Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

These were four urgent applications heard together in the Eastern Cape Division, Makhanda. Each application sought urgent relief arising from the disconnection of electricity supply to premises occupied by the respective applicant.

The applicants were Shaun Phillip Cormach, Mandisa Booi, Nonkanyiso Mpetukane, and Mayekiso Witness Kulile. The first and second respondents in each matter were King Sabatha Dalindyebo Municipality and its Municipal Manager. The third respondent was the Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC), which indicated that it would abide the decision of the court.

Procedurally, on 26 November 2025 the urgent applications were launched. The court issued directions on urgency, including a timetable for service and filing of opposition and replying papers, and directed that all four matters be heard on 5 December 2025. The municipality and municipal manager opposed the relief in all four matters and filed answering papers. The court directed that the matters be heard simultaneously because they involved the same subject matter and the same issues in dispute.

The general subject matter of the dispute concerned whether the termination/disconnection of electricity supply to ECDC-owned properties occupied by the applicants was lawful, particularly in light of statutory and constitutional duties relating to municipal services and alleged requirements of prior notice and procedural fairness.

2. Material Facts

It was common cause that each applicant occupied premises within the jurisdiction of the municipality in Mthatha and that the properties were owned by the ECDC. It was also common cause that the applicants were consumers of electricity supplied by the municipality and that the electricity had been purchased on a pre-paid basis by the various applicants.

The applicants alleged that on or about 24 October 2025, and without prior notice, the municipality disconnected electricity supply to the properties they occupied. On the applicants’ version, the disconnection occurred notwithstanding that they had purchased pre-paid electricity in varying amounts, and they asserted a right of access to electricity as a consumer, with reference to statutory and constitutional obligations on municipalities relating to basic municipal services.

The municipality, through the municipal manager (Mr Pakade), disputed the contention that there was no notice. The municipality’s version was that it received a letter dated 16 October 2025 from the ECDC (through the head of legal, compliance and governance) giving notice in terms of the municipality’s by-law for the discontinuance of electricity supply to the listed ECDC-owned properties, with effect from 20 October 2025, and stating that the ECDC would not be liable for charges after that date. The municipality treated the ECDC letter as a termination/discontinuance request by the contracting consumer/owner and accepted it.

According to the municipality, before electricity was terminated, a pre-termination notice was physically delivered at each affected property to each applicant as an occupier. That notice communicated the ECDC request and called upon occupiers to respond within a stated period (referencing a deadline of 21 October 2025) if they objected and to show cause why the request should not be implemented, warning that failure to respond could result in implementation without further notice. Mr Pakade further stated that, despite the shorter period reflected in the correspondence, the occupiers received at least seven calendar days’ notice before termination occurred.

It was also common cause that, although the circumstances might appear to suggest an indirect attempt to secure eviction, no party relied on eviction legislation, and it was not contended that the disconnection amounted to an illegal eviction. It was further common cause that the applicants were described as illegal occupiers of the ECDC properties, with allegations that rent had not been paid for various periods.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal question was whether the termination/disconnection of electricity supply to the applicants’ premises was unlawful due to a failure to comply with the municipality’s statutory and constitutional obligations, particularly obligations concerning procedural fairness and prior notice.

The dispute primarily concerned the application of law to fact, namely whether the relevant legal obligations (including notice requirements under the applicable statutory framework and municipal by-laws, and procedural fairness principles relied upon through PAJA and the Constitution) were complied with on the facts as found by the court. To the extent that the applicants asserted that there was no notice, and the municipality asserted that notice was given, there was also a factual dispute; however, the court’s determination turned on whether there was evidence of non-compliance by the municipality.

A further issue raised in argument was whether the municipality’s conduct in disconnecting electricity constituted administrative action contemplated by section 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and whether constitutional provisions concerning local government obligations and the right to just administrative action were infringed. The applicants also placed emphasis on the relationship between electricity supply and other rights, while the municipality relied on the termination of the underlying supply arrangement triggered by the ECDC’s notice.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The court treated it as common cause that the Municipal Systems Act requires a municipality to provide proper written notice before disconnecting electricity for non-payment, and that municipalities have statutory obligations to provide basic municipal services including electricity. The court also noted that these obligations were reflected in the municipality’s by-laws.

The applicants’ case, as advanced in the founding affidavits and argument, was that the municipality disconnected electricity without prior notice and that this was inconsistent with the procedural and constitutional duties owed to consumers who had purchased pre-paid electricity. Reliance was placed on section 3(1) of PAJA, and constitutional provisions including sections 152(1), 153, and 33.

The municipality’s opposing case was that it acted in response to a termination/discontinuance request by the ECDC, which was the owner of the properties and described as the consumer in contract with the municipality for supply to those properties. The municipality’s position was that notice was given to occupiers in the form of a pre-termination notice physically delivered at the properties. The municipality also advanced that its actions were neither unlawful nor unconstitutional in circumstances where it faced a termination of the supply relationship by the ECDC, and it contended that occupiers could pursue other arrangements to secure electricity supply through ordinary procedures.

In assessing the authorities relied upon by the applicants, the court referred to Siphokazi Mafilika & Others v Elundini Local Municipality & Another (620/2024) [2025] ZASCA 142, noting that in that matter the failure to give notice prior to termination was fatal and the municipality was ordered to restore supply. The court distinguished the present matters on the basis that, unlike in Mafilika, notice was given by the municipality, as supported by Mr Pakade’s evidence and the notices attached to the answering affidavit.

The court also considered Leon Joseph & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others (2009) ZACC 30, which had been relied upon by the applicants. It distinguished that case on the basis that it concerned an electricity entity (City Power (Pty) Ltd) adopting debt-collecting procedures as a credit control mechanism, and similarly turned on the fatal effect of failing to provide a pre-termination notice. The court indicated that the factual setting in Leon Joseph was different from the present cases and again emphasised that the decisive feature in the present matters was that there was no evidence of breach by the municipality of its duties under legislation, the by-law, or the Constitution.

On the evidence before it, the court concluded that it could find no evidence that the municipality breached any relevant duties. In that evaluative assessment, the court treated the existence of the ECDC termination notice and the municipality’s delivered notices to occupiers as sufficient to answer the applicants’ complaint that disconnection occurred without lawful process. The court further recorded that, although the circumstances might have suggested an ulterior eviction strategy, the parties did not frame the dispute as an eviction matter and it was common cause that no party relied on eviction-related infringement.

5. Outcome and Relief

The court declared the termination of electricity supply to the applicants to be lawful.

The applicants were ordered to pay the costs of each application on Scale B, as contemplated by Rule 69(7). The registrar was directed to ensure that there was no unnecessary duplication in costs, particularly because the matters were argued as one.

Cases Cited

Siphokazi Mafilika & Others v Elundini Local Municipality & Another (620/2024) [2025] ZASCA 142.

Leon Joseph & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others (2009) ZACC 30.

Legislation Cited

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (sections 152(1), 153, and 33).

Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (section 3(1)).

Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.

Rules of Court Cited

Rule 69(7).

Held

The court held that the municipality’s termination/disconnection of electricity supply to the applicants’ premises was lawful, principally because the municipality had given notice to the occupiers in response to the ECDC’s termination/discontinuance request, and the court found no evidence that the municipality breached its duties under the applicable legislation, by-laws, or constitutional provisions.

The court further held that the authorities relied upon by the applicants, which emphasised the fatal effect of failing to provide a pre-termination notice, were distinguishable on the facts because notice had been given in these matters.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A municipality’s compliance with statutory and by-law requirements concerning notice is central to the lawfulness of an electricity disconnection or termination, and where the court finds that appropriate notice was given, a challenge founded on the absence of notice will fail on the facts.

Precedents in which electricity termination was found unlawful due to the absence of pre-termination notice are fact-sensitive and may be distinguished where the evidence demonstrates that notice was in fact provided and there is no proved breach of statutory, by-law, or constitutional duties.

Where multiple urgent applications raise the same issues and are heard together, the court may make cost-management directions to avoid duplication of costs, even if costs are awarded in each individual matter.