Labournet (Pty) Ltd v Mohale (Application for Leave to Appeal) (2025/186217) [2026] ZALCJHB 4 (19 January 2026)

60 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Restraint of trade — Application for leave to appeal — The Labour Court dismissed an application to enforce a restraint of trade against the first respondent, finding that the applicant failed to establish a protectable interest. The applicant contended that the court erred in applying the onus of proof after striking out the respondent's affidavit, arguing that the onus shifted to the respondent to justify non-compliance. The court held that the applicant must prove the existence of a protectable interest before the restraint can be enforced.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an urgent application for leave to appeal in the Labour Court. The applicant, Labournet (Pty) Ltd, sought leave to appeal against two earlier orders made by the same court: an order dismissing Labournet’s application to enforce a restraint of trade against the first respondent (Ms Elsa Thutuka Mohale) and a limited costs order.


The second respondent was V3 Consulting Engineers (Pty) Ltd. The judgment indicates that the court received written submissions from both sides and determined the application in chambers. The application for leave to appeal was filed on 7 January 2026, and judgment was delivered on 19 January 2026.


The general subject-matter of the dispute is the enforcement of a restraint of trade following the first respondent’s departure from the applicant, and, in the leave-to-appeal proceedings, the related question whether the court’s approach to onus and protectable interests in restraint litigation justified appellate reconsideration. A further issue concerned whether the costs order warranted interference on appeal.


2. Material Facts


The court treated it as common cause for purposes of the leave-to-appeal enquiry that the underlying proceedings were a restraint-of-trade enforcement application and that the applicant’s case in those proceedings proceeded on the basis that a restraint existed and had been breached.


A procedural fact relied upon by the court in this leave-to-appeal judgment was that the answering affidavit had been struck out for lateness in the main proceedings. Labournet relied heavily on this procedural posture to argue that there was no justification before the court to resist enforcement of the restraint.


The decisive factual finding from the main order, as referenced in this judgment, was that Labournet failed to establish an interest worthy of protection. The leave-to-appeal judgment did not revisit the evidentiary detail underlying that finding; instead, it treated that finding as central to evaluating whether the court’s approach disclosed an appealable error.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether Labournet had established grounds for leave to appeal against the main order and the costs order, in particular whether the court had erred in its approach to onus in restraint-of-trade matters after striking the answering affidavit.


The dispute was primarily concerned with the application of legal principles to the procedural and factual posture of the case: whether, in the absence of an answering affidavit, the court was nonetheless required to scrutinise the founding papers to determine whether a protectable interest had been established, or whether enforcement should have followed automatically once existence and breach of the restraint were asserted as undisputed.


A secondary issue concerned a discretionary value judgment: whether the limited costs order reflected a misdirection justifying appellate interference, given that costs are generally a matter for the court’s discretion.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court addressed Labournet’s principal contention that restraint-of-trade litigation involves a strict “onus-shifting” sequence, namely that once an employer proves the existence of a restraint and breach, the burden shifts to the employee to prove unreasonableness. Labournet argued that, because the answering affidavit was struck out, there was no factual basis upon which unreasonableness could be established, and the restraint therefore had to be enforced.


The court rejected the proposition that the enquiry can be reduced to a mechanical onus shift that compels enforcement merely because the founding affidavit is unopposed. It held that more recent authority, particularly Jankielson (LAC) as relied upon by the court, requires an interrogation of the applicant’s own papers before a restraint is enforced. The court emphasised that where the facts in the founding affidavit do not disclose protectable interests, the enquiry does not proceed to the subsequent stage of balancing competing interests. On that approach, the absence of an answering affidavit does not cure deficiencies in an applicant’s case on protectable interest.


In dealing with the authorities cited by Labournet, the court distinguished them on the basis that they involved circumstances where the courts considered the applicant to have established an interest worthy of protection, and where the respondent then failed to demonstrate unreasonableness. By contrast, the key feature of the present matter, as the court put it, was that the court had found that Labournet did not establish a protectable interest in the first place, which meant Labournet’s reliance on an unopposed posture could not succeed.


The court further considered that its approach aligned with the broader procedural principle that a court should not merely “rubberstamp” relief in motion proceedings, even when unopposed. By reference to authority dealing with default-type relief, the court reasoned that courts have a duty to examine whether the relief sought is justified in law. The court regarded restraint enforcement as comparable, in the sense that it implicates a clash between private contractual enforcement and public policy considerations, thereby underscoring the need for judicial scrutiny of an applicant’s case.


Applying these principles to the leave-to-appeal test, the court concluded that Labournet had not demonstrated that another court would reach a different conclusion, and found no other compelling basis to grant leave to appeal on the merits.


On the costs order, the court reasoned that costs are an exercise of judicial discretion. It held that the limited costs award could not be characterised as an error merely because a different outcome on costs occurred in another case. The court stressed that discretionary decisions are not governed by drawing direct equivalences between cases, because that would undermine the nature of discretion. The court therefore found no basis to grant leave to appeal against the costs order.


Finally, the court noted that the respondents sought a punitive costs order in the leave-to-appeal proceedings but did not motivate it, and this formed part of the context for the eventual costs disposition in the leave-to-appeal application.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal in its entirety, including leave to appeal against both the main order dismissing enforcement of the restraint and the limited costs order.


The court made no order as to costs in the leave-to-appeal proceedings.


Cases Cited


A J Charnaud & Co (Pty) Ltd v van der Merwe and Others (2020) 41 ILJ 1661 (LC).


Service Parts Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Mshengu (2020) 41 ILJ 1762 (LC).


Sadan and Another v Workforce Staffing (Pty) Ltd (2023) 44 ILJ 2506 (LAC).


Beedle v Slo-Jo Innovations Hub (Pty) Ltd (2023) 44 ILJ 2493 (LAC).


Jankielson (Labour Appeal Court) (January 2017) (full citation not provided in the judgment).


Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd (Supreme Court of Appeal) (full citation not provided in the judgment).


Truworths Limited v Nxasana, Mr Price Group Limited and Another (2025/176724) [2025] ZAWCHC 580 (10 December 2025).


Sunset Ridge Estate Home-Owners Association v Van Deventer and Others (035234/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 220 (5 February 2024) (unreported).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Labour Court held that Labournet did not establish grounds for leave to appeal because, even where an answering affidavit is struck out and the matter is effectively unopposed, the court must still scrutinise the founding papers to determine whether the applicant has established a protectable interest justifying enforcement of a restraint of trade. Since the court’s main-order finding was that Labournet failed to establish such an interest, Labournet did not show that another court would reach a different conclusion or that any other compelling reason justified an appeal.


The court further held that the limited costs order was a discretionary decision and that Labournet had not established an appealable misdirection in that discretion. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, with no costs order.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court considering enforcement of a restraint of trade is required to interrogate the applicant’s founding papers and is not compelled to enforce a restraint merely because the respondent’s answering affidavit is absent or struck out. The absence of opposition does not relieve an applicant of the obligation to place before court facts establishing the legal basis for the relief sought.


In restraint-of-trade matters, the applicant must establish, on its own papers, the existence of a protectable interest. Where the founding affidavit does not disclose such an interest, the enquiry does not proceed to a further qualitative and quantitative weighing of competing interests.


Costs orders are generally matters of judicial discretion, and an alleged inconsistency with costs outcomes in other cases does not, without more, demonstrate an improper exercise of discretion warranting appellate interference.

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

Not reportable
Case No: 2025-186217
In the matter between:
LABOURNET (PTY) LTD Applicant
And
ELSA THUTUKA MOHALE First
Respondent
V3 CONSULTING ENGINEERS (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
Heard: In chambers
Delivered: 19 January 2026

JUDGMENT: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

RAMJI, AJ
[1] This is an urgent application for leave to appeal , filed on 7 January 2026,
against two orders:
1.1 An order dismissing the application to enforce a restraint of trade against
the first respondent, Ms Mohale (the main order)

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1.2 A limited costs order (the costs order).

[2] I received written submissions from both parties.
Leave to appeal the main order
[3] The primary appeal ground in the application for leave to appeal the main
order is that I erred in that, after striking out the answering affidavit for
lateness, I incorrectly applied the legal principles relating to onus in restraints
of trade.
[4] Labournet’s case is that once it had proved that a restraint of trade existed
and had been breached, the onus shifted to the respondents to justify non-
compliance with the restraint . Because I had struck out the answering
affidavit, there was no justification before me.
[5] Labournet submits the following:
‘2.6. Any restraint of trade application starts off with the employer party in the
application having to first discharge a particular onus, which was articulated in A
J Charnaud & Co (Pty) Ltd v van der Merwe and Others1 as follows:
‘In short, the logical sequence that applies in the case of an employer
(the applicant) seeking to enforce a restraint against an employee, is
firstly to prove the existence of a restraint obligation that applies to the
employee. Secondly, and if a restraint obligation is shown to exist, the
employer must prove that the employee acted in breach of the restraint
obligation imposed by the restraint. …’
2.7. Once the above onus is discharged by the employer party, the enquiry
and determination then turn to whether the facts, considered as a whole,
show that the enforcement of the restraint would be reasonable in the
circumstances. In this respect, a shift of the onus then takes place, and
the onus is then on the employee party to prove that enforcement of the
restraint would be unreasonable’ (footnotes omitted, original emphasis).

1 (2020) 41 ILJ 1661 (LC) at para 56.

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[6] I took the position based on several other cases that the complete shifting of
the onus to the former employee oversimplifies the approach adopted in
recent years by the courts.
[7] Labournet appears to argue for a strict approach to onus, or, if it accepts the
complexities of the inquiry, argues I could not follow the approach that I
followed in the absence of a competing version from the respondents.
[8] Labournet has put forward authority for its position, most of which pre- dates
Jankielson LAC which was handed down in January 2017. It referred to three
following decisions handed down after Jankielson. 2 These judgments
concern a failure by the respondent to show that a restraint of trade is
unreasonable after the applicant, in the courts’ views, established an interest
worthy of protection.
[9] In this case, the finding was that Labournet failed to establish an interest
worthy of protection.
[10] Labournet’s case, stated in its written submissions , is at odds with the recent
authorities. Labournet argues:
‘2.10. Once the evidence in the founding affidavit is undisputed, it had to
follow that the restraint of trade be enforced.’
[11] I consider the law, particularly from Jankielson LAC , to be quite clear that a
court is obliged to interrogate an applicant’s papers before enforcing a
restraint of trade and that the dicta from the cases are not limited only to
cases where there is an opposing version before the court. To repeat from
Jankielson LAC, if the facts disclosed in the founding affidavit ‘do not disclose
protectable interests, the next stage, namely, to weigh up the interest of the
parties qualitatively and quantitatively, falls away .’
3 The accords with the
judgment of the SCA in Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd

2 Service Parts Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Mshengu (2020) 41 ILJ 1762 (LC) at para 13; Sadan and Another
v Workforce Staffing (Pty) Ltd (2023) 44 ILJ 2506 (LAC) at para 19; Beedle v Slo- Jo Innovations Hub

(Pty) Ltd (2023) 44 ILJ 2493 (LAC) at para 20.
3 Jankielson LAC para 63.

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years before and Labournet has not shown that I erred in applying the SCA’s
approach to onus, made explicit in paragraph 4 of the judgment.
[12] This approach was recently affirmed in the Western Cape Division of the High
Court, where the court held:
‘The mere existence of the restraint of trade agreement does not necessarily
mean there is a protectable interest. The applicant must prove that the
interest exists. The court will only enforce the contract if interest is proven.’4
[13] The requirement that the applicant proves that a protectable commercial
interests exists also accords with the general position that an applicant must
make out a case for the relief that it seeks, and that a court’s role is not to
rubberstamp the relief sought where a motion is unopposed. In the context of
an application for default judgment, this position was expressed in the
Gauteng Division of the High Court:
‘[B]efore any court order is granted, the court has the duty to investigate the
matter and ascertain whether the relief sought is in accordance with the law
and should be made an order of the court. I am of the view that a court is
duty-bound to approach the evidence with an inquiring mind…’ 5
[14] The court was concerned with an eviction application. The situations are
comparable. Both applications involve a clash between private law and public
policy principles. The approach argued for by Labournet appears to me to
therefore be untenable.
[15] Labournet has not shown that a different court would come to a different
conclusion. There is no other compelling reason to grant leave to appeal.
Leave to appeal the costs order

4 Truworths Limited v Nxasana, Mr Price Group Limited and Another (2025/176724) [2025] ZAWCHC
580 (10 December 2025) at para 23.
5 Sunset Ridge Estate Home-Owners Association v Van Deventer and Others (035234/2022) [2024]
ZAGPPHC 220 (5 February 2024) unreported at para 18.

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[16] A costs order is an exercise in discretion. The reasons for decision to award
costs, and to limit the costs, are canvassed in the judgment. The costs order
cannot be an error in the exercise of judicial discretion simply because no
costs order was made in Jankielson LAC. Discretionary exercises cannot be
governed by drawing straight lines between one case and another. This
eliminates the discretion.
Costs
[17] The respondents sought but did not motivate for a punitive costs order in the
application for leave to appeal.
[18] For the above reasons, I make the following order:
Order
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.


_______________________
B. Ramji
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa