THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2025-122304
In the matter between:
GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT First Applicant
GAUTENG DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Second Applicant
and
PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
SECTORAL BARGAINING COUNCIL First Respondent
PSA obo GOODHOPE MASEKO Second Respondent
MOKHELE RASEBOKA Third Respondent
RICHARD MAKHUMISANI Fourth Respondent
TREVOR TABANE Fifth Respondent
ADVOCATE RONNIE BRACKS N.O. Sixth Respondent
Considered: In Chambers
Delivered: 16 January 2026
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: No
(3) Revised
TDM 16 January 2026
Signature Date
2
JUDGMENT
PHAKEDI, AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an unopposed application for leave to appeal against the whole
judgment granted by this Court on 4 August 2025 . The Applicants filed their
submissions as envisaged in Rule 67 (5) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct
of the Proceedings of the Labour Court.
[2] The application for leave to appeal was filed on time and within the prescribed
timeframes. However, the matter was only brought to the attention of this
Court on Monday, 12 January 2026.
[3] This court does not intend to deal with each of the grounds of appeal raised
by the applicants and this should not be construed to mean that such grounds
were not considered. Amongst other grounds, t he Applicants submit that this
Court erred in finding that the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction to deal
with a dispute relating to interpretation or application of the collective
agreement.
[4] The second respondent despite being properly served did not oppose this
application.
Applicable test for leave to appeal
[5] The application is governed by section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 1
which provides:
‘17 Leave to appeal
(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges
concerned are of the opinion that -
1 Act. 10 of 2013.
3
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should
be heard including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration,
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section
16 (2) (a), and
(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the
issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt
resolution of the real issues between the parties.’
[6] The above-mentioned section also applies to applications for leave to appeal
filed in the Labour Court as envisaged in section 151 (2) of the Labour
Relations Act2 (LRA).
[7] In Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha and
another3 the Supreme Court of Appeal said the following:
‘[16] Once again it is necessary to say that leave to appeal, especially to
this court, must not be granted unless there truly is a reasonable
prospect of success. Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013 makes it clear that leave to appeal may only be given where the
judge concerned is of the opinion that the appeal would have a
reasonable prospect of success; or there is some other compelling
reason why it should be heard.
[17] An applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper
grounds that there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of
success on appeal. A mere possibility of success, an arguable case or
one that is not hopeless, is not enough. There must be a sound,
rational basis to conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of
success on appeal.’
2 Act 66 of 1995, as amended. This section provides that ‘the Labour Court is a superior court that has
authority inherent powers and standing, in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, equal to that which
a court of a Division of the High Court of South Africa has in relation to the matters under its
jurisdiction.’
3 (1221/2015) [2016] ZASCA 176 (25 November 2016).
4
[8] The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in Martin and East (Pty) Ltd v National Union
of Mineworkers and others 4 emphasised that this court ought to be cautious
when leave to appeal is granted, as should the LAC when petitions are
granted taking into account that the LRA was designed to ensure an
expeditious resolution of labour disputes. The statutory imperative necessarily
requires that appeals be limited to those matters in which there is a
reasonable prospect that the factual matrix could receive a different treatment,
or where there is some legitimate dispute on the law.
Analysis
[9] It is trite that in order for the applicant to succeed with its application for an
interim interdict, the Court must be persuaded that the applicant has a prima
facie right and if the right is not protected, the applicant will suffer irreparable
harm. This position was espoused by the Constitutional Court in National
Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 5 where
it was held as follows:
‘under the Setlogelo test, the prima facie right a claimant must establish is not
merely the right to approach a court in order to review an administrative
decision. It is a right to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable harm
would ensue. An interdict is meant to prevent future conduct and not
decisions already made. Quite apart from the right to review and to set aside
impugned decisions, the applicants should have demonstrated a prima facie
right that is threatened by an impending or imminent irreparable harm. The
right to review the impugned decisions did not require any preservation
pendente lite.’
[10] In Fairtrade Tobacco Association v President of the Republic of South Africa 6
the full Court held that:
“As such, in considering the application for leave to appeal, it is crucial for this
Court to remain cognizant of the higher threshold that needs to be met before
leave to appeal may be granted. There must exist more than just a mere
leave to appeal may be granted. There must exist more than just a mere
4 (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC) at p 16.
5 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at para 50.
6 (21688/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 311 (24 July 2020) at para 6.
5
possibility that another court, the SCA in this instance, will, not might, find
differently on both facts and law.”
[11] After careful consideration of the grounds for leave to appeal submitted by the
applicants in this matter, this Court is persuaded that the application for leave
to appeal should succeed.
[12] Accordingly, the following order is made:
Order
1. The application for leave to appeal is granted
2. There is no order as to costs.
____________________
G. C. Phakedi
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa