2.2 of the Notice of Motion. It does not concern the remaining
prayers sought by Photi, and certainly would not dispose of the application.
Prima facie right
[39] The first consideration is whether Photi has shown a prima facie right which is
protectable in law. It trades in petroleum products, and it wants to protect its
business. The respondents contend that Photi does not have a prima facie
right to seek interim relief as it had failed to raise an objection when information
was published concerning the impending business development on 03 May
2024.
[40]
12
Some time ago I came across an argument of a similar nature that was raised
successfully in Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings Sac
National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others (CCT 38/12) [2012)
ZACC 18; 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC); 2012 ( 11) BCLR 1148 (CC) (20 September 2012).
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Limited and Others13 where the Court denied a party locus standi to challenge
a decision, saying that:
"[39] The proposition implied in WEBSA's second defence is as bad as would be
the proposition that, if one brother submitted a bid for a tender in his own
right and lost it to a competitor, any of his brothers or sisters may institute
legal proceedings in his or her own right to have the award of the tender
reviewed and set aside just because the two siblings belong to the same
family. The issue here is about separate legal entities. In my view, Eskom's
decision to award the tender to Areva did not affect any of WEBSA's rights or
interests because WEBSA did not bid for the tender in its own right."
[Emphasis added]
[41] In that judgment reference was made to an earlier authority in Giant Concerts
CC v Rona/do Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others14 in which it was held that a
litigant who approaches Court in its own interest must show that an impugned
decision directly affects its rights or interests, potential or otherwise. Further
that the interests must be real, not hypothetical nor academic.
[42] Earlier in this judgment I dealt with the question of who may institute an appeal:
that being any person that is affected by a decision of the Controller. It is
unthinkable how a party may be allowed to institute an appeal in terms of
section 12A of the Act but be denied a right to complain before Court when
another is acting in a manner that may render the appeal redundant. In
Gensinger it was held, in respect of a similar point, that:
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14
"[28] In the circumstances, since the appellants will be directly affected by the
Controller's decision, they have the right to appeal to the Minister against the
Controller's decision. It accordingly means that the appellants had standing
to institute the application."
Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings Soc Limited and Others (CCT20/16,
CCT24/16) [2016] ZACC 51 ; 2017 (6) BCLR 675 (CC); 2017 (6) SA 621 (CC) (21 December
2016).

CCT24/16) [2016] ZACC 51 ; 2017 (6) BCLR 675 (CC); 2017 (6) SA 621 (CC) (21 December
2016).
Giant Concerts CC v Ronaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others (2012] ZACC 28; 2013 (3) BCLR
251 (CC) para 41 .
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[43] Also, I am reminded of Mogoeng CJ once saying, in City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Others, 15 that the threshold for
determining whether a party has established prima facie right is low and may
even be open to doubt. He said:
"[50] Afriforum relies partly on section 31 of the Constitution as the prima
facie right sought to be protected with the restraining order pending the
finalisation of the review proceedings. Fortunately, the right is only required
to be prima facie, though open to some doubt. It need not be clear. .. . How
this right finds application to street names is not readily apparent to
me. Happily, as I said, it is acceptable that the right may be open to some
doubt. For this reason, I will assume without deciding that Afriforum has
established a prima facie right."
[44] On the facts of this case, especially in light of the fact that Photi filed an appeal
to challenge the decision of the Controller, it has been demonstrated that it
has established a prima facie right.
Reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm
[45] Photi contends that the introduction of new petrol station will divert customers
and sales from itself. Further that it will suffer revenue losses that it could not
recoup. It fears closure if the new petroleum station is not interdicted, and
should it start operations.
[46] On behalf of Twin City and Cat Man it was contended that the harm which
Photi alleged to apprehends was speculative. This is to say that the argument
lacks details to fully inform the Court what the extent of the harm is that Photi
reasonably anticipates will befall it. The contention went further to say that the
15 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another (157/15) [2016] ZACC 19; 2016 (9)
BCLR 1133 (CC); 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC) (21 July 2016).
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construction of property poses no harm to Photi and therefore it has not
demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm.
[47] There is a reason why construction is continuing. In my mind the only reason
for construction to be happening is to commence business once the buildings
are suitable to use. It would make no business sense for the developers to
spend funds on construction absent an intention to use the properties for
trading purposes. No reasonable businessperson would do that. Also, it was
not merely in respect of the construction that the application was instituted. It
covers also the question of trading which, quite conceivably, could have
business implications for Photi once trading begins.
[48] In Fuel Retailers Association and Another v Minister of Mineral Resources and
Energy and Others16 the issue of harm was dealt with in the following manner
by Poterill J:
"[35] On the one hand counsel for Sulnisa and Mayfield argued that the effect of
prayer 6 is final, but on the other hand argued the balance of convenience
requirement of an interlocutory interdict. I am satisfied that the applicants
have a prima facie right, though open to some doubt. The harm herein is an
irremediable breach of the second applicant's rights, as well as the rights of
the retailers that Fuel Retailers are there to establish and maintain."
[49] Sadly, I could not ascertain with specificity from the above judgment what were
the rights that the second applicant sought to protect. But Poterill J was
satisfied that there was a breach of the applicants' right, hence the outcome.
[50] In this case Photi seeks to protect its business rights, fearing that it stands to
lose business and income due to the new petrol station. I was told during the
hearing that Photi's complaint of potential loss of business is not sustainable
as there are a number of petrol stations around the area where the
16 Fuel Retailers' Association and Another v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (2024-

123240) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1267 (6 December 2024).
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development is taking place. Also that between the development and Photi's,
in Dalmada, existing petrol station there is another station which is operating.
[51] It may be so that there are other petrol stations around, numerous even. This
case is not concerned with them, but rather the Dalmada station's
development. I am not convinced that it can be said that Photi's business will
not be affected at all, to whatever degree, because there are other existing
stations. The law allows anyone who stands to be affected by a decision of the
Controller in relation to the new development to appeal.
[52] All that the person has to do is to plead the fact and show on reasonable
grounds that it stands to suffer irreparable harm if interdictory relief is not
granted. Photi has done so. this, in my view, would entitle it to an interim
interdict, provided, of course, that the remaining two requirements are also
satisfied.
Balance of convenience
[53] The question here is how the applicant's interests will be affected if an interdict
is not granted. Relatedly, how the respondents' interests will be affected if a
temporary interdict is granted. The appeal which is pending before the Minister
should be decided without any waste of time, all things being equal. It is in the
interests of all the parties that a decision on the appeal is finalized
expeditiously .
[54] The business entities, more so the first and second respondents, are the ones
that can reasonably claim inconvenience if an interdict is granted. While I
accept that the Municipality was cited as a party and is entitled to participate
in the application, the position that it has adopted in its opposition of the
application is unfathomable. It has concerned itself with irrelevant facts (such
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as pre-zoning advertisement) rather than the impugned decision of the
Controller - which is the subject of this litigation.
[55] Our law is that:17
"[In] an application for a temporary restraining order there will invariably be
at least two competing interests. And those interests are inextricably linked
to the harm a respondent is likely to suffer in the event of the order being
granted and the harm likely to be suffered by an applicant if the relief sought
is not granted."
[56] In Li Kui Yu the court was called to prevent "an offence of a serious kind,
namely that of interfering with the administration of justice by taking an action
which is bound to prevent the Court granting a remedy. '118 That is similar to
what Photi is seeking in this case.
[57] Photi acknowledges that Twin City and Cat Man may incur holding costs,
however, that it faces permanent loss if the interdict is not granted. I agree that
a temporary restraint on further progress with the construction works will not
cause undue inconvenience on any of the respondents. Further that the
respondents ought not to have proceeded with construction once the appeal
was lodged. Respecting legal processes is imperative, and the respondents
must live with the consequences of not doing so
[58] Internal appeals play an important role in the resolution of formal disputes,
particularly disputes related to administrative decisions. They are not merely
there to while away time or as boxes to tick. The Minister must decide the
appeal and, if Photi fails, the respondents will proceed with the business
17
18
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another, supra at para [62).
Li Kui Yu v Superintendent of Labourers 1906 TS 181 at 194.
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developments. The importance of internal appeal was considered by the court
in Bengwenyama 19 in respect of which it held thus:
"[50] Allowing an internal appeal under section 96 of the Act in the circumstances
of this case will enhance the autonomy of the administrative process and
provide the possibility of immediate and cost-effective relief prior to
aggrieved parties resorting to litigation. An internal appeal process will also
allow the Minister to develop guidelines for the proper application of the Act
in future decisions.
[59] It will be recalled that the legislation that was under consideration in the case
referred to above did not even provide for internal appeal. By contrast, the Act
considered in this case has catered for it. The appeal process should therefore
be respected even if there is some pressing exigency to see the businesses
opening their doors for trade.
Existence of alternative remedies
[60] Despite the many attempts that were undertaken by Photi in seeking to have
the Controller and the Minister comply with their statutory obligations, there
has been no movement from either of these two functionaries. That is
worrisome, and it leaves Photi in an invidious position. At the same time, the
respondents are proceeding with construction regardless of the appeal.
[61] Before me it was argued that trading has already begun and therefore the
court is no longer in a position to grant the interdict asked for. That smells like
a plan concocted to delay decision-making to the point of no return. In
situations such as the present court must intervene. And I do so.
19 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 39/10)
[2010] ZACC 26; 2011 (4) SA 113 (CC) ; 2011 (3) BCLR 229 (CC) (30 November 2010).
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[62] The application succeeds. With that said, I see no reason why the costs of the
litigation should not follow the result. Photi is entitled to be awarded costs and
on scale B.
Order
[63] I have already heard that construction has already begun on the petrol station
site. Thus, I can only interdict future work and not what has already been
started.
[64] The following order is made:
[a] The first and second respondents, including any of its subcontractors,
employees or business partners are hereby interdicted and restrained
from continuing with the construction, installation, erection and the
commissioning of the activities associated with the development of a
fuel filling station at Portion 68 of East Ridge Ext 3 on Krugersburg 993
LS, cnr R71 Road (Grabler Street) and Roas A, East Ridge Ext 3,
Polokwane.
[b] The first and second respondents, including any of its subcontractors,
employees or business partners are hereby interdicted and restrained
from commencing with the retailing of petroleum products at Portion 68
of East Ridge Ext 3 on Krugersburg 993 LS, cnr R71 Road (Grobler
Street) and Roas A, East Ridge Ext 3, Polokwane.
[c] The orders in terms of paragraphs [a] and [b] above shall apply from
the date of this order pending the final determination of the appeal
19

20
lodged by the applicant with the Minister of Mineral Resources and
Energy.
[d] The first, second, fifth and sixth respondents are liable to pay the costs
of this application, jointly and severally with any one paying and the
others to be absolved; and the costs shall be calculated on party and
party scale B.
G)~,
--------
M. Z. MAKOTI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
LIMPOPO DIVISION
APPEARANCES:
APPLICANT
1 ST & 2ND RESPONDENTS
5TH RESPONDENT
6TH RESPONDENT
ADV EVAN AS
VZLR ATTORNEYS
C/O CORRIE NEL & KIE ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
ADV M S MONENE
ADV M I TSHISIKULE
MPH ELA MOTIMELE ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
ADVVMOYO
KGATLAINC.ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
ADV F MARX
20

DATE HEARD
DATE DELIVERED
21
DE BRUIN OBERHOLZER ATTORNEYS
POLOKWANE
25 JULY 2025
19 JANUARY 2026
21