SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
Not reportable
CASE NO. 123/2023
In the matter between:
KHAYAKAZI VERONICA MAHLATHI First applicant
MERRIMAN NKOSOHLANGA MAHLATHI Second applicant
and
SIPHIWO MPAKO Respondent
In re:
SANLAM LIFE INSURANCE LIMITED Applicant
and
KHAYAKAZI VERONICA MAHLATHI First claimant
MERRIMAN NKOSOHLANGA MAHLATHI Second claimant
SIVENATHI MPAKO Third claimant
SIPHIWO GIVEN MPAKO Fourth claimant
SELINA LOTTER N.O. Fifth claimant
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MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT (MAKHANDA) Sixth claimant
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
LAING J
[1] This matter concerns an interpleader notice. Pursuant to case flow
management (CFM), the first and second claimants in the interpleader proceedings
were made the first and second applicants for purposes of the determination of the
dispute and the fourth claimant was made the respondent. The parties agreed that
the matter could be adjudicated on the papers, without need for referral to oral
evidence.
Background
[2] The late Dr Fundisw a Mahlati-Mpako (‘the deceased’) successfully applied to
the applicant (‘Sanlam’) for a life cover policy on or about 14 October 2014. The
policy was issued under number 0[...] and took effect from 1 January 2015. No
beneficiaries were appointed in te rms of the original policy. The deceased passed
away on 6 July 2021, resulting in a death benefit of R1 229 255 and a funeral benefit
of R122 926 becoming payable.
[3] Sanlam set out a detailed history of the matter in a letter sent to the
respondent and the fifth claimant (‘the executrix’) 1 after the deceased’s passing. The
deceased had commenced, but not yet finalised, divorce proceedings against the
respondent. No children were born during the marriage. On 5 October 2020, the
1 The fifth claimant is described in the founding affidavit to the interpleader proceedings as the executrix
for the deceased’s estate.
deceased co mpleted form 3001E, titled ‘Appointment of nominees for funds’, in
terms of which she nominated the first applicant (her sister), the second applicant
(her brother), and the third claimant (a foster child) as beneficiaries for a retirement
annuity. She fai led to insert a policy number. On 19 October 2020, pursuant to the
deceased’s telephone conversation with an employee of Sanlam, it became
apparent that she had intended to nominate the first and second applicants, as well
as the third claimant, as benefic iaries for her existing life cover and not the
retirement annuity. The deceased had already nominated the first applicant and the
respondent as beneficiaries in relation to the latter. Consequently, on 4 November
2020, the deceased completed form 3000E, ti tled ‘Appointment of beneficiaries for
death and funeral benefits’. She nominated the first and second applicants, as well
as the third claimant. The deceased inserted, however, the policy number for her
retirement annuity instead of her life cover.
[4] It was Sanlam’s opinion that the contents of forms 3001E and 3000E, together
with the telephone conversation, demonstrated that the deceased had indeed
intended to appoint the first and second applicants, as well as the third claimant, as
beneficiaries regardi ng her life cover. From subsequent communication with the
various parties, it became clear to Sanlam that there were competing claims. This
prompted the present application.
[5] The first and second applicants agreed with Sanlam’s description of the
history of the matter. They alleged that the deceased and the respondent had
experienced marital problems. They referred to the deceased’s last will and
testament, executed on 17 September 2019, in terms of which she bequeathed her
estate to the first applicant, t he third claimant, and a niece in equal shares. No
mention was made of the respondent. On 27 November 2019, the deceased
mention was made of the respondent. On 27 November 2019, the deceased
obtained an interim protection order against him. She instituted divorce proceedings
on 12 December 2019 and obtained a further interim protection order on 18
September 2020. The first and second applicants referred to a recording of the
deceased’s telephone conversation with the Sanlam employee, contending that it
demonstrated her intention to nominate the first and second applicants, as well as
the third claimant, as beneficiaries for her life cover.
[6] The respondent alleged that Sanlam had informed him in or about April 2021
that there were no nominated beneficiaries. The proper forms in that regard had
been required before a policy hol der passed away. The respondent disputed the first
and second applicants’ interpretation of the recording, pointing out that, at the time of
the deceased’s passing, she had failed to submit to Sanlam the necessary forms in
terms of which the first and seco nd applicants, as well as the third claimant, were
stipulated as beneficiaries. Consequently, the benefits of the life cover had to be paid
to the estate.
Issues and legal framework
[7] The issue identified by the parties during the CFM process is straightfo rward.
The court must decide the validity of the parties’ respective claims to the benefits
payable under the life cover.
[8] The provisions of rule 58 (6) of the Uniform Rules of Court provide the court
with a wide discretion. It may adjudicate the claim af ter considering such evidence
‘as it deems fit.’ Whereas the first and second applicants contended that there is a
factual dispute between the parties, neither the pleadings nor the evidence support
this. The parties agree about the history of the matter, the contents of forms 3001E
and 3000E, and the deceased’s intentions. The crux of the matter is the effect of the
deceased’s having stipulated the policy number for her retirement annuity, rather
than her life cover. This is a legal, not a factual, dispute.
[9] At the heart of the matter is the interpretation to be given to the contract
concluded between the deceased and Sanlam, as purportedly amended by the
former to provide for the appointment of beneficiaries. The parties referred to the oft -
quoted decision in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality ,2
where the Supreme Court of Appeal, per Wallis JA, held as follows:
‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it
‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it
legislation, some other statut ory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context
2 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).
provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a
whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature
of the document , consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the
ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the
apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its
production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed in
the light of all these factors. The process is objective, not subjective. A sensible meaning is
to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or u ndermines the
apparent purpose of the document.’3
[10] The above principles were neatly summarised, subsequently, in Betterbridge
(Pty) Ltd v Masilo and Others NNO,4 where Unterhalter AJ confirmed that:
‘[a]s the Supreme Court of Appeal has made clear, the interpretation of language, including
statutory language, is a unitary endeavour requiring the consideration of text, context, and
purpose.’5
[11] The above principles constitute the basic legal framework within which the
dispute must be decided.
Discussion
[12] In the present matter, the parties were ad idem that the ‘General Plan
Provisions’ to the policy encapsulated the relevant contractual terms for the
appointment of beneficiaries. To that effect, Sanlam indicated that benefits would be
paid either to t he policy holder or to his or her estate. The exception to this was,
however, recorded as follows:
‘ . . . you [ie the policy holder] may appoint one or more beneficiaries to receive the benefits
payable at your death. We will pay the benefits to a benefic iary only if the latter accepts the
3 Para 18.
4 2015 (2) SA 396 (GP).
5 Para 8.
appointment as beneficiary. However, a beneficiary can only accept the appointment after
your death.’
[13] The provisions continued:
‘You may cancel or change the appointment of a beneficiary at any time. The appointment,
cancellation, or change must be in writing and signed by you, and must reach our head
office before your death.’
[14] The respondent’s argument is straightforward: the deceased failed to submit a
valid nomination form, which would otherwise have resulted in the a ppointment of
the beneficiaries in question. In that regard, form 3001E was for her retirement
annuity and contained no reference to her life cover. When the deceased attempted
to rectify the situation, she completed form 3000E for her life cover but refer red to
the policy number for her retirement annuity.
[15] The ‘General Plan Provisions’ stipulate three requirements for the
appointment of a beneficiary: (a) it must be done in writing; (b) it must be signed by
the policy holder; and (c) it must reach Sanlam ’s head office before the policy
holder’s death. The provisions make no mention of either form 3001E or form 3000E.
They do not indicate that the appointment would be invalidated if the policy holder
completed and submitted an incorrect form or inserted an incorrect policy number (or
none). Returning to Endumeni, Wallis JA warned as follows:
‘[j]udges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard
as reasonable, sensible, or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a
statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in
a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact
made. The “inevitable point of departure i s the language of the provision itself,” 6 read in
context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the
preparation and production of the document.’7
preparation and production of the document.’7
6 Per Lord Neuberger MR, in Re Sigma Finance Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 1303 (CA), para 98, as quoted by
Wallis JA.
7 Endumeni, para 18.
[16] The respondent contended that it was a requirement for the appointment of a
beneficiary that the policy holder submit a valid nomination form. This is not,
however, apparent from the language used. If a policy holder stipulated in writing the
identity of a beneficiary, signed the document, and ensured that it reached the head
office before his or death, then that was sufficient to have given effect to the
provisions in question. To add the requirement indicated by the respondent would be
to stray into the territory against which Wallis JA warned. It would amount to making
a contract for the parties other than the one concluded. In Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd
and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others ,8 the Supreme
Court of Appeal, per Unterhalter AJA, cautioned that:
‘ . . . the triad of text, context, and pur pose should not be used in a mechanical fashion. It is
the relationship between the words used, the concepts expressed by those words, and the
place of the contested provision within the scheme of the agreement (or instrument) as a
whole that constitute th e enterprise by recourse to which a coherent and salient
interpretation is determined.’9
[17] The court went on to hold that:
‘ . . . Endumeni is not a charter for judicial constructs premised upon what a contract should
be taken to mean from a vantage point that is not located in the text of what the parties in
fact agreed. Nor does Endumeni license judicial interpretation that imports meanings into a
contract so as to make it a better contract, or one that is ethically preferable.’10
[18] There is, quite simply, nothing in the text of the ‘General Plan Provisions’ to
suggest that the parties had intended the appointment of beneficiaries only to be
given effect upon the submission of a valid nomination form, completed in full and
correct in every respect. There were three express requirements. None of them can
be interpreted as having stipulated that form 3000E (and only that form), with the
be interpreted as having stipulated that form 3000E (and only that form), with the
correct policy number inserted, had to be submitted to result in the appointment of
the beneficiaries and the concomitant duties imposed upon Sanlam.
8 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA).
9 Para 25.
10 Para 26.
[19] The context must not be overlooked. The deceased and the respondent had
experienced marital problems. She had excluded him from her last will and
testament and later obtained an interim protection order; this had been followed by
the commencement of divorce proceedings and a further interim protection order. It
is indisputable, from the recording, that the decease d had intended to appoint the
first and second applicants, as well as the third claimant, as beneficiaries under her
life cover. The following extract from the recording is essential to a proper
understanding of the context within which the forms were submitted:
‘DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Just before I forget to tell you, my dear, I did not have any
beneficiaries on this one [ie the life cover]. And then I think
sometime this month or September, I did send the beneficiary
form [ie 3001E].
MS BENTING: Let us have a look, let us have a look at that as well. Yes, you
sent the form, that was the 7 October. We’ve got it here. It was
an email that you sent us.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.
MS BENTING: Let me just open that form for you as well. Just waiting for the
form to open . . ., because I can see they have created a case
with regard to that. I see the policy number was not completed
on the form, but that is no problem. I am going to put a note on
this, that it pertains [to] the policy as well.’11
[20] The Sanlam employee was fully aware that the deceased had failed to include
the policy number on form 3001E. That had, however, not been a problem. The
conversation continued:
‘MS BENTING: Okay, I am also going to give you the reference number
pertaining to that.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.
MS BENTING: I just want to go in there quickly. So, it should be placed on this
policy number, hey?
11 Sic, emphasis added.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Yes, the life cover.
MS BENTING: The life cover.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Yes.
MS BENTING: Okay, perfect. Let me just make sure of t hat form again. Okay,
the form you completed [ie 3001E] is the incorrect form. The
form completed is for retirement annuities.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Oh, no.
MS BENTING: So . . .
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Not that one. I was referring to the life cover because they said
on my life cover, on the policy there, there are no beneficiaries.
MS BENTING: I can see that on your life cover there are no beneficiaries, yes.
But now the problem is the form that you completed, it is for a
retirement annuity.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: No, my dear. The retirement annuity, I think I have got two
beneficiaries, my sister and my husband.
DR BENTING: No, correct. Fundiswa, what I am saying is the form is the
wrong form that was completed.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.
DR BENTING: I need to send you the right form.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Please, my dear.
MS BENTING: I am going to email that through to you, I have got your email
details. Let me do that for you first before I go through to the
specialist. I just want to get that to you — and I am going to put
the right policy number on the email that I am sending you as
well.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.’12
[21] The employee required the ‘right form’ before she could complete the
appointment of the beneficiaries nominated by the deceased for her life cover. She
12 Sic, emphasis added.
would provide to the deceased the correct policy number for insertion on the form.
The conversation continued:
‘MS BENTING: I am almost finished. I am sending that email to you. Okay, that
form is now on its way through to you. I also want place a note
on th e previous document that you sent to say it is the
incorrect form.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.
DR BENTING: However, I have sent you now the right form. I will tell them
that you are completing that and sending that back to us.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.
MS BENTING: I am going to give you the reference number for this case that
was opened already for the change of beneficiary. Please take
down the following reference.’
[22] The employee then provided the deceased with a reference number.
Importantly, the former thereupon informed the latter as follows:
‘MS BENTING: The case will be finalised by 27 October on condition that you
send us now the correct form.
DR MAHLATI-MPAKO: Okay.
MS BENTING: Okay, that is that. . . .’13
[23] Whereas the submission of the ‘right form’ was, from the employee’s
perspective, a necessary element for the completion of the appointment, it was never
a contractual requirement. If anything, then form 3001E and form 3000E were
created for the convenience of the parties. They were designed to facilitate, not
make, the desired appointment. Crucially, it is common cause that the deceased
indeed submitted the correct form (3000E) but incorrectly inserted the policy number
for her retirement annuity. Neither i n terms of the ‘General Plan Provisions’ nor the
recording would this have invalidated the appointment. The purpose of the three
13 Sic, emphasis added.
requirements discussed previously was undoubtedly to ensure that the identities of
the beneficiaries, as nominated by the polic y holder, were clearly conveyed to
Sanlam prior to the time of death. This was done. The deceased’s insertion of the
incorrect policy number was an immaterial error that pertained to the administration
of the process, not the creation of rights and duties under the contract.
[24] The respondent argued that the present matter involved a stipulatio alteri. In
other words, the deceased’s appointment of the beneficiaries in question gave rise to
a stipulation of rights in their favour. 14 The absence of a vali d nomination form,
contended the respondent, prevented the beneficiaries from becoming parties to the
underlying contract. For the reasons already discussed, the court cannot agree. The
form eventually submitted by the deceased (3000E) was sufficient to ha ve
demonstrated a clear intention to have benefitted the beneficiaries. Nothing more
turns on the argument.
Relief and order
[25] The terms of the contract concluded between the deceased and Sanlam do
not support the respondent’s argument. There was no r equirement to the effect that
a valid nomination form (3000E) was to have been completed and submitted before
the appointment of the beneficiaries could have been given effect. The context of the
matter was the estrangement between the deceased and the res pondent and the
former’s intention to have conferred death benefits and funeral benefits upon the
beneficiaries in question. All that Sanlam required was for the deceased to have
nominated the beneficiaries in writing, signed the relevant document, and sub mitted
it to the head office before her passing. The relevant provisions indicate that Sanlam
merely had to be certain of the identities involved, nothing more.
14 The erstwhile Appellate Division restated the relevant pr inciples pertaining to a stipulatio alteri in Total
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO 1992 (1) SA 617 (A), at 625D –F . See, too, Sage Life Ltd v Van der Merwe
2001 (2) SA 166 (W), at 168E–H.
[26] Consequently, the court is persuaded that the deceased satisfied the
requirements, notwithstanding her insertion of the incorrect policy number. The first
and second applicants, as well as the third claimant, are entitled to the proceeds of
the deceased’s life cover and the costs of the proceedings. Regarding the latter, the
first and second a pplicants sought an order to the effect that these be paid from the
proceeds. There is no reason why not to do so.
[20] In the circumstances, the following order is made:
(a) the first and second applicants, as well as the third claimant, are
entitled to the proc eeds of the life cover held by the late Dr Fundiswa
Mahlati-Mpako under number 0[...] and Sanlam is directed to make
payment accordingly; and
(b) the costs incurred by the first and second applicants, as well as the
third claimant (if any), including th ose in relation to all case flow
management attendances, are to be recovered on a party -and party
scale (scale B) from the proceeds.
_________________________
JGA LAING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For the applicants: Adv Jozi
Instructed by: Malusi & Company Attorneys
7 Tecoma Street, Berea
EAST LONDON
5241
Tel: 043 722 9316
Fax: 04. 722 9318
Email: admin@malusiec.co.za
c/o Mabece Tilana Incorporated
39 New Street
MAKHANDA
6139
REF: Ms Nongogo/MAH2/0013
For the respondent: Adv Mdunyelwa
Instructed by: Werksman’s Attorneys
2nd Floor, Block B De Wagenweg Office Park
Stellentia Street
STELLENBOSCH
Ref: GC/me/SANL0018.166
Email: gcloete@werksmans.com
hgoldie@werksmans.com
c/o Wheeldon Rushmere & Cole
Mathew Fosi Chambers
119 High Street
MAKHANDA
Email: lit3@wheeldon.co.za
Ref: C Keese/Belerece/S26006
Date heard: 8 September 2025.
Date delivered: 20 January 2026.