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JUDGMENT
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NOKO J.
Introduction
[1] The applicant instituted an urgent application to review and set aside the decision of
the respondents to issue a blocking order (“Order”) against the applicant’s bank account held
with the eighth respondent . The order was issued in terms of the Exchange Control
Regulations1 (“Exchange Regulations”) which permit the respondent to issue an order where
there is a suspicion that a bank account is utilised for activities that contravene the exchange
regulations. The applicant contends that the decision to issue the order is susceptible to be
reviewed and set aside in accordance with the principle of legality, alternatively the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act2 (“PAJA”) or the Exchange Regulations.
[2] The seventh respondent , the head of the Financial Surveillance Department
(“FinSurv”) of the first respondent who issued an order is opposing the application and has
deposed to an answering affidavit on behalf of the first to sixth respondents. Other
respondents are not participating in this lis and reference to the respondent would mean the
first to seventh respondents.
Background
[3] Given that the judgment is limited to the findings on urgency the background of the
matter will be truncated. The South African Reserve Bank 3 has as one of its objectives “…
to protect the value of the currency of the Republic in the interest of the balanced and
sustainable economic growth in the Republic4and to maintain financial stability . Exchange
1 Promulgated by G overnment Gazette Notice R1111 of 1 December 1961 in Extraordinary Government
Gazette No 123.
2 Act 3 of 2000.
3 Established in terms of the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989.
4 In terms of section 3 of the Reserve Bank Act.
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Control regulations are promulgated in terms of section 95 of the Currency and Exchanges
Act6 and they, inter alia, regulate transferring or exporting currency directly and indirectly
from the Republic of South Africa which impacts the value of the currency and financial
stability. The responsibility to control and supervise compliance with the Exchange
Regulations resides within FinSurv. Apropos to this application are regulations 22A and 22C
of the Exchange Control Regulations , which provide for freezing (or blocking) of bank
accounts where there is suspicion that the regulations are being contravened. Once a bank
account is frozen the FinSurv has 36 months in terms of section 9(2)(g) of the Currency and
Exchanges Act to conduct a full -scale investigation. Regulation 22D of the Exchange
Regulations provides for a remedy to an aggrieved party to review and set aside the order
issued by the FinSurv.
[4] The applicant conducts its business as a financial services provider duly licensed to
conduct business as such in terms of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Service Act7
and operates a digital platform through which ordinary South African consumers are able …
to deposit and withdraw funds, make payments, hold value in a digital wallet, participate in
and benefit from the digital economy and trading ”. The applicant’s system “… is designed
to identify and exploit pricing differentials in cryptocurrency markets by executing linked
transactions – buying a crypto asset at a lower on an offshore exchange, transferring it to a
South African exchange, and selling it locally at a higher price (after costs and changes) with
the intention of realizing a profit on the differential.” 8
[5] The regulations allow a limited export of foreign currency from South Africa . In
respect of a Single Discretionary Allowance (“SDA”) a person may export up to R1million
and in respect of a Foreign Investment Allowance a person may export up to R10million .
and in respect of a Foreign Investment Allowance a person may export up to R10million .
Clients who successfully participate in t he applicant’s scheme are promised a bonus of
R2000.00 to R10 000 per annum to purchase and acquire crypto assets. Where a client has
no funds to invest with the applicant the latter may provide loans to qualifying clients.
5 Sec 9. Regulations regarding currency, banking or the exchanges. —
(1) The Governor-General may make regulations in regard to any matter directly or indirectly relating to
or affecting or having any bearing upon currency, banking or exchanges.
6 Act 9 of 1933.
7 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002.
8 See para 51 of the Applicant’s heads of argument at 054-15.
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[6] The applicant would, in its discretion and after identifying pricing differentials in
crypto markets, request from its Authorised Dealers (“Access Bank”) to convert the rands
(“the client’s funds”) into foreign currency. Such funds would be deployed to acquire crypto
assets abroad. The crypto assets would be repatriated to South Africa and then sold on the
local market in rands for the benefit of the clients. The profit made would after the charges
or interest (if applicable) be shared with the client.
[7] The respondent avers that it received information from the applicant’s bank, i.e. the
eighth respondent, whistleblowers and some of the applicant’s clients that t he nature of
transactions undertaken by the applicant appears to contravene the Exchange Regulations.
Then respondent then exercised his powers on 24 November 2025 in terms Regulations 22A
and 22C and issued an order freezing the applicant’s bank account.
[8] The applicant became aware of the order on 25 November 2025 and contacted the
respondent over the phone to urgently provide the reasons for the order. The reasons were
provided to the applicant over the phone. The applicant made a request in terms of section 5
of PAJA9 for the reasons to be provided in writing. There were exchanges between the parties
from 25 November 2025 until the written reasons were furnished on 16 December 2025. The
applicant then instituted a notice of motion in terms of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court
on 17 December 2025.
[9] The respondent was required to furnish the applicant with the record by 17h00 on 17
December 2025, being a period of five hours from service, and the applicant would, if need
be, deliver its supplementary affidavit a day later on 18 December 2025 at 17 h00. The
respondent would, if so advised, serve a notice to oppose at 12h00 on 19 December 2025 and
deliver the answering affidavit at 12h00 on 23 December 2025. The applicant would deliver
deliver the answering affidavit at 12h00 on 23 December 2025. The applicant would deliver
the replying affidavit, if need be, on 25 December 2025. The application was set down for
hearing on 30 December 2025 but was removed by agreement between the parties and
enrolled for 6 January 2026.
9 Section 5(1) of the PAJA provides that:
Any person whose rights have been materially and adversely affected by administrative action and who has
not been given reasons for the action may, within 90 days after the date on which that person became aware of
the action or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action, request that the
administrator concerned furnish written reasons for the action. (2) me administrator to whom the request is
made must, within 90 days after receiving the request, give that person adequate reaso ns in writing for the
administrative action.
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[10] The applicant contends that the application is urgent and should be adjudicated on
that basis as it is unable to carry out its contractual obligations to its clients, and that the order
“…has inevitably damaged client relationships and confidence in Kastelo’s platform .”
Furthermore, that the effect of freezing or blocking the core aspects of the business has
undermined the confidence of clients and other stakeholders.
[11] The applicant contends further that urgency is not self-created and attempts to settle
the dispute with the respondent was to avoid rushing to court. The respondent took time to
provide the reasons and at some stage had a meeting with the respondent and the latter
promised to furnish the reasons in writing on 5 December 2025 but still failed to furnish
them. The written reasons were only furnished after the applicant made a threat to approach
court and argue that the freezing was made without any reasons at all.
[12] The respondent in turn contends that the applicant was informed of the reasons on 25
November 2025 and should have proceeded to court immediately without demanding written
reasons. To this end the respondent submitted that the applicant did not act with the urgency
required and the alleged urgency was self-created. On this basis alone the application should
be struck from the roll. That notwithstanding, the applicant could not show that it would not
obtain substantial redress if it were to follow normal court process since it averred that it has
already suffered damages and this means the horse has bolted and the applicant cannot argue
that if the unlawful conduct of respondent is not arrested immediately damages would be
suffered, respondent argued.
Legal principles and analysis
[13] Urgency is regulated in terms of rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court which
provides that:
(a) In urgent applications the court or a judge may dispense with the forms and
service provided for in these rules and may dispose of such matter at such time
service provided for in these rules and may dispose of such matter at such time
and place and in such manner and in accordance with such procedure (which
shall as far as is reasonably practicable be in terms of these rules) as it deems fit.
(b) In every affidavit or petition filed in support of any application under paragraph
(a) of this subrule, the applicant must set forth explicitly the circumstances which
is averred render the matter urgent and the reasons why the applicant claims that
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applicant could not be afforded substantial redres s in due course. (Underlining
added).
[14] It can be deduced from the aforegoing that a party is enjoined to satisfy two
requirements: first, that the matter is indeed deserving of the urgent attention of the court and
that urgency is not self-created. Second, that the applicant would not be afforded substantial
redress in due course.
[15] A party that seeks to obtain redress on the basis that its matter is urgent is enjoined to
ensure that it does not adopt a laissez-faire posture and must avoid rushing to jump the queue.
Self-created urgency implies a degree of contrivance to queue jump. An applicant that is fully
apprised of its right and any harm that it may suffer cannot wait until the last possible
moment. To launch an urgent application for purposes that would constitute abuse, in
particular, a purpose which would defeat or delay the lawful exercise of the rights of others
would not be countenanced.
[16] The courts have, however, encouraged litigants to engage each other to resolve
disputes, thereby avoiding the need to rush to court and clog the urgent roll with matters that
could have been resolved inter se. The Constitutional Court held in South Africa Informal
Traders Forum and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others10 that “…it was only prudent
and salutary that the applicants first sought to engage the city before they rushed to court. ”
This exception to the general rule cannot be used as a ploy to justify an unreasonable delay
in engaging a party who has spurned the invitation to resolve the dispute amicably. I find the
reason advanced that the delay of approximately 3 weeks was due to negotiations to resolve
the dispute, unsustainable.
[17] The second explanation for the delay was that the applicant was entitled to written
reasons in terms of PAJA. In retort, the respondent contends correctly that reasons were
furnished over the phone, and the applicant could have approached the court without awaiting
furnished over the phone, and the applicant could have approached the court without awaiting
written reasons. I find that i t would not have been irregular for the applicant to launch the
urgent application for the review whilst awaiting reasons. Rule 53(4) 11 of the Uniform Rule
permits a party to supplement its papers once the record has been filed. The Constitutional
10 2014 (4) SA 371 CC at 37-38
11 Rule 53(4) provides that “The applicant may within 10 days after the registrar has made the record available
to the applicant, by delivery of a notice and accompanying affidavit, amend, add to or vary the terms of such
applicant’s notice of motion and supplement the supporting affidavit.”
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Court stated in Umkhonto Wesizwe Political Party, 12 where a party sought to file a
supplementary affidavit, as the reasons were furnished late that:
“Due to the urgent nature of the matter, the Commission brought the main application in this
Court before the Electoral Court’s reasons were delivered and this necessitated the filing of
a further affidavit. In the circumstances, the Commission is granted leave to file the
supplementary affidavit.”13
[18] The contention by the applicant that it had to await reasons is untenable as the above
authority suggests that a party may proceed to launch court papers without reasons at all. The
applicant’s position is worsened by the fact that PAJA upon which the request for reasons is
predicated is not applicable to this lis. This is informed by the respondent’s submission that
section 3(5) of PAJA provides that:
“Where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a procedure
which is fair but different from the provisions of subsection (2), the administrator may act in
accordance with that different procedure.”
[19] The respondent contended that the provisions of regulation 22D which are applicable,
are not impugned by the applicant on the basis that they are not fair and to this end the
applicant should have placed it s mast on regulation 22D which makes no provision that
reasons must be provided in writing.
[20] As if this is not enough , the applicant failed to pursue the matter on the date it had
been set down on 30 December 2025 but removed it to a later date. The court held in In re:
Several Matters on the Urgent Roll14 at para 18 that
12 Electoral Commission of South Africa v Umkhonto Wesizwe Political Party and Others (CCT 97/24) [2024]
ZACC 6; 2024 (7) BCLR 869 (CC); 2025 (5) SA 1 (CC) (20 May 2024).
13 Id at para 17.
14 (2012) 4 All SA 570 (GSJ)
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“Those matters that justify a postponement to allow the respondents to file affidavits should in
my view summarily be removed from the roll so that the parties can set them down on the
ordinary opposed roll when they are ripe for hearing, with costs reserved.” (underlining added).
[21] In the premises the applicant did not only unduly delay the launching of the
proceedings for a period of 15 days after the blocking order was issued but also postponed
the matter to a later date. The applicant did not act with the requisite haste alternatively
urgency, if any, was self-created.15 In addition, I find that this had the effect of unnecessarily
burdening the urgent court roll which court’s resources are already overstretched. This cannot
be countenanced.
[22] The respondent correctly submitted that ordinarily voluminous matters should be
preceded by a request for a special allocation fr om the Office of the Judge President. It was
held in In re: Several Matters on the Urgent Roll16 that:
“Further, if a matter becomes opposed in the urgen t court and the papers become
voluminous there must be exceptional reasons why the matter is not to be removed
to the ordinary motion roll. The urgent court is not geared to dealing with a matter
which is not only voluminous but clearly includes some complexity and some novel
points of law. See Digital Printers vs Riso Africa (Pty) Limited case number
17318/02, an unreported judgment of Cachalia J delivered in this division.”
(Underlining added).
[23] In casu, the respondent contended that the application has pages in excess of 800 and
should have been enrolled on a special court and proceeding to the urgent court is therefore
irregular. This was aggravated by the fact that the dies prescribed by the applicant were
unreasonably short. The respondent in a review application is entitled to 15 days within
15 With regard to self-created urgency it was stated in Roets N.O and Another v SB Guarantee Company (RF)
(Pty) Ltd and Others [2022] JOL55628 (GJ) at [26] where the court stated that“… urgency which is self-created
in a sense that an applicant sits on its laurels or takes its time to bring an urgent application can on its own lead
to a decision that a matter is struck off the roll.” See also Van Der Merwe and Others v Nel NO and Others
(2483/2023) [2023] ZAECMKHC 86 (11 August 2023) where it stated that “Urgent is diminished where the
litigant takes longer to act from the date of the event giving rise to the proceedings. In short, a party seeking
relief must come to the court immediately or risk failing on urgency”. Also, Association of Mineworkers &
Construction Union & Others v Northam Platinum ltd & Another the court held that “… the more immediate
the reaction by the litigation to remedy the situation by way of instituting litigation, the better it is for
establishing urgency. But the longer it takes from the date of the event giving rise to the proceedings, the more
urgency is diminished. In short, the applicant must come to court immediately, or risk failing on urgency.
16 (2012) 4 All SA 570 (GSJ) at para 15
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which to furnish the record and in this instance the records were required within 5 hours.
This is certainly unreasonable and unfair to a party for a matter which was postponed. Worse,
all these took place during the December festive season when the employees were already
on leave. I find that t he applicant was indeed inconsiderate and has failed in its papers to
address prejudice suffered by the respondent and other litigants. Fagan J stated in In I L & B
Marcow Caterers (Pty) Ltd v Greatermans SA Ltd & another; Aroma Inn (Pty) Ltd v
Hypermarket (Pty) Ltd & another17 that:
“It is clear from the requirements set out in Rules 27 and 6(12) that the Court's power to
abridge the times prescribed and to accelerate the hearing of the matters should be exercised
with judicial discretion and upon sufficient and satisfactory grounds be ing shown by the
applicants. The major considerations normally and in these two applications are three in
number, viz the prejudice that applicants might suffer by having to wait for a hearing in the
ordinary course; the prejudice that other litigants might suffer if the applications were given
preference; and the prejudice that respondents might suffer by the abridgment of the
prescribed times and an early hearing.” (Underlining added).
[24] The reasons for the urgency advanced by the applicant boil down to the fact that there
would be loss of clients and profits. This is what is referred to in common parlance as
commercial urgency. Whilst it is noted that commercial concerns could lay a basis for a party
to argue urgency this, without more, would not be sufficient and a party is required to
demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Though in the context of an employee, it was held
in Munthali 18 that.
“The issue of whether financial hardship is a basis of seeking urgent relief has
received attention in this and other courts. In other decisions, it has been held that as
a general principle, financial hardship does not establish a basis for urgency. It has
a general principle, financial hardship does not establish a basis for urgency. It has
been held that the mere fact that irreparable financ ial losses have been suffered or
would be suffered by the applicant was not, by itself, sufficient ground to acquire the
requisite urgency necessary to justify a departure from the ordinary court rules. In
other decisions however, it has been accepted that the general principle may be
17 1981 (4) SA 108 (C).
18 Munthali v Passenger Rail Agency of SA (2021) 42 ILJ 1245 (LC),
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departed from if exceptional circumstances are established, depending on the merits
of each case.”19
[25] Having failed to establish the first leg as set out in rule 12 of the Uniform rules then
cadit questio. There is no need to interrogate whether there would be substantial redress since
a party is required to satisfy both requirements. It’s a fallacy that if a party can demonstrate
that it would not obtain substantial redress in due course then it follows that the application
is deserving of a space in an urgent court . The applicant is required to prove both that the
application is urgent and that it would not obtain substantial redress in the long run. In any
event the respondent has demonstrated that the horse has bolted as the applicant has already
stated that the blocking order has damaged relationships with clients, undermined confidence
with stakeholders and as such the recourse lies in a damages action.
Conclusion
[26] In the premises the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the matter deserves a space
in the urgent court alternatively that urgency was compromised by the postponement and
further that urgency , if any, was not self -created. The applicant has further failed to
demonstrate potential prejudice that it would suffer as the horse has bolted. In the result the
application is bound to be struck from the roll.
Costs
[27] The respondent submitted that the conduct of the applicant warrants a punitive costs
order. The papers were voluminous. The dies prescribed were too short and unreasonable.
The pressure to comply timeously was unreasonable including that all these were during
festive times. It is trite that the question of costs is within the discretion of the court. It was
held in Bam20 that “[T]he general rule relating to costs is that costs follow the result. Re -
imbursing a successful party of his or her out of pocket expenses is a settled principle which
brooks no further ventilation.” Ordinarily such order is warranted in exceptional
brooks no further ventilation.” Ordinarily such order is warranted in exceptional
circumstances where the conduct of the litigant attract s the wrath of the court. The
19 Id at [8].
20 Bam v Holtzhausen and Others (2024/097438) [2025] ZAGPPHC (21 February 2025).