(1) Reportable: Yes/NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
_______ _____________
Signature Date
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case No: 2025-250203
In the matter between:
ZANELE LESLEY MTHUMKHULU Applicant
and
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED Respondent
Heard: 06 January 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by uploading on
Caselines; circulation to the parties' legal representatives by
email, and publication on the Labour Court’s website and
SAFLII. The date for hand -down is deemed to be on 09 January
2026.
JUDGMENT
TLHOTLHALEMAJE, J
Introduction:
[1] The Applicant approached the Court on an urgent basis, seeking interdictory
relief under the provisions of section 6 and 60 of the Employment Equity Act
(EEA)1, read with sections 157 and 158 of the Labour Relations Act (LRA)2.
1 Act 55 of 1998
2
[2] The Applicant effectively seeks an order that her precautionary suspension on
allegations of insubordination is unlawful and/or retaliatory; to restrain any
intended investigations or disciplinary steps pending the provision of
particulars forming the basis of the any discipline against her; to restore her
access to her work place and work tools, and further for the Respondent to
comply with the provisions of section 60 of the EEA. She further seeks to
interdict and restrain the Respondent from engaging in any further
harassment, victimisation, intimidation, and retaliation against her, pending
finalisation of the proceedings.
[3] At the hearing of the matter, counsel for the Applicant had abandoned any
relief regarding a declaratory order that her suspension was procedurally
unfair as initially sought under prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion. Equally
abandoned was relief under prayer 4 seeking to interdict or restrain the
Respondent from engaging in any further unfair labour practices against her.
[4] In the end, the Applicant relied solely on the alleged harassment and
retaliatory nature of the suspension, with regard to the provisions of sections
6(3) and 60 of the EEA , it being submitted that the jurisdiction was founded
further under section 50 of the EEA read with section 158 of the LRA.
[5] Of course the concession and abandonment of reliance any unfairness or on
the provisions of section 157 of the LRA was wise. This was so in the light of
the legal position emanating from Cibane and Another v Premier of Province
of Kwazulu -Natal3 that i n the absence of any statutory provision conferring
jurisdiction on th is Court both in respect of employer conduct alleged to be
unlawful and in employment -related matters generally, there was no general
rule that the Court has jurisdiction to intervene in medias res to restrain any
alleged illegalities, irregularities or unfairness in incomplete disciplinary
alleged illegalities, irregularities or unfairness in incomplete disciplinary
proceedings4. Furthermore, the LAC in Cibane had held that jurisdiction to
intervene in uncompleted disciplinary proceedings could not be sustained by
2 Act 66 of 1995
3(DA15/2024) [2025] ZALAC 44; [2025] 10 BLLR 1004 (LAC); (2025) 46 ILJ 2587 (LAC) (15 July
2025)
4 At para 27
3
section 157(1) of the LRA , since each case had to be determined based on
the pleadings5.
Background:
[6] The background to this application is fairly common cause. The Applicant is in
the employ of the Respondent since January 2021. She occupies the position
of Business Service Lead – IT Service Management (ITSM) in the
Infrastructure & Operations Division. Her primary responsibilities include IT
Service Management, Change Management, Incident Management and
participation in Major Incident Resolution Teams.
[7] The Applicant alleged that she has been subjected to various forms of hostile
treatment, victimisation and harassment by the Respondent since 2023 .
When her grievances were not resolved internally, she had referred a dispute
to the CCMA in June 2025. Attempts at conciliation failed and a certificate of
outcome was issued in October 2025.
[8] The Applicant then lodged a claim before this Court under Case Number:
2025-18494, alleging harassment, discrimination and breach of section 60 of
the EEA. As relief 6, she inter alia sought an order declaring that the
Respondent’s conduct constituted harassment and unfair discrimination under
the EEA, and further directing the Respondent to desist from any further
harassment or discrimination.
[9] The Respondent has since filed an Exception to the claim, contending that the
statement of claim lacked averments necessary to sustain a cause of action
based on the provisions of section 6 of the EEA.
[10] On 15 August 2025, the Applicant was issued with a written warning on
account of allegations of insubordination and failure to follow processes. An
appeal that she had lodged internally was unsuccessful. On 5 November
2025, the Respondent issued the Applicant with a final written warning for
insubordination and disrespectful conduct. It is common cause that a dispute
5 At para 32
6 Paragraph 85 of the Statement of Claim, Caselines 146
4
under section 186(2)(b) of the LRA was not referred to the CCMA in respect
of these warnings.
[11] On 28 November 2025 (Black Friday ), the Respondent had experienced a
major IT outage affecting its operations. The Respondent contended that the
Applicant failed to participate in the crisis call or incident process
notwithstanding numerous attempts by her superior to telephonically contact
her. After emails on both 29 November and 2 December 2025 were sent to
her, her response was that the ‘matter was sub -judice’, and that any
communication with her should be through her attorneys.
[12] In the light of the A pplicant’s alleged failures to perform her duties during the
outage, the Respondent asserted that her conduct had placed its operations
at risk . A virtual meeting meant to discuss the Applicant’s contemplated
precautionary suspension was then held on 9 December 2025 . The Applicant
is said to have refused to meaningfully engage the Respondent in any
discussions surrounding her contemplated suspension, citing procedural
irregularities and failure to disclose particulars of the allegations against her .
The Respondent took a decision to immediately place her on precautionary
suspension with pay. Upon her suspension, the Respondent disabled her
access to its systems and tools of trade.
[13] Following the Applicant’s suspension, meetings scheduled to be held on 12,
17 and 22 December 2025 to discuss the logistics surrounding the convening
of a disciplinary hearing did not proceed. A similar meeting has since been
scheduled to take place on 7 January 2026.
[14] Given the timing of this hearing and since judgment was reserved, it was
agreed at the end of these proceedings that the meeting as scheduled would
not proceed pending the delivery of this judgment.
The issues:
[15] The primary issue for consideration is whether this application deserves the
urgent attention of this Court. It follows that where urgency has not been
urgent attention of this Court. It follows that where urgency has not been
established, that ought to be the end of the matter. Where however urgency is
5
established, the Court must decide whether there is a case made out for it to
intervene in the yet to commence disciplinary hearing. Aligned to these issues
are whether the precautionary suspension is retaliatory and constitutes
harassment, and further whether this Court should consider other ancillary
relief and the directives sought under sections 6(3) and 60 of the EEA.
[16] The Respondent’s primary contentions are that the application is premature,
jurisdictionally flawed and factually misconceived. The Respondent also
challenges the urgency of the application and its merits.
Urgency:
[17] The requirements to be met when urgent relief is sought are trite emanating
from now familiar authorities 7. Under Rule 38 of the Rules of this Court, an
applicant seeking urgent relief must in her founding affidavit, set out the
reasons for urgency; why urgent relief is necessary; and the reasons why the
requirements of the rules were not complied with. Aligned to these
requirements is that an applicant cannot claim urgent relief, where on the
facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent that the urgency claimed is
self-created. Even if urgency can be established, it will not be indulged where
such urgency is self -created. Accordingly, t he consequence of self -created
urgency is fatal to an application8.
Further considerations the Court must take into account when considering
urgent relief are the interests of the respondent party, and any prejudice it
may suffer if the matter is disposed of on an urgent basis. Equally so, an
applicant must also explicitly advance the reasons why it claims that it will not
be afforded substantial redress in due course if it had brought the matter to
Court by way of an ordinary non -urgent procedure. The question of whether a
matter is sufficiently urgent to be enrolled is underpinned by the issue of the
7 See Jiba v Minister: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (2010) 31
ILJ 112 (LC) at para 18 ; Tshwaedi v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Council [2000] 4 BLLR 469
(LC) at para 11 ; Dynamic Sisters Trading (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank Limited [2023]
ZAGPPHC 709 (21 August 2023); Luna Meubel Vervaardigers v Makin and Another 1977 (4) SA 135
(W) at 136H-137F); Ntozini and Others v African National Congress and Others [2018] ZAGPJHC 415
at para 10.
8 See City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC) at
paras 24 and 25 ; Lindeque and Others v Hirsch and Others (In Re: Prepaid24 (Pty) Limited)
(2019/8846) [2019] ZAGPJHC 122.
6
absence of substantial redress in an application in due course. Where an
applicant fails to establish that substantial redress is not available in due
course, the matter must be struck from the roll9.
Evaluation:
[18] A concern needs to be raised to the extent that this application was brought
during court recess and the manner with which it was brought before the
Court. It is trite that the urgent intervention of a court must also be considered
against the haste with which an applicant acted in order to obtain urgent relief.
It does not assist applicants to be supine in the face of the alleged harm or
prejudice, and only to act at their own leisure. The more time that an applicant
takes to approach the Court for urgent relief, the more any urgency
dissipates10. This principle is premised on the fact that an applicant that
approaches the Court on an urgent basis essentially seeks an indulgence,
and to be afforded preference in order to prevent prejudice and harm that may
materialise or persist if urgent relief is not granted.
[19] In this case, t he Applicant having been suspended on 9 December 2025, the
application was brought some ten days later on 19 December 2025. No
attempt at all was made anywhere in the founding affidavit , to explain that
delay or why it should be condoned . The lack of any explanation for the delay
in approaching the Court, points to self-created urgency.
[20] Equally worrisome are the truncated time periods set for the Respondent to
deliver an answering affidavit when the matter was enrolled for 6 January
2026. Upon the filing of the application on 19 December 2025, the
Respondent had pointed out to the Applicant’s attorneys of record that the
papers were defective in that they were not properly served; had an incorrect
case number; were unsigned, and that the affidavit was not commissioned.
[21] It was only on 23 December 2025 that the errors were rectified, and even
then, the Respondent was afforded time periods in the middle of the public
then, the Respondent was afforded time periods in the middle of the public
9SARS v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 51; 2006(4) SA 292 (SCA)
10Association of Mineworkers & Construction Union & others v Northam Platinum Ltd & another (2016)
37 ILJ 2840 (LC) at para 26 ; Valerie Collins t/a Waterkloof Farm v Bernickow NO and Another [2001]
ZALC 223 (7 December 2001) at para 8.
7
holidays between 24 and 29 December 2025 to deliver answering papers.
Clearly the truncated periods were unreasonable given the timing of the filing
(during dies non), and the defects in the original papers.
[22] A ground relied upon by the Applicant in seeking urgent relief was that the
suspension on 9 December 2025 came into effect without prior disclosure of
allegations, evidence, or a fair opportunity to be heard. Of course there is no
merit in th e last ground relied on. This is so in that flowing from Long11 the
legal position in regards to pre-suspension hearings is that an employer is not
required to give an employee an opportunity to make representations prior to
a precautionary suspension. The issue of further particulars in respect of the
allegations is to be addressed further below in this judgment.
[23] In claiming urgency, the Applicant’s contention was that the suspension was
retaliatory and constituted harassment within the meaning of the
Code12(which provides the framework for determining what constitutes
harassment under section 6(3) of the EEA ). In reliance on the proposition that
the Applicant’s claim in regards to the alleged harassment was to be
determined from the pleadings, it was submitted that the harassment came
about after she had insisted on procedural fairness; or after the service of the
Section 60 EEA Notice by her attorneys of record, and further in the light of
her pursuing her claim before this Court.
[24] The above contention is without merit in the light of the events leading to the
suspension. Even if regard was had to the pleadings in this case, there is
nothing to indicate the basis of the alleged harassment claimed under the
provisions of section 158 of the LRA, read with section 50 of the EEA, for the
purposes of granting urgent relief. A mere perfunctory reference to these
provisions without more does not assist in pointing urgency.
[25] The events of 28-29 November 2025 as gleaned from the pleadings disclosed
[25] The events of 28-29 November 2025 as gleaned from the pleadings disclosed
that the Respondent was confronted with an employee who was unavailable
11 Long v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd and Others; Long v South African Breweries (Pty) Ltd and
Others (CCT61/18) [2019] ZACC 7; (2019) 40 ILJ 965 (CC); 2019 (5) BCLR 609 (CC); [2019] 6 BLLR
515 (CC)
12 Code of Good Practice on the Prevention and Elimination of Harassment in the Workplace, 2022
8
during a crisis, and when called upon to account, had merely referred the
Respondent to her attorneys. On the facts, the Applicant at a meeting held
with her on 9 December 2025 prior to the suspension, had refused to
participate.
[26] In the light of the seriousness of the conduct complained of related to the
events of 28 November 2025, clearly the Respondent was within its rights to
act in the light of operational risks arising from her conduct. In Long13, it was
confirmed that where there was a fair reason for the suspension (i.e. for the
purposes of investigations), and where the employee would not suffer any
prejudice, there was no cause to fault the employer’s decision.
[27] In this case, the precautionary suspension was with full pay and for the
purposes of investigations in the light of the Applicant’s conduct. She cannot
complain of any cognisable prejudice. I t would clearly be untenable for this
Court to intervene on an urgent basis at every turn, whenever employees are
suspended from duty based on allegations of misconduct, simply because
they construe such suspensions as harassment.
[28] The complaints raised by the Applicant about procedural issues and failure to
provide further particulars of the allegations prior to the suspension can
equally not form the basis of any harassment for the purposes of urgent relief.
It was sufficient at the time and given her posture at the meeting of 9
December 2025, that she was informed that the basis of the suspension was
alleged insubordination, which was under investigation.
[29] The disciplinary enquiry is still to be held once a meeting is held with her to
arrange logistics in that regard. It is at that meeting or at most, at the
disciplinary enquiry, where the applicant can raise a ll the procedural issues
surrounding the intended disciplinary process . This is not an issue that ought
to burden this Court on an urgent basis.
[30] The Applicant ’s reliance on issues surrounding access to the Respondent’s
[30] The Applicant ’s reliance on issues surrounding access to the Respondent’s
system including email and Microsoft Teams, and removal of her work laptop
13 At para 25
9
and LTE router for urgency are equally a red herring. In the end, again these
are also issues related to disclosure and further particulars of the allegations
to the extent that she seeks access to documents and correspondence
necessary for her defence . These are matters that ought to be brought to the
attention of the Chairperson of the disciplinary hearing , and it is premature at
this stage for the Applicant to seek the Court’s intervention in matters that are
yet to be dealt with at the disciplinary enquiry.
[31] As to whether t he Applicant will not be able to obtain substantial redress at
the hearing in due course is an issue which is curiously not even addressed
with any clarity under the rubric of urgency in the founding affidavit . The
Applicant cannot by any stretch of imagination allege that she will be deprived
of substantial redress in due course , when she still have to subject herself to
the disciplinary enquiry where her complaints surrounding procedural matters
are to be addressed.
[32] Allegations of discrimination, or harassment, are again matters pending
before this Court under her separate claim, and the principle of lis pendens
remains applicable in this instance. To the extent that there might be
procedural complaints arising from the disciplinary enquiry, substantive
redress in any event remains available to the Applicant through the dispute
resolution mechanisms of the LRA.
Summary:
[33] Ultimately, contrary to her submissions, the Applicant has not demonstrated
any exceptional circumstances compelling this Court to grant her urgent relief ,
nor do the pleadings disclose any basis for the Court to assume jurisdiction to
intervene in the yet to be held disciplinary enquiry There is no basis upon
which it can be said that the Applicant had set out forth in h er founding
papers, the facts and circumstances that make the matter urgent.
[34] In this judgment, the Court ha s outlined the difficulties the Applicant could not
[34] In this judgment, the Court ha s outlined the difficulties the Applicant could not
surmount, primarily being the issue of urgency. Clearly the urgency, given the
timing of the application and the pleaded case, is indeed self -created.
10
Furthermore, there is no basis for any conclusion to be made that she will be
deprived of substantial redress in due course.
[35] Ultimately, the Applicant cannot complain of any prejudice in circumstances
where she remains suspended with pay, and where the disciplinary enquiry is
still to be scheduled. On the opposite end, it is the Respondent that will suffer
prejudice should urgent relief be granted, given the nature of the relief sought,
which will deprive it of its prerogative to take disciplinary action against
conduct which was in its opinion, detrimental to its operations. It follows that
the application ought to be struck off the roll on account of lack of urgency.
Costs:
[36] The Respondent had sought a costs order in the light of its contentions that
the application was not only ill -conceived but also an abuse of Court process.
I agree with these contentions.
[37] It is trite that this Courts has a discretion upon the consideration of law and
fairness, to make cost orders. In Baloyi14, it was held that t he purpose
underlying costs is to indemnify the successful litigant against the expenditure
incurred as a result of having been unjustly compelled to either initiate or to
defend litigation.
[38] Further in Member of the Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu Natal v
Dorkin NO 15, it was held that in making decisions on costs orders, a fair
balance should be struck between not unduly discourag ing workers,
employers, unions and employers organizations from approaching the Labour
Court to have their disputes dealt with, and being burdened with frivolous
cases that should not have been brought in the first place.
[39] This application falls into the latter category as alluded above. There is no
merit in the submissions that the application was triggered by the
Respondent’s conduct. It has already been indicated that from the
14 At para 51
15 2008 (29) ILJ 1707 (CC)
11
background material and the Applicant’s conduct, there was cause for the
Respondent to suspend her.
[40] Furthermore, given the manner with which this application was brought before
Court, and what was initially pleaded as opposed to what ultimately had to be
determined by the Court , there is cause for the Court to show its displeasure.
On the facts, and as correctly pointed out on behalf of the Respondent, this
application was speculative and premature , and ought not to have burdened
this urgent court, let alone during recess. All that the Applicant needed to do
like multitudes of employees who find themselve s in similar circumstances,
was to attend the pre -disciplinary meeting as planned by the Respondent, go
through the disciplinary process, and then exercise her rights under the LRA
should she be aggrieved with any adverse outcome of the enquiry. Nothing on
the facts entitled her to jump the proverbial litigation queue.
[41] Furthermore, the issues she raised in her urgent application are matters
intrinsically linked to her pending claim before this Court . At most, the
application was contrived, ill -considered and motivated by self -created
urgency, and was hardly in genuine pursuit of vindication of rights . The
requirements of law and fairness under these circumstances dictate that the
Applicant be mulcted with a costs order, albeit not on a punitive scale as
sought by the Respondent.
[42] Accordingly, the following order is made;
Order:
1. The applica nts’ urgent application is struck off the roll on account of
lack of urgency.
2. The Applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application.
___________________
Edwin Tlhotlhalemaje
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
12
13
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant : Adv. B Bobison-Opoku
Instructed by : AJ Venter and Associates Inc.
For the Respondent : Adv. A Redding SC with Adv. R Itzkin
Instructed by : Webber Wentzel Attorneys.