Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

These proceedings were heard in the Labour Court of South Africa, Johannesburg, and concerned a jurisdictional and legal-characterisation question arising mid-trial in a matter where the applicant had referred multiple claims against her employer.

The applicant, Ms Makgosi Letimile, instituted an unfair discrimination claim in terms of section 6(4) read with section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA), together with two separate disputes under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). The respondent was The Cape Town International Convention Centre Company SOC Ltd (CTICC), which opposed all three claims.

After the applicant closed her case, and following evidence led on reasonable accommodation of disability (including expert evidence addressing the Code of Good Practice on Employment of Persons with Disabilities), the Court issued a directive calling for submissions on whether the applicant’s discrimination case was in substance a Chapter III EEA dispute (affirmative action compliance) and, if so, whether that would oust the Labour Court’s jurisdiction. The directive was prompted by the Labour Appeal Court’s approach in Dudley v City of Cape Town and another (2008) 29 ILJ 2685 (LAC) concerning claims framed as discrimination but in fact based on Chapter III obligations.

The general subject-matter of the dispute in this interlocutory judgment was therefore not the merits of the discrimination claim, but whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the reasonable accommodation aspect of the pleaded unfair discrimination case, and how to treat submissions linking reasonable accommodation to Chapter III duties.

2. Material Facts

It was common cause that the applicant had referred an unfair discrimination claim under section 6(4) read with section 6(1) of the EEA, and that the respondent opposed it.

During opening address for the applicant, it was indicated that the applicant’s case would include evidence that CTICC had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. The applicant then led evidence, including testimony by Dr Engelbrecht, directed specifically at the meaning of reasonable accommodation in discrimination matters and engaging with items in the Code of Good Practice on Employment of Persons with Disabilities, with the stated aim of showing a failure by CTICC to meet accommodation obligations.

After the applicant closed her case, the Court—acting on its own initiative—issued a directive requiring the parties to address whether the pleaded discrimination claim was, in truth, a claim under Chapter III of the EEA (which regulates affirmative action measures and designated employer obligations), and whether a Chapter II discrimination claim could legally be sustained on alleged non-compliance with Chapter III duties.

In response to the directive, counsel for the applicant submitted that the discrimination claim was not a Chapter III claim but remained grounded in Chapter II of the EEA. Counsel for CTICC accepted that the applicant’s pleaded claim was not a Chapter III claim.

The Court considered the applicant’s statement of claim and accepted that it confined the cause of action to Chapter II rather than Chapter III.

The respondent, while not disputing jurisdiction on the pleaded case, sought a ruling (within the framework of its understanding of the directive) that evidence led on reasonable accommodation—particularly the evidence of Dr Engelbrecht—was irrelevant to the unfair discrimination claim. The Court did not determine that relevance point in this judgment and instead held that it should be addressed, if pursued, at the end of the trial in closing argument.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal question was whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s unfair discrimination claim insofar as it relied on reasonable accommodation, given the potential contention that the claim might actually concern Chapter III affirmative action obligations rather than Chapter II unfair discrimination.

This question primarily concerned the application of law to pleaded facts, specifically the legal characterisation of the pleaded claim (Chapter II versus Chapter III) and the jurisdictional consequences that flow from that characterisation.

A related legal issue, raised by the Court’s directive but not requiring determination once jurisdiction was affirmed, concerned whether a Chapter II unfair discrimination claim could, as a matter of law, be sustained on the basis of alleged non-compliance with Chapter III obligations. The Court noted that this issue appeared to be addressed by Damons v City of Cape Town (2022) 43 ILJ 1549 (CC).

A further issue raised by CTICC in argument was the relevance of reasonable accommodation evidence to the pleaded discrimination claim, but the Court treated that as a matter to be addressed later in the trial process rather than decided at this stage.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The Court first addressed why it was entitled to raise the directive questions. It accepted the general principle that a court should not decide issues not pleaded, as articulated in Cape Peninsula University of Technology v Kabengele and Others [2024] 6 BLLR 553 (LAC). However, it relied on recognised exceptions, namely that a court may raise issues where parties proceed on an incorrect perception of the law or where it is necessary to dispose of an argument, with reference to Commercial Workers Union of SA v Tao Ying Metal Industries and others 2009 (2) SA 204 (CC) and Booi v Amathole District Municipality and others (2022) 43 ILJ 91 (CC). The Court further reasoned that it is duty-bound to raise jurisdictional issues mero motu, drawing on the principle referenced in Tao Ying.

Turning to jurisdiction, the Court considered the submissions made in response to the directive and examined the statement of claim. It accepted that the applicant’s pleaded cause of action was situated solely within Chapter II of the EEA and did not seek relief based on Chapter III affirmative action enforcement. Because the claim was pleaded as a Chapter II unfair discrimination case, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the reasonable accommodation component of that discrimination claim.

Although the directive had also asked whether a Chapter II discrimination claim can be sustained on alleged non-compliance with Chapter III duties, the Court held that, once jurisdiction was established on the pleaded basis, it was not strictly necessary to decide that second question for purposes of this interlocutory ruling. The Court nevertheless observed that both parties had referred to Damons v City of Cape Town (2022) 43 ILJ 1549 (CC), which appeared to answer that question in the affirmative, and the Court did not understand CTICC to contest that proposition in principle.

The Court then dealt with CTICC’s request for a ruling on the relevance of the reasonable accommodation evidence, including Dr Engelbrecht’s testimony. It clarified that the directive was not intended to decide evidentiary relevance at that stage, but rather the legal soundness and jurisdictional implications of the claim’s framing. The Court reasoned that whether the reasonable accommodation claim would succeed or fail on the evidence was best left for closing arguments after all evidence had been led. It also considered the procedural posture of the case, noting that requiring further written submissions at that stage would unduly delay the finalisation of a trial that had commenced in December 2024 and was set to reconvene shortly. Accordingly, the Court deferred the relevance debate to the end of the trial.

On costs, the Court reasoned that the submissions were required at the Court’s instance, and neither party sought a costs order. It therefore held that costs should not arise.

5. Outcome and Relief

The Court ruled that it has jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s claim for unfair discrimination based on reasonable accommodation.

The Court made no order as to costs.

Cases Cited

Dudley v City of Cape Town and another (2008) 29 ILJ 2685 (LAC).

Cape Peninsula University of Technology v Kabengele and Others [2024] 6 BLLR 553 (LAC).

Commercial Workers Union of SA v Tao Ying Metal Industries and others 2009 (2) SA 204 (CC).

Booi v Amathole District Municipality and others (2022) 43 ILJ 91 (CC).

Damons v City of Cape Town (2022) 43 ILJ 1549 (CC).

Legislation Cited

Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, section 6(4) read with section 6(1).

Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended).

Rules of Court Cited

No rules of court were cited in the judgment.

Held

The Labour Court held that the applicant’s pleaded unfair discrimination claim, including its reliance on reasonable accommodation, was framed under Chapter II of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and not as a Chapter III affirmative action compliance dispute. On that basis, the Court held that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.

The Court further held that any argument about the relevance of the applicant’s reasonable accommodation evidence was not for determination in this interlocutory ruling and could be raised, if necessary, at the conclusion of the trial in closing argument. The Court made no costs order.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The judgment applied the principle that, although courts generally should not decide matters not pleaded, a court may raise issues mero motu where parties proceed under an incorrect understanding of the law or where it is necessary to dispose of an argument, and it is in any event obliged to raise jurisdictional issues on its own initiative.

It further applied the principle that the Labour Court’s jurisdiction in EEA matters depends materially on whether the claim is properly characterised as a Chapter II unfair discrimination claim (which the Court may adjudicate) or as an attempt to enforce Chapter III affirmative action obligations (which, in terms of the jurisprudence referenced, raises distinct jurisdictional and substantive considerations).

The judgment also reflected the procedural principle that evidentiary relevance and the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a cause of action are generally better determined at the close of all evidence and during closing argument, particularly where interlocutory determinations would delay the finalisation of a part-heard trial.